only to the fecurity of his own do ninions and thofe of his allies, and to the general fafety of Europe. Whenever he fhall judge that fuch fecurity can in any manner be at tained, as refulting either from the internal fituation of that country, from whole internal fituation, the danger has arisen, or from fuch other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce, the fame end, his majefty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of immediate and general pacification. Unhappily no fuch fecurity, hitherto exifts; no fufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no readonable ground by which to judge of its fiability. In this fituation, it can, for the prefent, only remain for his majefty to purfue, in con junction with other powers, thofe exertions of juft and defenfive war, which his regard to the happiness of his fubjects will never permit him either to continue beyond the neceflity in which they originate, or to terminate on any other grounds, than fuch as may best contribute to the fecure enjoyment of their tranquillity, their conftitution, and their independence..

"

Grenville. Downing-ftreet, Jan. 4, 1800.

which you will find annexed. Re ceive, my lord, the affurance of my high confideration.

(Signed): Ch. Mau. Taileyrand,

!ΝΟΤΕ.

··

The official note, under date of the 14th Nivofe, the 8th year, addreffed by the minifter of his Britan nic majefty, having been laid before the first conful of the French republic, he obferved with furprize that it refted upon an opinion, which is not exact, refpecting the origin and confequences of the prefent war. Very far from its being France which provoked it, fhe had, it must be remembered, from the commencement. of her revolution, folemnly proclaimed her love of peace, and her difinclination to conquefts, her refpect for the inde pendence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, he would have avoided taking part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations.

But from an oppofite difpofition, as foon as the French revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its deftruction. The aggreffion was real, long time before it was public; internal refiftance was excited; its opponents were favourably received; their extravagant declamations were fupported; the French nation was infulted in the perfon of its agents; and England fet particularly this example by the difmittal of the minifter accredited to her.— Finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her fafety, long time before the war was declared. Thus it is to the projects of fubjection. diffolution

diffolution, and difmemberment, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was feveral times attempted and purfued, that France has a right to impute the evils which he has fuffered, and thofe which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, for a long time without example, with refpect to to powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal confequences. Aflailed on all fides, the repubiic could not but extend univerfally the efforts of her defence; and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that he has made ufe of thole means which the poffeffed, in her own ftrength, and the courage of her citizens. As long as the faw that her enemies obftinately refufed to recognize her rights, he counted only upon,the energy of her refiftance; but, as foon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invafion, the fought for means of conciliation, and manifefted pacific in tentions and, if thefe have not always been efficacious; if, in the midft of the critical circumftances of her internal fituation, which the revolution and the war have fucceffively brought on, the former depofitaries of the executive authority of France have not always thewn as much moderation, as the nation itself has fhown courage; it muft above all be imputed to the fatal and perfevering animofity with which the refources of Eng land have been lavithed to accomplish the ruin of France. But if the wishes of his Britannic majefty (in conformity with his affurances) are in unifon with thofe of the French republic, for the re-eftablishment of peace, why, inftead of attempting the apology of the war, fhould not attention be rather

1

paid to the means of terminating it? And what obftacle can prevent a mutual understanding, of which the utility is reciprocal, and is felt, efpecially when the first conful of the French republic has perfonally.. given fo many proofs of his eager, nefs to put an end to the calamities of war, and of his difpofition to maintain the rigid obfervance of all treaties concluded? The first conful of the French republic could not doubt that his Britannic majefty recognized the right of nations to choofe the form of their government, fince it is from the exercife of this right that he holds his crown: but he has been unable to compre-, hend, how to this fundamental principle, upon which refts the exiftence of political focieties, the minifter of his majefty could annex infinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the republic, and which are no lefs injurious to the French nation and tổ its government, than it would be to England and his majefty, if a fort of invitation were held out in favour of that republican government of which England adopted the forms in the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a revolution compelled to defcend from it. If at periods not far diftant, when the conftitutional fyftem of the republic prefented neither the strength nor the folidity which it contains at prefent, his Britannic majefty thought himfelf enabled to invite à negociation and pacific conferences; how is it poffible that he thould not be cager to renew negociations to which the present and reciprocal fituation of affairs promifes a rapid progrets? On every fide the voice of nations and of humanity inplores

plores the conclufion of a war, marked already by fuch great calamities, and the prolongation of which threatens Europe with an univerfal convulfion and irremediable evils. It is, therefore, to put a ftop to the cause of these calamities, or, in order that their terrible confequences may be reproached to thofe only who fhall have provoked them, that the first conful of the French republic propofes to put an immediate end to hoftilities, by agreeing to a fufpenfion of arms, and naming plenipotentiaries on each fide, who fhould repair to Dunkirk, or any other town as advantageonfly fituated for the quicknefs of the refpective communications, and who fhould apply themfelves, without any delay, to effect the re-establishment of peace, and a good understanding between the French republic and England. The firft conful offers to give the paflports which may be neceflary for this purpose.

(Signed) C. M. Talleyrand. Paris, the 20th Nivole (Jan. 14), 8th year of the French republic.

Letter from Lord Grenville to the Minifier for Foreign Affairs at

Paris.

Downing-freet, Jan. 20, 1800.

Sir,

I have the honour to inclose to you the answer which his majefty has directed me to return to the official note, which you tranfmitted to me. I have the honour to be, with high confideration, fir, your moft obedient, humbie fervant, Grenville.

NOTE.

The official note, tranfmitted by the minifter for foreign affairs in France, and received by the under

figned on the 18th inftant, has been laid before the king. His majefty cannot forbear expreffing the concern with which he obferves in that note, that the unprovoked aggreffions of France, the fole caufe and origin of the war, are fyftema tically defended by her prefent rulers, under the fame injurious pretences by which they were originally attempted to be disguised.His majesty will not enter into the refutation of allegations now univerfally exploded, and in fo far as they refpect his majesty's conduƐ) not only in themfelves utterly groundless, but contradicted, both by the internal evidence of the tranfactions, to which they relate, and alfo by the exprefs teftimony (given at the time) of the govern ment of France itfelf. With refpect to the object of the note, his majefty can only refer to the answer which he has already given. He has explained, without referve, the obftacles which, in his judgement, preclude, at the prefent moment, all hope of advantage from negociation. All the inducements to treat, which are relied upon in the French official note; the perfonal difpofitions which are faid to prevail for the conclufion of peace, and for the future obfervance of treaties; the power of enfuring the effect of thofe difpofitions, fuppofing them to exift; and the folidity of the fyftem newly established, after fo rapid a fucceffion of revolutions

all thefe are points which can be known only from that teft to which his majefty has already referred them-the refult of experience, and the evidence of facts. With that fincerity and plainnefs which his anxiety for the re-establishment of peace indifpenfably required, his majefty has pointed out to France

the

the fareft and speedieft means for the attainment of that great object. But he has declared, in terms equally explicit, and with the fame fincerity, that he entertains no defire to prefcribe to a foreign nation the form of its government; that he looks only to the fecurity of his own dominions, and of Europe; and that, whenever that effential object can, in his judgement, be, in any manner whatever, fufficiently provided for, he will eagerly concert with his allies the means of Mimmediate and joint negociation, for the re-establishment of general tranquillity. To thefe declarations his majefty fteadily adheres; and it is only on the grounds thus ftated, that his regard to the fafety of his fubjects will fuffer him to renounce that fyftem of vigorous defence, to which, under the favour of Providence, his kingdoms owe the fecurity of those bleflings which they now enjoy.

ville, is directed to fubmit to him the following obfervations:

Preliminaries of peace had been concluded and figned between his imperial majefty and the French republic. The intervention of lord Minto, who demanded that England fhould be admitted to take part in the negociations, prevented their ratification by his imperial majefty.

The fufpenfion of arms, which had taken place folely in the hope of a fpeedy peace between the emperor and the republic, ought then to cease, and will in fact ceafe on the 24th Fructidor (11th September), fince France had facrificed to that hope alone the immenfe advantages which her victories had fecured to her.

The intervention of England renders the queftion of peace fo complicated, that it is impoffible for the French government to prolong farther the armiftice on the continent, unlefs his Britannic majefty will confent to render it common to the three powers.

If then the cabinet of St. James's

defires to continue to make a common cause with Auftria, and if its defire to take part in the negoci ations be fincere, his Britannic majefty will not hesitate to adopt the propofed armiftice.

But if this armiftice be not concluded before the 24th Fructidor, (11th Sep..) hoftilities will be renewed with Auftria, and the first conful will no longer be able to confent, with regard to that power, to any but a separate and complete peace.

In order to afcertain the explanations demanded relative to the armiftice, the undersigned is di rected to acquaint lord Grenville, that the places which it is propofed

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