Court,instead of remand-preme Court may, at their lidity or construction of the Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions or authority of the Federal Government. The argument may be thus stated: 1. That the Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to cases of a character which includes the questions described in the section, and that by the word "case," is to be understood all of the case in which such a question arises. 2. That by the fair construction of the Act of 1789 in regard to removing those cases to this court, the power and the duty of re-examining the whole case would have been devolved on the court, but for the restriction of the clause omitted in the Act of 1867; and that the same language is used in the latter Act regulating the removal, but omitting the restrictive clause. And, 3. That by re-enacting the statute in the same terms as to the removal of cases from the State Courts, without the restrictive clause, Congress is to be understood as conferring the power which that clause prohibited. We will consider the last proposition first. What were the precise motives which induced the omission of this clause, it is impossible to ascertain with any degree of satisfaction. In a legislative body like Congress, it is reasonable to suppose that among those who considered this matter at all, there were varying reasons for consenting to the change. No doubt there were those who, believing that the Constitution gave no right to the Federal Judiciary to go beyond the line marked by the omitted clause, thought its presence or absence immaterial; and in a revision of the statute it was wise to leave it out, because its presence implied that such a power was within the competency of Congress to bestow. There were also, no doubt, those who The result of this reasoning is that the 25th believed that the section standing without that section of the Act of 1789 is technically repealed, clause did not confer the power which it proand that the 2d section of the Act of 1867 has hibited, and that it was, therefore, better omitted. taken its place. What of the Statute of 1789 It may also have been within the thought of a few is embraced in that of 1867 is of course the law that all that is now claimed would follow the renow, and has been ever since it was first made peal of the clause. But if Congress, or the framers What is changed or modified is the law as of the bil!, had a clear purpose to enact affirmthus changed or modified. That which is omit-atively that the court should consider the ted ceased to have any effect from the day that the substituted statute was approved. A careful comparison of these two sections can leave no doubt that it was the intention of Congress, by the latter statute, to revise the entire matter to which they both had reference to make such changes in the law as it stood as they thought best, and to substitute their will in that regard entirely for the old law upon the subject. We are of opinion that it was their intention to make a new law so far as the present law differed from the former, and that the new law embracing all that was intended to be preserved of the old, omitting what was not so intended, became complete in itself and repealed all other law on the subject embraced within it. The authorities on this subject are clear and uniform. U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 88 [78 U. S., XX., 153]; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 652 [78 U. S., XX., 235]: Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass., 537; Com. v. Cooley, 10 Pick., 36; Sedg. Stat., 126. 80. This view is strongly supported by the consideration that the revision of the laws of Congress passed at the last session, based upon the idea that no change in the existing law should be made, has incorporated with the Revised Statutes nothing but the 2d section of the Act of 1867. Whatever might have been our abstract views of the effect of the Act of 1867, we are, as to all the future cases, bound by the law as found in the Revised Statutes by the express language of Congress on that subject; and it would be labor lost to consider any other view of the question. 2. The affirmative of the second question propounded above is founded upon the effect of the omission or repeal of the last sentence of the 25th section of the Act of 1789. That clause in express terms limited the power of the Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of a State Court, to errors apparent on the face of the record and which respected questions, that for the sake of brevity, though not with strict verbal accuracy, we shall call federal questions, namely: those in regard to the ya class of errors which that clause forbid, nothing hindered that they should say so in positive terms; and in reversing the policy of the Government from its foundation in one of the most important subjects on which that body could act, it is reasonably to be expected that Congress would use plain, unmistakable language in giving expression to such intention. There is, therefore, no sufficient reason for holding that Congress, by repealing or omitting this restrictive clause, intended to enact affirmatively the thing which that clause had prohibited. We are thus brought to the examination of the section as it was passed by the Congress of 1867, and as it now stands, as part of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Before we proceed to any criticism of the language of the section, it may be as well to revert for a moment to the constitutional provisions which are supposed to, and which do bear upon the subject. The 2d section of the 3d article, already adverted to, declares that "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority.' The proposition as thus stated has great force, Waiving for the present the question whether and is entitled to our most careful considerathe power thus conferred extends to all question. If the invariable effect of a writ of error tions, in all cases, where only one of the ques to a Circuit Court of the United States is to retions involved arises under the Constitution or quire of this court to examine and pass upon all laws of the United States, we find that this ju- the errors of the inferior court, and if re-examdicial power is by the Constitution vested in ination of the judgment of the court in the same one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts manner and under the same regulations, means as Congress may establish. Of these courts that in the re-examination everything is to be the Constitution defines the jurisdiction of none considered which could be considered in a writ but the Supreme Court. Of that court it is said, to the circuit court, and nothing else, then the after giving it a very limited original jurisdic-inference which is drawn from these premises tion, that "In all other cases before mentioned, would seem to be correct. the Supreme Court shall have appellate juris- But let us consider this. diction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress may prescribe.' This latter clause has been the subject of construction in this court many times, and the uniform and established doctrine is, that Congress having by the Act of 1789 defined and regulated this jurisdiction in certain classes of cases, this affirmative expression of the will of that body is to be taken as excepting all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, than those enumerated. Wis cart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall., 321; Durousseau v. U. S., 6 Cranch, 307; The Lucy, 8 Wall., 307 [75 U. S.. XIX., 394]; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall., 506 [74 U. S., XIX., 264.] It is also to be remembered that the exercise of judicial power over cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, may be original as well as appellate, and may be conferred by Congress on other courts than the Supreme Court, as it has done in several classes of cases which will be hereafter referred to. We are under no necessity, then, of supposing that Congress, in the section we are considering, intended to confer on the Supreme Court the whole power which, by the Consti tution, it was competent for Congress to confer in the class of cases embraced in that section. Omitting for the moment that part of the section which characterizes the questions necessary to the jurisdiction conferred, the enactment is, that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit can be had (when one of these questions is decided), may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed, in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a writ of error *** in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been passed or rendered in a court of the United States. It is strenuously maintained that as the office of a writ of error at the common law, and as it is used in relation to the inferior courts of the United States when issued from this court, is to remove the whole case to this court for revision upon its merits, or at least upon all the errors found in the record of the case so removed, and as this statute enacts that these cases shall be re-examined in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as in those cases, therefore all the errors found in a record so removed from a State Court must be reviewed so far as they are essential to a correct final judgment on the whole case. There are two principal methods known to English jurisprudence, and to the jurisprudence of the Federal Courts, by which cases may be removed from an inferior to an appellate court for review. These are the writ of error and the appeal. There may be and there are other exceptional modes, such as the writ of certiorari at common law, and a certificate of division of opinion under the Acts of Congress. The appeal, which is the only mode by which a decree in chancery or in admiralty can be brought from an inferior Federal Court to this court, does bring up the whole case for re-examination on all the merits, whether of law or fact, and for consideration on these, as though no decree had ever been rendered. The writ of error is used to bring up for review all other cases, and when thus brought here the cases are not open for reexamination on their whole merits, but every controverted question of fact is excluded from consideration, and only such errors as this court can see that the inferior court committed, and not all of these, can be the subject of this court's corrective power. Now, one of the first things apparent on the face of this statute is, that decrees in chancery and in admiralty also, if a State Court shall entertain jurisdiction of a case essentially of admiralty cognizance, are to be removed into this court from the State Courts by this writ of error as well as judgments at law. And such has been the unquestioned practice under the Act of 1789 from its passage until now. But this writ cannot bring a decree in chancery or admiralty from the circuit court to this court for review. It has no such effect, and we dismiss every day cases brought here by writ of error to a circuit court, because they can only be brought here by appeal, and the writ of error does not extend to them. The San Pedro, 2 Wheat., 132; McCollum v. Eager, 2 How., 61; Minor v. Tillotson, 2 How., 392; Benton v. Lapier, 22 How.,118. [Not found in testing citations, but see case of Brewster v. Wakefield on page cited, 63 U. S., XVI., 301.-ED.] Unless, therefore, we have been wholly wrong for eighty years, under the Act of 1789, and un less we are prepared to exclude chancery cases decided in the State Courts from the effect of this writ, it cannot, literally, have the same effect as in cases from a court of the United States; and if we could hold that the writ would have the same effect in removing the case, which is probably all that is meant, still the case when removed cannot literally be examined in the same manner, if by manner is meant the principle on which the judgment of the court must rest. For chancery cases, when brought here from the circuit courts, are brought for a trial de novo on all the evidence and pleadings in the case. It is, therefore, too obvious to need comment, that this statute was designed to bring equity suits to this court from the State Courts by writ of error, as well as law cases, and that it was not intended that they should be re-examined | in the same manner as if brought here from a court of the United States, in the sense of the proposition we are considering. But passing from this consideration, what has been the manner in which this court re-examines the judgments of the circuit courts on writs of error, as touching the errors into which it will look for reversal? For it is this manner which is supposed to require an examination of all errors, whether of federal law or otherwise under this statute. It requires but slight examination of the reports of the decisions or familiarity with the practice of this court, to know that it does not examine into or decide all the errors, or matter assigned for error, of the most of the cases before them. Many of these are found to be immaterial, the case being reversed or affirmed on some important point which requires of itself a judgment without regard to other matters. There are errors also which may be sufficiently manifest of which the appellate court has no jurisdiction, as in regard to a motion for a new trial, or to quash an indictment, or for a continuance, or amendment of pleadings, or some other matter which, however important to the merits of the case, is within the exclusive discretion of the inferior court. court. In short, the whole phrase is one eminently appropriate to the expression of the idea that these cases, though coming from state instead of federal tribunals, shall be conducted in their progress through the court, in the matter of the general course of procedure, by the same rules of practice that prevail in cases brought under writs of error to the courts of the United States. This is a different thing, however, from laying down rules of decision, or enacting the fundamental principles on which the court must decide this class of cases. It differs widely from an attempt to say that the court in coming to a judgment must consider this matter and disregard that. It is by no means the language in which a legislative body would undertake to establish the principles on which a court of last resort must form its judgment. There is an instance of the use of very similar language by Congress in reference to the removal of causes into this court for review which has uniformly received the construction which we now place upon this. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, there was no appeal in the judicial sense of that word, to this court in any case. Decrees in suits in equity and admiralty were brought up by writ of error only, until the Act of 1803; and as this writ could not bring up a case to be tried on its controverted questions of fact, the 19th section of the Act of 1789 required the inferior courts to make a finding of facts which should be accepted as true by the appellate court. But by the Act of March 3, 1803, 2 Stat. at L., 244, Nor does it seem to us that the phrase "in the these cases were to be brought to this court by same manner and under the same regulations, appeal, and to give this appeal full effect the and the writ shall have the same effect" is in- 19th section of the Act of 1789 was repealed, tended to furnish the rule by which the court shall and upon such appeal the court below was dibe guided in the considerations which should rected to send to this court all the pleadings, enter into the judgment that it shall render. depositions, testimony and proceedings. In this That the writ of error shall have the same effect manner the court obtained that full possession as if directed to a circuit court can mean no and control of the case which the nature of an more than that it shall transfer the case to the appeal implies And it is worthy of observaSupreme Court, and with it the record of the tion that Congress did not rely upon the mere proceedings in the court below. This is the ef-legal operation of the word "appeal" to effect fect of the writ and its function and purpose. When the court comes to consider the case it may be limited by the nature of the writ, but what it shall review, and what it shall not, must depend upon the jurisdiction of the court in that class of cases as fixed by the law governing that jurisdiction. So the regulations here spoken of are manifestly the rules under which the writ is issued, served and returned; the notice to be given to the adverse party, and time fixed for appearance, argument, etc. Another important effect of the writ and of the regulations governing it, is that when accompanied by a proper bond, given and approved within the prescribed time, it operates as a supersedeas to further proceedings in the inferior court. The word "manner" also much more appropriately expresses the general mode of proceeding with the case, after the writ has been allowed, the means by which the exigency of the writ is enforced, as by rule on the clerk, or mandamus to the court, and the progress of the case in the appellate court; as filing the record, docketing the case, time of hearing. order of the argument, and such other matters as are merely incidental to final decision by the this, but provided in express terms the means necessary to insure this object. But to avoid the necessity of many words as to the mode in which the case should be brought to this court and conducted when here, it was enacted "That such appeals shall be subject to the same rules, regulations and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of writs of error." Here is language quite as strong as that we have had under consideration, and strikingly similar both in its purport and in the purpose to be served by it. Yet no one ever supposed that when the court came to consider the judgment which it should render on such an appeal, it was to be governed by the principles applicable to writs of error at common law. It was never thought for a moment, notwithstanding the use of the word "restrictions," that the court was limited to questions of law apparent on the record; but the uniform course has been to consider it as a case to be tried de novo on all the considerations of law and of fact applicable to it. There are many decisions of this court showing that these words have been held to apply alone to the course of procedure, to matters of mere practice, and not at all affording a rule for decision of the case on its merits in the conference room. Villabolos v. U. S., 6 How., 81; Castro v. U. S., 3 Wall., 46 [70 U. S., XVIII., 163]; Mussina v. Cavazos, 6 Wall., 355 [73 U. S., XVIII., 810]. There is, therefore, nothing in the language of the Act, as far as we have criticised it. which in express terms defines the extent of the re-examination which this court shall give to such cases. But we have not yet considered the most important part of the statute, namely: that which declares that it is only upon the existence of certain questions in the case that this court can entertain jurisdiction at all. Nor is the mere existence of such a question in the case sufficient to give jurisdiction-the question must have been decided in the State Court. Nor is it sufficient that such a question was raised and was decided. It must have been decided in a certain way, that is, against the right set up under the Constitution, laws, treaties or authority of the United States. The federal question may have been erroneously decided. It may be quite apparent to this court that a wrong construction has been given to the federal law, but, if the right caimed under it by plaintiff in error has been conceded to him, this court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the case, so very careful is the statute, both of 1789 and of 1867, to narrow, to limit and define the jurisdiction which this court exercises over the judgments of the State Courts. Is it consistent with this extreme caution to suppose that Congress intended, when those cases came here, that this court should not only examine those questious, but all others found in the record-questions of common law, of state statutes, of controverted facts, and conflicting evidence? Or is it the more reasonable inference that Congress intended that the case should be brought here that those questions might be decided and finally decided by the court established by the Constitution of the Union, and the court which has always been supposed to be not only the most appropriate but the only proper tribunal for their final decision? No such reason nor any necessity exists for the decision by this court of other questions in those The jurisdiction has been exercised for nearly a century without serious inconvenience to the due administration of justice. The State Courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress acted upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of their ability to construe those laws correctly. cases. Let us look for a moment into the effect of the proposition contended for upon the cases as they come up for consideration in the conference room. If it is found that no such question is raised or decided in the court below, then all will concede that it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. But if it is found that the fed eral question was raised and was decided against the plaintiff in error, then the first duty of the court obviously is to determine whether it was correctly decided by the State Court. Let us suppose that we find that the court below was right in its decision on that question. What, then, are we to do? Was it the intention of Congress to say that "While you can only bring the case here on account of this question, yet when it is here, though it may turn out that the plaintiff in error was wrong on that question, and the judgment of the court below was right, though he has wrongfully dragged the defendant into this court by the allegation of an error which did not exist, and without which the case could not rightfully be here, he can still insist on an inquiry into all the other matters which were litigated in the case"? This is neither reasonable nor just. In such case both the nature of the jurisdiction conferred and the nature and fitness of things demand that, no error being found in the matter which authorized the re-examination, the judgment of the State Court should be affirmed, and the case remitted to that court for its further enforcement. The whole argument we are combating, however, goes upon the assumption that when it is found that the record shows that one of the questions mentioned has been decided against the claim of the plaintiff in error, this court has jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction extends to the whole case. If it extends to the whole case then the court must re-examine the whole case, and if it re-examines it must decide the whole case. It is difficult to escape the logic of the argument if the first premise be conceded. But it is here the error lies. We are of opinion that upon a fair construction of the whole language of the section the jurisdiction conferred is lim ited to the decision of the questions mentioned in the statute and, as a necessary consequence of this, to the exercise of such powers as may be necessary to cause the judgment in that decision to be respected. We will now advert to one or two considerations apart from the mere language of the statute, which seem to us to give additional force to this conclusion. It has been many times decided by this court on motions to dismiss this class of cases for want of jurisdiction, that if it appears from the record that the plaintiff in error raised and presented to the court by pleadings, prayer for instruction or other appropriate method, one of the questions specified in the statute, and the court ruled against him, the jurisdiction of this court attached, and we must hear the case on its merits. Rector v. Ashley, 6 Wall., 142 [73 U. S., XVIII., 733]; Bridge Proprs. v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall., 116 [68 U. S., XVII., 571]; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall., 44 [75 U. S., XIX., 370]; Armstrong v. Treasurer. 16 Pet., 281; Crowell v. Randall, 10 Pet., 368. Heretofore these merits have been held to be to determine whether the propositions of law involved in the specific federal question were rightly decided, and if not, did the case of plaintiff in error, on the pleadings and evidence, come within the principle ruled by this court. This has always been held to be the exercise of the jurisdiction and re-examination of the case provided by the statute. But if when we once get jurisdiction, everything in the case is open to re-examination, it follows that every case tried in any State Court, from that of a justice of the peace to the highest court of the State, may be brought to this court for final decision on all the points involved in it. That this is no exaggeration, let us look a moment. Suppose a party is sued before a justice of the peace for assault and battery. He pleads that he was a Deputy-Marshal of the United States, and in serving a warrant of arrest on plaintiff he gently laid his hands on him and used no more force than was necessary. He also pleads the general issue. We will suppose that to the special plea some response is made which finally leads to a decision against the defendant on that plea. And judgment is rendered against him on the general issue also. He never was a deputy-marshal. He never had a writ from a United States court; but he insists on that plea through all the courts up to this, and when he gets here the record shows a federal question decided against him, and this court must re-examine the whole case, though there was not a particle of truth in his plea, and it was a mere device to get the case into this court. Very many cases are brought here now of that character. Also, cases where the moment the federal question is stated by counsel we all know that there is nothing in it. This has become such a burden and abuse that we either refuse to hear, or hear only one side of many such, and stop the argument, and have been compelled to adopt a rule that when a motion is made to dismiss it shall only be heard on printed argument. If the temptation to do this is so strong, under the rule of this court for over eighty years to hear only the federal question, what are we to expect when, by merely raising one of those questions in any case, the party who does it can bring it here for decision on all the matters of law and fact involved in it. It is to be remembered that there is not even a limitation as to the value in controversy in writs to the State Courts as there is to the circuit courts; and it follows that there is no conceivable case so insignificant in amount or unimportant in principle that a perverse and obstinate man may not bring it to this court by the aid of a sagacious lawyer raising a federal question in the record -a point which he may be wholly unable to support by the facts, or which he may well know will be decided against him the moment it is stated. But he obtains his object, if this court, when the case is once open to re-examination on account of that question, must decide all the others that are to be found in the record. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended this result, and equally impossible that they did not see that it would follow if they intended to open the cases that are brought here under this section to re-examination on all the points involved in them and necessary to a final judgment on the merits. The 25th section of the Act of 1789 has been the subject of innumerable decisions, some of which are to be found in almost every volume of the reports from that year down to the present. These form a system of appellate jurisprudence relating to the exercise of the appellate power of this court over the courts of the States. That system has been based upon the fundamental principle that this jurisdiction was limited to the correction of errors relating solely to federal law. And though it may be argued with some plausibility that the reason of this is to be found in the restrictive clause of the Act of 1789, which is omitted in the Act of 1867, yet an examination of the cases will show that it rested quite as much on the conviction of this court that without that clause and on general principles the jurisdiction extended no further. It requires a very bold reach of thought, and a readiness to impute to Congress a radical and hazardous change of a policy vital in its essential nature to the independence of the State Courts, to believe that that body contemplated, or intended, what is claimed, by the mere omission of a clause in the substituted statute which may well be held to have been superfluous, or nearly so, in the old one. Another consideration, not without weight in seeking after the intention of Congress, is found in the fact that where that body has clearly shown an intention to bring the whole of a case which arises under the constitutional provision as to its subject-matter under the jurisdiction of a Federal Court, it has conferred its cognizance on Federal Courts of original jurisdiction and not on the Supreme Court. It is the same clause and the same language which declares in the Constitution that the judicial power shall extend to cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States and to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this same Act of 1789 the jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases is conferred on the District Courts of the United States, and is made exclusive. Congress has in like manner conferred upon the same court exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases of bankruptcy. Upon the circuit court it has conferred jurisdiction with exclusive reference to matters of federal law, without regard to citizenship. either originally or by removal from the State Courts in cases of conflicting titles to land under grants from different States. 1 Stat. at L., 89. In cases arising under the patent laws. 16 Stat. at L.. 206, 215. In suits against banking associations organized under the laws of the United States. 13 Stat at L., 116. In suits against individuals on account of acts done under the revenue laws of the United States. Act of March 2, 1833, 4 Stat. at L., 632; July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 172. In suits for damages for depriving, under color of state laws, any person of rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 141; April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. at L., 13. See, also, for removal of cases of similar character from State Courts, Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L., 756; April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 27; May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 142. The Acts referred to, and perhaps others not enumerated, show very clearly that when Congress desired a case to be tried on all the issues involved in it because one of those issues was to be controlled by the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, it was their policy to vest its cognizance in a court of original jurisdiction, and not in an appellate tribunal. And we think it equally clear that it has been the counterpart of the same policy to vest in the Supreme Court, as a court of appeal from the State Courts, a jurisdiction limited to the questions of a federal character which might be involved in such cases. It is not difficult to discover what the pur |