time prescribed has elapsed, because he is a cit- | Wherefore they, the defendants, pray and deizen of that State, while the other cannot be- mand judgment against the plaintiffs, and that cause he is a citizen of New Jersey, when each the plaintiffs be enjoined and restrained from has been equally and always liable to service of ever claiming, suing for, or setting up any title process. Nor do I believe, on a review of all to the said several tracts of land, or either of the cases, that the courts of New York have them, or any part or portion thereof, and that intended to give such a construction to those the pretended estate and interest of the plaintstatutes. iffs be determined and wholly held for naught. Leave was granted to the plaintiffs by the My brother Strong agrees with me in these court to file a reply, and they did so, as more views. fully appears in the record, in which they controvert each and every of the material allega Cited 21 Wall., 497; 104 U. S., 629; 3 Sawy., 211; 4 tions of the answer, except that the defendants Sawy., 129. Fee simple title is claimed by the present defendants to the several tracts of land described in the declaration, and they commenced an action of ejectment to recover the possession of the same, and for the rents and profits, and for the value of certain timber which, as they allege, the defendants have cut thereon and converted to their own use. are in the possession of the premises, and allege that the principal defendant acquired the possession by wrongful and unlawful means, and re-assert their claim of title, as set forth in the declaration. Subsequently the parties waived a jury and went to trial before the court. Evidence was introduced on both sides, and the court made numerous findings of fact and several conclusions of law. Certain exceptions were also taken both to the rulings and the findings of the court. Some delay followed, and both parties having been fully heard the court rendered judg ment as follows: "That the plaintiffs have and recover of and from said defendants the lands and tenements described in the declaration. That they also have and recover of the said William A. Simpson the sum of $4,300, the value of the rents, issues and profits of said lands and tenements, and for the timber taken from said land by the said defendant. That defendants the sum of $2,600, to be credited as the plaintiffs also have and recover of the other part of the said $4,300, if collected, it being the value of the rents above found." Judgment was signed on the 15th of Novem fendant, William A. Simpson, filed a petition ber, 1870, and on the following day the dein error and a transcript of the record in the in which he represents that the other defendclerk's office of the Supreme Court of the State. the petition, but the record shows that all the ants, naming each, will not consent to join in other defendants, on the 12th of January following, filed a petition in error in the Supreme Court, praying that the judgment rendered in the subordinate court should be reversed for the reasons stated in the petition of the first petitioner. Due notice was given, by a summons issued Eight other persons besides the present plaint- under the first petition, to the original plaintiff were joined as defendants in the suit, and iffs and all of the defendants except the first they were all duly served with process and ap- petitioner, that the first petitioner had filed such peared and made defense in the first district a petition and a transcript of the record in the court of the State where the writ was returnable. clerk's office of the State Supreme Court, but Two defenses were set up, as follows: (1) all of the persons named as defendants in the They, the defendants, denied every allegation original writ are also named as such in the sumand averment of the declaration. (2) They mons issued by the clerk of the State Supreme pleaded that the title to the several tracts of Court. Service of the summons was duly acland was in William A. Simpson; that he acknowledged by the original plaintiffs and by quired the same in the manner and by the means circumstantially set forth in their second plea, and that the other defendants are in the possession of the said several tracts as tenants of the said Simpson, and have large and valuable crops growing thereon, and that they hold the same by lease from the actual owner of the title. NOTE.-Parties in error, who necessary. See note to Owings v. Kincannon, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.), 399. all of the eight defendants who did not sign the first petition in error. Seasonable entry of the case was made in the Supreme Court of the State, and the parties having been fully heard the said Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the subordinate court and sent down their mandate commanding the subordinate court to cause execution to be had of the said judgment of the said Supreme Court, according to law. Early application was made by the present plaintiff to the clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for that district for a writ of error, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, to remove the cause into this court, and the record shows that it was duly issued and that it was properly allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. Errors of a material character are assigned by the plaintiff as reasons for the reversal of the judgment rendered in the state courts, but it is necessary in the first place to examine the objection taken by the defendants to the jurisdiction of this court, as that objection presents a preliminary question which, if decided in favor of the defendants, will dispose of the case. They, the defendants, insist that the writ of error should be dismissed because one only of the nine defendants in the court below is made a party in the writ as issued by the clerk of the circuit court, and because only one of the number has given bond to prosecute the writ of error with effect, as required by the Act of Congress in such case made and provided. of all is affected by the judgment, the rule is universal, that all must join in the writ of error, else it is open to the other party to demand that it be dismissed, unless a severance of the parties in interest has been effected by summons and severance, or by some equivalent action appearing in the record. Smyth v. Strader, 12 How., 327; Davenport v. Fletcher, 16 How., 142; Wilson v. Ins. Co., 12 Pet., 140; O'Dowd v. Russell, 14 Wall., 402 [81 U. S., XX., 857]; Deneale v. Stump, 8 Pet., 526. Apply that rule to the present case, and it is clear that the writ of error must be dismissed, as one only of the nine defendants in the orignal suit is named in the writ of error; nor is there anything in the record to take the case out of the operation of the general rule, as the plaintiffs in the court below have recovered judgment for the several tracts of land described in the declaration, against all of the defendants therein joined. Separate judgment for the damages and the whole of the rents and profits is rendered against the present plaintiff; but the court also rendered judgment against the other eight defendants for the amount of the rents and profits, to be credited to the other defendant when collected, which shows that each defendant is interested in every part of the judgment. Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it is quite clear that the writ of error in this case must be dismissed, as all the defendants are directly or indirectly affected by the judgment in respect to the damages and rents, issues and profits, as well as the judgment that the title to the lands described in the declaration is in the present defendants. Such a controversy can not be properly re-examined here by installments, nor unless all the parties to be affected by the result are before the court. Writ of error dismissed. Mr. Justice Bradley did not sit during the argument of this cause, and took no part in its decision. Cited 78 N. Y., 226. TWENTY PER CENT. CASES. Where there was a joint judgment against several and one only of the defendants sued out a writ of error, without joining the others, it was decided by this court, Marshall, Ch. J., giving the opinion, that it was irregular, and the court dismissed the writ of error. Williams v. Bk., 11 Wheat., 414. Subsequently the same rule was applied in a case where the cause was removed into this court by appeal, the opinion of the court being also given by the Chief Justice. Owings v. Kincannon, 7 Pet., 402. Reference was made in the opinion in that case to the former decision, but the court, not relying merely on authority, decided that it was correct as matter of principle that the whole cause ought to be brought before the court at the same time, and that all the parties united in interest ought to unite in the appeal, as appeals are subject to the same rules, regulations and restrictions as are prescribed by law in case of writs of error. Since those decisions were published, the question has frequently been presented to this court, and has uniformly been determined in the same way, where it appeared that the interest was joint and that no severance had been effected either in the judgment or by 733. UNITED STATES, Appt., v. THOMAS FUGITT. subsequent summons and severance or by some proceeding of an equivalent character. terson v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 416 [77 U. S., 735. XIX., 953]; Hampton v. Rouse, 13 Wall., 187 [80 U. S., XX., 593]. Undoubtedly, those cases show what the general rule is, but it is equally well established, where some of the parties in interest refuse to join in the writ of error or appeal, that the others are entitled to resort to the process and proceeding of summons and severance to enable them effectually to remove the cause from the subordinate court into the appellate tribunal for re examination. Todd v. 744. Daniel, 16 Pet., 523. Cases arise, beyond all | 745. doubt, where only one of several defendants is 740. affected by the judgment or decree, and it is 746. well settled that in such cases the party whose interest only is affected by the alleged error may carry up the case without joining the others in Additional compensation to government employés the appeal or writ of error. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How., 203; Germain v. Mason, 12 Wall., 261 [79 U. S., XX., 392]; Cox v. U. S., 6 Pet., 182. Exceptional cases of the kind occasionally arise, but where the interest is joint and the interest Mas 66 66 734. 46 736. 737. 738. "J. D. TOWNLEY. "JOHN CULLEN. 66 CHARLES WOOD. "TIMOTHY CRAVEN 'JOHN WILD. JOHN DONNELLY. "PATRICK WELSH. JAMES HANNAN.. THOMAS DURKIN. "JOHN SMITH. 66 "MAURICE TUCKER "O.H.O.HOFFMAN repealed nor the right of recovery barred by the Appropriation Act of July 12, 1870. 2. A sexton at Arlington Cemetery is not within same or higher rates than was paid by private individuals or corporations for the same work. Messrs. N. P. Chipman, A. A. Hosmer. C. P. Culver and J. Daniels, for claimants. Messrs. G. H. Williams, Atty-Gen., and John Decided May 4, 1874. Goforth, Asst. to Atty-Gen., for the United States. the words of the Joint Resolution, nor a plate printer, working under a contract. [Nos. 733-746.] Argued Apr. 22, 1874. APPEALS from the Court of Claims. The general nature of these cases is explained in the opinion. Thomas Fugitt was employed as a machinist in the Navy Yard at Washington, D. C., upon daily wages, at the agreed sum and price of $3.25 per day. J. D. Townley was employed as coppersmith on the Treasury extension, upon daily wages. He was employed and paid at the highest market price then paid by private parties for similar services. Under specific appropriation for the construction of the Treasury extension, contracts were entered into for finished work, comprehending both materials and labor; materials separately, and labor by the day sep, arately. The services claimed were rendered under the latter contract. John Cullen was a watchman upon the Capitol extension at daily wages, and was employed and paid at the highest market price then paid by private parties for similar services. His compensation changed during the year. Charles Wood was employed as a laborer upon monthly wages in the Quartermaster's Department in the City of Washington. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Additional compensation is claimed by the respective appellants, as employés in the civil service of the United States in this city, by virtue of the Joint Resolution of the 28th of February, 1867, which provides that twenty per cent. additional compensation shall be allowed and paid to certain classes of such employés in Washington, as therein designated. Civil officers, whose annual salaries do not exceed $3,500, and all clerks, whether temporary or permanent, and messengers and watchmen, are specifically named in the Resolution, including enlisted men detailed as such, and the provision is that the additional allowance shall be computed upon the gross amount of the compensation received by such employé as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon the pay of the employé for that fiscal year, and that the benefit of the Resolution shall extend to employés, male and female, in the executive mansion and in any of the following named departments, or any bureau or division thereof, to wit: state, treasury, war, navy, interior, postoffice, attorney-general, and agricultural, and including civil officers and all clerks and employés, male and female, in the offices of the Timothy Craven was employed in the Treas ury extension as a laborer upon daily wages. John Wild was employed by the authority of the Surgeon-General of the Army, as a carpen-coast survey, naval observatory, navy yard, ter at the depot for receiving and distributing medical supplies in Washington. John Donnelly was employed as a watchman, laborer and teamster, by the Quartermaster's Department at the City of Washington. Ó. H. O. Hoffman was employed by one of the Quartermasters on duty in the Department at Washington. The facts in the case of Patrick Welsh are the same as in the case of J. D. Townley. James Hannan was employed as a laborer by the Commissary Department at Washington. Thomas Durkin was employed as a laborer upon daily wages at the Washington Arsenal, by General George D. Ramsey. The facts in the case of John Smith are the same as in the case of John Donnelly. Maurice Tucker was employed in the secret service division of the Treasury Department in the capacity of detective, and at a monthly salary of $150. George A. Bell was a plate printer, in the bureau of Printing and Engraving in the Treasury Department. He was paid the market price for his work, the price being neither a salary nor a per diem compensation, but a fixed rate for the work done. In the performance of his duties he employed and paid an assistant, but the pay of the assistant was received directly by her from the disbursing officers of the Treas and was deducted by them from the amount earned by claimant. The amount paid to him after such deduction was $1,184.30, for 20 per cent. of which the court below entered judg ment. Each of the above employés was paid at the arsenal, paymaster general, bureau of refugees, freedmen and abandoned lands, quartermasters, capitol and treasury extension, city postoffice, and commissioner of public buildings; to the photographer and assistant photographer of the Treasury Department, to the superintendent of meters, and to lamp-lighters under the commissioner of public buildings. Judgments rendered by the Court of Claims, involving controversies of a like character, were removed into this court by appeal on a former occasion, when it became the duty of this court to examine the Joint Resolution in question and to determine what, in the judgment of the court, is its actual scope and true intent and meaning, as applied to the several cases then before the court. Attempt was then made in argument to convince the court that the words of the Resolution, "in the civil service of the United States," as there employed, should be restricted to persons filling offices or holding appointments established by law, but the court rejected that narrow construction of the phrase and unanimously decided that neither a commission nor a warrant of appointment is necessary to entitle an employé to the benefits of the Joint Resolution, provided he was actually and properly employed in the executive mansion, or in any of the departments, or in any bureau or division thereof, or in any of the offices specifically designated in the said Joint Resolution; that persons so employed here are properly to be regarded as employés in the civil service of the United States within the true intent and meaning of that phrase as there used, if they were employed by the head of the department, or of the bureau or any division of the department, charged with that duty and authorized to make such contracts and fix the compensation of the person or persons employed, even though the particular employment may not be designated in an appropriation Act. Twenty Per Cent. cases, 13 Wall., 576 [80 U. S., XX., 708]. become fixed and vested, and the Joint Resolution had ceased to be operative in respect to prospective services. Viewed in the light of these suggestions grave doubts arise whether the repealing Act in question applies at all to the Joint Resolution, as it is difficult to believe that Congress would deem it necessary to repeal a provision which had expired by its own limitation more than three years before they acted upon the subject. Mere supererogation, however, it is said, cannot properly be imputed to the National Legislature; and there would be much force in the sug been in operation and had been the only provision of the kind to which the descriptive words of the repealing Act would apply, but the fact is plainly otherwise, as there are several Acts of corresponding import which were in full force at that date and which, it must be admitted, are unquestionably included within those descriptive words. 12 Stat. at L., 587; 14 Stat. at L., 206; 15 Stat. at L., 77. Such was the unanimous opinion of the court as to the true construction of the Joint Resolution under consideration on that occasion, and the court, with equal unanimity, adheres to that conclusion in the cases before the court. Many persons, not employed as clerks or mes-gestion if the Joint Resolution had at that time sengers of a department, are in the public service by virtue of an employment by the head of a department, or by the head of some bureau of a department or division thereof authorized to make such contracts, and such persons are as much in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of the Joint Resolution, as the clerks and messengers employed in the rooms of the department building. U. S. v. Belew, 2 Brock., 280; Graham v. U. S., 1 Nott & H.,380; Com. v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & R., 149. Much discussion of that topic, however, is unnecessary, as the question was explicitly determined in our former decision, to which reference is made for a full exposition of the present views of the court upon that subject. Grant all that; still it is insisted that the Joint Resolution has been repealed since that decision was made, and that the effect of the repealing Act is to bar the right of recovery in all of the cases under consideration; in support of which proposition reference is made to the 4th section of the Appropriation Act of the 12th of July, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 250, which enacts that all Acts and Joint Resolutions or parts thereof, and all Resolutions of either House of Congress granting extra compensation or pay, be, and the same are hereby repealed, to take effect on the first day of July in the same year. Two propositions are submitted by the United States, based upon that repealing Act to show that the respective appellants in these cases cannot recover: (1) That the repeal of the Joint Resolution prevents the officers of the treasury from paying the additional compensation after the date of its passage. (2) That the repealing Act, even if the Resolution created in implied contract and gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to enforce it, devested the Court of Claims of all jurisdiction in such controversies. Both of the propositions, as it seems to the court, overlook the material facts of the case, all of which are undisputed. They are as follows: (1) That the Joint Resolution ceased to be operative at the end of the fiscal year in which it was enacted. (2) That such additional compensation is allowed only for that year. (3) That the claims in these cases are only for such additional compensation during that fiscal year. (4) That the Joint Resolution ceased to be operative at the close of that fiscal year. (5) That the right to such additional compensation be came fixed and vested when the year's services were faithfully performed. (6) That the repealing Act, which it is supposed constitutes a bar to the cause of action in these cases, did not become a law until more than three years after the right to the additional compensation had See 20 WALL, U. S., Book 22. Enough appears in the repealing Act itself to show that Congress did not intend to give it any retroactive effect, except as therein provided, as the Act expressly enacts that the provision in question shall take effect on the first day of July next before the day it was approved, which affords a demonstration that Congress never intended that it should retroact to any other or greater extent. 16 Stat. at L., 250. Courts of justice agree that no statute, however positive in its terms, is to be construed as designed to interfere with existing contracts, rights of actions, or with vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly declared or is to be necessarily implied, and pursuant to that rule courts will apply new statutes only to future cases, unless there is something in the nature of the case or in the language of the new provision which shows that they were intended to have a retroactive operation. Even though the words of a statute are broad enough in their literal extent to conprehend existing cases, they must yet be construed as applicable only to cases that may hereafter arise, unless the language employed expresses a contrary intention in unequivocal terms. Pott. Dwar., 161; Wood v. Oakley, 11 Paige, 403; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 325; Jarvis v. Jarvis, 3 Edw., 466; McEwen v. Den, 24 How., 242 [65 U. S., XVI., 672]; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall., 329 [69 U. S., XVII., 871]; Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumn., 535; U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cranch, 399. Such a law, if passed by a State, and construed to have the effect claimed for it in this case by the appellants, would be unconstitutional and void; but it is not necessary to discuss any such proposition in this case, as there is not a word in the repealing Act to support the conclusion that Congress intended to rescind any antecedent contract, or to enact any bar to the right of recovery in such cases where the service had been faithfully performed before the repealing Act was passed. Apply those rules to the cases before the court and it is clear the appellees in the first twelve are entitled to recover, as the finding of the court below shows that the claimant in each of those cases is included within the Joint Resolution as construed and defined by this court. 22 341 States for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs in error doing business as distillers in Chicago by the name and style of H. J. Pahlman & Co., filed their declarations in assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against the defendant as Collector of Internal Revenue in said District, for the recovery of certain sums of money illegally assessed upon them as such distillers, and collected of them under protest by defendant. But the other two claimants, to wit: United IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States v. 0. H. O. Hoffman and U. S. v. George A. Bell, are not entitled to recover, the former because he was employed as sexton at the Arlington Cemetery, in the State of Virginia, and not in Washington," and, consequently, his claim is not within the words of the Joint Resolution. Nor was the latter, in the civil service of the United States within the meaning of that provision, as he was a plate printer working under a contract at an agreed rate "per one hundred sheets of face printing and per one hundred sheets of back printing." He employed an assistant, for whose compensation he was responsible; but the finding of the subordinate court shows that the assistant was paid directly by the disbursing officer, and that the sum thus paid was deducted from the gross earnings of the claimant. Suffice it to say that the claimant was a contractor, and that he employed another to do most or all of the work, and in the judgment of the court such a contractor is not entitled to the additional compensation allowed and directed to be paid by the Joint Resolution under consideration. Judgment affirmed in the twelve cases first named. Judgment reversed in the two cases last named, and the causes remanded, with directions to dismiss the respective petitions. Mr. Justice Swayne, dissenting: I dissent from the judgment of the court in these cases in favor of the claimants, and will give my views as briefly as may be. When the Resolution giving the twenty per cent. was passed, nearly eight months of the year to which the allowance related had elapsed. The allow ance was a mere gratuity. Hence there was no vested right arising from the Resolution and there could be none. But the Resolution was operative in each case until the clamaint was paid. When repealed, the gratuity which it gave fell with it. The repeal necessarily had that effect. I see no reason for giving the repealing section a more limited construction. It was intended to take away from all those who had not then been paid, the right to be paid thereafter. I think, therefore, that the judgments of the Court of Claims should be reversed. I am authorized to say that Mr. Chief Justice Chase and Mr. Justice Davis concur in this opinion. On petition of defendant, the cause was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook County to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. On hearing the argument upon the demurrer to the declaration, the circuit court sustained the demurrer, and rendered judgment for costs against the plaintiffs; and they now prosecute a writ of error on the judgment out of this court. The case further appears in the opinion. Messrs. Walter B. Scates and Whitney, for plaintiffs in error: 1. The law taxes the capacity of our distillery to mash and ferment grain. 2. The time which each distiller will take to ferment, he is allowed and required to determine for himself before he commences operating, and to strictly abide by the same. 3. The corollary is therefore obvious, as we think, that the law taxed the capacity of our distillery to mash and ferment grain according to the mode and time of fermentation provided for by the law and naturally used, and not according to a mode and time of fermentation contrary and repugnant to the law, and not used at all. 4. If the Commissioner's action in prescribing a fermenting period is proper, then the provision of section 6, as to distiller's notice of time of fermenting, and the action of Congress in making such a provision, are utterly incomprehensible. 5. As between the distiller's notice as to length of fermenting period, and the survey of the Assessor on the same subject, the latter is conclusive while it remains, and this only upon the assumption of its truth; but when the distiller's notice is admitted to be true, and the Assessor's survey to be false, the truth should prevail over the acknowledged error in all courts of justice. 6. By the face of the record the tax which we claim a refunding of, was erroneous and illegal. 7. While the law might have given authority HERMAN J. PAHLMAN ET AL., Piffs. in to the Commissioner to order the assessment of Err., Submitted Apr. 13, 1874. Decided May 4, 1874. this tax as it is now claimed, in which case it 8. And redress for this invasion of a citizen's rights is by express law denied to all other authority, and expressly confided to the U. S. courts. Messrs. Geo. H. Williams, Atty-Gen., and S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: In pursuance of a stipulation of the parties, |