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They claim that before the judgment had been enforced by the execution, it had been stayed by supersedeas.

If this claim is supported by the facts, no new supersedeas is now necessary. That already obtained will operate to stay any further proceedings which may be had under the judgment.

gress had any purpose to place them on a differ- | 1, for the allowance of a supersedeas; and 2, for ent footing from other government lands for sale a writ which shall command the Marshal of the at $1.25 an acre. Such a purpose would conflict Territory to restore Ben. T. Davis to the office with the general land system, and disturb its of assessor and tax collector of Boise County, harmony, and cannot be imputed to Congress from which he has been removed by the execu in the absence of an express declaration to that tion of the judgment in the court below. effect. This system required that all lands should be brought into market, after proper notice, so as to afford competition before being subject to private entry. It is true the lands in question were once offered at public sale at $2.50 an acre, but the reason of the rule required that they should be again offered to the highest bidder, because their condition as to price had been changed, and there had been no opportunity for competition at the reduced price. Congress meant nothing more than to fix $1.25 as their minimum price, and to place them in the same category with other public lands not affected by land grant legislation. When they were withdrawn from the operation of this legislation, and their exceptional status terminated, the general provisions of the land system attached to them, and they could not, therefore, be sold at private entry, until all persons had the opportunity of bidding for them at public

auction.

It follows that the plaintiff's entries were invalid and rightly canceled, because they were made before the lands had been proclaimed for sale at the minimum price of $1.25 an acre, and that the defendant's entries were in accordance with law, as they were located after the lands had been properly brought into market.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wis consin is affirmed.

THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
BOISE COUNTY AND BEN. T. DAVIS,
Piffs. in Err.,

v.

JOHN GORMAN. Supersedeas-motion to restore plaintiff to office, when not entertained-renewal of motion. Where a judgment has been stayed by supersedeas before it has been enforced by execution, no new supersedeas is necessary.

A motion to avoid the effect of an improper execution of the judgment and restore the plaintiff in error to an office,cannot be entertained except after

reasonable notice to the opposite party.

In this case no such notice having been given, such motion is overruled, but without prejudice to its renewal after reasonable notice to defendant in error, the court saying that in case it is renewed, the plaintiff in error, in order to obtain the relief asked, will be required to show to the satisfaction of the court that the judgment below was in fact executed after he had become entitled to a stay of proceedings. [No. 717.]

Motion filed Mar. 6, 1874. Decided Mar. 16, 1874. 'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Ter

IN ERROR to the

The real object of this motion is to avoid the effect of the alleged improper execution of the judgment, and restore Davis to his office. Such a motion cannot be entertained, except after reasonable notice to the opposing party. No such notice has been given in this case.

This motion is, therefore, overruled, but without prejudice to its renewal after reasonable notice to the defendant in error.

In the event of its renewal, the plaintiffs in error, in order to obtain the relief asked, will be required to show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the judgment below was in fact executed after they had become entitled to a stay of proceedings.

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3. Where a steamer was going at an undue rate of speed, and it was her fault that she came into a position from which she could not escape without colliding with a bark, she was held liable for the damages.

3. The bark held in fault for violation of the rules

of navigation, which required her to blow a foghorn when under way.

had nothing to do with the disaster, the liability for 4. If it clearly appears that such fault could have damages is upon the ship whose fault caused the injury.

5. But when a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is a reasonable presumption that tributory cause of the disaster. the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a con

6. In such a case the burden rests upon the ship to show, not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not,

but that it could not have been.

7. Where both vessels were in fault, the damages, according to the admiralty rule, should be divided. [No. 213.]

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. Argued Jan. 29, 1874. Decided Mar. 16, 1874. See, also, the report of the subsequent decision of the case, post.

Mr. Henry E. Prickett, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs in error moved in this cause,

NOTE.-Collision; rights of steam and sailing vessels with reference to each other, and in passing and meeting. See note to St. John v. Paine, 51 U. S. (10 How.), 557.

Measure of damages in cases of collision. See note to Smith v. Condry, 42 U.S. (1 How.), 28; and note to The Amiable Nancy, 16 U. S. (3 Wheat.), 546.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit- wholly without fault in respect to the time at

ed States for the Eastern District of New which the bark was discovered.

York.

The appellees, who are owners of the British bark Mary R. Troop, filed their libel in this cause, in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, June 21, 1869, against the steamship Pennsylvania.

The libel averred, in substance, that on or about June 15, 1869, while the bark Mary R. Troop was on a voyage from Ardrasson, Scotland, to the Port of New York, loaded with a cargo of pig iron, she was run into by the steam ship Philadelphia and sunk, and became a total loss. The libel alleged that the collision oc curred off Georgia Shoals, about two hundred miles from Sandy Hook, at nine and a half o'clock A. M.; that a dense fog was prevailing, accompanied with squalls; that the bark was hove to on the starboard tack, with a competent lookout, her bell being constantly rung; that the steamship came, head on, under full headway, etc.; and charged that the collision was caused solely by the fault of the steamship in running at such a rate of speed, in not having a proper lookout, and in not changing her course in time to avoid the bark, by going under her stern, as she might and could have done.

Second Point. The steamer was wholly without fault in respect to every act done after the presence of the bark in her neighborhood was first indicated. The evidence is conclusive that those on duty and in charge of her used every means in their power to avoid the collision.

Third Point. The evidence clearly established the fact that the bell of the bark was not heard and could not have been heard until the bark was within three hundred feet of the steamer, and that this proximity was not due to any fault of the steamer.

Fourth Point. The court erred in holding the steamer at fault in any particular, in respect to any order given or act done by those in charge of her in the brief and inappreciable interval between the first sound of the beil and the collision.

The weight of the evidence is overwhelming that all was done by them which discipline, duty and good seamanship demanded, and the theory of confused or vacillating orders is wholly without foundation in fact.

Fifth Point. The bark was clearly in fault in not complying with the rule which required the use of a fog-horn while she was under way; and the presumption of culpable negligence raised by this conceded violation of law, is not removed by the evidence. On the contrary, it is so strengthened that the bark, upon a fair view of the evidence, must be held chargeable with the close and fatal proximity to the steam. er in which she was when her presence was first indicated.

Act, Apr. 29, 1834, art. 10, subd. b, 13 Stat. at L., 60. 61.

The answer puts in issue the several allegations of the libel, and in respect to the facts of the collision, àvers that the steamer Pennsylvania was going at reduced speed, only sufficient to keep her course, with a competent look out, the weather being so foggy that a vessel could not be seen more than a length off, and all attention paid to sounds; that the sound of a bell was heard and immediately the bark hove in sight, too near for the steamship to avoid a collision; that The Pennsylvania's en gines were at once stopped and backed, and her helm ported; but the bark having her helm lashed and being unable to port, came into The Seventh Point. The court below erred in atPennsylvania and, being loaded with iron, sank. tempting to speculate upon the question whether The answer charges the fault of the collis- the established negligence and violation of law ion to the bark, in not keeping a proper look-on the part of the bark, was or was not the out, not blowing a fog horn, as she should have done, and in using only a bell placed on a stay; and that the collision was caused, notwith standing all that was possible was done by the steamship to avoid it.

The U. S. District Judge condemned the

steamer.

Sixth Point. The court below erred in holding the steamer at fault on account of her rate of speed at the time of the collision.

cause of the disaster. The fact of such violation without excuse, and the extent to which it operated as a proximate cause of the collision not being ascertained, it was error to impose the burden of the disaster upon a vessel which was complying with the law in all respects.

The North Star, 8 Blatchf., 209; The Ariadne, See Op. of Benedict, J., The Pennsylvania, 4 | 13 Wall., 475 (80 U. S., XX., 542); The Scotia, Ben., 257. 14 Wall., 170 (81 U. S.. XX., 822); The ContiThe U. S. Commissioners, to whom it was re-nental, 14 Wall., 345 (81 U. S., XX., 801); The ferred to ascertain the amount due libelants, Queen, 8 Blatchf., 234. reported the sum of $24,466.50, with interest from Jan. 26, 1871, as the amount so due. Ex ceptions to the report were taken which were overruled and a decree entered Aug. 9, 1871, from which an appeal was taken to the U. S. Circuit Court.

The circuit judge affirmed the decree.
See Op. of Woodruff, J., The Pennsylvania,
9 Blatchf., 451.

The claimants appealed to this court.
The facts appear in the opinion.
Messrs. John Chetwood, C. Donohue and
William Allen Butler, for appellant:

First Point. The presence of the bark was discovered by the steamer's lookout at the earliest possible moment, and the steamer was

Even if the steamer erred (which we deny) in not reducing her speed more than she did, it is settled by the court, that errors committed by one of two vessels, approaching each other from opposite directions, do not excuse the other from adopting every proper precaution required by the special circumstances of the case, to prevent a collision, as the Act of Congress provides that, in obeying and construing the prescribed rules of navigation, due regard must be had to the special circumstances rendering a departure from them necessary, in order to avoid imminent danger.

13 Stat. at L., 61; The Maria Martin, 12 Wall., 31 (79 U. S., XX., 251), see, per Mr. Justice Clifford, p. 47 (255); The Sapphire, 11 Wall.,

164 (78 U. S., XX., 127); The Ariadne (supra). Eighth Point. This case is not within the rule sometimes applied, that this court will not re verse, in cases where the district and circuit courts have concurred in opinion on the fact. The Hypodame, 6 Wall., 216, 223 (73 U. S., XVIII., 794, 796).

The evidence is mainly by deposition, and not ore tenus; the gravest doubts are expressed by the learned circuit judge as to the correctness of the conclusions reached by the district court. See, opinion, 9 Blatchf., 451; The Ariadne (supra), per Swayne, J.

Ninth Point. It may be argued that the delin quency of duty on the part of those in charge of the bark was simply a contributing cause of the collision and, therefore, that the loss should be apportioned.

Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How., 548 (62 U. S., XVI., 211); The Gray Eagle, 9 Wall., 505 (76 U. S., XIX., 741).

It is respectfully submitted that the clear weight of the evidence shows that the bark was wholly in fault.

Tenth Point. The District Court for the East ern District of New York never acquired jurisdiction in this cause. The steamer being at tached to a wharf in the City of New York, in the North River, was not within the Eastern District at the time of the filing of the libel.

U. S. Supreme Court Rules, Admiralty Rule, XXIII.; Act Feb. 25, 1865, creating Eastern Judicial District of N. Y., 13 Stat. at L., 438.

Eleventh Point. The court below erred in fix ing the value of the bark, and the appellant's exceptions to the commissioner's report should have been allowed.

Messrs. R. D. Benedict and E. E. Benedict, for appellee:

First Point. The evidence before this court is the same as it was before the district and circuit courts. And both those courts have given decrees against The Pennsylvania. This court would be slow to reverse those decrees, if they stood alone, as it has repeatedly said.

The Water Witch, 1 Black, 500 (66 U.S., XVII., 156); The Potomac, 2 Black, 583 (67 U. S., XVII., 364); Newell v. Norton, 3 Wall., 267 (70 U. S., XVIII., 273); The Grace Girdler, 7 Wall., 204 (74 U. S., XIX., 116); The Quickstep, 9 Wall., 669 (76 U. S., XIX., 768).

Second Point. The Pennsylvania was in fault for running at too high a speed.

The Europa (Jenk. Rule of the Road, 52); The Magna Charta, 1 Mar. Law Cas., 153; The Louisi ana, 2 Ben., 371; The City of New York, 8 Blatchf., 197; The Bridgeport.7 Blatchf., 214; The Bridge port, 14 Wall., 116 (81 U. S., XX., 787).

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avoid the bark after her presence was known, by either starboarding or porting, if the steamer had been properly managed.

Sixth Point. The principal charge that is made against the bark, viz.: that she was ringing a bell instead of blowing a fog-horn, if a fault at all under the circumstances, was only a technical, not a substantial fault, and did not in any way contribute to the collision.

Seventh Point. It is urged that the courts below should not have considered the question, whether or not the ringing of the bell contrib uted to the collision.

Doubtless it would simplify the trial of collision cases, if the courts were only called upon to inquire whether each vessel had complied with all the requirements of the law, and not to inquire whether any failure to comply with them had anything to do with the collision.

But that would be an unheard of mode of disposing of these cases. The question always is: Did the vessel commit a fault which contributed to the collision?"

The Farragut, 10 Wall., 334, 339 (77 U. S., XIX., 946, 947); Cohen v. The Mary T. Wilder, Taney, 573.

Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court:

It may be that when the bark was discovered by those on board the steamer it was too late to avoid a collision. The two vessels were then not more than three or four hundred feet apart, and the steamer had the bark almost across her bow. Yet it is possible that if her helm had been put to starboard instead of to port when the lookout announced, "Bell on the starboard bow," and had been kept starborded, the collision might either have been avoided or have been much less disastrous. By porting her helm she was turned toward the point where the bell indicated the bark was, and this apparently increased the danger of a collision.

But if this is not to be attributed to her as a fault, there is no excuse to be found in the evidence for the high rate of speed at which she was sailing during so dense a fog as prevailed when the vessels came together. The concurrent testimony of witnesses is that objects could not be seen at any considerable distance, probably not farther than the length of the steamer; and yet she was sailing at the rate of at least seven knots an hour, thus precipitating herself into a position where avoidance of a collision with the bark was difficult, if not impossible, and would have been, even if the bark had been stationary. And she ought to have apprehended danger of meeting or overtaking vessels in her path. She was only two hundred miles from Sandy Hook, in the track of outward and inward bound vessels, and where their presence might reasonably have been expected. It was, therefore, her duty to exercise the utmost caution. Fourth Point. The Pennsylvania also was in Our rules of navigation, as well as the British fault in the contradictory orders which were rules, require every steamship, when in a fog. given as to her helm. It was first ported, then "to go at a moderate speed." What is such speed starboarded, and then again ported. This shows may not be precisely definable. It must depend that, as Lord Romilly says, "There was consid-upon the circumstances of each case. That may erable confusion on the part of the steamer." " be moderate and reasonable in some circumSuch confusion is a fault.

Third Point. The Pennsylvania was in fault, in that her second officer, Nicoll, who was in charge of her navigation, was so negligent as not to hear the first announcement of the bark's presence.

Fifth Point. These faults of the steamer were the all-sufficient cause of this collision. There was an abundance of time for the steamer to

stances which would be quite immoderate in others. But the purpose of the requirement being to guard against danger of collisions, very plainly the speed should be reduced as the risk

of meeting vessels is increased. In the case of | "The Europa,"Jenkins, Rule of the Road at Sea, 52, it was said by the Privy Council: "This may be safely laid down as a rule on all occasions, fog or clear, light or dark, that no steamer has a right to navigate at such a rate that it is impossible for her to prevent damage, taking all precaution at the moment she sees danger to be possible, and if she cannot do that without go ing less than five knots an hour, then she is bound to go at less than five knots an hour." And we do not think the evidence shows any necessity for such a rate of speed as the steamer maintained. It is true her master, while admitting she was going seven knots, states that he don't consider she could have been steered going slower-could not have been steered straight. And two other witnesses testify that, in their opinion, she could not have been navigated with safety and kept under command at a less rate of speed than seven miles an hour. These, however, are but expressions of opinions based upon no facts. They are of little worth. And even if it were true that such a rate was necessary for safe steerage, it would not justify driving the steamer through so dense a fog along a route so much frequented, and when the probability of encountering other vessels was so great. It would rather have been her duty to lay to. But there is the evidence of one who had been a ship master, and who once crossed the Atlantic as a passenger in this steamer. He states that on the passages he did not, to the best of his knowledge. average over four knots during twenty-four hours, and that he noticed no difficulty in her steerageway at that low rate of speed. As he was in the habit of going to sea he would probably have noticed difficulty if there had been any. This is a fact of more weight than any | mere opinions unsupported by observation or trial. We think, therefore, it must be concluded that the steamer was going at an undue rate of speed, and that it was her fault that she came into a position from which she could not, or certainly did not, escape without colliding with the

bark.

on her starboard tack, carrying two close reefed topsails, foresail, foretopmast and mizzen staysails, and with no sails aback, so far as it appears. She was constantly changing her position. It was her duty, therefore, to blow a foghorn, and not to ring a bell. By ringing a bell, as she did, she gave a false signal and, so far as she could, assured all approaching vessels that she was not under way. There is some evidence that a bell can be heard as far as can a a fog horn, and some that it can be heard farther. On the other hand, there is evidence that a fog-horn can be heard farthest. However this may be, the bark had no right to substitute any equivalent for the signal required by the navigation rules. In the case of "The Emperor," Holt's Rule of the Road, 38, it was said: "It is not advisable to allow these important regulations to be satisfied by equivalents, or by anything less than a close and literal adherence to what they prescribe." In addition to this it may be remarked that a bell can never be an equivalent for a fog horn. It gives different information. Both may notify an approaching vessel that the signalling ship is in the neighborhood, but the one gives notice that the ship is moving, and the other that the ship is stationary.

Concluding, then, as we must, that the bark was in fault, it still remains to inquire whether the fault contributed to the collision, whether in any degree it was the cause of the vessels coming into a dangerous position. It must be conceded that if it clearly appears the fault could have had nothing to do with the disaster, it may be dismissed from consideration. The liability for damages is upon the ship or ships whose fault caused the injury. But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been. It is next to be considered whether any fault Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience of the bark contributed to the collision. That to the mandate of the statute. In the case of she was in fault is beyond controversy. She "The Fenham," 23 Law Times, 329, the Lords was in plain violation of the rules of naviga- of the Privy Council said: "It is of the greattion, which required her to blow a fog horn. est possible importance, having regard to the Both our own and the British shipping Acts en- admiralty regulations, and to the necessity of act that sailing ships, when under way, shall enforcing them, to lay down this rule: that if use a fog-horn and, when not under way, shall it is proved that any vessel has not shown lights, use a bell. The British merchants' shipping the burden lies on her to show that her nonActs expressly declare that owners and masters compliance with the regulations was not the of ships shall use no other fog signals than such cause of the collision." In some cases it is posas are required by the regulations, and that if sible to show this with entire certainty. In in any case of collision it appears to the court others it cannot be. The evidence in the presbefore which the case is tried that such collision ent case leaves it uncertain whether if a fog-horn was occasioned by the non-observance of any had been blown on the bark, it would not have regulation made by the Act, or in pursuance been heard sooner than the bell was heard, and thereof, the ship by which the regulation has thus earlier warning have been given to the been infringed shall be deemed to be in fault, steamer-seasonable warning to have enabled unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court her to keep out of the way. It was not withthat the circumstances of the case made a de-out reason that the statute required a fog-horn parture from the regulation necessary. Our own statute does not contain this provision ex pressed, but its meaning is the same. The bark in this case was a British ship, as was the steamer. She was under way, moving slowly, indeed little, if any, more than a mile an hour, with her helm lashed three quarters to port, but

for ships under way, and a bell for those not under way. The Legislature must have known it was important ships should have the earliest possible notice of the proximity of other moving vessels. They might be approaching each other. If so, they would come together sooner than they could if one of them was not under

WILLIAM A. COIT, Appt.,

v.

ROBINSON AND

CHAMBERLIN.

(See S. C., 19 Wall., 274-286.)

ENOCH

Review, in this court, of cases under Bankrupt Act-appeal in cases of supervisory jurisdiction.

1. Cases arising under the 3d clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, where the amount is sufficient, are within the 9th section of the Bankrupt Act, and as such, may be removed here for re-examination by writ of error or appeal. 2. Suits in equity and cases at law, under the jurisdiction created by that Act, may be removed to the circuit court for re-examination, as provided by the 8th section of the Act.

3. An appeal does not lie to this court from a decree of the circuit court rendered in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon that court by the 1st clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act. [No. 677.]

Submitted Jan. 30, 1874. Decided Mar. 16, 1874.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit

York.

ed States for the Southern District of New The case is stated by the court.

Messrs. J. W. Moore and C. Tracy, for appellant.

Mr. G. A. Seixas, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court:

way. It may be assumed, therefore, that the
Legislature acted under the conviction that a
fog-horn could be heard at a greater distance EDWARD
than a bell, and required the use of one rather
than that of the other for that reason.
To go
into the inquiry whether the Legislature was
not in error-whether, in fact, a bell did not
give notice to the steamer that the bark was
where she was as soon as a fog horn would have
done-is out of place. It would be substituting
our judgment for the judgment of the law-
making power. It would be admitting the va
lidity of an equivalent for that which the stat-
ute has made a positive requirement. Then
how can it be shown on the part of the bark
that the failure to use a fog-horn certainly con-
tributed in no degree to the collision? How
can it be proved that if a fog-horn had been
blown, those on board the steamer would not
have heard it in season to have enabled them to
check their speed or change their course, and
thus avoid any collision? Though there were
two lookouts on the steamer, each in his proper
place, the bark's bell was not heard until the
vessels were close upon each other. Who can
say the proximity of the vessels would not have
been discovered sooner if the bark had obeyed
the navy regulations? If it be said this is spec-
ulation, it may be admitted; but it is specula-
tion rendered necessary by a certain fault of
the bark. It is equally speculative to conclude
that the collision would have taken place if a
fog-horn had been used instead of a bell, and
infer therefrom that the fault of the bark had
no relation to the disaster. The truth is, the
case is one in which, while the presumption is
that the failure to blow a fog-horn was a con-
tributory cause of the collision, and while the
burden of showing that it was in no degree oc-
casioned by that failure rests upon the bark, it
is impossible to rebut the presumption. It is a
well known fact that in some states of the at
mosphere a fog horn can be heard at much
greater distances than in others. How far it
could have been heard when this collision oc-
curred can never be known. Nor can it be
known what precautions the steamer would
have adopted if the true and proper signal had
been given her. Hence, it appears to us, the
bark has not proved that her failure to obey the
shipping regulations was not a concurrent cause
of the injury she received; and, consequently,
as both vessels were in fault, the damages, ac
cording to the admiralty rule, should be divided.
We have not overlooked the fact that in a
libel by the owners of the cargo of the bark
against the steamer for damages resulting from
the same collision, it was held by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in England,
that the disaster was chargeable to the steamer
alone. The Pennsylvania, 23 Law Times Rep.,
55. But with great respect for the tribunal that
thus decided, we do not feel at liberty to sur
render our judgment, especially in view of the
fact that the case is now more fully presented
and the evidence is more complete than it was
in the British court.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.

S. C.-4 Ben., 257.

Aff'd-9 Blatchf., 451.

District courts have original jurisdiction, in their respective districts, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, and are authorized to hear and adjudicate the same according to the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. 14 Stat. at L., 517. Circuit courts have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under that Act, within and for the districts where the proceedings under the Act are pending; and, except when special provision is otherwise made, may, upon bill, petition or other prop er process, of any party aggrieved, hear and determine the case as in a court of equity; the provision also being that the circuit court, or any justice thereof, may exercise the powers and jurisdiction granted by that clause, term time or vacation." 14 Štat. at L.,517, 518.

in

On the 29th of February, 1868, the respondents filed their petition in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, representing that they owed debts within the judicial dis trict exceeding $300, and that they were unable to pay all their debts in full; that they were willing to surrender all their estate and effects for the benefit of their creditors, and stating that they desired to obtain the benefit of the Bankrupt Act; and prayed that, after due proceedings had, they might, by a decrce of the court, be adjudged to be bankrupts; and that, upon complying with all the requirements of that Act, they may severally be decreed to have a certificate of discharge from all their debts provable under the said Act. By the record it also appears that the petitioners, on the 12th of June in the same year, were adjudged to be bankrupts within the true intent and meaning of the Bankrupt Act.

Complete jurisdiction of the case was by

Cited 12 Blatchf., 67; 7 Ben., 525; 5 Sawy., 65; 9 those means acquired by the district court, and Biss., 468; 2 Hughes, 144; 32 Ohio St., 147, 149.

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