of descents, regulate the conveyance and transfer of property, provide remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar Acts which would be valid if emanating from a law ful government-must be regarded as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government; but that Acts in furtherance and support of rebellion and against the just rights of the citizens must be regarded as invalid, which accords with the rule of decision adopted and promulgated in the prior decision of the same court, and which is all that need be said responsive to that proposition. III. Under the circumstances it will not be necessary to add much to what has been remarked responsive to the preceding proposition to refute the third one of the series, as the language of the final proposition decided by the State appellate court is borrowed from the decision in Texas v. White, 7 Wall.,733 [74 U. S., XIX., 240], of this court upon the same sub ject. Surely such remarks do not serve to support the proposition of the appellant; and he is equally unfortunate in his reference to the case of Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 580 [84 U. S., XXI., 660], in which the opinion was given by Mr. Justice Field. Order, say the court in that case, was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated precisely as in times of peace. No one that we are aware of, say the court, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindred subjects where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citi zens under the Constitution. Viewed in the light of the qualifying phrase, the remarks reproduced accord with the present views of the court, as the qualifying phrase Certain Acts, such as those described by the is equivalent to an affirmative decision that juState appellate court, it is admitted, are valid, dicial and legislative Acts hostile in their purbut the late Chief Justice, as the organ of the pose or mode of enforcement to the authority court, proceeded to say that Acts in furtherance of the National Government, or which impaired or support of rebellion against the United States, the rights of citizens under the Constitution, or intended to defeat the just rights of the citi are invalid and void, which, in principle, is exzens, and other Acts of like nature, must be reactly what the State appellate court decided in garded as invalid and void. Nor is there any thing in the case of White v. Hart, 13 Wall., 650 [80 U. S., XX., 687], which is in the slight est degree inconsistent with the rule laid down in the preceding case. Exactly the same doctrines were laid down in the case of Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall., 413 [83 U. S., XXI., 318], in which the opinion of the court was also given by the late Chief Justice. Bonds for the payment of money to a large amount were issued, before the rebellion, by the United States to the State of Texas, to adjust certain claims made by that State growing out of a dispute as to her boundaries. Part of those bonds were still in the treasury of the State when the rebellion broke out. Texas joined the rebellion, and during that period some of those bonds were used by the ruling power of the State. War ensued, but in the progress of events the rebellion was crushed. Various efforts were subsequently made to re organize the State as one of the States of the Federal Union, and those efforts were so far successful before the suit in the case last cited was commenced that the Supreme Court decided that the State was competent to sue. She brought that suit to recover part of those bonds. Defenses of various kinds were set up by the defendant in the subordinate court. Exceptions were filed by him to the rul. ing of the court and the case was removed here by writ of error. In disposing of the case here, the court remarked as follows: whether the alienation of the this case. Decree of the State Court affirmed. THE MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSUR- v. HALLIE NEWTON. (See S. C., 22 Wall., 32-38.) Admission of party-effect of, asevidence-preliminary proofs-evidence against insurance company. to be taken as an entirety of the fact which makes *1. Every admission upon which a party relies is for his side, with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect. When, therefore, the agent and officers of an insurance company stated to the agent of a party claiming upon a policy of insurance, that the preliminary proofs presented were sufficient as to the death of the insured, but that they showed that the insured had committed suicide, the whole admission must be taken together: if sufficient to establish the death of the insured, it was also sufficient to show the manner of his death. 2. The preliminary proofs presented to an insurance company, in compliance with the condition of its policy of insurance, are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein against the insured and on behalf of the company. [No. 183.] Argued Feb. 9, 1875. Decided Mar. 1, 1875. bonds by the usurping government devests the tiIN tle of the State depends, as we have said, upon other circumstances than the quality of the government. If the government was in the actual control of the State, the validity of its alienation must depend on the object and purpose of it. If that was just in itself and laudable, the alienation was valid, but if the object and purpose were to break up the Union and to overthrow the constitutional government, the alienation was invalid. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. This action was brought by the defendant in error, upon two policies of insurance. It was originally commenced in the Missouri Circuit Court of St. Louis County, whence it was removed to the court below. *Head notes by Mr. Justice FIELD. insurance in cases of suicide. See note to Mut. Life NOTE.-Effect of provision avoiding policy of life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U. S., XXI., 236. The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. | proofs, or a question on which defendant in Messrs. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, error was bound to speak at the time, in order Edward L. Stanton, C. Parker and Alex. to constitute these voluntary recitals admissions. Martin, for plaintiff in error: Cluff v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 99 Mass., 317; Newton v. Mut. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 2 Dill., 154; N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 2 Big. L. & A. Ins., 166. Heretofore, in insurance cases, it has been frequently mooted whether statements contained in the proofs of loss estopped the assured, or whether they were merely admissible as testimony and subject to contradiction and correction. Campbell v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 10 Allen, 213; Irving v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 1 Bosw., 507; N. Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Watson, 23 Mich., 486; McMahon v. Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law J., 73; Par mellee v. Hoffman Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law J., 111; Germania v. Curran, 8 Kan., 9; Hubbard v. Hartford Ins. Co., 33 Iowa, 325; De Camp v. N. J. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law J., 89; Conn. Ins. Co. v. Huckberger, 52 Ill., 464; N. A. Ins. Co. v. Burrows, 28 Legal Ins., 342; Ins. Co. v. Francisco, 17 Wall., 672 (84 U. S., XXI., 698). With the single exception of the case at bar, proofs of loss have, in every instance, been admitted, if not as an estoppel on the plaintiff, as at least evidence proper to be considered by the jury, but open to explanation or correction. Mr. T. Z. Blakeman, for defendant in er ror: It was not necessary for defendant to produce the proofs on trial in making out her case. It was sufficient for her to show that proofs of death were given, and that the Company admitted that the proofs were satisfactory, or that it based its refusal to pay upon other grounds than the sufficiency of the proofs. Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Wright, 22 Ill., 462; Mc Masters v. Westchester Ins. Co., 25 Wend., 379; Miller v. Eagle L. & H. Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268; Lewis v. Monmouth F. Ins. Co., 52 Me., 492; Hincken v. Mut. Benefit L. Ins. Co., 3 Big. Ins. Rep., 711 (S. C., 50 N. Y., 657). The assertions in the proofs on the part of the affiants as to the manner of death, have none of the requisites to constitute an estoppel. They were not sworn to, indorsed or assented to by defendant in error. The manner of death was not required to be proved by the terms of the contract; consequently, the manner of death was not a question to be decided by the proofs. The Company was not, by the disclosures of the manner of death in the proofs, led to adopt or abandon any particular line of defense. | The defendant in error not only refrained from assenting to, or adopting as her own, the narration of the manner and circumstances attending the death, as shown in said affidavits, but she denied the truthfulness of the affidavits in this respect, by demanding of the Company, again and again, the payment of the amount of the policy. She submitted the affidavits under the terms of the policy, to prove the death. The Company assured her that the proofs disclosed the fact of death; that they were satisfied of said fact from the proofs. She knew that "death by his own hand" would avoid the policies, and she denied the imputed manner of death by demanding the payment of the policies. The Company was not misled in its defense by the disclosures as to manner of death, in the proofs, but set up several defenses. It took depositions in California, at the place where death occurred, to sustain their defenses. The defendant in error read those depositions at the trial in support of her own allegations, and the jury were convinced by them that the insured did not "die by his own hand." Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: The policies upon which this action is brought, stipulate for the payment of the insurance money within ninety days after due notice and proof of the death of the party insured; but they provide, also, that the policy shall be void if the insured shall die by his own hand. In answer to the action the Company avers that the insured did thus die by his own hand, and that the policies thereupon ceased to be binding. The insured died at Los Angelos in California in June, 1870, and proofs of his death were delivered by the father of the plaintiff to the agent of the Company in August following. These proofs showed that the deceased committed suicide. They consisted of several affi. Greenl. Ev., secs. 204, 207; 2 Stark. Ev., davits, giving the time, place and circumstances 100, 17; Campbell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., of his death, and the record of the finding of 10 Allen, 213; Bliss, Life Ins., 2d ed., p. 443; the jury upon the coroner's inquest. The findMcMasters v. Ins. Co. of North America, 64 ing was that the deceased came to his death Barb., 536; affirmed on appeal, 3 Ins. Law" By a pistol shot fired by a pistol in his own Jour., 273; Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Curran, 8 Kan., 9. The disclosures as to the manner of death did not amount to admissions on the part of the defendant in error. The contract only required "due notice and proof of death." The proofs were submitted to prove the fact of death, and they were satisfactory on this point to the Company. The affidavits were not signed or indorsed by the defendant in error, and there is no evidence that she assented to or adopted their contents. The recital of the manner of death was gratuitous and unnecessary on the part of the afflants, and on a subject not in question at the time. The manner of death must have been a question to be decided by the hand through the heart.” On the trial the father of the plaintiff testified that he was the agent, in the matter of these policies of his daughter, and that acting in that capacity, he had delivered the written proofs mentioned, to the agent of the Company at St. Louis, and had demanded payment of him and afterwards, also, of the officers of the Company, at the home office in Newark, New Jersey; that at neither place was any objection made, either by the agent or the officers of the Company, to the form or fullness of the proofs of the death of the insured; that the agent had said that they were sufficient as to form; but that st both places objection was made, at the same time that the proofs disclosed a case of suicide, and on that account payment of the insurance | laid down is properly applicable only where the was refused. The court allowed the statement to the witness as to the sufficiency of the proofs of death of the insured to be received as conclusive of that fact, but by its charge to the jury in effect separated the admission of that fact from its accompanying language, that the proofs disclosed a case of suicide, and held that this latter statement was of an independent fact to be es tablished by the Company. In this particular we think the court erred. Every admission is to be taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one side, with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. This is a settled principle which has passed by its universality into an axiom of the law. Here the admission related to the two particulars which the proofs established, the death of the insured and the manner of his death, both of which facts appear by the same documents. They showed the death of the insured only as they showed that he had committed suicide, and all that the officers of the Company evidently intended by their declaration was that they were satisfied with the proofs of the one fact because they established the other. The whole admission should, therefore, have been taken together. If it was sufficient to establish the death of the insured, it was also sufficient to show that the death was occasioned in such a manner as to relieve the Company from responsibility. But the court also erred in excluding from the jury the proofs presented of the death of the insured when offered by the Company. When the plaintiff was permitted to show what the agent and officers of the Company admitted the proofs established, it was competent for the Company to produce the proofs thus referred to and use them as better evidence of what they did establish. But independently of this position, the proofs presented were admissible as representations on the part of the party for whose benefit the policies were taken, as to the death and the manner of the death of the insured. They were presented to the Company in compliance with the condition of the policy requiring notice and proof of the death of the insured as preliminary to the payment of the insurance money. They were intended for the action of the Company, and upon their truth the Company had a right to rely. Unless corrected for mistake, the insured was bound by them. Good faith and fair dealing required that she should be held to rep resentations deliberately made until it was shown that they were made under a misapprehension of the facts, or in ignorance of material matters subsequently ascertained. insurers have been prejudiced in their defense by relying upon the statements contained in the proofs. Be that as it may, all that we now hold is that the preliminary proofs are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein against the insured and on behalf of the Company. No case has come under our observation, other than the present, where the preliminary proofs presented by the insured have been entirely excluded as evidence when offered by the insurers, the question being in all the cases whether these proofs estopped the insured from impeaching the correctness of their statements, or from qualifying them, or whether they were subject to be explained and varied or contradicted on the trial. The case of Cluff v. Ins. Co., 99 Mass., 317, in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, cited by the plaintiff, is far from sustaining his posi tion. There the beneficiary had submitted in connection with the preliminary proof certain slips cut from newspapers showing reports that the insured had died in known violation of law. On the trial upon the issue, whether the plaintiff had, ninety days previous to the commencement of the suit, furnished the Company sufficient proof of the death of the insured, the plaintiff put in evidence certain affidavits by which that proof had been made, but did not offer the slips; the latter were then offered by the Company and were excluded, and the Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, held that the exclusion was not a valid ground of exception unless it plainly appeared that the insurers were prejudiced thereby, and that they were not so prejudiced because the fact of death was otherwise sufficiently shown. When an apparent ground of defense," said the court, "is disclosed by a separate and unnecessary narration of circumstances, and the proofs required by the policy are complete without that narration and disclosure, it cannot be said that the party has failed to comply with the conditions imposed upon his right to litigate his claim; and the effect of such disclosure to defeat the action must depend upon the degree to which the plaintiff is bound by the statement. If not sworn to by the plaintiff, nor treated by him in such manner that he is concluded by his conduct, the whole question will be open to explanation and proof upon the main issue subject to the usual rules of evidence." In the present case the proofs presented were sworn to; they consisted, as already stated, of affidavits and the record of the finding of a jury under oath. Here the narration of the manner of the death of the deceased was so interwoven with the statement of his death that the two things were inseparable. The fact that the There are many cases which hold that where proofs were presented by the father of the plainta mistake has occurred in the preliminary proofs iff and not by the plaintiff herself cannot change presented, and no corrected statement is fur- their character. They were the only proofs nished the insurers before trial, the insured will presented, and without them there was no atnot be allowed on the trial to show that the facts tempted compliance with the condition of the were different from those stated. The case of policies. He was the agent of the plaintiff with Campbell v. Ins. Co., 10 Allen,213, decided by the respect to the policies, intrusted by her with Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and the case the presentation of the preliminary proofs. Preof Irving v. Ins. Co., 1 Bosw., 507, decided by sented in her name and by her agent in the matthe Superior Court of the City of New York, ter, and constituting the essential preliminary are both to this effect. It is not necessary, how-to her action, they must stand as her acts, and ever, to maintain any doctrine as strict as this the representations made therein must be taken in the present case; and possibly the rule there as true until at least some mistake is shown to have occurred in them. As already said, no suggestion is made that these proofs do not truly state the manner of the death of the in sured. It is sought, however, to avoid their ef fect in favor of the Company by taking a part of the statement of its officers as to what the proofs showed, and rejecting the residue, and then excluding the proofs themselves. This position cannot be sustained without manifest injustice to the Company. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial ordered. Cited-95 U. S., 390. JAMES MORGAN, Appt., v. GEORGE W. CAMPBELL, Assignee of the Estate of HENRY LEIBENSTEIN and JOSEPH SPEIGEL, Bankrupts. (See S. C., 22 Wall., 381-394.) rests upon the lien which the landlord has upon the property. and always presupposes some right in or lien on the thing to be distrained, upon which the right rests, and the distress warrant is the process of execution, for the enforcement and execution of it. To state the proposition differently, for rent-service, or rent-charge, where power of distress is reserved, the property of the tenant is primarily liable for the rent, and distress is the remedy, to enforce that liability. The property being thus liable for the rent, it follows that the landlord has a lien on it, from which flows his right to take it by his private act of distress or distress warrant. We are aware that this question has, before this case, been once before the very able and learned judge of the Circuit Court of the United States in this district, when he was District Judge (In re Joslyn), in the district court, and that his decision was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court, by His Honor, Justice Davis. In Landlord's lien in Illinois-levy necessary-bank-re Joslyn, 2 Biss., 235. ruptcy. 1. The Illinois Statute confers upon the landlord a lien upon the crops growing or grown upon the demised premises in any year for the rent of that year, but no specific lien is given upon other property of the tenant. 2. Prior to the levy of a distress warrant by the landlord, he has no lien on the personal property of the tenant on the premises except the crops. 3. Where a distress warrant was levied by the landlord on such property other than crops, after proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced against the tenant, the assignee in bankruptcy subsequently appointed will hold the property against the landlord. [No. 732.] Submitted Dec 21, 1874. Decided Mar. 1, 1875. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Il ΑΙ linois. The case is stated by the court. Mr. J. A. Sleeper, for appellant: By the common law and the Statute of the State of Illinois and the law of the State, as expounded and interpreted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the lien of the landlord, on the property of the tenant for rent due, is paramount and superior to the right of an execution or at taching creditor, a general assignee for the benefit of creditors, or an assignee in bankruptcy. Penny v. Little, 3 Scam., 301; 3 Kent, Com., 485; Tayl. Land. & Ten., tit. "Distress for Rent," 439, 6th ed. and n. 1 to sec. 557; Bradby, Dist., 22-33. The right to exercise the power to distrain, NOTE.-Distress for rent. A distress for rent is now no more than a summary method of seizing and selling the tenant's property to satisfy the rent which he owes. Taylor's Land. & Ten.. sec. 557. The common law and most of the English statutory provisions regulating a distress for rent were quite generally adopted in the United States. In the New England States it never obtained; in New York and Mississippi it was abolished by statute; in North Carolina it has been held inconsistent with the spirit of the laws and government, and in other States it has been modified or abolished by statute. Burket v. Bond, 3 Dana, 209; Garret v. Hughlet, 1 Har. & J., 3; 7 Har. & J., 370; Ridge v. Wilson, 1 Blackf., 409; Mayo v. Winfree, 2 Leigh, 370; Owens v. Connor, 1 Bibb, 607; 1 McCord, 299; Dagleich v. Grandy, Can. & Nor., 22; Deaver v. Rice, 3 Bat.. 431; Youngblood v. Lowry, 2 McCord, 39; Talvande v. Cripps, 3 McCord, 147; Reeves v. McKenzie, 1 Bailey, 497; Potter v. Hall, 3 Pick., 360. We think that the learned judge in his opinion misconceived the principle of the case of Rogers v. Dickey, 1 Gilm., 636, upon which he relied as a warrant for him to overrule the case of O'Hara v. Jones, 46 Ill., 288. I submit that the sections of the statute which were in force when the rents became due from the bankrupts to Morgan, by the force of their terms created a lien in favor of the landlord, and that when the petition in bankruptcy was filed, the goods of the bankrupts were subject to this lien. Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall., 328 (82 U. S.,XXL., S., XXI., 254); Marshal v. Knox, 16 Wall., 551 35); Holdane v. Sumner, 15 Wall., 600 (82 U. (83 U. S., XXI., 481); Re Rose, Lyon & Co., 3 Bk. Reg., 265; Re Wynne, 4 Bk. Reg., 23; Ez parte Morrow, Re J. B. Young, 1 Low., 386. Mr. Adolph Moses, for appellee: The court will perceive, as to the personal property of a tenant, that the statute creates no lien whatever, but simply recognizes the existence of the right of distress at common law, and attempts to regulate its exercise. But as to the crops and agricultural products, the statute confers a lien; and the distinction of law between movable property and crops is based upon considerations of policy. It is no damage to agricultural products to be subject to a lien, but it hampers the sale and exchange of personal property, which consideration has a wider scope than the mere protection of the landlord. The rent must be certain, or capable of being made certain, and payable at a certain time, in order to give a right of distress. Dunk v. Hunter. 5 B. & A., 322; Valentine v. Jackson, 9 Wend., Grier v. Cowan, Addis., 347: Reeves v. McKenzie, 1 Bailey, 500; Daniel v. Gracie, 6 Q. B., 145; S. C., 13 L. J. Q. B.. 309; Wells v. Hornish, 3 Pa., 30; Reynart v. Porter, 7 Bing., 451; Jacks v. Smith, 1 Bay, 315; Smith v. Fyler, 2 Hill, 648; Smith v. Colson, 10 Johns., 91. In order to sustain the right of distress, the relation of landlord and tenant must exist and be actually completed, and not merely in contemplation; there must be an actual demise and not a mere agreement for a lease. Schuyler v. Leggett, 2Cow. 660; Jacks v. Smith, 1 Bay, 315; Knight v. Bennett, 3 Bing., 361; 12 East, 134: Hegan v. Johnson, Taunt.. 148; Hancock v. Austin, 14 Com. B., N. S.. 634: Spencer v. Burton, 5 Blackf., 57; Watson v. Waud. 8 Exch., 335; Cohen v. Broughton, 54 Ga 296; Hill v. Stocking, 6 Hill, 277. A careful reading of the case of Penney v. Little, 3 Scam., 301, will show that the court, in that opinion, carefully treats simply of the right to distrain for rent, and that the phrase, "landlord's lien" is not used therein. This decision is not a warrant for the position of the court in O'Hara v. Jones, 46 Ill., 288, that, "Under our law, the landlord has the lien and a right to distrain." Webb v. Sharp, 13 Wall., 14 (80 U. S., XX., 478); Fowler v. Rapley, 15 Wall., 328 (82 U. S., XXI., 35); Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall., 554 (83 U. S., XXI., 483). Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court: This is a contest between a landlord of demised premises and the assignee in bankruptcy of his tenants. Morgan, the appellant, leased a storehouse in Chicago to Libenstein and Speigel, at a certain monthly rental, beginning on the 18th of June, 1872. These tenants were in arrears for several months when, on the 17th day of May, 1873, the landlord issued his dis Three We might well content ourselves with the decision In re Joslyn, 3 Bk. Reg., 118 (S. C., 2 Biss., 238), wherein His Honor Judge, Drummond, then District Judge, reviewed this whole subject-matter in 1870, for the guidance of the practice in the Northern District of Illinois. His conclusions, which have always been regarded as satisfactory to the Bar, were, on aptress warrant to the proper officer, which was peal, affirmed by His Honor, Judge Davis, sitting in the circuit court. The opinion is mainly devoted to the effect of proceedings by distress, commenced prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy; yet, the scope of the decision traverses the effect of the statute as a whole. If the position of appellant be true, that the lien is given by the statute, then proceedings would have been unnecessary to fix the lien, and ap pellant might well file his bill to have his statutory lien (?) allowed out of the proceeds. Having levied his warrant after the commencement of bankrupt proceedings, he stands in the same position as if he had not instituted any proceedings, and the following language used in In re Joslyn, supra, applies to this case. "Of course it follows, from what has been said, that where no distress warrant has been issued, as is the fact in some of the cases upon which the judgment of the court has been asked, prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, that the landlord can have no preference over the general creditors, but must prove his debt like any other general creditor of the bankrupt and, consequently, that all the property, so held by the tenant is vested in the assignee." We deem it useless to argue to this court the difference between the laws of Louisiana and the District of Columbia, and those of Illinois on this subject. levied on the same day upon property of the The bill in this case cannot be sustained, unless_the_laws of Illinois conferred upon the landlord a statutory lien upon the personal property of the tenant in the county prior to the levy of the warrant. If the lien existed independently of the warrant, and the warrant was used merely as a means of enforcing it, then the theory of the bill is correct. On the Where there is a surrender terminating the relations of landlord and tenant, or where the landlord elects to treat the tenant as a trespasser or exercises an option to regard the lease as void, the right to distrain is gone. Bain v. Clark, 10 Johns., 424; Jones v. Carter, 15 Mees. & W., 718; Jackson v. Sheldon, 5 Cow., 448; Bridges v. Smyth, 5 Bing., 410; S. C., 2 Moore & P., 740; Franklin v. Carter, 1 Com. B., 750; S. C., 3 D. & L., 213; Williams v. Stiven, 9 Q. B., 14. The right to distrain is not waived or lost by taking, as collateral security, a note or bond, or note and chattel mortgage, or bond and warrant of attorney, or even by a judgment pursuant to such bond and warrant. Chipman v. Martin, 13 Johns., 240; Cornell v. Lamb, 20 Johns, 407; Bantleon v. Smith, 2 Binn., 146; Bailey v. Wright, 3 McCord, 484; Price v. Limehouse, 4 McCord, 544; Bates v. Nellis, 5 Hill, 651; Snyder v. Kunkleman, 3 Pa., 487; Atkins v. Byrnes, 71 Ill., 326; Davis v. Gyde, 4 Nev. & Man., 462. But taking note as payment destroys right to Horse sent to livery stable to be fed and cared for cannot be distrained for rent. Youngblood v. Lowry, 2 McCord, 39; S. C., 13 Am. Dec., 698. cles excepted, and the tendency of our decisions is, upon the whole, against the right of distraining goods not the property of the tenant. 3 Bl. Com., 7; 3 Kent, 476; Kessler v. McConachy, 1 Rawle, 435; Gorton v. Falkner, 4 Term, 565; Howard v. Ramsay, 7 Harr. & J., 113; Harvie v. Wickham, 6 Leigh, 236; O'Donnell v. Seybert, 13 Serg. & R., 54; Karns v. McKinney, 74 Pa. St., 387; Gilman v. Elton, 6 Moore, 243; Holt v. Johnson, 14 Johns., 425; Snyder v. Hill, 2 Dana, 204: Brown v Sims, 17 Serg. & R., 138; Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend., 475; Bevan v. Crooks, 7 Watts & S., 452; Riddle v. Welden, 5 Whart., 1; Stone v. Matthews, 7 Hill, 428; Owen v. Boyle, 22 Me., 47; McCreery v. Claflin, 37 Md., 435; S. C.. 11 Am. Rep., 542; Cadwalader v. Tindall, 20 Pa. St.. 422. Books of account of a merchant are not liable to seizure for rent. Davis v. Arledge, 3 Hill (S. C.), 170; S. C., 30 Am. Dec., 360. Distress must, at common law, be made on the demised premises. The right ceases on the removal of the goods. Martin v. Black, 9 Paige, 641; 38 Am. Dec., 574. An action will not lie for distraining for more rent than is due. Hamilton v. Windolf, 36 Md., 301; S. C., 11 Am. Rep., 491. The goods of the principal in the store of his commission merchant for sale are not liable to distress for rent due by the latter to the landlord of the premises. McCreery v. Claflin, 37 Md., 435; 8. C., 11 797 Though, at common law, all movable chattels found upon the rented premises might be distrained for rent, whether they were the property of the tenant or a stranger, yet there were, very early, arti-Am. Rep., 542. See 22 WALL. U. S., Book 22. 50 |