jail, or infirmary without rendering it neces- no application to the latter. TALCOTT. the Mississippi, and prior Acts of the kind, It does not belong to courts to interpolate We pass by, without remark, the point whether in cases like this the public or private charThe 2d and 14th clauses of article 18 pre-acter of the work is not a legislative rather than scribe that when private property is taken for a judicial question. public use just compensation shall be made to the owner. These provisions relate to the exer cise of the right of eminent domain. The 13th clause of article 15 declares that "the Legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and villages, and shall restrict their powers of taxation, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit." The power here in question was exercised by a township. The language of this clause clearly implies that the powers to be restricted may be exercised; and what is implied U. S. v. is as effectual as what is expressed. Babbit, 1 Black, 61 [66 U. S., XVII., 96]. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Federal Constitution expressly, or by necessary intendment, permits. The legislative power of a State extends to everything within the sphere of such power, except as it is restricted by the Federal Constitution or that of the State. In the present case we have found nothing that in our judgment warrants the conclusion that the Act in question is wanting in validity by reason of its unconstitutionality. But it has been argued that aside from any constitutional prohibition the Legislature had no power to authorize the imposition of a tax for any other than a public purpose, and that this Act is not within that rule. Conceding, for the purposes of this opinion, the soundness of the first proposition, the second can by no means be admitted. Though the corporation was private, its work was public, as much so as if it were to be constructed by the State. Private property can be taken for a public purpose only, and not for private gain or benefit. Upon no other ground than that the purpose is public can the exercise of the power of eminent domain in behalf of such corporations be supported. This view of the subject has been taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich., 427. But upon other grounds, we think the public character of such works cannot be doubted. Where they go they animate the sources of prosperity, and minister to the growth of the cities and towns within the sphere of their influence. Unless prohibited from doing so, a municipal corporation has the same power to aid in their construction as to procure water for its water-works, coal for its gas works, or gravel for its streets from beyond its territorial limits. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall., 389 [68 U. S., XVII., 566]. Under the limited powers conferred by the Federal Constitution, Congress The has frequently given aid in such cases. Pacific railroads and the Louisville Canal furnish instances of such action by that body. The gift to the sufferers from the overflow of It is insisted that the invalidity of the statute has been determined by two judgments of the Supreme Court of Michigan, and that we are bound to follow those adjudications. People v. Salem, 20 Mich., 452; Bay City v. Treasurer, 23 Mich., 499. We have examined those cases with care. With all respect for the eminent tribunal by which the judgments were pronounced, we must be permitted to say that they are not satisfactory to our minds. We think the dissenting opinion in the one first decided is unanswered. Similar laws have been passed in twenty-one States. In all of them but two, it is believed It is not easy to resist the force of their validity has been sustained by the highest The local courts. such a current of reason and authority. question before us belongs to the domain of general jurisprudence. In this class of cases this court is not bound by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise. It must hear and determine for itself. Here, commercial securities are involved. When the bonds were issued, there had been no authoritative intimation from any quarter that such statutes were invalid. The Legislature affirmed their validity in every Act, by an implication equivalent in effect to an express declaration. And during the period covered by their enactment, neither of the other departments of the government of the State lifted its voice against them. The acquiescence was universal. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175 [68 U. S., XVII., 520]. In cases The general understanding of the legal profession throughout the country is believed to have been that they were valid. The National Constitution forbids the States to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts. properly brought before us that end can be accomplished unwarrantably no more by judicial decisions than by legislation. Were we to yield in cases like this to the authority of the decisions of the courts of the respective States, we should abdicate the performance of one of the most important duties with which this tribunal is charged and disappoint the wise and salutary policy of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the creation of an independent Federal judiciary. The exercise of our appellate jurisdiction would be but a solemn mockButz v Muscatine, 8 Wall., 579 [75 U. S., ery. XIX., 492]. The question here under consideration was fully considered by this court in R. R. Co. v. Otoe Co., 16 Wall., 667 [83 U. S., XXI., 375], and in Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678 [83 U. S., XXI., 382]. We have no disposition to qualify anything said in those cases. They are conclusive in the case before us. In Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional 233 Law, p. 90, it is said: "It must be further borne The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. in mind that the invalidity of contracts made in | Barb., 378; Chester Glass Co. v. Dewey. 16 Mass., violation of statutes is subject to the equitable 94: Steamboat Co. v. McCutcheon, 13 Pa. St., 13; exception, that although a corporation in making Potter v. Bk., 5 Hill, 490; Suydam v. Morris 0. a contract acts in disagreement with its charter, & B. Co., 5 Hill, 491; Sacket's Harbor Bk. v. where it is a simple question of capacity or Lewis Co. Bk., 11 Barb., 213; Mott v. U. S. Trust authority to contract, arising either on a question Co., 19 Barb., 568. But it is not necessary to of regularity of organization or of power con place our judgment upon this ground. Werest ferred by the charter, a party who has had the it upon the other views which have been exbenefit of the agreement cannot be permitted pressed, and the authority of our own precedin an action founded on it to question its valid-ing adjudications. ity. It would be in the highest degree inequitable and unjust to permit the defendant to repudiate a contract the fruits of which he retains. And the principle of this exception has been extended to other cases. So a person who has borrowed money of a savings institution upon his promissory note, secured by a pledge of bank stock, is not entitled to an injunc tion to prevent the prosecution of the note upon the ground that the savings bank was pro hibited by its charter from making loans of that description." The authorities referred to sustain the text. Palmer v. Lawrence, 3 Sandf. (Super. Ct.), 162; Steam Nav. Co. v. Weed, 17 234 Dissenting, Mr. Justice Miller and Mr. Justice Davis. Mr. Chief Justice Waite and Mr. Justice Bradley did not sit in this case and took no part in its decision. Cited-94 U. S., 206; 103 U. S.. 8; 105 U. S., 70; 107 U.S., 34: 109 U. S., 38; 5 Dill., 210, 284; 7 Biss., 199; 49 END OF VOLUME 86. |