United States; that they may be delivered up to the State, if still in the possession of the Bank, and if not, that the Bank may be decreed to pay their value to the State. A copy of the contract of the Military Board with White & Chiles is annexed to the bill. The Bank and Huntington answered jointly. The answer, among other things Denies all knowledge of the transactions between the Military Board and White & Chiles; it denies that they hold or claim the bonds described in the bill; it denies that they were in any way the agents of White & Chiles or bought any bonds from them; it denies that they had any knowledge that their bonds came through White & Chiles; it avers that they had heard there would be difficulty about the White & Chiles bonds, and before purchasing made diligent inquiry at the Treasury Department; that no one there could identify the bonds in question as White & Chiles' bonds, and that the Bank bought them believing they were not such; it avers that they knew the Secretary of the Treasury had paid similar bonds, and gives a large list of such bonds; it denies all knowledge of White & Chiles. The court below decreed against the Bank for the value of nineteen bonds and interest. Those bonds are numbered in the decree as follows: 4226, 4227, 4229, 4703, 4705, 4706, 4748, 4813, 4825, 4843, 4844, 4912, 4927, 4928, 4929, 4960, 4961, 4962 and 4963. The Bank removed the case to this court by appeal, and it is now before us for review. The complainant did not appeal. This defines the ground of the controversy in this court between the parties, and narrows the circle of inquiry to the bonds numerically specified in the decree. There is neither proof nor admission in the record of the execution of the contract of the Military Board with White & Chiles. It must, therefore, be laid out of view. Averments by the complainant, vital in the case, are denied by the answer. The answer is responsive and the denials absolute. This throws the burden of proof upon the complainant, and the denials are conclusive unless overcome by the testimony of two witnesses to the contrary; or the testimony of one witness, and circumstances established otherwise equal in effect to the direct testimony of another. The effort of Texas to leave the Union was revolutionary. All her legislative Acts for the accomplishment of that object were void. Her position has been aptly resembled to that of a county in rebellion against the State. Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall., 197 [76 U. S., XIX., 551]. While her enactments outside of the sphere of her normal authority were without validity, those within it, passed for the ordinary administration of her powers and duties as a State, had the same effect as if the rebellion had not occurred. The latter principle springs from an overruling necessity. A different rule would involve the dissolution of the social compact, and resolve society back into its original elements. The repeal touching the Governor's indorsement was an act of ordinary legislation. It was, therefore, within the rule last mentioned. If it had in view the promotion of the rebel cause it was too remote from that end, and its tendency too indirect to render it fatally liable to that objection. The repeal put an end to the existence of the restriction. But if the restriction had not been repealed I cannot admit that the want of the indorsement would have in anywise affected a bona fide holder; or, in other words, one who had honestly bought the bonds for a valuable consideration without knowledge of any infirmity in the title of his vendor. The United States made them payable "to the State of Texas, or bearer." Delivery passed the title, Texas could not restrain their transferability in the markets of the world, according to the law merchant, in any case, without bringing home notice to the party sought to be implicated or putting upon the bonds something which must necessarily operate as a notice to every buyer. Winston v. Westfeldt, 22 Ala., 760, has an important bearing upon this subject. There the holder of a promissory note had been enjoined from transferring it. He transferred it, underdue, by indorsement. The indorsee gave a valuable consideration and took it without notice of any defect. It was held that the title of the indorsee was valid, notwithstanding the injunction. The fact that the bonds were overdue when the Bank bought them does not affect the case. The transferee of overdue negotiable paper takes it liable to all the equities to which it was subject in the hands of the payee. But those equities must attach to the paper itself, and not arise from any collateral transaction. A debt due to the maker from the payee at the time of the transfer cannot be set off in a suit by the indorsee of the payee, although it might have been enforced if the suit had been brought by the latter. Burrough v. Moss, 10 B. & C., 558; Whitehead v. Walker, 10 Mees. & W., 696; Hughes v. Large, 2 Pa. St., 103; Gullett v. Hoy, 15 Mo., 400; Story, Bills, sec. 220. The result is the same whether the transfer be made by indorsement or delivery. But the protection of this principle is confined to the maker or obligor. It does not apply as between successive takers. Actual notice is necessary to affect them. There is no adverse presumption. Each one takes the legal title, and his equity is equal to that of his predecessors. "The equities being equal, the law must prevail." Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 614 [58 U. S., XV., 232]. The position of the transferee must be at least as favorable as that of the assignee of a chose in action. There the assignee takes subject to the equity residing in the debtor, but not to an equity residing in a third person against the assignor. Chancellor Kent, speaking of this rule in this class of cases, says: "The assignee can always go to the debtor and ascertain what claims he may have against the bond or other chose in action which he is about purchasing from the obligee, but he may not be able with the utmost diligence to ascertain the latent equity of some third person against the obligee. He has not any object to which he can direct his inquiries, and for this reason the assignee, without notice, of a chose in action, was preferred in the late case of Redfearn v. Ferrier, 1 Dow, 50, to that of a third party setting up a secret equity against the assignor. Lord Eldon observed in that case that if this were not so no assignment could ever be taken with safety." Murray v. Lilburn, 2 Johns. Ch., 443. This reasoning is strikingly applicable in the case before us. It was the duty of the cashier to inquire at the Treasury Department. IIe did so, and The only testimony in the record in any delearned that there was no objection to any of gree adverse to the Bank upon the points in isthe bonds but those which had been delivered sue, is that of Comptroller Taylor and that of to White & Chiles, and he became satisfied that Judge Paschal. those involved in this controversy did not belong to that class. It was impossible for him to find and consult all those through whose hands they might have passed before they were offered to the Bank. If negotiable paper, underdue, be in the hands of a bona fide holder, any subsequent holder may avail himself of that fact against the equity of the maker. 3 Kent, Com., 92; Chit. Bills, 221; Smith v. Hiscock, 14 Me., 449; Fairclough v. Pavia, 9 Exch., 690; Oulds v. Harrison, 10 Exch., 579. Every holder is presumed to have acquired his title before the maturity of the instrument and bona fide. The burden of proof rests upon the party alleging the contrary. Byles, Bills, 165. It is only in case of dishonor that the equities of the maker, or obligor, can be set up against a bona fide holder. It may be doubted whether these bonds belonged to that class. 9 Op. Atty-Gen., 413; 11 Id., 332. I have preferred to consider the case in this aspect, upon the hypothesis most favorable to the complainant. It is unnecessary to resolve, in this case, either way the doubt suggested. The rights of the holders of commercial paper were largely considered by this court in Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 343 [61 U. S., XV., 934], and in Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall, 110 [69 U. S., XVII., 857]. What was there said need not be repeated. It remains to consider the case in the light of the evidence. In order to maintain the decree it is necessary for the complainant to establish the following facts: (1) That the bonds specified in the decree were of those disposed of by the Military Board to White & Chiles; (2) That the transaction was in aid of the rebellion; (3) That the Bank, before it bought, had notice of the infirmity of the title of White & Chiles. And these facts must be established by the measure of proof requisite to overcome the responsive denials of the answer. It is shown by the complainant's own testimony-and there is none to the contrary-that six of the bonds here in question were transferred and delivered by the authorities of the State pursuant to an Act of the Legislature to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. They are numbered 4703, 4705, 4706, 4748, 4813 and 4825. It is proved by the same testimony that four more were not of those delivered to White & Chiles. They are numbered 4960, 4961, 4962 and 4963. It is also proved that five of the bonds, Nos. 4843, 4844, 4927, 4928 and 4929, were sold to the Bank by Jay Cooke & Co. It is not shown when Cooke & Co. acquired them. It is, therefore, presumed they bought them underdue and bona fide, and their title inures to the benefit of their vendee. Three of the bonds, Nos. 4226, 4227 and 4229, were bought by the Bank of Wolf. There is some testimony tending to show that he bought after they were due. But there is no such proof as to his vendor. The presumption as to the latter is, therefore, otherwise. This ends the controversy as to these eighteen bonds. The remaining bond is No. 4912. In his examination-in-chief the Comptroller said: "From all the circumstances, my opinion is those were of the White & Chiles bonds. That is only an opinion, however." On cross-examination: Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, that White & Chiles, or either of them, ever saw one of these bonds? A. I know it only from the papers on file in the department; that is, from my opinion of what those papers show. They are too numerous for me to present here now, and I might add, that one would have to study them very carefully, and make his calculations as to the different bonds. It would be by taking the seven hundred and eighty-two bonds that were not indorsed, and tracing them back by the evidence into the hands of those parties who held them at different times, and ascertaining, in some instances, the particular numbers that were known to be in the hands of particular parties before the transaction between White & Chiles and the Military Board, and taking others, again, that came from the State of Texas, and then drawing my conclusions as to what were White & Chiles bonds." Deposition of Mr. Taylor, Record, p. 37. With these admissions before us it is sufficient to remark that his testimony is clearly incompetent. Armstrong v. Boylan, 1 South., 76; Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N. Y., 514. And, if not so, it would be insufficient to maintain, in behalf of the complainant, the issue between the parties. The same remarks are applicable to the testimony of Judge Paschal. So far as it affects this case it is liable to the same objections. He says, among other things: "I was employed by Governor Pease to prosecute this suit, and caused it to be instituted in 1868; and judging from a careful examination made in Texas, and in the Treasury Department here, I feel confident that the bonds redeemed for the Bank, described by Mr. Tayler, were a part of the bonds which passed through the hands of White & Chiles, and I judge this from the cir cumstances which he has stated." This is mere opinion, founded upon data not disclosed and in part upon the opinion of another witness. Further remarks upon the subject are unnecessary. There are other defects in the evidence for the complainant, but it is unnecessary to advert to them. Altogether it fails wholly to sustain the case made by the bill. The decree of the court below is, in my opinion, properly reversed. Cited-96 U. S., 196; 1 Hughes, 412; 81 N. C., 253; 31 Am. Rep., 501; 21 W. Va., 301; 45 Am. Rep., 565. OSCAR A. BURTON, Piff. in Err., v. WILLIAM S. DRIGGS. (See S. C., 20 Wall., 125-137.) NOTE. What particularity in exceptions is neces sary in order to review in appellate court; general erception or objection, when not sufficient. See note to Moore v. Bk. of Metropolis, 38 Ü. S. (13 Pet.), 302. Grounds of objection, ichen must be stated-sec ondary evidence-instructions to jury. 1. Where a party excepts to the admission of testimony, he is bound to state his objection specifically, and in a proceeding for error he is confined to the specific objection so taken. If he assign no ground of exception, the mere objection cannot avail him. 2. The rule, that the contents of any written instrument lost or destroyed may be proved by competent evidence, applies to depositions. Where a deposition is lost, a party is not bound to supply its place by another, but may give parol evidence of its contents. 3. Where books of a bank are out of the State and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence to prove their contents is admissible. When it is necessary to prove the results of voluminous facts, or of the examination of many books and pa pers and the examination cannot be conveniently inade in court, the results may be proved by the person who made the examination. ered the whole case, it is not the duty of the judge 4. Where the instructions given to the jury covto give others suggested by either party. [No. 284.] Argued Apr. 10, 1874. Decided Apr. 20, 1874. Ν IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit ed States for the District of Vermont. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Driggs, the defendant in error, and was tried by a jury on the plea of the general issue. The defendant in error on the trial gave evidence to show that he was applied to in the City of New York by the plaintiff in error, who proposed to sell and assign to him a certain claim which he, plaintiff in error, pretended to have against the Tioga County Bank, in the State of Pennsylvania. The claim was pretended to be evidenced by a certain paper, signed by the plaintiff in error and three other persons, and contained in the record. This paper recited, in substance, that the plaintiff in error and the other signers had each advanced to that bank the sums therein specified, to enable the bank to redeem its circulation, which sums were to be refunded by the bank; and that, in the meantime, the bank agreed to loan the parties, on paper payable in New York, not exceeding $10.000 at any one time, at five per cent. interest. The plaintiff in error represented that the facts recited in this paper (called A) were true; that he had advanced to the bank the sum of money and upon the terms therein stated, and was a creditor of the bank therefor. The defendant in error relying upon this representation, and believing it to be true, and having no knowledge or reason to suspect the contrary, purchased the pretended claim of the plaintiff in error against the bank, paid him for it the sum of $7,060.18, with interest from the date of the pretended ad vance, and took an assignment of it in writing. On application to the bank in Pennsylvania, the defendant in error learned that the whole statement of the plaintiff in error, as well as the recital in the paper A, was false; that no such transaction with the Tioga County Bank had ever taken place; that the plaintiff in error had not and never had such a claim or any other claim against the bank, the officers of which did not know him and had never had any dealings with him. The plaintiff in error did not attempt to controvert these facts; but admitting that he had no such claim against the bank as recited in the paper (A) set up in defense that he did in fact own certain powers of attorney to transfer stock in that bank, executed by parties who owned such stock, and for which he paid $10,000; that he explained to defendant in error, at the time of the assignment to him, that such was the real nature of the claim transferred to him, and delivered to him these powers of attorney; and that defendant in error received them, and subsequently acted under them, participated in an election of directors, and assisted in redeeming the circulation of the bank. In reply, the defendant in error introduced evidence to show that this defense was entirely false. Upon these facts the defendant in error claimed to recover back the money paid by him to the plaintiff in error, upon the grounds: 1. Of the warranty of the plaintiff in error, both express and implied, that the claim defendant in error, was genuine. scribed in the paper (A) and assigned to the de 2 That the money was obtained from the defendant in error by the plaintiff in error by fraud and without equivalent. 3. That the consideration upon which the money was paid and received had totally failed. The court, after intimating an opinion that the law was with the plaintiff upon the questions of warranty and failure of considerations, if the facts claimed by the plaintiff were made out. ruled that, for the purposes of the present trial, the case would be submitted to the jury only upon the question of fraud; and upon that subject the court instructed the jury, in substance, as follows: that they were to inquire what the real transaction was between the defendant and the plaintiff, as shown by the evidence; what were the representations actually made by the defendant to the plaintiff; were they true; and what, if anything. did the plaintiff realize from the transaction; that, in this view of the case, the paper (A) might be regarded only as evidence, in connection with the other evidence, of what the representations of the defendant actually were; that it was not denied that the plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of money claimed and took the assignment attached to the paper (A); that the jury would then inquire, whether the representations of the defendant, which included that transaction, were such as the paper (A) and the evidence for the plaintiff tended to show, or whether they were such as the defendant claimed them to have been; that if the statements there made by the defendant were such as his evidence tended to show, the plaintiff could not recover in this action; that if the statements and representations claimed by the plaintiff were proved to have been made, the jury would then inquire whether they were true. Had the defendant any such interest in the Tioga County Bank as he had represented? If the representations were not true,did the plaintiff receive or realize anything under the assignment in any way? If he did not get the interest described in the paper (A) did he get, under the assignment, any other interest or equivalent? Did he receive from the defendant the stock, or interest in the stock of the bank, that defendant I claimed to have transferred to him? That, under the assignment, any interest the defendant actually had in the bank, if any, passed to the plaintiff. Had the defendant, then, any such interest as described in the assignment, or any actual interest in the bank? And for the purposes of the trial, the jury were instructed: that, if the plaintiff, under the assignment or in the transaction in question, received or acquired any interest whatever in the bank, either such as paper A purported to describe, or such as the defendant claimed to have transferred to the plaintiff, the verdict should be for the defendant. But if the representations of the defendant were such as were claimed by the plaintiff and were untrue in point of fact, and the plaintiff received nothing from the defendant, under the assignment or out of the transaction, then the verdict should be for the plaintiff. These instructions were explained and applied to the evidence. Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff. A motion for new trial was made and overruled, and the case brought to this court by writ of er ror. The nature of the exceptions appears in the opinion. Messrs. Daniel Roberts, L. P. Poland and B. B. Smalley, for plaintiff in error: The circuit court erred in admitting in evidence the paper, claimed to be a copy of the deposition of Vine De Pue. No Statute of Congress authorizes the use of a copy of a deposition as evidence, where the original is lost. No decision of the court is found which sanctions this. The decision made must rest for its justification upon the common law doctrine, that secondary evidence is admissible, when the primary cannot be had; as parol evidence of the contents of a lost writing. But there are good reasons why this doctrine should not be extended to the case of lost depositions: 1. The statutes, authorizing the use of depositions in cases at law, are exceptional, varying from common law, and imply the existence of a better kind of evidence, viz.: the testimony of the witness in open court; and they allow depositions only in peculiar cases, and to prevent a possible failure of justice. As far, therefore, as the statutes go, we may follow, but no further. Depositions themselves are regarded as only secondary evidence. Haupt v. Henninger, 37 Pa., 138. 2. The rule requiring the best evidence attain able to be used in the cause, demands that the witness, being in life, should be produced, not to testify to what he once testified in a deposition, but what he at the time of the trial knows of the matter. For this (the best evidence) the statute allows, in peculiar cases, an inferior grade, viz. : a deposition made out of court; but goes no further. The common rule then should exclude evidence of a still inferior grade (as, a copy of a deposition) so long, at least, as the tes timony of the witness in court, or a new deposition can be maintained. 3. It might be safely admitted, that if the witness, De Pue, had deceased, the contents of his deposition, being lost, might be proved; for, in such case, this would have been the best attainable evidence. But it would be a dangerous precedent and practice to allow secondary evidence of the contents of depositions, except in case of such absolute necessity. Brown v. Woodman, 6 Car. & P., 206 (25 Eng. C. L., 358); Follett v. Murray, 17 Vt.,530; Low v. Peters, 36 Vt., 177. As to the deposition of Turner, the defendant below claimed that he had advanced certain money for the benefit of Tioga County Bank, and that he had certain powers of attorney which entitled him to stock in that bank, and represented stock. The plaintiff below met this claim by evidence that there was not, upon the books of said bank, any evidence of the exist ence of such claim. 1. These books, so called, were but private writings and memoranda, and were not evidence, per se-certainly not as to strangersthough admissible, perhaps, as memoranda, in aid of the testimony of the party making them. They were used purely as substantive evidence. 2. Before the admission of secondary evidence of the contents of the books, more especially evidence of what does not appear upon the books, it should have been proved that the bank had and kept books, and their authenticity that those books had upon them, in regular entry, items and all items of the class represented by the said defendant's claims. It is only in such case that the absence of an entry representing the defendant's claim could furnish an inference of the non-existence of the claim. No preliminary evidence of this kind was given, but these preliminary facts were assumed. Highland Turnpike Co.v. McKean, 10 Johns., 154. The contract in this case, as well as the assignment, were instruments under seal. An action of assumpsit, therefore, could not be maintained, which counted upon the instrument. Young v. Preston, 4 Cranch, 239; 1 Ch. Pl., 103. Mr. E. J. Phelps, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont. The action was assumpsit. The defendant in error was the plaintiff in the court below, and recovered the judgment which is sought to be reversed in this proceeding. The first assignment of error relates to the admission in evidence of a copy of the deposition of Vine De Pue. The bill of exceptions sets forth that the original deposition was regularly taken, sealed up and transmitted to the clerk of the court where the cause was pending, and by him properly opened and filed; and that thereafter it was lost and could not be found; and that the copy offered was a true copy, taken under the direction of the clerk, and by him compared and certified. The exception is as follows: "The defendant objected to the copy on the ground that it was not the original. The court overruled the exception and admitted the deposition, to which decision the defendant excepted." It is a rule of law that where a party excepts to the admission of testimony he is bound to state his objection specifically, and in a proceeding for error he is confined to the objection so taken. If he assign no ground of exception, the mere objection cannot avail him. Camden v. Doremus, 3 How., 515; Hinde v. Longworth, 11 Wheat., 199. In the latter case this court said: "As a general rule, we think the party ought to be confined, in examining the admissibility of evidence, to the specific objection taken to it. The attention of the court is called to the testimony in that point of view only." Here the objection was that the copy was not the original. This, as a fact, was self-evident; but as a ground of objection it was wholly indefinite. It does not appear to have been suggested that the place of the lost deposition could only be supplied by another one of the same witness retaken, and that secondary evidence was inadmissible to prove the contents of the former. If the contents of the one lost could be proved at all by such evidence, that offered was certainly admissible for that purpose. But the objection was presented in the argument before us in the latter shape, and we shall consider it accordingly. It is an axiom in the law of evidence that the contents of any written instrument lost or destroyed may be proved by competent evidence. Judicial records and all other documents of a kindred character are within the rule. Renner v. Bk., 9 Wheat., 581; Riggs v. Tayloe, 9 Wheat., 483; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 509. But it is said a different rule as to depositions-unless the wit ness be dead-obtains in Vermont, and the cases of Follett v. Murray, 17 Vt.,530, and Lou v. Peters, 36 Vt., 177, are referred to as supporting the exception. The next assignment of error is the admission in evidence "of such parts of the depositions of A. L. Turner and C. P. Steers as refer to what appeared or did not appear on the books of the Tioga County Bank." It was shown by the plaintiff in this connection that the books in question were in the Village of Tioga, Pennsylvania, that the plaintiff had endeavored to obtain them for use on this trial, and that those having the custody of them refused to permit them to go. The testimony of Turner was, in substance, that he was the cashier; that he had examined the books and papers in the bank relating to its affairs from its organization down to July, 1859, and that he found no evidence of any kind that the defendant ever had any connection or transaction with the bank, or any interest in it whatever; and that subsequently, at the request of the plaintiff and for the purposes of this suit, he repeated the examination with the same result. Steers testified that he was cashier of the bank from about the 15th of September, 1858, to about the 29th of April, 1859, and that during that time the defendant, Burton, did not furnish to the bank $7,060.18, or any other sum of money; that his name was never on the books of the bank, nor did the bank owe him anything on any account during that period, and that the witness did not think his name appeared on the books of the bank as a stockholder during that time. The books being out of the State and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, secondary evidence to prove their contents was admissible. The last assignment relates to the charge of the court. Those cases are unlike the one before us. In Follett v. Murray the witness resided within the State, and there being no copy of the caption it When it is necessary to prove the results of did not appear that the deposition had been voluminous facts, or of the examination of many regularly taken. In the other case the witness books and papers and the examination cannot was dead, and no question was raised as to any be conveniently made in court, the results may defect in the lost original. The copy was, there- be proved by the person who made the examfore, admitted as of course. If a deposition be ination. 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 93. Here the obnot properly taken it is not made admissible by ject was to prove, not that the books did, but the death of the witness. Johnson v. Clark, 1 that they did not show certain things. The reTyler, 449. In Harper v. Cook, 1 Car. & P., sults sought to be established were not affirm139, it was held that the contents of a lost affiative, but negative. If such testimony be comdavit might be shown by secondary evidence. petent as to the former, a multo fortiori must it The necessity of retaking it was not suggested. be so to prove the latter. In the present case the witness lived in another State and more than one hundred miles from the place of trial. The process of the court could not reach him; for all jurisdictional purposes he was as if he were dead. It is well settled that if books or papers necessary as evidence in a court in one State be in the possession of a person living in another State, secondary evidence, without further showing, may be given to prove the contents of such papers, and notice to produce them is unnecessary. Shepard v. Giddings, 22 Conn., 282; Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo., 475; Teall v. Van Wyck, 10 Barb., 376; see, also, Boone v. Van Dyke,3 Mon., 532; Eaton v. Camp bell, 7 Pick., 10; Bailey v. Johnson, 9 Cow., 115; Mauri v. Heffernan, 13 Johns., 58. Here there was nothing to prevent the operation of the general rule as to proof touching writings lost or destroyed. The deposition was one of the files in the case. The plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the contents of that document. Having been lost without his fault, he was not bound to supply its place by another and a different deposition, which might, or might not, be the same in effect with the prior one. There was no error in admitting in evidence the copy to which this exception relates. The examination of this subject renders it necessary to refer briefly to the cause of action. The defendant, Burton, and three others, executed an instrument, under seal bearing date October 20, 1858, whereby it was recited and agreed as follows: that the parties had severally furnished to the Tioga Bank, to enable it to redeem its bills promptly, certain sums of money, to wit: O. A. Burton, $7,060.18, etc.; that the bank was to refund said moneys as soon as it was in a condition to do so, and that it would lend to said parties, not exceeding $10,000 at any one time, on paper payable in New York, with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum; that the Tioga Bank had advanced to be paid in on the stock of the Pittston Bank of Pennsylvania, $9,870, which money belonged to the four parties to the instrument, and it was agreed that each of the parties owned one fourth part thereof, less cost and expenses. To this paper was annexed a further instrument, under seal, dated April 29, 1859, whereby the defendant assigned to the plaintiff, for the consideration of $7,060.18, his interest in that amount paid by him to the Tioga |