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commiffioners been appointed, as was done upon the union with Scotland. Had the minifter applied his attention to that very neceffary inquiry, of afcertaining the relative ability of the two nations, he would have compared the balance which Great Britain has in her favour, from her trade with all the world, amounting to 14,800,000l. with that of Ireland upon the whole of her trade, amounting to 509,3127. bearing a proportion to each other of about 29 to 1:-he would have examined into the amount of revenue, out of which the faid proportions muft naturally be paid, namely, the produce of the permanent taxes of each nation, which he would have found to have produced in Great Britain, in the year end ing the 5th of January, 1799, the sum of 26,000,000%. and the permanent taxes in Ireland in the correfponding year did not exceed 2,000,000. bearing a proportion to each other of about 13 to 1. He would have been informed that the only influx of money into Ireland which can be difcovered, is the faid balance of her trade of 500,000. and that the remits to Great Britain annually 724,7537. a fum exceeding by upwards of 215,000l. the amount of fuch balance. That the remit tances of her abfentees (as stated by Mr. Pitt) amount to 1,000,000l. but are computed really to amount to double that fum, and muft neceffarily greatly increase fhould an union take place, fuch drains exhaufting in a great degree the refources of this kingdom, and adding to the opulence of Great Britain. The facility with which large fums of money have lately been raifed in Great Britain, compared with the unfuccefsful attempt to raife fo fmall

a fum in this kingdom as one million and a half, would have afforded to him the ftrongeft proof of the opu lence of the one and the poverty of the other. From the Irish minifter's own ftatement he has computed that the fum for which this kingdom fhall be called upon annually in time of war, as her contribution, will amount to 4,492,6801. but has not attempted to point out the means by which the can raise fo enormous a fum. When the minifter fhall find the circumftances of Ireland are fuch as have been herein stated, and thall recollect that this new project has been fuggefted by him, and forced upon this nation, he will feel the immenfe reponfibility which falls upon him for the difaftrous confequences which it may produce, not only upon this kingdom, but upon the whole empire, he will be alarmed at the difcontents which an impofition of taxes beyond the abilities of the people to pay muft produce, and the fatal confequences that they may occafion.

8thly, Because the transfer of our legislature to another kingdom will deprive us of the only fecurity we have for the enjoyment of our liberties, and being against the fenfe of the people, amounts to a grofs breach of truft; and we confider the fubfiitute for our conftitution, namely, the return of the propofed number of perfons to the united parliament as delufive, amounting, indeed, to an acknowledgement of the neceffity of reprefentation, but in no fort fupplying it, inasmuch as the 32 peers and the 100 commoners will be merged in the vaft difproportion of British members, who will in fact be the legiflators for Ireland; and when we confider that all the eftablifhments of the two separate


governments are to continue, which muft add to the influence of the minifter over the conduct of parliament, and advert to his power in the return of Irish members to parliament, we conceive that fuch portion is more likely to overturn the conftitution of Great Britain than to preferve our own.

9thly, Because we confider the intended union a direct breach of truft, not only by the parliament with the people, but by the parliament of Great Britain with that of Ireland, inafmuch as the tenour and purport of the fettlement of 1782 did intentionally and exprefsly exclude the re-agitation of conftitutional queftions between the two countries, and did establish the exclufive legiflative authority of the Irish parliament, without the interference of any other. That the breach of fuch a folemn contract, founded on the internal weaknefs of the country, and its inability at this time to withstand the deftructive defign of the minifter, muft tend to deftroy the future harmony of both, by forming a precedent, and generating a principal of mutual encroachment, in times of mutual difficulties.

10thly, Because, that when we confider the weakness of this kingdom at the time that the meafure was brought forward, and her inability to withstand the deftructive defigns of the minifter, and couple to the act itself the means that have been employed to accomplish it, fuch as the abufe of the place bill, for the purpose of modelling the parliament-the appointment of theriffs to prevent county meetings the difmiffal of the old ftedfaft friends of conftitutional government for their adherence to the confti

tution, and the return of perfons into parliament who had neither connec tion nor ftake in this country, and were therefore felected to decide upon her fate-when we confider the armed force of the minifter, added to his powers and practices of corruption, when we couple thele things together, we are warranted to fay, that the baseft means have been used to accomplish this great innovation, and that the measure of union tends to dishonour the ancient peerage for ever, to difqualify both houfes of parliament, and fubjugate the people of Ireland for ever. Such circumftances, we apprehend, will be recollected with abhorrence, and will create jealoufy between the two nations, in the place of harmony, which for fo many centuries has been the cement of their union.

11thly, Because the argument made ufe of in favour of the union, namely, that the fenfe of the people of Ireland is in its favour, we know to be untrue; and as the minifters have declared, that they would not prefs the measure against the fense of the people, and as the people have pronounced, and under all difficulties, their judgement against it, we have, together with the fenfe of the country, the authority of the minifter to enter our proteft againft the project of union, against the yoke which it impofes, the difhonour which it inflicts, the difqualification paffed upon the peerage, the ftigma thereby branded on the realm, the difproportionate principle of expense it introduces, the means employed to effect it, the difcontents it has excited, and muft continue to excite; against all these, and the fatal confequences they may produce, we have endeavoured to interpose our

votes, and failing, we tranfmit to
names in folemn
after-times our
proteft on behalf of the parliament
conftitution of this realm, the li-

which it protected, the connexion
which it preferved, and the confti-
tution which it fupplied and forti

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This we feel ourselves called
upon to do in fupport of our cha-
racters, our honour, and whatever
is left to us worthy to be tranfmit
ted to our pofterity.

Moira, by proxy, for the
8th, 10th, and 11th rea-
Ludlow, by proxy,


Kingston, by proxy,
Riverdale, by proxy,

- Belmore, by proxy,
Maffey, by proxy,
De Vefci,

Wm. Down and Connor.
R. Waterford and Lifmore,
Sunderlin, except for the
7th reafon,
Lifmore, by proxy.

Letters from the Minifler for Foreign
Affairs in France, and from Ge-
neral Buonaparte, with the An-
fwers returned to them by the Right
Honourable Lord Grenville, his
Majefty's principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

Letter from the Minifler of Foreign
Affairs in France to Lord Grenville.

Y lord, I difpatch, by order

conful of the French republic, a
meflenger to London; he is the
bearer of a letter from the first con-
ful of the republic to his majesty the
king of England. I request you to
give the neceffary orders, that he
may be enabled to deliver it di-
rectly into your own hands. This
ftep, in itself, announces the im-
portance of its object. Accept, my
lord, the affurance of my highest

(Signed) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand.
Paris, 5th Nivofe, 8th year of the
French republic, (Dec. 25, 1799.)

French Republic-Sovereignty of the

Bonaparte, first Conful of the Repub-
lic, to his Majefly the King of
Great Britain and Ireland.

Paris, 5th Nivofe, 8th Year of the Republic.

Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the firft magiftracy of the republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your majefty. The war, which for eight years has ravaged the four "quarters of the world, muft it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two moft enlightened mations of Europe, powerful and ftrong beyond what their fafety and independence require, facrifice to of commerce, internal profperity, ideas of vain greatnefs the benefits


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and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that The king has given frequent proofs peace is of the firft neceffity as of his fincere defire for the re-eftawell as the first glory? These fenti blifhment of fecure and permanent ments cannot be foreign to the tranquillity in Europe. He neither heart of your majefty, who reigns is, nor has been, engaged in any over a free nation, and with the conteft for a vain and falle glory.fole view of rendering it happy. He has had no other view than that Your majefty will only fee, in this of maintaining, against all aggref overture, my fincere defire to con- fion, the rights and happiness of tribute efficaciously, for the fecond his fubjects. For thefe he has con. time, to a general pacification, by tended against an unprovoked at a ftep, fpeedy, entirely of confi- tack; and for the fame objects he dence, and difengaged from thofe is ftill obliged to contend; nor can forms which, neceflary perhaps to he hope that this neceffity could be difguife the dependence of weak removed by entering, at the preftates, prove only in those which are fent moment, into negociation with ftrong the mutual defire of decei- those whom a fresh revolution has ving each other. France and Eng- fo recently placed in the exercise of land, by the abuse of their ftrength, power in France; fince no real admay ftill, for a long time, for the vantage can arife from fuch negoci misfortune of all nations, retard the ation to the great and defirable obperiod of their being exhaufted.ject of general peace, until it fall But I will venture to fay, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.

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diftinctly appear that thofe caufes have ceafed to operate, which originally produced the war, and by which it has fince been protracted, and, in more than one instance, renewed. The fame fyftem, to the prevalence of which France july afcribes all her prefent miferies, is that which has also involved the reft of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long fince unknown to the practice of civilized nations. For the extenfion of this fyftem, and for the extermination of all established governments, the refources of France have from year to year, and in the midft of the moft unparalleled diftrefs, been lavifted and exhaufted. To this indifcriminate fpirit of deftruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swifs Cantons, (his majesty's ancient friends and allies), have fucceffively been facrificed, Ger


many has been ravaged; Italy, though now refcued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His majefty has himfelf been compelled to maintain an arduous and burthenfome conteft for the independence and exiftence of his kingdoms. Nor have these calamities been confined to Europe alone; they have been extended to the moft diftant quarters of the world, and even to countries fo remote both in fituation and intereft from the prefent conteft, that the very existence of fuch a war was perhaps unknown to those who found themfelves fuddenly involved in all its horrors. While fuch a fyftem con tinues to prevail, and while the blood and treafure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its fupport, experience has fhewn that no defence, but that of open and fteady hoftility, can be availing. The moft folemn treaties have only prepared the way for fred aggreffion; and it is to a determined refiftance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of ftability for property, for perfonal liberty, for focial order, or for the free exercife of religion. For the fecurity, therefore, of these effential objects, his majefty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general profeffions of pacific difpofitions. Such profeffions have been repeatedly held out by all thofe who have fucceffively directed the resources of France to the deftruction of Europe; and whom the prefent rulers have declared to have been all, from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of amity and peace. Greatly, indeed, will his majefty rejoice, whenever it fhall


appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and thofe of his allies have been fo long expofed, have really ceafed; whenever he fhall be fatisfied that the neceffity of refiftance is at an end; that, after the experience of fo many years of crimes and miferies, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the reftlefs fchemes of deftruction, which have endangered the very existence of civil fociety, have at length been finally relinquished: but the conviction of fuch a change, however agreeable to his majefty's wishes, can refult only from experience, and from the evidence of facts.

The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the reftoration of that line of princes which for fo many centuries maintained the French 'nation in profperity at home, and in confi. deration and respect abroad: fuch an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obftacles in the way of negociation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolefted enjoyment of its ancient territory'; and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that fecurity which they are now compelled to feek by other means. But, defirable as fuch an event must be both to France and to the world, it is not to this mode exclufively that his majefty limits the poffibility of fecure and folid pacification. His majefty makes no claim to preferibe to France what fhall be the form of her government, or in whole hands the fhall veft the authority neceffary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. His majefty looks


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