Mr. Justice Strong: I concur in the judg. | 4 Gill & J., 152; and see, ad idem, Smith v. Peoment, but not in all the positions taken in the ple, 47 N. Y., 330. opinion. And even where there is an expressed purpose, the whole legislation must be considered Mr. Justice Bradley did not sit in the argu- in connection with the purpose so expressed. ment, and took no part in the decision. Cited-23 Wall., 367, 558; 94 U. S., 202, 297: 98 U. S., 39, 139; 101 U. S., 656; 106 U. S., 147, 428; 111 U. S., 103; 4 Cliff., 389, 402, 419, 439, 505; 10' Biss., 225, 227: 14 Blatchf., 287, 303, 304; 15 Blatchf., 198; 16 Blatchf., 109, 110; 17 Blatchf., 338, 155, 156. STATE OF MARYLAND, Piff. in Err., v. Charles St. Avenue v. Merryman, 10 Md.,544. But the whole doctrine is summed up by this court, in the single statement that "The intention of the Legislature, whatever it may be, constitutes the law." James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall., 161 (83 U. S., XXI., 267). There is another consideration also, which the Court of Appeals has altogether overlooked; and that is, the construction given by the parties to the statutes, from the time of their enactment THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD down to the year 1865. Not only before but all COMPANY. (See S. C., 22 Wall., 105-115.) Payment in gold—when not required. 1. An undertaking to pay an obligation in gold cannot be inferred from anything outside of the in strument. through the war, and down through July, 1865, the Company went on paying the State's interest in sterling funds in London, never paying over the dividend, or interest of six per cent., from the beginning at any time to the State, but always retaining it in its own hands, and never accounting for any balances in favor of the State, which, as the auditor's accounts show, from time to time 2. So held, in regard to the payment, by a railroad company, of interest on state bonds payable in Lon-existed. don, issued in aid of the railroad, the interest upon which it had agreed to pay to the State. 3. The fact that the company did pay the State's interest in sterling funds in London for several years, cannot change the construction of the con[No. 50.] tract. Argued Nov. 2, 3, 1874. Decided Nov. 16, 1874. N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State IN of Maryland. Suit was brought in the Superior Court of Baltimore, by the plaintiff in error, to recover a certain claim against the B. & O. R. R. Co. The only point of difference was, whether or not the sum demanded must be paid in coin. Judgment having been given in favor of the plaintiff for the sum claimed, in gold, it was versed upon appeal, by the Court of Appeals of the State; whereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. This long continued recognition of the inten tion of the statutes and the parties, that the interest or dividend of six per cent. should pay the sterling interest, is entitled to great weight, which the Court of Appeals erred in not giving it. James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall., 161 (83 U. S., 206: Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall., 54 (76 U. S., XXI.,267); Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat., XIX., 596). Messrs. Reverdy Johnson, J. H. B. Latrobe and J. M. Gwinn, for defendant in error: The defendant in error holds, that the decision of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the character of the contract, and that it is not re-open before the Supreme Court, to contend that the contract between the State and the appellee was either a contract to pay the dividend or interest on the preferred stock in gold, or an inThe case is further stated by the court. demnity as against a loss arising from a depreMessrs. A. K. Syester, Atty-Gen. of Maryland, ciated currency, or anything, in fine, but a conI. N. Steele, Phil. F. Thomas and S. T. Wal-tract to pay in what was made a legal tender by the Acts of Congress. lis, for plaintiff in error: The Court of Appeals concedes that the ar- Cockroft v. Vose, 14 Wall., 5-8 (81 U. S., XX., rangement between the State and the Company 875, 876); Steines v. Franklin Co., 14 Wall., 15 was intended to secure to the State a yearly (81 U. S., XX., 846): Kennebec R. R. Co. v. Portamount sufficient to meet its sterling interest, and R. R. Co., 14 Wall.. 23 (81 U. S., XX., and that it was supposed at the time that the ar850); Smith v. Adsit, 16 Wall., 185 (83 U. S., rangement would have that effect. The purpose XXI., 310). of the statutes was, therefore, to secure indemnity to the State, and the contract was not simply to pay money to the State, but to pay it for the purpose of indemnification. "Statutes should be construed with a view to the original intent and meaning of the makers, and such construction should be put upon them as best to answer that intention, which may be collected from the cause or necessity of making the Act, or from foreign circumstances; and when discovered, ought to be followed, although such construction may seem to be contrary to the letter of the statute. Ches. & O. Canal Co. v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co., The law is now well settled, that no person can be held to pay any debt, or to discharge any obligation, in gold or silver coin, unless he has expressly contracted to make payment in such coin. Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall., 697 (79 U. S., XX., 462). It cannot be pretended that the Act of 1835, ch. 395, sec. 9, stipulated for payment, by the Company, of the agreed dividends in any other manner than by a payment in money generally. The citation of other Acts, made by the plaintiff in error, show only that the State endeavored, by the terms of the various arrangements made to pay for this stock, to avoid any loss upon its investment; but it did not foresee or provide for the contingency which occurred. The other stockholders who paid for their stock in coin or its equivalent, are in no better case. The defendant in error is itself in a similar situation. Its tariff rates for freight and passengers were granted by the State and accepted by the Company, upon the theory that the Company would be always entitled to demand them, if it so pleased, in gold and silver coins. They are not capable of increase, although they are now paid in a depreciated currency. These tariff rates create the fund out of which the profits of the Company are declared. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: It is, we think, unimportant in this case to determine whether the State of Maryland, under her arrangement with the Railroad Company, is to be regarded as a creditor or as a preferred stockholder. In form, at least, she is the holder of stock which, under her contract with the Company, is entitled to a preferred six per cent. dividend perpetually, payable out of the clear profits of the Company. But this sheds no light upon the vital and only question in the case, which is, whether what she is entitled to demand is, by the contract, payable only in gold, or whether it may be satisfied by legal tender notes. The contract, whatever it was, must be sought for and found in the Acts of the Maryland Leg islature, passed on the 4th of June, 1836, and on the 5th of April, 1839, and principally, if not entirely, in the 9th section of the former Act. The provisions of both the Acts were accepted by the Company. By accepting the proposition of the State made in the first Act, the Company undertook to guaranty to the State, after the expiration of three years from the payment of each of the installments of the stock subscribed by the State, the payment from that time, out of the profits of the work, of six per centum per annum, payable semi-annually on the amount of money which should be paid to the Company, under and by virtue of the Act, until the clear annual profits of the railroad should be more than sufficient to discharge the interest which it should be liable so to pay to the State, and should be adequate to a dividend of six per cent. per annum among its stockholders, and thereafter that the State should, in reference to the stock so subscribed for, and on so much thereof as the State might hold, be entitled to have and receive a perpetual dividend of six per centum per annum out of the profits of the work, as declared from time to time, and no more. Such is the language of the contract. When it was made, payment in coin was the only mode of payment recognized by law and, doubtless, in this case, as in all other cases of promises to pay money made at that time, the expectation of the parties was that the debt would be discharged in coin. So natural was this expectation, that it was very rarely thought necessary to provide against the contingency of a debt's becoming payable with anything else than coin. But in 1862, an Act of Congress, held constitutional in the cases of Knox v. Lee, and Parker v. Davis, 12 Wall. [79 U. S., XX., 287], made United States treasury notes a legal tender for the pay. ment of debts, with some exceptions mentioned in the Act, of which the debt claimed by the State of Maryland is not one. Since that time there has been two kinds of money or representatives of value with which debts may be paid: coin and legal tender notes. An ordinary debtor is at liberty to pay his debt with either. This is the general rule. But it has been ruled by this court that he can pay his debt with legal tender notes only when his contract does not specify that payment shall be made with coin. A contracting party may not only have promised to pay, he may have defined the medium of payment. He may have undertaken to discharge his obligation by payment in gold or silver, and when he has he will be held to his contract as specifically made. Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall., 687 [79 U. S., XX., 460]; Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall., 229 [74 U. S., XIX., 141]. It is not contended in this case that the contract between the parties contains any express undertaking to pay what the Company assumed to pay, either in coin or in any specified kind of money, or with anything other than that which might be a legal tender for the payment of debts, when the time for payment should arrive. But the argument on behalf of the State is, that the language used implies an undertaking to pay in coin, and that the case is, there fore, within the principle laid down in Trebil cock v. Wilson, 12 Wall., 687 [79 U. S., XX., 460]. Conceding that such an undertaking may be implied, when there is no express promise to pay in gold, still the implication must be found in the language of the contract. It is not to be gathered from the presumed or the real expectations of the parties. As was said in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall., 457 [79 U. S., XX., 287], "The expectation of the creditor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the contract would be discharged by the payment of coined money, but neither the expectation of one party nor the anticipation of the other constitutes the obligation of the contract. There is a well recognized distinction between the expectation of the parties to a contract and the duty imposed by it. Were it not so, the expectation of results would always be equivalent to a binding engagement that they should follow." There is sound reason in what was said by Lord Denman in the Queen's Bench, in Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Ad. & Ell. (N. S.), 671, which was an action upon a covenant." Where parties," said his Lordship. "have entered into written engagements with express stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable to extend them by any implications. The presumption is that, having expressed some, they expressed all the conditions by which they intend to be bound under that instrument. It is possible that each party to the present instrument," said he, "may have contracted on the supposition that the business would in fact be carried on and the service in fact be continued during three years, and yet neither party be willing to bind themselves to that effect; and it is one thing for the court to effectuate the intention of the parties to the extent to which they may have even im perfectly expressed themselves, and another to add to the instruments all such covenants as upon a full consideration the court may deem fitting for completing the intention of the parties, but which they, either purposely or unin tentionally, have omitted. The former is but the application of a rule of construction to that which is written; the latter adds to the obliga tion by which the parties have bound themselves, and is of course quite unauthorized, as well as liable to great practical injustice in the application." Applying these principles, and looking to the contract, we discover no basis for such an implication as the plaintiff in error asserts. We are asked to consider the circumstances which attended the legislative enactments and induced them. The State was then in part the owner of an unfinished railroad. It was important to the interests of the people of the State, as well as to the State as a stockholder, that the road should be finished and, to accomplish its completion, pecuniary assistance by the State was needed. For this purpose the State lent her credit. This was the object she had primarily in view. It is said she had also in view her own protection and that of her citizens against loss in so doing, and that it must be presumed the Legislature discharged its duty. and made effectual provision for such protection. This is assuming what cannot be con ceded. It assumes that it was the duty of the Legislature to exact from the Company all that could be exacted, and this though the Company was in great need of assistance, and though it was the interest of the State that such assistance should be furnished. But if the assumption might be made, it would still be inadmissible to deduce an implication of a promise, not from the contract itself, but from the extraneous fact that such a promise ought to have been exacted. Ordinarily a reference to what are called surrounding circumstances is allowed for the purpose of ascertaining the subject matter of a contract, or for an explanation of the terms used, not for the purpose of adding a new and distinct undertaking. any possible implication of an engagement to indemnify, and to make it apparent that such an obligation was not intended to be imposed or assumed. As has been noticed, the Company was required by the Act of 1836 to pay, after the first three years, six per cent. interest out of the profits of the work, and pay it semi-annually, until the net profits should be adequate to pay a six per cent. dividend, and thereafter pay a perpetual dividend of six per cent. annually. But the bonds first authorized to be issued by the State to pay her subscription were bonds bearing six per cent. interest payable quarterly, and running not less than fifty years. The commissioners for their sale were also authorized to make the interest on the bonds payable at the loan office of the State, in the City of Baltimore, or at some place or places in Europe, should they find it advantageous so to contract. It is manifest, therefore, that if the bonds had been made payable in Baltimore, principal and interest, the semi-annual payment required of the Company would not have met the obligations of the State, which were to pay quarterly her interest. And if the bonds had been made payable in Europe, still less would the six per cent. due from the Company, though paid in gold, have enabled the State to pay her interest abroad. In addition she must have paid exchange and the cost of transmission. This seems to indicate clearly that the Act of 1836 not only was not, but that it was not intended to create an obligation to indemnify the State. And this is not all. The bonds first issued were exchanged under the Act of 1839, and sterling bonds bearing five per cent. interest payable semi-annually in London were given to the Company in their place. This Act required the Company to secure the payment of the interest at the rate of five per centum per annum on the stock (the sterling bonds) created by the Act, semi-annually, at least ninety days before the first day of January and July in every year for the term of three years from the date of the bonds or certificates of stock, together with the cost of transmitting the interest to London to be there paid, and also the difference in exchange of currency between London and Baltimore. This was a stipulation for indemnity. It covered all that the State was required to pay as interest on her sterling bonds. But it was expressly limited to the interest for the first three years, and hence it excluded any implication of an obligation to indemnify against all liability of the State to pay the subsequently accruing interest. Unless this is true the limitation to three years is unmeaning. After the expiration of that period, nothing more was required than the semi-annual payment of six per cent. as stipulated by the Act of 1836. The plaintiff in error further insists that the contract, as exhibited in the Acts of the Legislature, amounts to an engagement on the part of the Company to indemnify the State for the payments she was under obligation to make in discharge of the interest upon her bonds, by means of which the money was raised to pay her subscription to the Company's stock; and as that interest could only be discharged by gold, it is argued the Company must be held to have undertaken to pay in gold, since pay. ment by legal tender notes would not amount to indemnity. But we see nothing in the contract which justifies its being construed as a contract of indemnity. It may be conceded, It is, we think, also a matter of some signifiand it probably was the fact, that both parties cance that, by the contract, the payments to the thought what the Company undertook to pay State were required to be made at first out of would suffice to pay the interest upon the state the profits, the gross receipts of the Company. bonds from time to time as it should fall due. No distinction was made between the kind of But nothing in the statutes, read as a whole or money the Company might be compelled to reread with reference to the required guaranty, ceive and that required to be paid to the State. or read in the light of the circumstances then Nor was any distinction attempted to be made existing, exhibits any undertaking that the Com-between the kind of money with which the pany's stipulated payments should suffice to dividends to the State and other stockholders discharge the liabilities of the State. On the could be paid. contrary, there is much in the statutes to repel | For these reasons, we think, the contract be tween the parties exhibits no just ground for an implication that the Company assumed an obligation to pay its dues to the State in gold, or in any other manner than in money generally, and the fact that the Company did pay the State's interest in sterling funds in London down to 1865, cannot change the construction of the contract. We do not perceive that the case of Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71 [74 U. S., XIX., 101], has any bearing upon the present controversy. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. | perpetual injunction was granted in accordance with the prayer of the bill; whereupon the respondents sued out this writ of error. The case is further stated by the court. Mr. Britton A. Hill, for plaintiffs in error: The 5th section of the Act of Mar. 31, 1868, under which the appellees claimed the release of the lien of the State for $10,500,000 on the Pacific Railroad and appurtenances, on the payment of $5,000,000 into the State Treasury, is unconstitutional and void, because the subject of said 5th section is not expressed in the title of the Act, as required by the 32d section, 4th article of the Constitution of 1865, which is as Dissenting, Mr. Justice Clifford and Mr. follows: Justice Field. No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that Cited-95 U. S., 31; 102 U. S., 65; 79 N. Y., 165; 35 subject expressed in the title; but if any sub Am. Rep., 510. 1. Where the Constitution of a State prohibits the Legislature from releasing the lien held by the State upon any railroad, it is not a restriction upon the power of the Legislature to sell any claims held by the State against a railroad company, but means only that, while the debt remains, the Legislature may not let go the security for it. 2. Such Constitution does not forbid the Legislature to sell the railroad, or compromise the debt claimed by the State, for less than the entire indebtedness; and though the Legislature had no power to release the lien while the debt remained, it was not prohibited from selling the claim or commuting the debt. 3. The 5th section of the Missouri Act of March 31, 1868, is not in conflict with that provision of the State Constitution which forbids, for any purpose whatever, a release of the lien held by the State upon any railroad. lic auction. ject embraced in an Act be not expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as is not so expressed." The title of the Act of 1868 is as follows: "An Act for the Sale of the Pacific Railroad and to Foreclose the State's Lien Thereon, and to Amend the Charter Thereof." This Act, excluding the 5th section, provides for all the purposes stated in the title, in strict accordance with the Constitution, and the con stitutional Ordinance. In every respect this 5th section is in direct conflict with the title of the Act, and embraces different and opposite subjects, to wit: "To prevent the advertisement and sale of the road," and "To prevent the foreclosure of the State lien thereon," by releasing that lien for less than one third the amount secured to the State, by the existing statutory liens on the railroad. The title required to embrace the subject contained in the 5th section would be: "An Act to Prevent the Sale of the Pacific Railroad, and to Prevent the Foreclosure of the State's Lien thereon, by a Release of the Lien of the State for $10,780,000, on the Payment of $5,000,000." The Act of the General Assembly and the deed of release of 1868, therefore, purport to release the whole lien and debt of the State for $10,780,000, against the railroad company, on the payment of $5,000,000, without a sale of the railroad under the lien by a foreclosure of the State's lien, as declared in the title to be the 4. The State constitutional Ordinance does not require that the sale of a railroad shall be for a price equal to the whole debt, or that it shall be at a pub5. Where a State Constitution ordains "That no law shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title," it cannot be justly said that an Act violates that provision, which has many details, but they all relate to one general sub-purpose of the Act. ject. The appellees filed their bill in equity in June, 1873, in the court below, to enjoin the adver tisement of the sale of the Pacific Railroad and its appurtenances, under an alleged statutory lien. They alleged that the debt for which said lien was claimed had been compromised, satisfied and paid, pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the Act of March 31, 1868; and that in accordance therewith, Thomas Fletcher, as Governor of the State of Missouri, had executed a deed of release of all the right, claim and interest of the State in said road, Oct. 10, 1868, to said Pacific Railroad Company. The respondents claimed that said deed was invalid, and said debt and lien still existing. A Therefore that section is void. See Potter's Dwar. Stat., pp. 103, 105, 121; Ind. Cent. Railway Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind., 681; second ed. Cooley, Const. Lim., 78, 82, 141-149. In the case of State v. Miller, 45 Mo., 495, the This provision of the new Constitution is equally obligatory and mandatory with any other provision of the Constitution, and where a law is clearly and palpably in opposition to it, there is no other alternative but to pronounce it invalid. It was intended to kill log-rolling, and prevent unscrupulous, designing men and interested parties from dexterously inserting matters in the body of a bill, of which the title gave no intimation of the true character. See, also, State, ex rel. Hixon,v. Lafayette Co. Court, 41 Mo.. 39; People, ex rel. McConvill ̧v. Hills, 35 N. Y., 449; People, ex rel. Failing.v. Commissioners of Highways, 53 Barb., 70; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.), 72; Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann., 298. Gen. Stat. Mo., 1865, p. 43. The words used in sec. 15, art. 11 of the Constitution of Missouri are clear, definite and unambiguous, admitting of no judicial construction to alter, vary or affect the plain intent of the people in adopting it. Cooley, Const. Lim., 2d ed., 1871, p. 55, and notes. II. This release of the state lien of $10,780.- | without any abatement in money or bonds of 000 for less than one half of the amount of the the State; that such payment of said bonds, lien, is in direct conflict with the 15th section principal and interest, shall be enforced: 1. By of the 11th article of the Constitution of Mis levying and collecting a tax of ten per cent. on souri, of July 4, 1865, which reads as follows: the gross earnings of the railroad for two years, "The General Assembly shall have no power, up to the first of October, 1868, and a tax of for any purpose whatever, to release the lien fifteen per cent. from and after said date, until held by the State upon any railroad." all of said bonds, principal and interest, are paid in full in money or bonds of the State. 2. If the said railroads fail to pay the said tax, and the principal and interest of all bonds loaned said railroad by the State, then the railroads shall be sold under the lien (of 1851) reserved to the State, and the proceeds of such sales shall be appropriated to the payment of the amount remaining due and unpaid from said railroad companies. 3. If the State buys any railroad at such sale on statutory foreclosure, the General Assembly shall provide by law how the same may be sold for the payment of the debt of the railroad company in default; but no railroad property or franchises so bought by the State can be restored to any company so in default, until it shall first have paid all interest due from said company; and all interest to accrue shall be paid semi-annually, in advance, and all sums remaining unpaid shall be secured by a lien on all the property and franchises so sold or disposed of, and all payments of such liens shall be made in money or in state bonds. Railroad Ordinance, secs. 1-5, Gen. Stat. 1865, pp. 52, 53. See opinion of Mr. Justice Bronson, in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35, wherein that eminent jurist examines and denies the power of the court to depart from the plain, explicit meanings of the words of the Constitution, and furnish another meaning by construction, based upon the consideration of the mischief against which the clause was directed. He says: "Written Constitutions of Government will soon come to be regarded as of little value, if their injunctions may be thus slightly over looked; and the experiment of setting a bound ary to power will prove a failure. We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language." See, also, to the same effect, the cases of Spencer v. State, 5 Ind., 41; State v. King, 44 Mo., 285, and Austin, Jurisprudence. This statutory lien was the only one then existing upon the Pacific Railroad in favor of the State, to secure the payment of the bonds loaned the company, and indorsed and transferred by the company to the holders thereof for value. It is, then, this lien on the Pacific Railroad that the Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from releasing. But the 5th section of the Act of March 21, 1868, directs the Governor of the State To execute and deliver to said Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims," on the payment of $5,000,000. The 5th section, directing this act to be done, is, therefore, void, and the release executed there under is inoperative beyond the $5,000,000 paid, and the lien continues for the remainder of the debt and interest, and the State has a right to enforce it by a sale of the railroad. Trask v. Maguire, 18 Wall, 408 (85 U. S., XXI., 946). This 5th section and the deed executed under it by the Governor, is a release of the lien of the State, an express release. 1 Hill., Mort., 485; 2 Hill., Mort., 458; Jerome v. Seymour, Har. Ch. (Mich.), 357. It would be valid if the Constitution did not prohibit it from being done without payment of the debt secured by the lien. III. Another and conclusive proof that the 5th section of said Act of 1868 is unconstitutional and void, is derived from the railroad Ordinance, entitled "An Ordinance for the Payment of the State and Railroad Indebtedness," which was Adopted as a Part of the Constitution of Missouri in 1865. The Railroad Ordinance expressly declares that the railroads shall pay their bonds, loaned them by the State, principal and interest in full, See 22 WALL. U, S., BOOK 22. The Constitution and Railroad Ordinance, are to be construed together, as one instrument. It is a rule of construction, "That the whole is to be examined, with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part." "If any section of a law be intricate, obscure or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another." "Effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every section and clause." "In interpreting clauses, we must presume that words have been employed in their natural and obvious meaning." Co. Litt., 381, a; Cooley, Const. Lim.,55, 59. In construing the effect of the 15th section of article 11 of the Constitution, and sections 1-5 and 7 of the Railroad Ordinance, upon the validity of the 5th section of the Act of Mar. 31, 1868, it will be found that all the questions in this case are disposed of, and the invalidity and unconstitutionality of section 5 of Act of 1868, are established beyond all doubt. The 5th section of Act 1868, comes directly in conflict with these provisions of the 3d, 4th and 5th sections of the Railroad Ordinance. It enacts that "The Governor shall not advertise said railroads for sale;" that The Governor shall execute and deliver to the said Pacific Railroad Company a deed of release for all claims, title and interest which the State of Missouri has in and to the said Pacific Railroad, its property and appurtenances, *** on the payment of $5,000,000, in ninety days, to the State Treasury, when the railroad company shall be fully discharged from all claims. The 4th section of the Railroad Ordinance declares that the railroad shall be sold under the lien reserved to the State, which lien was created | by the Missouri Act of 1851, requiring the Gov717 45 |