M. C. Phillips, for the appellant. W. H. Stafford, for the respondent. 21 CASSODAY, J. After the plaintiff had notified the defendant of his injury, and in September, 1891, the defendant's soliciting agent called upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff asked him to get him some money. Such agent thereupon reported such request, together with the facts in regard to the plaintiff's condition, and that he was in serious need of 22 money, to the defendant, and thereupon the de fendant sent to the plaintiff the fifty dollars mentioned. The affidavit or proofs of loss made by the plaintiff January 18, 1892, and mentioned in the foregoing statement, constitute what is called the "defendant's Exhibit 4" in the ninth and tenth findings of the jury. It is there found by the jury, in effect, that the plaintiff executed the same without a knowl edge of its contents, and that in doing so, or in the alleged settlement, he made a gross error. Such proof of loss consisted of a blank furnished by the defendant and filled out by one of the plaintiff's employers, and the plaintiff signed the same by his mark. There is testimony to the effect that the plaintiff could neither read nor write the English language; that he signed such proofs of loss without knowing that they contained a statement to the effect that the payment of seven dollars and fifty cents a week for twenty-six weeks should be a full discharge of all claim on account of such injury; and that upon receiving the one hundred and forty-five dollars he expressly refused to sign a receipt in full. The admission of such parol testimony is assigned as error; but such admission, under such circumstances, has repeatedly been sanctioned by adjudications of this court: Schultz v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 44 Wis. 638; Bussian v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 56 Wis. 326; Leslie v. Keepers, 68 Wis. 123; Lusted v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 71 Wis. 391; Sheanon v. Pacific Mut. etc. Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 507; Whitmore v. Hay, 85 Wis. 251; 39 Am. St. Rep. 838. These cases hold, in effect, that one who signs a discharge or acquittance without knowing the contents or intending to sign such an instrument, is not bound by it. Here, such discharge or acquittance was not properly any part of the proofs of injury and loss, but an attempt to limit the amount of the claim and bar any further recovery. Had the question of such discharge been squarely presented to the plaintiff, it may be inferred from the testi mony that he would have refused to sign it, as he did the receipt in full a day or so afterward. 23 But the more serious question is whether the tearing off of three fingers wholly, and a part of the other, and cutting the hand, and destroying the joint of the thumb, as mentioned in the proofs, was the loss of one hand, "causing immediate, continuous, and total disability" of the same, within the meaning of the contract of insurance. After careful consideration we are constrained to hold that it was a question of fact for the jury; and the jury have found that such loss of the hand was entire. On the part of the defendant it is contended that there is no such thing as the loss of the hand unless the injury is such as to require the amputation of the hand above the wrist. That would be too much of a refinement upon language for practical purposes. The hand was for use; and, if it was injured so as to become useless as a hand, then the defendant became liable for its loss under the contract. This was held, in principle, in Sheanon v. Pacific Mut. etc. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 618; 20 Am. St. Rep. 151; 83 Wis. 510. The charge appears to be full and fair throughout. In fact, there are no specific exceptions calling for a review of any particular portion of it: Luedtke v. Jeffery, 89 Wis. 136. By the COURT. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. RELEASE SIGNED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENTS.-If a plea of release is set up in an answer alleging an agreement in the nature of a discharge of a cause of action to recover for personal injury caused by negligence, a reply to such plea, alleging that such agreement was obtained by fraud while plaintiff was unable, from pain and suffering, to comprehend his act in signing it, and that he never assented thereto, is good and sufficient in an action at law, and a resort to equity to cancel the instrument is unnecessary: Girard v. St. Louis etc. Wheel Co., 123 Mo. 358; 45 Am. St. Rep. 556, and note. One who has signed a written instrument, such as a release, without being induced to do so by fraud or deception, cannot avoid its effect on the ground that at the time he signed the paper he was ignorant of its contents: Albrecht v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 87 Wis. 105; 41 Am. St. Rep. 30, and note. See, also, the note to Bliss v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 39 Am. St. Rep. 508. PAROL EVIDENCE is not admissible to show that a party to a contract did not understand its obligations: Gist v. Drakely, 2 Gill, 330; 41 Am. Dec. 426. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT.-In Sheanon v. Pacific Mut. etc. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 618, 20 Am. St. Rep. 151, it was held that by the total loss of limbs was meant the loss of their use as members of the body, so that they will perform no function whatever. Their severance from the body was held not necessary. AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLVI. -52 PEPPERCORN v. CITY OF BLACK RIVER FALLS. [89 WISCONSIN, 38.] PARENT AND CHILD-CHILD CANNOT RECOVER FOR LOSS OF TIME.-A minor suffering physical injury from the negligence of another cannot recover compensation for loss of time during his inability to labor, nor for money voluntarily paid by his relatives for medicines or medical attendance, unless he has been emancipated and thereby become entitled to the proceeds of his own labor. JURY TRIAL-RECEIVING EVIDENCE OUT OF COURT.-If certain jurors, during the progress of a trial, visited and examined the place of an acci dent for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of a walk, through defects in which the plaintiff claims to have received injuries, a new trial must be granted. They have no right to base their finding on evidence not adduced in court nor upon a view not authorized by the court. JURY TRIAL.-THE AFFIDavit of a JurOR MAY BE RECEIVED TO IMPEACH HIS VERDICT by proving that during the trial he visited the place of the alleged accident for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of a walk from which it was claimed the injury to the plaintiff resulted. ACTION to recover compensation for injuries to plaintiff, a minor, by reason of a defective sidewalk. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. G. M. Popham and O'Neill & Marsh, for the plaintiff. 40 CASSODAY, J. The trial court committed no error in refusing to allow the plaintiff compensation for loss of time during her minority from inability to labor by reason of the injury. It does not appear that she was emancipated, and, of course, her services during that time belonged to her father, and not to her. Nor did the court commit any error in refusing to allow her to recover for moneys paid out or incurred by her brother in her behalf for medical attendance and medicines in consequence of such injury. It may be that the physician so in attendance and the person so furnishing the medicines, respectively, might have recovered therefor as for necessaries, but those things gave her no right of action for moneys voluntarily paid and liabilities voluntarily incurred by her brother or her father: 41 Taylor v. Hill, 86 Wis. 105. The result is, that the plaintiff can take nothing by her appeal; and, in so far as the judgment is in favor of the defendant in disallowing those two items, the same is affirmed. It is undisputed that during the trial certain of the jury men in the case, without any view having been authorized and without the knowledge of those representing the defendant, examined the place of the accident for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the walk. Whether such examination was influential in securing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff it is impossible to tell. We cannot say that it did not have that effect. Since it may have had that effect, we must assume that it did have that effect. The rule in such cases is well stated by an able text-writer, as follows: "Jurors must base their findings upon evidence adduced in their hearing in court, or upon a view authorized by the court. For a juror to go out of court of his own motion, and make an inspection of the premises or thing in dispute, will be good ground of setting aside the verdict; though, if the party entitled to complain have knowledge of the irregularity, and remain silent, it will be deemed waived": Thompson on Trials, secs. 904, 2605. Here there is no pretense of any such waiver: Woodbury v. Anoka, 52 Minn. 329. It is contended that the affidavits of the jurors as to such misconduct were incompetent. But the rule of public policy which excludes the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict extends only to matters taking place during their retirement: Thompson on Trials, sec. 2619. This question was recently considered by this court in McBean v. State, 83 Wis. 206. We have no doubt that the affidavits of the jurors in the case at bar were competent. By the COURT. So much of the judgment as is against the defendant is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. INFANTS-RECOVERY OF DAMAGES BY, FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO.-For a personal injury to a child nine years of age the law furnishes no measure of damages other than the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors, guided by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Amongst the results of the injury to be considered are pain and suffering, disfigurement and mu. tilation of the person, and impaired capacity to pursue the ordinary avoca tions of life at and after the attainment of majority: Western etc. R. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397; 12 Am. St. Rep. 320. In an action for damages for personal injuries to a minor, brought for his benefit by a next friend, the damages which diminish his capacity to earn a living must be limited to the period after his majority, for until that period is reached he is not entitled to the proceeds of his own labor: Houston etc. Ry. Co. v. Boozer, 70 Tex. 530; 8 Am. St. Rep. 615. TRIAL-IMPEACHING VERDICT BY AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR.-No affidavit, deposition, or other sworn statement of a juror, can be received to impeach a verdict or show on what ground it was rendered: Weatherford v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 530; 37 Am. St. Rep. 828, and note. But see Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132; 43 Am. St. Rep. 20, and note; and also the extended note to Crawford v. State, 24 Am. Dec. 475. GOTZIAN V. SHAKMAN. [89 WISCONSIN, 52.] MARSHALING SECURITIES.-IF ONE CREDITOR CAN RESORT TO TWO FUNDS and another to one only, the latter can compel the former to resort to the fund which the latter cannot touch unless they have not the same creditor, or the two funds are not the property of the same person. PARTNERSHIP FUNDS AND PROPERTY, WHAT ARE.—If under an agreement of partnership one of the parties is to advance certain necessary capital, but, instead of doing so directly, he gives a bond and mortgage to a third person to obtain credit for goods purchased for the firm business, such bond and mortgage become, in legal effect, part of the capital of the partnership. MARSHALING SECURITIES.-IF THERE ARE TWO CREDITORS OF A PARTNERSHIP, one of whom has the security of a bond and mortgage given by one only of the partners, but under such circumstances that his giving them may be regarded as part of his contribution to the firm capital which he had agreed to make, the creditor so secured may be compeiled to exhaust such security before resorting to the other property of the firm. MARSHALING SECURITIES. THE FACT THAT A CREDITOR HAVING TWO SECURITIES MUST SUFFER SOME DELAY if compelled to exhaust one of them before resorting to another does not constitute a sufficient cause for the refusal of the application of another creditor, having but one security, to compel a resort to the security in which he has no interest. SUIT in equity by the plaintiffs as attaching creditors of a partnership, consisting of Sommermeyer, Brimi, and Huebner, to compel the defendant, Shakman, to resort to and exhaust certain securities held by him before selling under attachment the property of the firm. Sommermeyer, prior to the organization of the firm, agreed that he would contribute to it the capital required over and above four thousand dollars furnished by the other partners. As a mode of doing this he executed his bond in favor of the defendant, Shakman, in the sum of ten thousand dollars, secured by mortgages on real property situate partly in Wisconsin and partly in Minnesota and South Dakota, to secure Shakman for selling goods to the firm. It, in the transaction of its business, became indebted to sundry persons, including plaintiffs and the defendant, Shakman, and the latter secured the first attachment. The object of this suit was to compel him to |