The intrusted with this choice, ought to be placed not at the base, but at the top of the establishment. elections should proceed, not from the bottom, where they must neceffarily be bad; but from the head, where they must necessarily be good; for the electors, if they are properly conftituted, will always have the greatest interest in the maintenance of order and liberty, in the ftability of institutions, and in the folidity of good principles. It is fafficient that their choice can fall upon none who are not pointed out by the people. Such is a good democracy, with all the advantages of that form of government; for, in this system, the most perfect equality prevails among all the citizens, since every one may be placed upon the list of eligibles. But besides, you thus obtain the democracy purged from all its inconveniences; for under this order of things, there is no populace, or mob, to agitate in the forum or in clubs. The ignorant class exercise no influence either upon the legislature, or upon the government. By these means, too, you get rid of demagogues. Every thing is managed in the name of the people, and for the interest of the people. Nothing is done by the people, or under their precipitate direction. They are tranquil under the protection of the laws: they enjoy the advantages of real liberty. participation of that body by which it is to be executed. Experience has proved the neceffity of this measure. Along with the legislative body you have a tribunate, whose bufiness it is continually to petition in the name of the people. Neceffarily composed of the most energetic and the most eloquent men in the country, it will be entitled to make continual appeals to public opinion, to cenfure in every way the proceedings of government; to denounce those which it confiders hoftile to the constitution, to accuse and to prolecute all the executive agents; to speak and to publish their sentiments with the most complete independence, without the members ever being called upon to answer for their speeches and writings. The existence of this popular magistracy, together with the liberty of the press, which, under a vigorous government, muft always be unrestrained, forms one of the principal securities for public liberty; for, do what you can, these securities can never be real and durable, but when they rest upon public opinion. In a republic like France, the executive government must be strong. It ought to have unity of thought and of action. This is the only real advantage of a monarchy. The representative system may avail itself of this unity. Of whatever number of functionaries the head of the executive power may be composed, it is always evident that, ultimately, one must have the means of terminating difcuffion, and bring all opinions to concur. The functions of the legislative body comprises three distinct operations. The proposal of a law, its difcuffion, and its adoption. The propofal ought not to be made by the same assembly which adopts. This is an acknowledged principle. The difcuffion ought executive. It belongs therefore not to take place without the to the latter to appoint judges, without, The judiciary power may be confidered as an emanation from the without, however, having the right to displace them, in order that thus the latter may be independent in the sentences they pronounce. The connection of the executive power, with the armed force, must be regulated by the exigency of circumstances. Our fituation may require, either that certain members of the executive, should have the power of commanding the armies, or that numerous military corps should remain under its command in the neighbourhood of the great commune, or established capital. All this may be confidered only as provisional, but we must hasten to get into the tract of principle in proportion as our fituation becomes more calm, both at home and abroad. The government, the foundation of which I have pointed out, is that which the new focial compact presents. The basis of it has long fubfifted in the mind of its author, Sieyes. It was eagerly adopted, with some alterations by another man of genius (Buonaparte) qualified to appreciate its merit, and made to derive new glory from the support given to its establishment after having enlightened the discusfion of it by the powers of his understanding." Cabanis then proceeded to anfwer the objections which had been made to the plan of the conftitution, "It is alleged," continued he; "first, that the power of the executive is immenfe, there is no fecurity againft its defigns. We must have a government full of vigour and life. If it were not created so, it would ufurp, or it would quickly perish, as happened in the cale of the directory. The fecurities we here have are in the po The tent permanence of the conservative fenate, and in the turbulent character of the tribunate. executive power, befides, is restrained by the decided responsibility of the minifters and the regular proceedings of the council of state. It is next faid, that it is to be feared that the scheme of the tribunate will produce turbulence and violence. These apprehenfions spring from the remembrance of our past evils. But the demagogues of the convention, and of the council of five hundred, had a right to bring forward laws drawn up in form. They caused them to be discusled, and often to be adopted, by undue influence. They kept the property, the liberty, the life of the citizen in a conftant ftate of uncertainty. Here the tribunes may make a great deal of noise in their own house; but all they can fay, has no force but that which it derives from opinion. If they are very violent, public opinion will be decidedly unfavourable to them. They will alarm the public more than the executive power, or the conservative senate, which will know perfectly well how to maintain themselves against the result of their vain clamours." "The conftitution, after several meetings of the commissions and copfuls, was carried by a great majority, and received the fanction of the whole. It bears date the thirteenth of December, and was offered to the French nation, in a proclamation by the confuls, on the fifteenth. It was therein declared to be founded on true principles of a reprefentative government; on the lacred rights of property, equa ity, and liberty; that the authorities which conftituted tuted it would be firm and durable, in order to secure the rights of the citizens and the interests of the state; and, finally, that the government was now fixed upon the principles on which it had begun. This conftitution confifted principally in three confuls, or rather one, called the chief conful with two affeffors, who had votes only in matters of secondary importance; a corservative senate, and a legislative body divided into two parts, tribunes and senators; the tribunes to reason or plead on any proposition, but not to vote; the senators to vote and decide filently, but neither to argue nor even to declare the grounds on which they gave their opinion. The chief conful was to propose laws, and make regulations for car ying them, when agreed to, into execution. He was to appoint the new councils of state, ministers, ambaffadors, agents, all officers of the army and navy, judges, members of local administrations, and commiffioners of the government to different courts. He was to proclaim and enforce the law, and to be allowed a yearly revenue of half a million of livres, or 20,8331. fterling. His two colleagues were allowed one hundred and fifty thoufand livres each. The chief conful, quitting his station, either on the expiration of his funcions, or in confequence of refignation, was to become a fenator of immediate right and neceffity. No new laws could be promulgated but when the project should have been proposed by the government, communicated to the tribunate, and decreed by the legislative body. And, in every stage of the discussion of thele projects, government, that is, in fact, the first conful, whether with or without the approbation of his two afsessors, might withdraw them, and produce them anew in a modified state. The first conful was to take measures for the internal security and external defence of the state. He was to station the forces, military and naval, and regulate the manner of their being employed. The national guard in activity was also subject to his direction. He it was in whom the power was vested of maintaining political relations abroad, managing negociations, making preliminary stipulations, caufing, signing, and concluding all treaties of peace, alliance, truce, commerce, and other conventions. Declarations of war and treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, were proposed, discussed, decreed, and promulgated like laws: but difcuffions on these subjects, whether in the tribunate, or legiflative body, were to take place only in a fecret committee, and when the chief consul should defire it. The first conful was to direct the receipts and expenses of the state, agreeably to the annual law which should determine the amount of each. He was also to fuperintend the coinage of money. One of the minifters was especially intrusted with the administration of the public treasury. He was to secure the receipts, to order the transfer of fums, and the payments authorized by law. But he could not make, or cause to be made, any payment except in virtue, first of a law, and till the concurrence of funds, which had been fixed for a distinct species of expense: secondly, of a decree of the government: thirdly, of a warrant figned by a mis nifter. It its own number, who were lain and defend its views -tives, in either cafe, before egiflative body. It might rethe fenate: but that folely on ne ground of conftitutionality, the of perfons eligible, the proceedgs of the legislative body, and the Proceedings of government. might exprefs an opinion refpecting laws made, or to be made concerning abuses that might require correction, or improvements to be made in any part of the public adUreat miniftration: but fuch opinion had be no necessary-confequence, and was waich not to bind any constituted authoree can-rity to act. The fittings of the fethe nate were not to be public. The fittings of the legiflative body and the tribunate were to be public. The number of strangers in both not to exceed two hundred in each. When the tribunate should adjourn itself, it might appoint a committce of from ten to fifteen members, authorised to assemble it if thought advisable. The fitting of the legiflative body was to commence every year on the twenty-fecond of November, and to continue only four months. But it might be convoked, extraordinarily, during the eight remaining months by the government. by the by the was to ne refolu conftitu the go was com edmembers, vears of age. wain, at least, sach department The legislative ws by a private any difcuffion ne members, respect- the speeches of and government. was compofed of a at least twenty- a fifth part every were indefinitely eligible e tribunate was to t of a law, and adoption or rejection, d three speakers, cholen The revenues of certain national domains, to be fixed on, were to be liable to the payment of the expenfes of the state. The annual falary of each member to be equal to the twentieth part of that of the chief conful. The falary of a tribune was 6251. annually; that of a legiflator, 4161. With regard to the new judicatories proposed, and the new regulations refpecting the exercife of various minifterial functions, it may juft * This new constitution of the French republic is inferted, at full length, in the appendix of our last volume, page 142. just be observed, in this place,* that in the former, due regard was paid to the equal distribution of justice; and that in the latter, the authority of the laws as well as the personal freedom and property of individuals, were confulted by the annexation of refponfibility in many cafes, to the fundry offices of administration. But, on the other, the confuls were not responsible in any. It was ordained that the citizens of every commercial district should point out by their votes those they conceived to be the most proper to manage their public affairs. The number so pointed out would form a lift of men, worthy of confidence, amounting to a tenth of the number of citizens having a right to vote. Out of this lift were to be chosen the public functionaries of the district. The citizens comprehended in the communal lifts of a department, were likewife to point out a tenth part of their own number. Hence there was formed a fecond lift, called departmental, from which were to be chofen the public functionaries of the department. The citizens whose names ftood on, likewile named a tenth part of their own number. Thus was formed a third list, which comprehended the citizens of the department eligible to public national functions. All the lifts made up in virtue of this last article, in the departments, were addresled to the ferate, and composed the national ift: out of which lift the fenate was to choose the national functionaries, as above obferved. This new constitution, as an universal subject, as might be expected, of critical obfervation, and in Paris, according to the genius of the Parifians, of jokes and raillery. The French nation, it was there acknowledged, must always have fome darling idol. That which they had now got, possessed this advantage, that it might be worshipped without a breach of the fecond commandment; fince it was not the "likeness of any thing in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath." While fome praifed it for its unprecedented originality, and ingenious combinations, and launching forth on the ocean of poffibility and human nature, conducted, not merely by shores and landmarks, but chiefly by the polarity of reafons, others for that very reason condemned it. Constitutions were not things to be formed like mathematical diagrams, or like fyllogifms, by recluse metaphyficians, but grew out of examples and precedents, which could alone fix the nature of any conftitution, and the limits of any form of government. The most prominent feature in this new production was the great and almost unlimited, or at least, in fact, illimitable power of the first conful. One party of reafoners dreaded and detefted this as the grave of liberty: others expressed an opinion that it was not greater than the temper of the French nation and the circumstances of the times demanded. On one fide, an observation of Mr. Hume'st was quoted that if the king's negative, † This writer was very popular, and almost adored by the French. And certainly, though he is partial to absolute monarchy, and a fworn enemy to democracy, his writinga had a great share in bringing about the revolution. in |