it further appears that such proceedings were | courts, in the exercise of their supervisory juhad that the respondents, on the 17th of July risdiction, may hear and determine any such following, were, by the decree of the district case or question upon bill, petition or other court, discharged from all debts and claims proper process of any party aggrieved, as in a provable under that Act against them on the court of equity. Cases and questions of the day their petition to be adjudged bankrupts kind may be heard and determined by the was filed. proper circuit court, or by any justice thereof, in term time or vacation, which of itself is quite sufficient to show that the power and jurisdiction conferred by that clause of the 2d section is not the same as that conferred upon the circuit courts by the 11th section of the Judiciary Act. 1 Stat. at L., 78, 84. Opposition to their discharge was made by the present appellant, and the district court, on the 24th of the same month, heard the parties and passed an order that the bankrupts recover of him, as such opposing creditor, the costs incurred by them in resisting such opposition, amounting to the sum of $129.50. Three days Special provision is not otherwise made in the later the appellant, as such opposing creditor, Bankrupt Act for the review or revision by the gave notice that he intended to petition the cir- circuit court of either of the questions involved cuit court for the same district for a reversal of in the orders or decrees of the district court, the aforesaid decree of the district judge, and which are the subject of complaint in the case, on the same day he filed a bond for costs, exe- and for that reason it follows that the power cuted by himself and a surety, and pursuant to and jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear and the notice given, on the 6th of August follow-determine the complaint of the appellant, and ing, he filed in the circuit court a certain paper to review or revise the orders or decrees of the called the "petition of appeal," in which he re-district court in the case, were decided under fers to the petition in bankruptcy of the re the 1st clause of the 2d section of the Bankspondents and states that he is a creditor of rupt Act. their estate; that he proved a part of his claim in that proceeding, and that he filed proof of the same with the register; that the bankrupts were examined at his instance, and that he made op position to their discharge, and that he filed the grounds of his opposition in that behalf with the district court; that he was heard in support of his opposition before the district judge, and that the district judge overruled his opposition and granted the respective certificates of dis charge to the alleged bankrupts, and awarded such costs to them as they incurred in resisting his opposition, and concludes as follows: "Your petitioner, feeling aggrieved thereby, prays the circuit court for a reversal of the said several orders of the said district court as being consequently, it follows that final judgments in trary to law and to the evidence," as more fully set forth in the petition, to which he made oath before the register and caused notice thereof to be served on the solicitor of the bankrupts. Duly certified copies of the proceedings in bankruptcy, as well those that took place be fore the register as those before the district judge, whether in term time or vacation, were, on the 17th of September in the following year, filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the same district, together with a copy of the minutes of the testimony taken before the register, filling more than three hundred and sixty closely printed pages of the transcript, without including the numerous exhibits which are an nexed to the certificate of the clerk. Hearing was had in the circuit court on the petition for review, and the circuit court, on the 28th of March last, adjudged and decreed that the de cree of the district court be in all things affirmed, and that the bankrupts recover such costs of the petitioner as they incurred in resisting his opposition, amounting to the sum of $94.25. Beyond all question the case in the circuit court was a petition for review under the first clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, which gives to the circuit courts within and for the districts where the proceedings in bank ruptcy are pending, a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions aris ing under the Bankrupt Act, except where special provision is otherwise made. Such Said circuit courts also have jurisdiction, concurrent with the district courts, of all suits at law or in equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming any adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of said bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such assignee. Concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of all suits at law or in equity, are the words of that clause, showing conclusively that the jurisdiction intended to be conferred is the regular jurisdiction between party and party, as described in the 11th section of the Judiciary Act and the 3d article of the Constitution. Con such civil actions, or final decrees in such suits in equity, rendered in cases where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $2,000, may be re-examined in this court under the 22d section of the Judiciary Act, when properly removed here by writ of error or appeal, as required by existing laws. Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall., 80 [78 U. S., XX., 64]. Like jurisdiction in all such suits at law or in equity. is also vested in the district courts, concurrent with the circuit courts, but inasmuch as such controversies are made the subject of special provision, neither the judgment nor the decree of the district court in such a suit can be reviewed or revised by the circuit court under the first clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, nor in any other manner than that provided in the 22d section of the Judiciary Act and the subsequent Act regulating appeals. 1 Stat. at L., 84; 2 Stat. at L., 244. Opportunity for further litigation, either in the district or circuit court, being closed, the appellant, on the 11th of April last, filed in the circuit court a petition, addressed to the justices of this court, giving a full summary statement of the aforesaid proceedings, both in the district court and in the circuit court, and concluding as follows: "Your petitioner, therefore, prays that all and singular the records and proceedings of said circuit court upon the said case, and the appeal thereon, may be removed 66 to the Supreme Court, and that the said decree of the circuit court may be reversed, and that your petitioner may have such other and further relief as may be deemed fit and proper." Before lodging that petition in the clerk's office of the circuit court, the appellant filed in the same office a bond in the sum of $1,000, conditioned to prosecute the appeal with effect, dated one day earlier, and approved by the circuit judge as to form and sufficiency of sureties." Since the case was entered in this court, the respondents have appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the want of jurisdic tion, which is the principal question for the consideration of the court at the present time. Cases arising under the third clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, where the amount is sufficient, are plainly within the 9th section of the Bankrupt Act and, as such, when the case has proceeded to final judgment or decree, may be removed here for re-examination by writ of error or appeal, as the case may be, but the review and revision contemplated by the first clause of the same section is evidently the same in substance and effect as that given to the circuit courts in the prior Bankrupt Act, as sufficiently appears from the words " general superintendence," preceding and qualifying the word "jurisdiction;" and more clearly from the fact that the revisory jurisdiction extends to mere questions, as contradistinguished from judgments or decrees, as well as to cases; and from the further fact that the jurisdiction in that behalf may be exercised in chambers as well as in court, and in vacation as well as in term time. Morgan v. Thornhill [supra]. Suits in equity and cases at law, under the jurisdiction created by that Act, may be removed to the circuit court for re-examination, as provided by the 8th section of the Act, but it is quite clear that the removal in such cases must be effected under the regulations prescribed in the 22d section of the Judiciary Act and the subsequent Act allowing appeals in cases of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 2 Stat. at L., 244. Mere questions are not re examinable under the regulations prescribed in those Acts, nor would any judgment or decree be regarded as a regular final judgment or decree for such a purpose, unless it was rendered in term time when the court was in session. By that section, "all cases in equity" and "cases at law," when the debt or damages claimed amount to more than $500, may be removed into the circuit court for re-examination, and the further provision is that any supposed creditor whose claim is wholly or in part rejected, or any assignee who is dissatisfied with the allowance of a claim, may appeal from the decision of the district court to the circuit court for the same district, if claimed, and due notice thereof is given, as therein required, within ten days after the entry of the decree or decision in the district court. Nor can any writ of error be allowed under that section unless the party claiming it shall comply with the statutes regulating the granting of such writs, and the better opinion is that the writ of error must be sued out within the same time as that allowed for claiming an appeal in an equity suit. Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall., 258 [82 U. S., XXI., 493]. Appellate jurisdiction may unquestionably be exercised by the circuit courts in four classes of cases under the Bankrupt Act: (1) By appeal from the final decree of the district courts, in suits in equity commenced and prosecuted in the latter courts by virtue of the jurisdiction created by the third clause of the 2d section of the Act. (2) By writs of error sued out to the district courts in civil actions finally decided by such courts in the exercise of jurisdiction created by the same clause of that section. Where the amount in dispute in such cases exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $2,000, the final judgment or decree in the case, as rendered in the circuit court, may be removed into this court for re examination, as provided in cases originally brought in the circuit court. (3) By appeal from the decision of the district court rejecting wholly or in part the claim of a creditor, as provided in the 8th section of the Act. (4) By appeal from the decision of the district court allowing such a claim when the same is opposed by the assignee. Doubts are entertained whether the cases mentioned in the last two propositions are re-examinable in this court, but the question is not presented for decision in this case. Whether the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge pursuant to the 29th section of the Bankrupt Act is always a question to be decided by the district court under the conditions prescribed in that section. Creditors opposing the discharge may file a specification in writing of the grounds of their opposition, but the only effect of such a specification, as declared in the 31st section of the Act, is to authorize the court, "in its discretion," to postpone the question of fact to be tried at a stated session of the court, as the 32d section provides that if it shall appear to the court that the bankrupt has, in all things, conformed to his duty under the Act, the court shall grant the prescribed discharge. 14 Stat. at L., 533. Regulations of a different character are prescribed in a case where the question is, whether the alleged insolvent shall be adjudged a bankrupt without his consent, as in that event the provision is that the court shall, if the debtor, on the return day of the notice, required to be given on the petition, so demand in writing, order a trial by jury as therein provided; but the Bankrupt Act contains no provision for a jury trial on the question of discharge, and in the judgment of the court the only power vested in the circuit court to review and revise the decision of the district court, made in granting or refusing such a discharge, is that conferred by the first clause of the 2d section of that Act. Except when special provision is otherwise made, the circuit courts under that clause have a general superintendence and jurisdiction of all cases and questions arising under the Bankrupt Act. Special provision is not otherwise made for the re-examination by the circuit court of the decision of the district court in granting or refusing a discharge in bankruptcy and, of course, it can only be done under the power conferred by that clause. Nothing remains for consideration in this case except to inquire whether an appeal lies to this court from a decree of the circuit court rendered in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon that court by the first clause of the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, which is the very question that was presented to this court in the case of Morgan v. Thornhill [supra], where this court unanimously decided the question in the negative. Since that opinion was delivered this court has decided the same question in the same way in four other cases, all of which are published in the regular series of the reports of the Supreme Court. Hall v. Allen, 12 Wall., 452 [79 U. S., XX, 458]; Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall., 430 [81 U. S., XX., 751]: Mead v. Thompson, 15 Wall., 638 [82 U. S., XXI., 243]: Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall., 555 [83 U. S., XXI., 481]. None of these statements can be successfully contradicted, and it follows that this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal in this case. The motion to dismiss is granted, and the case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting: I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. The Judiciary Act gives a writ of error to this court from all final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in the cireuit courts, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2,000. The Act of March 3, 1803, 2 Stat. at L., 244, converts this writ of error into an appeal in cases of equity, and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and prize cases. The cases in which appeals in bank ruptcy have heretofore been disallowed, were cases of interlocutory orders or decrees; and, therefore, not within the terms of the law. The decree appealed from in this case has all the elements of a final decree, and belongs to a system of proceeding which has always been regarded in England as of equitable cognizance. The fact that it depends upon statutory regulation does not divest it of that character. A bankruptcy proceeding by which the estate of a debtor is administered, is essentially an equitable one. In a case of such importance as that which in volves a man's liability or non liability for his debts after he has given up all his property, he ought not to be deprived of the right of appeal if the law, fairly considered, gives it to him. I think it does give it to him in this case. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Miller concurs with me in this opinion. started forward to stop his horse, and in that at- or peril. This was an action brought in the court below, by the defendant in error, upon a policy of insurance issued by the plaintiff in error upon the life of her husband. The general nature of the case is stated in the opinion of the court. The circumstances in regard to the death of Seaver, appear more fully in the bill of exceptions, as follows: The plaintiff then further gave evidence tending to show that Oct. 19, 1866, at Morrisville, Vt., said John B. Seaver was engaged in driving a trotting race or match on a trotting course; that he drove on that occasion a mare named "Mansfield Belle," harnessed to a sulky and owned by one Thomas F. Benner; that two other horses in sulkies were driven in competition in the same race, one of them named Northern Light, owned by J. A. Dwinelle & C. R. Paige, was driven by one Gilmore; that the track was in form like the link of a chain, and one half a mile around. On the first heat, and soon after leaving the judges' stand, Seaver, having the inside of the track and his horse and Gilmore's being nearly abreast, Seaver's mare broke and fell back, and Gilmore's horse got a little ahead; that Gilmore thereupon reined in towards the inside of the track,apparently to get the inside, his team being then about half a length ahead of Seaver's mare; that Seaver's mare at that moment regained her speed and, gaining on the other horse, the sulkies came in collision; the wheel of Seaver, passing over the near wheel of Gilmore, when Seaver instantly jumped from his carriage and struck upon the grass ground of the track, and upon his feet, uninjured and enCOM-tirely free from his team, and some two or three feet from his carriage; and that if he had remained standing where he struck, he would have received no injury; that he instantly spoke to his mare and she slackened her speed, and Seaver started to catch her, and with that purpose ran a distance of some twenty feet by her side, trying to get hold of the reins to stop her; that the reins were hanging loosely across the axletree of the carriage; that when Seaver ran the distance as aforesaid, and while thus running with one hand either holding or grasp ing for the reins, the mare turned in upon the grass ground and toward Seaver, throwing him down, when, in some way, he became entangled in the reins, and was dragged along a few feet until his head struck either a stone or a stick of timber with great velocity; that Seaver was im Cited 23 Wall., 160, 293; 93 U. S., 348, 351; 98 U. S., 380; 15 Bank. Reg., 422; 116 Mass., 128 (17 Am. Rep., 144). THE TRAVELERS' INSURANCE Ο. ELIZABETH SEAVER. (See S. C., 19 Wall., 531-544.) Accident insurance policy-death by horse-racing -no recovery for-policy, how construed-jury question. 1. In an action on an accident insurance policy, containing a condition that the insurers would not be liable for a death by an accident caused by a violation of law, a recovery cannot be had in a State where horse-racing is a misdemeanor, for a death by accident while engaged in a horse-race. 2. While the insured and another were engaged in horse-racing, their sulkies came into collision, and the insured jumped to the ground and was entirely clear from the sulky, harness and reins, and mediately taken up insensible and carried into | accordance with defendant's request. And the the house, and physicians called; that he died instruction given on this point was erroneous. from the injury the next morning. The plaint- Messrs. Geo. F. Edmunds and H. H. iff's evidence further tended to show that, by Powers, for defendant in error: the rules of the trotting course, Gilmore had not the right to attempt to take the inside track until he had passed Seaver a distance equal to the length of Seaver's team. Defendant's evidence did not vary in any material particular from that given by the plaintiff on the same subject as above stated, except that evidence for defendant tended to show that Seaver was actually entangled in the reins when he jumped from the vehicle, and was thereby thrown down after striking on his feet. Messrs. E. J. Phelps and J. C. Noble, for plaintiff in error: I. The driving of the race by the insured was, under the circumstances stated, a breach of the law within the meaning of the proviso in the policy relied upon by the defendant. II. The death of the assured was caused by the race, and is, therefore, not covered by the policy. 1. The claim of the defendant in error at the trial, that upon the circumstances detailed in the evidence, the injury to the assured was not the proximate result of the race itself, but of an independent accident, requires no discussion and admits of none. It was not sustained by the court and does violence to common sense. The accident was a continuous and almost instantaneous one, no new or separate agency intervening. 2. The distinction adopted by the learned judge, between an accident resulting from the race and an accident resulting from the carelessness of the driver at the race, cannot be maintained, and the instruction to the jury upon this point was entirely erroneous. An accident is never the necessary consequence of a race; some incident must intervene to produce it; the misconduct of the driver, a defect in the vehicle, the harness or track, a fright or stumbling of the horse. In all these cases, it might be claimed, with the same propriety, that the injury was not caused by the race, but by the intervening accident that immediately occasioned it. The court will not investigate whether a transaction that was criminal throughout, was conducted according to the rules established for its management by those engaged in it. The case of Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall., 44 (74 U. S., XIX., 65), is decisive against the plaintiff upon this point. See, also, Waters v. Ins. Co., 11 Pet., 213; Tilton v. Ins. Co., 1 Bosw., 367; Cluff v. Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308. 3. Equally untenable is the proposition that has been claimed by the defendant in error, though not adopted by the court on the trial, that, as the illegality of the race consisted in its being run for money, and as the wager was not in itself fatal to the assured, his death, although occasioned by the race, was not after all caused by a breach of the law. III. The driving in the race, by the assured, was a willful exposure of himself to an unnecessary danger or peril, within the meaning of the terms of the policy. The jury should have been so instructed, in The meritorious object of life insurance is to provide for the necessities of the family; hence courts so construe such contracts as to effectuate this object, if possible. Palmer v. Ins. Co., 1 Story, 360; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; 1 Duer, Ins., 361; Huidekoper v. Douglass, 3 Cranch, 1; Breasted v. Loan & Trust Co., 8 N. Y., 305; Hoffman v. Ins. Co., 32 N. Y., 405. If the proviso in question is suceptible of different constructions, that must be taken which is most liberal to the policy-holder and strongest against the insurer. Insurance against accidents resulting in death is a mode of life insurance, and is subject to the rules of construction applicable to ordinary life policies. No question can be made but that Seaver's injuries and death were occasioned by an accident within the meaning of this policy. Sinclair v. Mar. Passengers' Assur. Co., 107; Eng. C. L., 478; True v. Ins. Co., 6 Hurl. & N., 839; Fitton v. Ins. Co., 17 C. B. (N. S.), 122; Schneider v. Ins. Co., 24 Wis., 28. Seaver's death, then, being an accidental one, the Company insists that it was caused by a breach of law within the meaning of the 2d proviso in the policy, which provides that this insurance shall not extend to "any death or injury caused by dueling or fighting, or other breach of the law on the part of the assured." Where general words follow special words of confined meaning, the general words are limited to subjects ejusdem generis. Sandiman v. Beach, 14 Eng. C. L., 22; Regina v. Nevill, 55 Eng. C. L., 452; Rex v. Mosley, 9 Eng. C. L., 70; Vaughan v. Porter, 16 Vt., 266. By inserting this proviso, the Company seeks to exempt itself from its liability for personal injuries only, which liability is the very thing Seaver contracts for. It has no object to forbid dueling, only so far as it may make it liable: hence, if the assured should fight a duel, and while in the very act should receive an accidental injury from another source, as if he were struck by lighting, the Company is not relieved as it only contracts for an exception in cases where the duel causes the injury. So, also, in the case of fighting. The Statute of Vermont referred to, is a mere police regulation, and it will be observed that the Statute does not make the act of driving in a race illegal; it is the wager of money that taints the transaction. The breach of such a law in no sense naturally or usually imports or results in personal injury. The maxim, Non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur, applies to contracts of insurance. It is especially applicable to this case, inasmuch as the Company uses the word "caused" in qualifying its liability in the second proviso. The breach of law must not only be proximate as a cause of the death, it must be adequate also. If it is inadequate to produce the result, it is not the cause. 3 Kent, Com., 302; Arn. Ins., 764; Williams v. Ins. Co.,3 Sumn., 276; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 2 Duv.,506; Livie v. Janson, 12 East, 648; Ionides v. Ins. Co., 108 Eng. C. L., 259. This last case reviews the whole doctrine of insurance law, was decided in 1863 and fully sustains the charge of the court below, and was approved in 1865, in the case of Marsdon v. City and County Assur. Co., L. R., 1 Com. Pl., 231; see, also, Patrick v. Ins. Co.. 11 Johns. ,14; Tilton v. Ins. Co., 14 How. Pr., 372; Waters v. Ins. Co., 11 Pet., 213; Harper v. Ins. Co., 19 Mo., 506; Breasted v. Loan & Trust Co., 8 N. Y., 304: Cluff v. Ins Co., 13 Allen. 309, and 99 Mass., 317: Bradley v. Ins. Co., 45 N. Y., 422. A new force intervened after Seaver commenced the race, sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune. See Op. of Justice Miller, Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall., 52 (74 U. S., XIX., 67). The illegal act only brought Seaver within reach of the new cause of his injury. The question as to Seaver's willful exposure to peril is settled by the jury, and the charge of the court is unexceptionable. Schneider v. Ins. Co., 24 Wis., 28. The special verdict of the jury shows that, when Seaver was injured, he had ceased all connection with the race. The accident of the race was the collision. By that accident Seaver was uninjured. He jumped to the ground, and had he remained standing where he landed, he would have been unhurt. He then sets out upon a new undertaking, and in his foot-race is injured. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: The action in this case was founded on a policy, which insured the defendant in error against loss of life of her husband, caused by any accident within the meaning of the policy and conditions thereto annexed. Among these conditions is, that the insurance shall not extend to death or injury caused by dueling or fighting, or other breach of the law on the part of the as sured, *** or by his willfully exposing him self to any unnecessary danger or peril.' The defendant's husband was killed suddenly, immediately after jumping from a sulky in which he was driving in a match race, on the event of which a considerable sum of money was wagered. The defense of the Company, as the case was submitted to the jury was, that his death was caused by a breach of the law, and by his willfully exposing himself to unnecessary dan ger. The Statutes of Vermont make all horse-racing for any bet or wager a misdemeanor, and impose a fine not exceeding $500 for the offense. In regard to this branch of the defense the court instructed the jury that they were to regard the trotting race, in which the insured was engaged when he jumped from the sulky and was killed, as a breach of the law within the meaning of that clause of the policy. As plaint iff below took no exception to this ruling and had a verdict, no error can be assigned on it here, and we need not further examine the argument of her counsel, which controverts that proposition. The court further instructed the jury, on this branch of the subject, as follows: "That if the jury should find that Seaver was killed by the race itself, by an ordinary accident of the race, so that the race was the proxi mate cause of the death, the plaintiff could not recover; but if the jury should find that Gilmore turned his horse in, intentionally and tortiously, with the purpose of winning the race at all hazards, whether he should crowd Seaver from the track or not, then that the conduct of Gilmore and not the race would be the proximate cause of the death,and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. "That the plaintiff's evidence showed that Gilmore, turning in as he did, was in violation of the rules of the race; that a man was usually to be taken as intending the natural and necessary consequences of his own acts. And that if the jury were of opinion that Gilmore drove, as he did, tortiously, and with the intention of winning the race in any event, even though in his so doing he should crowd Seaver from the track and upset him, and that such driving caused the death of Seaver, then the jury should find for the plaintiff." In regard to this the plaintiff in error contends that no evidence was given tending to show that Gilmore intentionally and tortiously turned his horse, with the purpose of winning the race at all hazards, whether he should crowd Seaver from the track or not. All that the bill of exceptions discloses on this point is, that Seaver, having the inside track, his mare broke and fell back a little; "that Gilmore thereupon reined in towards the inside of the track, apparently to get the inside track, his team being then about half its length ahead of Seaver's mare; that Seaver's mare at that moment regained her speed and, gaining on the other horse, the sulkies came into collision." We think this a very slender foundation to put to the jury the question of Gilmore's tortious intention to drive Seaver from the track at all hazards, and to rest upon that possible secret intention the proposition that the race was not the proximate cause of the death, but that Gilmore's act was. It was well calculated to mislead, and no doubt did mislead, the jury. If the legal proposition was sound, the state of the testimony, as given in the bill of exceptions, on which it was founded, could hardly justify it. It would have been much nearer sound principle to have said to the jury that if Seaver saw that Gilmore was ahead of him ever so little, his persistence in so running his horse as to bring about a collision was willfully exposing himself to danger within the meaning of the policy. But we are of opinion that if the testimony raised the point the instruction was erroneous. The Company in protecting themselves against accident or death caused by a violation of law, acted upon a wise and prudent estimate of the dangers to the person generally connected with such violations. And in the class of cases under consideration we have no question that the sum of money often at stake stimulates to further acts of carelessness in the way of violence, fraud and a disregard of the rules of fair racing, which increase largely the dangers always attendant on that sport. The class of men who collect on such occasions, and who often become the leading parties in the conduct of the affair when large sums of money are wagered, have led to its denunciation by many wise and thoughtful people, and very surely adds to the risk of personal injury to the rider or driver. |