SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCT. TERM, ally assailed upon the trial of this cause in the the terms of the sale. On the 15th of April, court below. This renders it necessary to ex- 1866, the administrator gave a receipt to the amine the case in this aspect. The record purchaser for $60,600, being the amount of the shows the following facts: June, 1850, H. H. Williams recovered in the by the same instrument released his vendor's on the 28th of purchase money with ten per cent. interest, and District Court of the United States held at lien. On the same day the administrator exeGalveston, against S. M. Williams, then liv-cuted a deed of conveyance to H. H. Williams. ing, a judgment for $26,736. And on the 12th It recites all the proceedings touching the sale of July, 1858, another judgment for the sum, upon which it was founded. of $43,936.34. The second judgment was founded upon the first one, and was for the principal and interest due upon the latter. At the January Term, 1866, of the Galveston County Court, H. H. Williams, by his counsel, ap plied for an order that the administrator of S. M. Williams be cited to appear and show cause why he should not make application to the court for an order to sell enough of the prop erty of said estate to pay a judgment obtained by the said Henry Williams against the said Samuel M. Williams, to the amount of $40,000; which said judgment was allowed and approved as a valid claim against said estate, in October, 1859, with eight per cent. interest per annum, etc. 99 The administrator appeared at the same term, and answered that the plaintiff recovered the judgment first herein before mentioned; that it was presented for allowance against the estate with the usual affidavit and allowed; that he could not say whether it was approved by the Chief Justice of Galveston County; that it had never been paid, and that the reason he had taken no measures to pay it was that the plaintiff had told him that, being against his brother, he did not intend to enforce it. thereupon, at the same term, made an order as The court follows: trator executed to H. H. Williams another deed On the 2d of January, 1868, the adminisfor the same premises. It recites more fully the proceedings relative to the sale, and sets out that there were certain clerical errors of dates in the former deed, and that this deed was made to correct them. upon the trial in the court below, were all deThe titles adverse to the plaintiff, developed rived from heirs at law of Samuel N. Williams. The premises were liable under a paramount lien for the debts of the ancestor. Paschal, Dig., art. 1373. The plaintiff's claim was of that character. Hence, if the sale and conveyance to him by the administrator were valid, recover, however, only upon the strength of his they were conclusive in his favor. own title. The weakness of the title of his adHe could versaries could not avail him. ministrator taken in the brief of the plaintiffs Most of the objections to the sale by the adin error, were not insisted upon in the argument at the bar, and are of such a character as to require no observations from the court. One was pressed upon our attention with earnestness and ability, and to that one our remarks will be confined. A Statute of Texas requires all claims against "On this day came on to be heard in this cause legal representative and to be allowed by such the estate of a decedent to be presented to his the motion of Henry Williams, by his agent, John representative, and to be approved by the proH. Williams, asking that the administrator be bate judge. Until so allowed and approved required to sell sufficient property of the estate they have no legal validity and cannot be recogto pay a certain judgment obtained by the nized as debts against the estate. If disallowed, said Henry H. Williams in the United States or not approved, they must be sued upon withDistrict Court, on the 28th day of June, A. D. in three months. 1850, for the sum of $26,736, with interest from allow or approve, there can be no recovery. If sued without a refusal to date of rendition; and it appearing to the court The absence of such fact is fatal to the action. that this claim has been duly allowed, and that Paschal, Dig., art. 1309, 1311; Danzey v. Swinthe administrator has no funds in hand what-ney, 7 Tex., 625; Martin v. Harrison, 2 Tex., ever to pay the same, it is ordered that he make 456. sale of sufficient property in pursuance of the prayer of the motion. And the administrator having designated the following piece of property, it is ordered that he shall make public sale of one league of land, situated," etc. The premises in controversy were then described, the mode and time of advertising, and the place and terms of the sale were prescribed, and the administrator was directed" to make due report of his action in the premises to the court." On the 15th of March, 1866, the ad ministrator reported that, pursuant to the order of the court, after due notice according to law, he had offered the premises for sale at public auction, at the time and place required by law, and that they were struck off and sold to Henry H. Williams, for the sum of $60,000, on a credit of twelve months, secured by a vendor's lien; that Williams was the highest and best bidder, and that the price was a reasonable one. At the March Term the court confirmed the report and ordered the administrator to make a deed to the purchaser, upon his complying with 258 had been allowed by the administrator, but is The order of sale sets forth that the claim silent as to its approval by the judge. The plaintiffs in error argued that this omission rendered the order a nullity. and the answer of the administrator gave the The application of the judgment creditor judge jurisdiction over the parties and the real estate of the deceased. 1305. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine. To make the order of sale required Paschal, Dig., art. the exercise of this power. It was the business and duty of the court to ascertain and decide whether the facts were such as called for that action. The question always arises in such proceedings-and must be determined-whether, upon the case as presented, affirmative or nega tive action is proper. The power to review and reverse the decision so made is clearly appellate an appellate tribunal in a proceeding had diin its character, and can be exercised only by rectly for that purpose. not to be done by another court, in another case, It cannot and ought CHARLES CHAFFEE, as JOHN CHAFFEE & BROTHER, Interveners, Appts., v. JESSE K. BELL AND A. G. KENNETT, as KENNETT & BELL. (See S. C., "The Lottawanna," 20 Wall., 201–226.) Improper order of Circuit Court-liens on property sold in admiralty-attachment of―appeal, effect of. District Court and also dismiss the appeal. where the subject is presented incidentally, and a reversal sought in such collateral proceeding. The settled rule of law is, that jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything done within the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is to be held con clusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud. Every intendment is made to support the proceeding. It is regarded as if it were regular in all things and irreversible for error. In the absence of fraud no question can be collaterally entertained as to anything lying within the jurisdictional sphere of the original case. Infinite confusion and mischiefs would ensue if the rule were otherwise. These re-order of the admiralty court, follow the proceeds, marks apply to the order of sale here in question, The county court had the power to make it and did make it. It is presumed to have been properly made, and the question of its propriety was not open to examination upon the trial in the circuit court. These propositions are sustained by a long and unbroken line of adjudi cations in this court. The last one was the case of McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall., 366 [83 U. S., XXI, 348]. They are not in conflict with the adjudications of Texas upon the subject. The Statute of Texas does not require the evidence upon which the judgment of the court proceeded to be set forth in the record. Such 1. A Circuit Court cannot affirm the decree of the 2. Maritime liens upon the property sold by the could not have proceeded against the property in but the court cannot decree that third persons, who rem, may recover a proportion of the proceeds to satisfy their claims against the owner. in a case where the owner appears and opposes the applica tion. ment. 3. No lien or right of preference in the fund can be acquired by virtue of proceedings under the state garnishee process, or by execution or attach4. Where an appeal taken from the decree of the District Court is a proceeding in rem to the Circuit Court,the property or proceeds thereof follows the cause into the Circuit Court. [No. 233.] Argued Mar, 19, 1874. Decided Apr. 6, 1874. a statement can do no good, and its omission APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United does no harm. As regards public officers, "acts done which presuppose the existence of other Acts to make them legally operative, are presumptive proofs of the latter." Bk. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat., 70. Facts presumed are as effectually estab lished as facts proved, where no presumption is allowed.' In the case of Ward v. Barrows, 2 Ohio St., 247, a sale for taxes came under ex amination. It was held that certain acts of the county auditor were presumptive proofs that he had administered to the collector the oath prescribed by law touching the delinquent list. The sale was sustained. Here the judge who made the order of sale was the judge to approve the claim. The order was presumptive proof of the requisite approval. Such approval was necessarily implied, and what is implied in a record, pleading, will, deed, or contract, is as effectual as what is expressed. U. S. v. Babbitt, 1 Black, 61 [66 U. S., XVII., 96]. The proceedings touching the sale were properly admitted in evidence, and the instruction given to the jury upon the subject was correct. The last assignment of error relates to fraud in obtaining the order of sale. It seems to us that the evidence disclosed in the record was hardly sufficient to raise any question upon that subject. However that may be, the instruction given to the jury was unexceptionable, and the plaintiffs in error have no right to complain. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Cited-93 U. S., 283; 96 U. S., 195; 100 U. S., 23: 110 U. S., 189; 17 Bank. Reg., 470; 90 Ill., 488; 13 Vroom.. 458; 36 Am. Rep., 532. JOHN WILSON, WILLIAM FAGAN AND BENJAMIN MILLER, as WILSON, FAGAN & COMPANY, AND JOHN CHAFFEE AND States for the District of Louisiana. Messrs. John A. Grow and L. Madison Day, for appellants. Messrs. Durant & Hornor and Thos. Hunton, for appellees. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Complicated, as the record is, it will be impossible to state the questions presented for decision, in a manner to be understood, without referring to the original proceedings in the District Court, as the suit, when it was commenced, was a libel in rem filed by two mariners, Jonathan D. Cox and Jasper N. Geren, against the steamboat Lottawanna, her tackle, apparel, machinery and furniture, in a cause of subtraction of wages, civil and maritime. Prior to the institution of the suit, the allegation is that the steamer had been engaged in commerce and navigation between the Port of New Orleans and various other ports and places on Red River and its tributaries, and that the libelants, during that period, were duly employed by the master as the pilots of the steamer, and that they continued in that employment for the respective periods and at the monthly wages specified in the libel. They also allege that they faithfully performed their respective duties, as such pilots, and that there is due to them the respective sums charged in the schedule exhib. ited in the record. Wherefore they pray for process against the steamer, etc., and that she may be condemned and sold to pay their respective claims. Pursuant to the prayer of the libel a warrant was issued, and the return of the marshal shows that he seized the steamer and that he published a monition, citing and admonishing the owninterest in the steamer, to appear, on a day ers, and all others claiming any right, title or therein named, at the District Court, and show cause, if any they have, why the prayer of the libel should not be granted. Subsequently, on the same day, the libelants filed a petition in the District Court, representing that the steamer was expensive to keep and perishable, and prayed for an order that she might be sold. On the 13th of the same month the court entered a decree in favor of the libelants, as follows: that J. D. Cox recover the sum of $1,306, and that J. N. Geren, the other libelant, recover the sum of $674.28, from which decree neither the libelants nor the owners of the steamer have ever appealed. On the same day, also, Moses Morgan filed an affidavit in the case, stating that he owned three fourths of the steamer, and that he had no objection that she should be sold, and the record shows that the court immediately passed an order that the steamer be sold by the marshal, he giving legal notice of the sale, and that the proceeds be deposited in the registry, subject to the further order of the court. Nothing is ex-libel, and on the same day the court passed an hibited to show that there was any irregularity in the sale, and it appears that the proceeds, amounting to $10,500, were deposited in the registry of the court. Before the other owner of the steamer, Philip A. Work, appeared, seventeen libels of intervention were filed in the court against the proceeds of the sale of the steamer, embracing some forty interveners, with claims for wages as mariners, and claims for materials for repairs, and for stores and supplies, and for money loaned for the steamer, or for the individual owners, and to pay for debts contracted by the master, or owners, for repairs and supplies during a period of two or more years. On the 4th of February, 1871, more than a month after the original libel was filed, Philip A. Work appeared and filed a claim that he was the owner of the other undivided fourth part of the steamer; and he excepted to all of the libels of intervention except the one filed by the mariners, being the libel of intervention first named in the record, and upon three grounds, and prayed that the interventions might be dis missed: (1) Because the court was without jurisdiction, ratione materiæ, of the matters al leged in the several libels. (2) Because the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the interventions or to adjudicate thereon, for the reason that all of the owners of the steamer, at the date of the several causes of action set forth, were citizens of that State and resided in the City of New Orleans, at which port the steamer was registered and enrolled. (3) Because the respect ive interveners did not, on filing their libels, give stipulations, with sureties, to abide the final decree rendered in the case, and to pay costs, as required by the rules in admiralty proceedings. Intervention was subsequently claimed by other parties and other directions were given, which it becomes important to notice, in order to have a full view of all the material proceedings in the District Court. Libels in personam were also filed by the appellees and by John Chaffee and Charles Chaffee, who are the last named appellants. By the transcript it appears that the libel of the ap pellees was filed on the 6th of February, 1871, and that the libel of the said appellants was filed on the following day. Service of the original monition was made January 1, 1871, and on the 7th of February succeeding, the court passed an order that the delay allowed by law having expired, and no answer having been filed, that all persons interested in the property seized be pronounced in contumacy and default, and that the libel in the principal case be adjudged and taken pro confesso. On the 3d of March, 1871, subsequent to the said decree, Jesse K. Bell filed a libel of intervention, claiming the sum of $2,200, as paid by him on two claims for fuel furnished to the steamer by the persons named in the libel. Leave was granted to the applicant to file the order that the cause be referred to a commissioner to report upon a tableau of distribution, and to classify the various claims according to law, giving all parties a right to take further evidence before the commissioner. Since that time further libels of intervention have been filed as follows, to wit: one by J. Sharp McDonald, on the 18th of the same month, for five hundred and forty boxes of coal; another by Thomas Onley & Co., on the 31st of the same month, for services, the account being approved by the master and by the mate; and one other by Christian & Hyatt, on the 2d of May in the same year, for stationery furnished for the use of the steamer. Besides the libel filed by the two pilots, a libel in rem was also filed by the mate against the steamer, on the 30th of December, 1870, for the balance due him for wages, and the record shows that the court, on the 10th of February next after the commencement of the suit, entered a decree in his favor for the amount claimed and taxable costs. Morgan and Work failed to answer the suit in personam of Kennett & Bell against them, and the court, on the 20th of November, 1871, passed an order that the libel be taken pro confesso, and that a decree be entered in favor of the libelants, and three days later it was ordered that the suit be consolidated with the record in the original suit in rem against the steamer. Different proceedings took place in the suit in personam commenced by Chaffee & Bro., as Joseph Morgan appeared on the same day and confessed judgment in favor of the libelants for the sum of $10,896.56, with eight per cent. interest from the 23d of January preceding. Judgment was accordingly rendered in their favor against Morgan for that amount. Work made default, and a decree, dated June 1, 1871, was entered against him for the same amount in favor of the same libelants. Report in due form was made by the com missioner, on the 4th of May in the same year. He decided that none of the creditors, presenting claims for repairs and supplies, had any right to libel the steamer in her home port, and recommended that the proceeds in the registry of the court be distributed as follows: First, that all legal costs be paid in full. Second, that all claims of the seamen for wages be paid in full. Third, that all claims for labor, supplies, and materials for repairs, be paid pro rata, according to the schedule of claims annexed to the report. Exceptions of various kinds were filed to the report of the commissioner: (1) That certain claims were allowed which were not due from the owners of the steamer, or were, in whole or in part, improperly classified as claims for stores | period the District Court, on the 6th of Febru or for supplies and repairs. (2) That the schedule improperly includes claims not having any maritime lien on the steamer or the proceeds in the registry of the court, nor entitled to any preference by attachment or otherwise. (3) That the compensation charged by the commissioner is excessive. Pending the hearing of the exceptions to the report of the commissioner, the court passed an order that the claims for costs and the claims of the seamen for wages should be paid, and it appears that the order was promptly carried into effect, but the residue of the report was finally referred back to the commissioner for further proceedings. In the meantime the appellees here, having obtained judgment against the owners of the steamer in their suit in personam, sued out a garnishee process from the Sixth District Court of the State, and attempted to at tach the proceeds as money in the hands of the clerk of the District Court. All parties were again heard by the commissioner, and, on the 4th of June following, he made a supplemental report. In his second report, he decided that, where there is a maritime lien upon the vessel, the lien will attach to the proceeds in case the vessel is sold, and the proceeds are paid into the registry of the court, but where there is no maritime lien upon the vessel, that the proceeds should not be distributed, if the owners make opposition to the application, unless the applicants prove that they have some legal or equitable interest in the subject-matter, and the commissioner being of the opinion that the interveners had no maritime lien, reported that the proceeds remaining in the registry of the court could not be distributed for their benefit in this case, and recommended that the court order, either that the proceeds be paid over to the owners of the steamer or to the sheriff who seized the same in the hands of the clerk acting as registrar, under the garnishee process. Seasonable exceptions were filed to the report by many of the interveners opposed in interest to its conclusions, including the last named appellants. Due notice having been given, the parties were heard, and the court entered a decree that all the interventions in the cause, founded on claims which are not liens in ad miralty, be dismissed at the cost of the respect ive parties. All such parties, including the last named appellants here, claimed an appeal to the Circuit Court, and the record shows that the appeal in their behalf was duly allowed, and that they filed an appeal bond, executed to the owners of the steamer and the appellees in this court. Certain other interveners also petitioned for an appeal, and the court passed an order granting it, without requiring any additional bond, in consequence of which omission the present appellees, on the 20th of December following, moved the District Court to set aside and dismiss the last named appeal, and the record shows that the court, on the 25th of January following, granted the motion and vacated and annulled the appeal. ary following, entered a decree that the proceeds in the registry of the court be applied, first, to the satisfaction of the judgment of the present appellees against the owners of the steamer; and, second, that the balance, if any, be paid over to Chaffee & Bro., seizing creditors, next in rank. Application for an appeal by Chaffee & Bro. was made on the following day, and on the 26th of the same month the court overruled the motion to transfer the fund into the Circuit Court, and the last named motion for an appeal, and ordered that the fund be paid over as directed in the order previously given upon that subject. Chaffee & Bro., however, were among the petitioners for the appeal which was previously allowed by the court, and their names appear in the bond which was filed to prosecute the appeal, but they were libelants in personam and not strictly interveners in the original suit prosecuted in rem by the two pilots. Copies of all the material orders, directions and proceedings in the original suit, and in the several suits of Allen v. The Steamer; Kennett & Bell v. The Owners; and Chaffee & Bro. v. The Owners, were sent to the Circuit Court under the certificate of the clerk of the District Court, together with copies of all documents filed and of the minutes of all the evidence introduced in those several cases, and the case was entered in the Circuit Court, on the 29th of May, 1872, under the title of J. D. Cox et al. v. The Steamer, which is the title of the original suit in the District Court, from which no appeal was ever taken, either by the libelants or the owners. Appearance was entered by Kennett & Bell, and they moved to dismiss the appeal for the following reasons: (1) Because the appeal was discharged in the District Court, which is not sustained by the record. (2) Because the bond filed is irregular and not such as the law requires; and the Circuit Court having affirmed the decree of the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. Immediate application for an appeal to this court was made by the present appellants, which was allowed by the Circuit Court, and the petitioners gave bond with surety to the present appellees et al. to pay all such damages as they may recover against the appellants, in case it should be decided that the appeal was wrongfully obtained. Irrespective of the question whether the appeal is regular or irregular it is quite clear that the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, as one part of it is repugnant to another part. Plainly, if the appeal was regular, it was error to dismiss it; and if it was so irregular that it became the duty of the court to dismiss it, the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to affirm the decree of the District Court. Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $50, may be removed from the District Court into the Circuit Court by appeal, and the Seamen's wages and costs having been paid, provision is that such appeal shall be subject the interveners whose appeal was allowed moved to the same rules, regulations and restrictions the court, on the 11th of January, 1872, that as are prescribed by law in case of writs of erthe fund in the registry of the court be trans-ror. 2 Stat. at L., 244. Jurisdiction in such ferred to the Circuit Court, which motion was cases is given to the appellate court by the apfor a time held under advisement. During that peal or writ of error, as the case may be, which See 20 WALL. 17 U. S., Book 22. 261 sent for consideration. ceases to exist, even if regular, when the appeal | 456]; The Belfast [supra]; Steamboat Co. v. or writ of error is dismissed, or if not regular Chase [supra]; Leon v. Galceran [supra] in essential particulars, then jurisdiction does Much embarrassment has existed ever since not attach for the purpose of affirming the de- the old twelfth admiralty Rule was repealed, as cree upon the merits. 1 Stat. at L., 184. Argu the new rule makes no provision to enforce the ment to support these conclusions is not neces- payment of contracts for repairs and supplies sary, as they are self-evident, but inasmuch as furnished to domestic ships, except by a libel in the case must be remanded for a new hearing, personam. Repeated judicial attempts have it becomes necessary to examine some of the been made to overcome the difficulty, none of questions which the anomalous proceedings pre- which have proved satisfactory, because they failed to provide a remedy in the admiralty by a proceeding in rem. Inconveniences of the kind have been felt for a long time, until the Bench and the Bar have come to doubt whether the decision that a maritime lien does not arise in a contract for repairs and supplies furnished to a domestic ship is correct, as it is clear that the contract is a maritime contract, just as plainly as the contract to furnish such repairs and supplies to a foreign ship or to a domestic ship in the port of a State other than that to which the ship belongs. Abb. Ship., pp. 143, 148. Such a remedy is not given even in the latter case, unless the repairs and supplies were furnished on the credit of the ship, and it is difficult to see why the same remedy may not be given in the former case if the repairs and supplies were obtained by the master on the same terms. 5 Am. L. Rev., 612; 7 Am. L. Rev., 8; The St. Lawrence [supra); The Harrison, 2 Abb., U. S., 78; The Belfast [supra]. These and many other considerations have had the effect to create serious doubts as to the correctness of the decision made more than fifty years ago, that a maritime lien does not arise in such a case. The General Smith, 4 Wheat.,443. Most of the claims of the interveners were for stores, materials for repairs, or for labor and supplies furnished to the steamer, either at the request of the master or at the request of one or both of the owners, in the home port of the vessel. More than half a century ago this court decided that where repairs and supplies are fur nished to a ship in her home port, or in a port of the State to which the ship belongs, that no maritime lien is implied, nor any other lien unless it is given by the local law, by which the rights of the parties in such a case is altogether governed. The General Smith, 4 Wheat., 443. Where necessary repairs have been made or necessary supplies furnished to a foreign ship, or to a ship in a port of a State to which the ship does not belong, the general maritime law, as all agree, gives the party a lien on the ship itself for his security, which may be enforced in the admiralty by a proceeding in rem; but the court decided, in the case before referred to, that as to such repairs and supplies furnished to a ship in her home port, or in a port of the State to which the ship belongs, the case is governed by the local law, and that no lien arises unless given by the local law. All the Federal Courts were governed by those rules for years, and little or no difficulty arose in practice, as most or all of the States enacted laws giving a lien for the protection of material men in such cases, and this court adopted a rule authorizing a proceeding in rem against domestic ships, "where by the local law a lien was given to se cure the payment of contracts in such cases for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries." Since that time, however, that rule has been repealed and a new one adopted in its place, which does not authorize a proceeding in rem, except where there is a claim founded on a maritime lien against a foreign ship, or against a ship in a foreign port, or the port of a State other than that to which the ship belongs. The Lulu, 10 Wall. 192 [77 U. S., XIX., 906]: The Belfast, 7 Wall., 644 [74 U. S., XIX., 272]; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall., 191 [78 U. S., XX., 76]; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall., 533 [83 Ú. S., XXI., 372]; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522 [66 U. S., XVII., 180]. Attempts were made by the States to obviate the embarrassment which grew out of the repeal of that rule, and the adoption of the new rule withdrawing the use of the proc ess in rem from the District Courts to enforce the payment of claims for repairs and supplies furnished to domestic ships, but this court de cided in several cases that the State Legislatures could not create a maritime lien, nor could they confer jurisdiction upon a state court to enforce such a lien by a sait or proceeding in rem as practiced in the admiralty courts. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall., 430 [71 U. S., XVIII., 401]; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall., 571 [71 U. S., XVIII., Expressions, however, to the same effect are found in other opinions of this court, and inasmuch as the question is not satisfactorily put in issue in the pleadings in this case, and does not appear to have been directly presented to the Circuit Court by either party, the court here is not inclined to enter more fully into the consideration of it at the present time. None of the interveners alleged in direct terms that they had a maritime lien upon the steamer or the proceeds in the registry of the court. Many libels of intervention were filed subsequent to the sale of the steamer, and some of them contain a prayer that the court will decree the payment of the claim of the libelant, with privilege on the steamer or the proceeds, but in no case does the libelant allege in terms that the contract set forth in the libel constitutes a maritime lien upon the steamer or the proceeds in the registry of the court, nor does the libelant pray for process to enforce any such lien. Doubtless the maritime lien is, in many cases, well described as a privilege in the thing, but the state law, which cannot be enforced in the admiralty, also gives material men a privilege or lien in such cases, and in view of that fact it may well be questioned whether the allega tion in the libels is sufficient to apprise the own ers of the specific nature of the interest which the libelants claim in the proceeds, as the rule of decision in the Federal Courts has been for many years that a maritime lien does not arise in such a case. Any person having an interest in the proceeds may intervene pro interesse suo, but he ought to allege enough to apprise the owner of the nature of the interest claimed. 43d |