terest touching the property or rights of property aforesaid in any court whatsoever, unless the same shall be brought within two years from the time of the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee.' Counsel for appellant argues that this provis ion of the statute (14 Stat. at L., 536) has no application to the present case because it is not shown that the defendants have set up or as serted any claim to the property now sought to be recovered adverse to that of the assignee. It is rather difficult to see exactly what is meant by this proposition. The suit is brought to be relieved from some supposed claim of right or interest in the property on the part of the defendants. If no such claim exists, it does not stand in the way of complainant, and he does not need the aid of a court of equity to set it aside. If it is intended to argue that until some one asserts in words that he claims a right to property transferred to the assignee by virtue of the Act, which is adverse to the bankrupt, the statute does not begin to run, though such person is in possession of the property, acting as owner, and admitting no other title to it, we think the construction of the proviso entirely too It is obviously one of the purposes of the Bankrupt Law, that there should be a speedy disposition of the bankrupt's assets. This is only second in importance to securing equality of distribution. The Act is filled with provisions for quick and summary disposal of questions arising in the progress of the case, without regard to usual modes of trial attended by some necessary delay. Appeals in some instances must be taken within ten days; and provisions are made to facilitate sales of property, compromises of doubtful claims, and generally for the early discharge of the bankrupt and the speedy settlement of his estate. It is a wise policy, and if those who administer the law could be induced to act upon its spirit, would do much to make the statute more acceptable than it is. But in stead of this, the inferior courts are filled with suits by or against assignees, each of whom as soon as appointed retains an attorney, if property enough comes to his hands to pay one, and then instead of speedy sales, reasonable compromises, and efforts to adjust differences, the estate is wasted in profitless litigation, and the fees of the officers who execute the law. To prevent this as much as possible, Congress has said to the assignee: you shall commence no suit two years after the cause of action has accrued to you, nor shall you be harassed by suits when the cause of action has accrued more than two years against you. Within that time the estate ought to be nearly settled up and your functions discharged, and we close the door to all litigation not commenced before it has elapsed. But appellant relies in this court upon another proposition which has been very often applied by the courts under proper circumstances, in mitigation of the strict letter of general statutes of limitation, namely: that when the object of the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or becomes known to the party injured by it. This proposition has been incorporated in different forms in the statutes of many of the States, and presented to the courts under several aspects where there were no such statutes, And while there is unanimity in regard to some of these aspects, there is not in regard to others. In suits in equity where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the authorities are without conflict in support of the doctrine that where the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the facts, from the other, the statute will not bar relief provided suit is brought within proper time after the discovery of the fraud. We also think that, in suits in equity, the decided weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. Booth v. Warrington, 4 Bro. P. C., 163; So. Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms., 143; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & L., 634; Stearns v. Page, 7 How., 819; Moore v. Greene, 19 How., 69 [60 U. S., XV., 533]; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas., 143; Snodgrass v. Bk., 25 Ala., 161. On the question as it arises in actions at law there is in this country a very decided conflict of authority. Many of the courts hold that the rule is sustained in courts of equity only on the ground that these courts are not bound by the mere force of the statute as courts of common law are, but only as they have adopted its principle as expressing their own rule of applying the doctrine of laches in analogous cases. They, therefore, make concealed fraud an exception on purely equitable principles. Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns., 33; Callis v. Waddy, 2 Munf., 511; Miles v. Berry, 1 Hill (S. C.), 296; York v. Bright, 4 Humph., 312. On the other hand, the English courts and the courts of Connecticut, Massachusetts. Pennsyl vania, and others of great respectability, hold that the doctrine is equally applicable to cases at law. Bree v. Holbech, 2 Doug., 655; Clark v. Haugham, 3 Dowl. & R., 322; Granger v. George, 5 Barn. & C.,149; Turnpike Co. v. Field, 3 Mass., 201; Welles v. Fish, 3 Pick., 75; Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates, 109; Rush v. Barr, 1 Watts, 110; Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts, 401; Mitchell v. Thompson, 1 McLean (C. C.), 96: Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curtis (C. C.), 230. As the case before us is a suit in equity, and as the bill contains a distinct allegation that the defendants kept secret and concealed from the parties interested the fraud which is sought to be redressed, we might rest this case on what we have said is the undisputed doctrine of the courts of equity, but for the peculiar language of the statute we are considering. We cannot say in regard to this Act of Limitations that courts of equity are not bound by its terms, for its very words are that "No suit at law or in equity shall in any case be maintained *** unless brought within two years," etc. It is quite clear that this statute must be held to apply equally by its own force to courts of equity and to courts of law, and if there be an exception to the universality of its language it must be one which applies under the same state of facts to suits at law as well as to suits in equity. But we are of opinion, as already stated, that the weight of judicial authority, both in this country and in England, is in favor of the ap plication of the rule to suits at law as well as in equity. And we are also of opinion that this is founded in a sound and philosophical view of the principles of the Statutes of Limitation. They were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had been satisfied, transferred or extinguished, if they ever did exist. To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the Statute of Limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud, the means by which it is made successful and secure. And we see no reason why this principle should not be as applicable to suits tried on the common law side of the court's cal endar as to those on the equity side. 1. It has been the uniform policy of the government since the inauguration of our land system in 1796, to reserve salt-springs from sale. 2. The 4th section of the Act of July 22,1854, leaves no doubt of the intention of Congress to extend to the territory embraced by the States of Kansas and Nebraska, the same policy. 3. It cannot be supposed without an express declaration to that effect, that Congress intended to permit the sale of salines in Territories soon to be organized into States. 4. The purpose of reserving them was to preserve them for the use of the future States, and no State had been org inized without a grant of salt-springs. ratified by the proviso to the section granting the 5. The locations in question in this action are not salt springs. 6. Patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale or appropriated, are [No. 391.] void. Argued Feb. 19, 23,1875. Decided Mar 29,1875. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska. This action of ejectment was brought by the plaintiffs in error, in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska. Judgment having been given for the defendants, and affirmed upon appeal by the Supreme Court of the State, the plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. Messrs. J. S. Black, E. Wakeley, J. H. Hopkins and Montgomery Blair, for plaintiffs in error: The plaintiffs exhibited a complete legal title, unless the actual delivery of a patent is necessary to give it effect, or unless, after a patent is duly executed, recorded and dispatched to the local office for delivery, the Land Department has the power to recall and annul it, as the dis. trict court decided by refusing the plaintiffs' second instruction. We contend that said instruction ought to have been given, and that the plaintiffs' title is complete without the delivery of the patent, and that the land officer had no right to withhold or cancel it. While we might follow the construction of the state courts in this matter, where those stat utes governed the case, in construing this Stat ute of Limitations passed by the Congress of the United States as part of the law of bankruptcy, we hold that when there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to the party suing, or those in privity with him. The result of this proposition is, that the decree "The patent of March 1, 1870, took effect of the Circuit Court sustaining the demurrer and from the moment it was signed by the Presi dismissing the bill must be reversed, with direcdent and passed the great seal; certainly from tions for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion. Cited-21 Wall., 642; 93 U. S., 350; 98 U. S.. 252; 104 U. S., 301; 105 U. S., 642; 111 U. S., 191; 1 McCrary, 451; 14 Bk. Reg., 238, 512; 15 Bk. Reg., 25, 188; 16 Bk. Reg., 10, 287; 15 Blatchf., 540, 544; 4 Dill., 135; 6 Biss., 106; 2 Wood, 116; 1 Hughes, 201, 630; 4 Cliff., 567; 29 Hun, 284; 36 Ohio St., 78. J. STERLING MORTON, CHARLES A, V. This question has been recently considered, and the authorities bearing upon it very fully and carefully examined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, in the case of Le Roy v. Clayton. In delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Sawyer says: the time it was recorded in the proper record, and dispatched to the Surveyor-General of California, to be delivered to the claimant. A delivery in the case of a government patent is not necessary. The patentee takes by matter of record.' Lott v. Prudhomme, 3 Rob. (La.), 293, which is directly in point; Donner v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 513; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 247; Chipley v. Farris, Sup. Ct. Cal., April Term, 1873. not yet reported (since reported, 45 Cal., 527): CunIrwin, 1 Tenn. (Overt.), 235. ningham v. Browning, 1 Bland, 299; Philips v.. "If the title vested under the patent, the Commissioner of the General Land Office could STATE OF NEBRASKA, JESSE T. GREEN not, of his own motion, devest it by canceling AND HORACE SMITH. (See S. C., 21 Wall., 660-675.) Salt-springs-reserved on public lands-in Territories-improper location-patent. the patent, or the record of the patent, without 437. * * * title of the claimant. As against the government, this record, so long as it re mains unvacated and it can only be vacated by a judicial tribunal (U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 535 (69 U. S., XVII., 767), is conclusive, and it is equally conclusive upon those claiming under government by titles subsequent. Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall., 492 (70 U. S., XVIII., 92). In Hines v. Greenlee, 3 Ala. (N. S.), 73, the court says: "The law provides that, on certain things being done, the citizen shall acquire a title to a portion of the public lands, and that a patent therefor shall issue, which shall be recorded. The patent is not the title, but merely the evidence that, according to law, a portion of the public domain has been transferred to a citizen. Its efficacy proceeds from the law which authorizes certain officers to issue and record it." In Peralta v. U. S., 3 Wall., 440 (70 U. S.. XVIII., 223), the court says: "The record was the grant." In McCauley v. State, 21 Md., 572, the court, in discussing the legal effect of an official copy made evidence by statute, says: Such copies are prima facie evidence of all that is necessary to authorize their registration, when it appears they have been duly recorded." To the same effect, Mayo v. Mazeaux, 38 Cal., 449. The general rule is, that a patent takes effect upon its being issued, and it is not necessary to show a delivery to or acceptance by the patentee." Chipley v. Farris, not reported (since reported 45 Cal., 527). The doctrine of delivery, as applied by us to private grants, has no application to grants made by government. Donner v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 513. Delivery of patent is not necessary. Ex parte Kuhtman, 3 Rich. Eq., 257. Entry of payment by W., to whom patent issued, proof of issue of patent, though not produced. Willis v. Bucher, 3 Wash. (C. C.), 375. In Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall., 402 (73 U. S., XVIII., 925), the court says: "The right to a patent once vested is equivalent, as respects the government dealing with the public lands, to a patent issued." In Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall., 72 (80 U. S., XX., 485), the court says that a bill could be maintained to control the title though only a patent certificate had been issued. The defendants, having no title, could not question the title of plaintiffs. Satarpy v. Papin, 7 Mo., 506; Parmlee v. Oswego & Syracuse R. R. Co., 7 Barb., 621; Crommelin v. Minter, 9 Ala., 594; Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How., 173 (59 U. S., XV., 338); Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How., 317; West v. Cochran, 17 How., 413 (58 U. S., XV., 114); Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How., 334 (60 U. S., XV., 674); Ballance v. Papin, 19 How., 343 (60 U. S., XV., 678); Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal., 413; People v. Mauran. 5 Den., 398; Sutton v. Men ser, 6 B. Mon., 438; Taylor v. Fletcher, 7 B. Mon., 83. If the authority to issue a patent depend upon the existence of particular facts in reference to the condition or location of the property, or the performance of certain antecedent acts, and officers have been appointed for the ascertainment of these matters in advance, who have ascer tained them and given their judgment, then the patent, although the judgment of the officers be in fact erroneous, cannot be attacked collaterally by parties showing title subsequent from the same source, much less by those who show no color of title in themselves. Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal., 325. Messrs. William Lawrence,E. R. Hoar, Robert H. Bradford, J. R. Webster and L. Crounse, for defendant in error: A patent issued for lands not authorized to be sold, or reserved from sale, is not only voidable but void, and may be attacked collaterally and defeated in an action at law. This is so clearly true on all principle, that it would seem axiomatic. It is deemed sufficient to state it, and refer without comment to conclusive authorities. 1 Ops. Attys-Gen., 420, Saline Springs, in Ill.; 2 Ops. Attys-Gen, 186, Concerning Land Patents; 5 Ops. Attys Gen., 9, Patents to Preempters; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How., 284; Kissell v. St. Louis Schools, 18 How., 19 (59 U. S., XV., 324); Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How., 431 (62 Ú. S., XVI., 183); Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How., 87 (59 U. S., XV., 279); S. C., 9 Ala., 594; Brown v. Clements, 3 How., 650; U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 525 (69 U. S., XVII., 765); Hale v. Gaines, 22 How., 144 (63 U. S., XVI., 264); Wilcox v. Jackson. 13 Pet., 498; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall.,160(73 U. S., XVIII., 849); State of Ind. v. Miller, 3 McLean, 151; Hunter v. Hemphill, 6 Mo., 106; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns., 26; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96 (76 U. S., XIX., 599). This, in fact, is determined by Congress in the Acts providing for the return of purchase money in the case of unauthorized sales. Acts, March 3, 1819; May 21, 1824; January 12, 1825; May 24, 1828; 1 Lester, 34, 36, 38, 40, 667. Then, if in this case, it is shown that the lands were not subject to private entry because they were saline, this fact, shown by parol, will defeat a patent, even if the plaintiffs had produced it, and no proceeding to cancel it is necessary. It was the duty of the deputy-surveyor who surveyed these lands, to note in his field-book the true situations of all mines, salt-licks, saltsprings and mill-seats, which came to his knowledge. Acts, May 18, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 465; May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73; Rev. Stat.,441, secs. 2, 395. This duty he did. It was the duty of the Surveyor-General: To prepare and transmit to the registers, general plats. Act, May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73. But his failure to note the salt-springs on these, could not give the holder of land warrants a right to locate on land really saline. The Act of July 22, 1854, did not exclude from sale those saline lands so marked on the books and record of the register and receiver only. but all saline lands. The Act, of May 18, 1796, reserved for future disposal, not merely those so noted, but every salt-spring which may be discovered. The purpose of Congress may readily be seen | upon a creek which empties into the Scioto by a comparison of this with other statutes. The Preemption Act of September 4, 1841, 5 Stat at L., 456, declares that: "No lands on which are situated any known salines or mines, shall be liable to entry." But when the reservation is made in the Acts of 1796 and 1854, it is not of the known salines, but "every salt-spring," and the salines. The record shows, and it was not denied on trial, that when the lands were entered, the locator knew their saline character. But, independently of this, the fact was noted on the deputy-surveyor's field-notes in the SurveyorGeneral's office. This was a public record and notice to all the world. But the laws in relation to Nebraska went further, and designed to reserve salines, no matter when or how discovered. This question is decided in principle by this court in Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96 (76 U. S., XIX., 599). The same view is supported by many other authorities collected in Bates v. Herron, 35 Ala., 123, where it is applied in all cases of patents, not merely voidable, but void, as issued without authority of law, or for lands not authorized to be sold. 1 Ops. Attys-Gen., 420, Saline Springs of Ill.; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How., 87 (59 U. S., XV., 279). The question of reservation is the hinge of this case, and involves the history of saline reservations. Those reservations began with the Act of May 18, 1796, creating the office of Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyors, and organizing our present rectangular system of surveys, and prescribing the mode of selling the domain. The statute is the mud-sill of our land system. On March 1, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Harding, Arthur Lee and James Monroe, delegates from the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the Congress of the United States of America, under the Articles of Confederation, signed and delivered a deed conveying to the United States all the right of the Commonwealth to the Territory northwest of the River Ohio. Public Land Laws, Opinions and Instructions, Part 1, p. 585, ed. of 1838. The Act of Congress of May 18, 1796, was the first Act providing a system for the survey and sale of any part of that great region. It is entitled "An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the Territory Northwest of the Ohio River and above the Mouth of the Kentucky River." Section 2 requires the land to be subdivided into townships and sections, and prescribes the mode of measuring the lines and marking the lines and corners. "Every surveyor," says the section, "shall note in his field-book, both the true situation of all mines, salt-licks, salt-springs and mill-seats, which shall come to his knowledge; all water courses, over which the line he runs shall pass; and also the quality of the lands." The section then requires these field-books to be returned to the Surveyor-General, and requires him to cause a plat of every township to be made, and to send a description of the land, with a copy of every map, to the places appointed for the sale of the lands.' Section 3 enacts, " That a salt-spring, lying River, on the east side, together with as many contiguous sections as shall be equal to one township, and every other salt-spring which may be discovered, together with the section of one mile square, which includes it, and also four sections at the center of every township, containing each one mile square, shall be reserved for the future disposal of the United States; but there shall be no reservation except for salt-springs, in fractional townships, where the fraction is less than three fourths of a township." Section 4 enacts, "That, whenever seven ranges of townships shall have been surveyed, and the plats made and sent, conformably with the provisions of the Act, the said sections of 640 acres (excluding those hereby reserved), shall be offered for sale, at public vendue, at Cincinnati or Pittsburgh; and that the townships remaining undivided shall be offered at the seat of Government of the United States, in quarter townships, excluding the four central sections, and the other reservations before mentioned." This Act is now the law for all Surveyors-General and their deputies. The Act of September 27, 1850, 9 Stat. at L., 496, declares "That a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for the Territory of Oregon, who shall have the same authority, perform the same duties respecting the public lands and private land claims in the Territory of Oregon, as are vested in and required of the surveyor of lands in the United States northwest of the Ohio, except as hereinafter provided." Section 14 declares "That no mineral lands, nor lands reserved for salines, shall be liable to | any claim under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act." And the Act of July 22, 1854, 10 Stat. at L., 308, section 4 of which, as we contend, preserved the salines in dispute here, declares in section 1, that a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for New Mexico, Whose authority and duties shall be the same as those provided by law for the Surveyor-General of Oregon." It declares, in section 10, that the President shall also appoint "A Surveyor-General for the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, who shall locate his office at such place as the President of the United States shall from time to time direct, and whose duties, powers, obligations, responsibilities and compensation shall be the same as those of the Surveyor-General of Wisconsin and Iowa." Wisconsin Territory formerly embraced the State of Iowa. 5 Stat. at L., 235. The office of public lands in Wisconsin Territory, was created by Act of June 12, 1838, 5 Stat. at L., 243, whose 1st section devolves upon him "The same duties respecting the public lands and private claims in the Terri tory of Wisconsin, as are now vested in and required of the Surveyor of the Lands of the United States in Ohio." Thus it appears that the Act of May 18, 1796, so far as it prescribes the duties of SurveyorsGeneral and their deputies, is the law of New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska, and a more extended view of the statute would show that it is also the law governing every Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyor in the Union. In this land officers to the same original source. Missouri Territory then embraced the land in dispute, for the Act of June 4, 1812, sec. 1, 2 Stat. at L., 743, had substituted that name for the former name of Louisiana Territory. case the deputy who surveyed the lands in controversy obeyed the 2d section of the Act of 1796, and noted in his field-book the true situations of all salt-licks, salt-springs, etc., on those lands; but the Surveyor-General disobeyed that section, and failed to show these things on the plat, or in his description of the whole lands surveyed, and this suppressio veri bred error of fact, and misled the President into offering for sale these reserved lands, which it was not law-ters; so that, if the Act of July 22, 1854, had made ful for him to offer. The Act of June 1, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 490, extended the power and duties of the surveyor over other large tracts north west of the Ohio, and required him to exercise them in the man ner directed by the Act of May 18, 1796; and reserved those lands, "Except salt-springs therein, and the same quantities of land adja cent thereto, as are directed to be reserved with the salt-springs in the said recited Act," for the satisfaction of the warrants for military services provided for by Virginia, on behalf of her troops in her deed of cession of March 1, 1784. Thus early were salt-springs, and the sections containing them, saved from location by military bounty land-warrants, and that, too, where the satisfaction of the warrants was a condition of the cession of the general region in which they were to be located. The Mississippi Territory extends from Georgia to the Mississippi River, and from Tennessee to the 31st degree of north latitude, the present northern boundary of East Louisiana. The Act of March 3, 1803, 2 Stat. at L., 229, pro- | vides for appointing a Surveyor-General and Register in the Territory, ard for the survey and sale of the public lands; a d sections 10 and 4 impose on them, respective.y, the duties imposed on the Surveyor-General and registers north of the Ohio and above the mouth of Kentucky River. On the 30th April, 1803, we acquired Louisiana from France, 8 Stat. at L., 200. The Act of March 26, 1804, 2 Stat. at L., 283, erected the province into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana-the former to extend east to the Perdido (sales of Hub. Lands in Ter. of Orleans, 3 Ops., 697). and north to the south boundary of Mississippi Territory and to the present State of Arkansas; and the latter to embrace the rest of the Province. Therefore the District of Louisiana embraced the land in controversy. The Act of March 2, 1805, sec. 3, 2 Stat. at L., 324, divided the Territory of Orleans into two land districts, the boundary between them to be designated by the President; and provided for a register in each district with the same powers and duties as are by law provided with respect to the registers in the several offices established for the disposal of the lands of the United States north of the River Ohio, above the mouth of Kentucky River. So the Act of March 3, 1811, sec. 4, 2 Stat. at L., 662, creating the land district north of Red River in Orleans Territory, and providing for the appointment of a register, required of him the duties devolved by law on the registers in the Mississippi Territory, which we have seen were similar to those of the registers northwest of the Ohio. So the Act of Feb. 17, 1818, 3 Stat. at L., 406, to provide additional land officers in the Missouri Territory, referred the duties of the The general duty of reserving salines from public or private sale, as prescribed by the Act of May 10, 1800, will be found, by examining the statutes, to devolve at this time on all regis no express reservation of salines, such reservation in respect to the lands in controversy. might well have been implied from the general duties of Surveyors-General and deputies, as prescribed by the Act of May 18, 1796, and the general duties of registers, as prescribed by the Act of May 18, 1800, and from the succession of statutes fixing those same duties on the offi cers connected with these warrant locations. All the salines in the Virginia cession were reserved, and afterwards granted to the several States carved out of that region. The same policy was adopted in the Mississippi Territory. See, the Reserving Act of June 15, 1809, sec. 1, 2 Stat at L., 548; and see the grant to Alabama, by Act of March 2, 1819, sec. 6, 3 Stat. at L., 489. And in the Louisiana purchase, which, as we have seen, embraces the premises in dispute, the salines have been as universally reserved. The first Act for the sale of lands in that Territory is that of March 3, 1811, above cited. Section 10 empowers the President to direct the sale of the lands in the Territory, after survey, with the exception of the 16th section, etc., “And with the exception also of the salt-springs and leadmines, and lands contiguous thereto; which, by the direction of the President of the United States, may be reserved for the future disposal of the said States, etc." So that the first reservation of the tract in question was made on March 3, 1811, and it attached when Richard Taylor surveyed this township in October, 1857, or at farthest, when the survey was approved in July, 1858. When a statute says that a public officer "may" do things, it will be construed as mandatory when so required by public interest or the protection of individual rights. Supervisors v. Ü. S., 4 Wall., 435 (71 U. S., XVIII., 419). So the reservation of land contiguous to saltsprings, by the President, under the Act of 1811, and like Acts, was mandatory, and it seems he so regarded it. The President speaks and acts through the heads of departments about the business committed to them. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498. On the same principle, the Commissioner of the General Land Office represents the President. 3 Ops. Attys-Gen., 93–96 (Author. of Reg. & Receivers). On July 22, 1854, the Act was passed reserv ing the salines of New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska. There were laws passed after that, extending the system, but it is not necessary to state them. It is enough to know that, before the Act of 1854, every saline in the Louisiana purchase had, from time to time, been reserved by the legislation just reviewed, save the salines in the States of Kansas and Nebraska. To extend the system to those States as well as to |