For these supplies he claimed a large allowance beyond the amount stipulated in his con tract. The petition then states as follows: "But your petitioners state that the officers of the Treasury, feeling themselves bound only by what appeared of record in the department, allowed the said Piatt, in the settlement of his ac count for rations furnished after the first day of January, 1815, no more than the original contract price per ration; under these circumstances he brought his claim before the Secretary of War, Mr. Crawford, who would have settled it on the principles for which the said Piatt then contended, and which your petitioners now claim to be legal and just, but that, by reason of what he considered countervailing evidence, he had doubts whether such assurances had ever been given."

Thus it is seen that there were two sides to the question at that early day, when all the events were fresh, and when Mr. Monroe was living at the seat of government, and accessible at any moment.

In 1820, Piatt was arrested for $48,230.77, the balance found due to the Government in his accounts, as ascertained by the settlement at the department. He then brought his claim before Congress, and the Judiciary Committee of the Senate reported adversely thereto. But on the 8th of May an Act was passed for his relief, to wit: "An Act for the relief of John H. Piatt. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the proper accounting officers of the Treasury Department be, and they are hereby authorized and required to settle the accounts of John H. Piatt, including his accounts for transportation, on just and equitable principles, giving all due weight and consideration to the settlements and allowances already made, and to the assurances and decisions of the War Department; provided that the sum allowed under the said assurances shall not exceed the amount now claimed by the United States, and for which suits have been commenced against the said John H. Piatt."

Thereupon his accounts were restated under the provisions of the Act; and the officers of the department, after allowing him the sum of $63,620.48 for provisions furnished to friendly Indians and to distressed settlers of Michigan (which was entirely outside of his contract, and was afterwards paid in full), allowed him a credit on the footing of the assurances of Mr. Monroe for $48,230.77, the full amount of the claim for which he had been arrested. He was thereupon discharged from custody on the 25th

The present case is stronger. Congress proposed to allowed Piatt a settlement of his claim by the Treasury Department, in which due weight and consideration should be given to the assurances in question, provided that the sum allowed under them should not exceed the amount claimed by the United States against him, and for which suit had been commenced. He accepted the law, had the benefit of the set tlement, and was allowed under the assurances the amount named, which justly canceled the the debt for which he was sued and arrested by the Government. Thereupon he was discharged. The declaration of Congress, thus made binding by the acts of the party, that nothing should be allowed against the Government on that claim beyond a certain amount named, was equivalent to a solemn adjudication. It amounted to a declaration of the Government that it would not suffer itself to be pursued or molested for a greater sum. Can it now be contended that the Act of 1855 constituting the Court of Claims and allowing suits to be brought against the Government on contracts made with it, has opened this adjudication-this settlement and determination of the case? In my judgment, certainly not. The Act constituting the Court of Claims was not intended to disturb past adjudications and settlements, and to open afresh claims that had been disposed of. The Court of Claims had no right to go behind the final settlement, and attempt to establish the original facts of the case. Its findings of fact, in this respect, were illegal and void. The Govern ment has never consented to be sued on this claim, or on any claims similarly situated.

The conclusion of law to which the court came, I think, was correct, and the decree should be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Swayne, Mr. Justice Davis and Mr. Justice Hunt, concur in this opinion.

v.

UNITED STATES;

parties (Piatt and the Government). this case was then and there forever ended and determined. Between individuals it must necessarily have been so. Had such a disputed and doubtful claim been held by one man against another, and left to arbitration, subject to the condition that no sum should be awarded beyond a certain amount, and had that amount been awarded and accepted, can there be a doubt that the award would have been binding and conclusive? I think not.

Deceased, Appt.,

v.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C., "The Elgee Cotton Cases," 22 Wall., 180198.)

Captured and Abandoned Property Act-contract of sale-when title passes—who may sue.

1. No one can sue in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of captured or abandoned property, unless he can prove his ownership of the property seized;

titled to the specific performance of said con

tract.

That, from the net proceeds of said 572 bales of cotton and with interest accrued thereon, the said Elgee and Chambers are entitled to be paid at the rate of ten cents per pound on 1,528 bales thereof, of 500 pounds each, and on 572 bales at the actual weight thereof and their proportion of said interest.

And the said Lobdell is entitled to be paid at the rate of twenty cents per pound on 572 bales of said cotton at their actual weight and his proportion of said interest.

And the said C. V. Woodruff & Co. are entitled to be paid the balance of said net proceeds and interest.

That the contract made in Oct., 1863, between J. K. Elgee and Haller Nutt through his agent, Truman Holmes, was executory merely and that thereby the said Nutt acquired no property in said 2,100 bales of cotton, and no right to the net proceeds of 572 bales thereof in the Treasury, or to the interest thereon.

That the said contract between said Elgee and said Nutt was made in violation of the Non-Intercourse Acts and is void.

The various parties in this case were represented by the following counsel:

For the United States, Messrs. Geo. H. Will iams, Atty-Gen., and S. F. Phillips, Solicit or-Gen.

For Woodruff & Co., Messrs. B. F. Butler, Jno. A. Grow and R. M. Corwine.

For Mrs. Gaussen, Executrix, Messrs. W. W. McFarland, J. M. Carlisle & J. D. McPherson.

For Mrs. Nutt, Mr. Joseph Casey.

Montgomery v. U. S., 5 N. & H., 658; Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black, 476 (66 U. S., XVII., 222); Mason v. Thompson, 18 Pick., 305; Bloram v. Saunders, 4 Barn. & C., 941; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614; Blackburn, Sales, 160; Story, Sales, 321; Benj., Sales, Am. ed., 318, 319 and notes. Mr. Casey:

The contract between Elgee and Lobdell of July 31 did not transfer the title to the cotton to Lobdell. Under this contract, the title could not pass until the delivery of the cotton at Fort Adams, and this delivery could not be made without violating the non-intercourse laws.

Montgomery v. U. S., 5 Ct. of Cl.. 58; MeDonald v. Hewett, 15 Johns., 349; Rapelye v. Mackie, 6 Cow., 250; Outwater v. Dodge. 7 Cow., 85; Young v. Austin, 6 Pick, 280; The Reform, 3 Wall., 617 (70 U. S.. XVIII., 105); The Sea Lion, 5 Wall., 630 (72 U. S., XVIII., 618); The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall., 521 (73 U. S., XVIII., 935); Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall., 542 (74 U. S., XIX., 244); U. 8. v. Lane, 8 Wall, 185 (75 U. S., XIX., 445): Montgomery v. U. S., 15 Wall., 395 (82 U. S., XXI., 97); U. S. v. La pene, 17 Wall., 601 (84 U. S., XXI., 693).

Delivery of the property and payment of the price were to be simultaneous, and no property had passed until that was done.

Mason v. Thompson, 18 Pick., 305; Low v. Andrews, 1 Story, 38; N. Y. F. Ins. Co. v. DeWolf, 2 Cow., 56; Bloxam v. Saunders, 4 Barn. & C., 941; Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R., 9; Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East, 614; Rugg v. Minett. 11 East, 210; Withers v. Lys. 4 Camp., 237; Wallace v. Breeds, 13 East, 522; Austen v. Craren, 4 Taunt., 644; White v. Wilks, 5 Taunt.. 176;

Messrs. Butler and Grow.

The bill of sale to Lobdell vested the title of the cotton in him.

Benj. Sales, 233, 234, 238-242; Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y., 258; Blackburn, Sales, 152; Turley v. Bates, 2 Hurl. & C., 200; Woodruff v. U. S., 7 Ct. of Cl., 620.

The assignment of the bill of sale and claim against the Government for the proceeds of the cotton by Lobdell to Woodruff & Co., authorized and empowered them to institute proceed ings in the Court of Claims.

Lawrence & Crowells' case, 8 Ct. of Cl., 252; 15 Stat. at L., 75, sec. 4; 12 Stat. at L., 767,sec. 12; U. S. v. Burns, 12 Wall., 246 (79 U. S., XX., 388): Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 666 (74 U. S., XIX., 169); see, also, La. Civil Code, arts. 1920. 2433, 2437; Barrett v. His Creditors, 12 Rob.,474; Stephens v. Chamberlin, 5 Ann.,657. Mr. W. W. McFarland:

Smith, 43 N. H., 141; Henning v Powell. 37 Pa., 187; Civil Code. La., 2433; Campbell v. Penn, 7 La., 371; Parmele v. McLoughlin, 9 La., 439; Shuff v. Morgan, 9 Mart., 592, Wason v. Phillips, 4 La. Ann., 158.

The contract between Elgee and Holmes, as the agent of Nutt, did not contemplate the payment of any money, nor even the ascertain ment of weight, etc., until the cotton arrived at Liverpool. The contract was for all the cotton at so much per bale, and transferred the title and property and right of possession to Nutt at once. No time was fixed for the shipment to Liverpool, but it must have been necessarily implied that this was to take place when the cotton could be removed and shipped without violation of the non-intercourse laws.

Nutt's contract was a present sale at a stipulated price of a designated lot of cotton payable at a future time. It was a completed, perfected, unconditional sale.

Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court:

These cases have been elaborately and very ably argued, touching both the legality and the construction of the contracts under which the different parties claim. But in the view which we take of the merits of the controversy, it is unnecessary to do more than to examine the contracts themselves, and to determine what is their true meaning.

The fundamental question, in all the cases, is, whether Elgee parted with the ownership by either of the contracts found by the Court of Claims to have been made by him, or for him by his agent, Gordon. It is the owner alone who has any standing in the Court of Claims under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act. In regard to such property, only such suits can be brought as are authorized by the statute. That statute (Act of March 12, 1863) furnishes a complete system for the prosecution of claims under it, and defines the extent of the rights which those who claim an interest in the proceeds of property captured or abandoned during the civil war may assert against the Government. According to the well known rules of statutory construction, the system is exclusive of all others, and the rights defined are the only ones which can be enforced in any judicial proceeding. The language of the Act is" That any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property, may, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims, and on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of said property, of his rights to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given any aid or support to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of such proceeds, after the deduction of any purchase money which may have been paid, together with the expense of transportation and sale of said property and other lawful expenses attending the disposition thereof."

Thus, it is plain that no one is allowed to sue in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of captured or abandoned property unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court three things: first, his ownership of the property seized; second, his right to the proceeds thereof; and, third, that he never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion. The third, it is true, has been ruled by this court to be no longer necessary since the amnesty proclamations, but the ownership of the property at the time of the seizure, and the right to the proceeds thereof, are still indispensable to any standing in court as a claimant for the proceeds of property capt ured, which have been paid into the Treasury of the United States.

We are, then, to inquire whether either Woodruff and Bouchard or Haller Nutt had acquired the ownership of the cotton prior to its seizure by the agent of the United States, on the 2d of April, 1864; for if either of these parties had become the owner and entitled to the proceeds of its sale before that date, that party is entitled to a judgment for the sum remain ing in the Treasury, after the deductions are made provided by the statute. If, on the other hand, neither of those parties has shown that Elgee parted with his title; if the owner

ship remained in Elgee until after the seizure, and until his death, his representatives are the only persons that are authorized to sue for the proceeds of the cotton in the Court of Claims, for they only are the owners, whatever equities may exist in favor of the parties who contracted to buy.

We come, then, at once to the question whether Woodruff and Bouchard acquired the ownership of Elgee. If they did, it was mediately through C. S. Lobdell. They made no contract with Elgee, but Lobdell did, and they purchased Lobdell's contract. What, then, was that contract?

On the 31st day of July, 1863, W. C. Gordon, an authorized agent of Elgee and Chambers, entered into the following agreement with Lobdell:

Mississippi, Wilkinson County:

We have, this 31st of July, 1863, sold unto Mr. C. S. Lobdell our crops of cotton, now lying in the county aforesaid, numbering about 2,100 bales, at the price of ten cents per pound, currency; the said cotton to be delivered at the landing at Fort Adams, and to be paid for when weighed, Mr. Lobdell agreeing to furnish at his cost the bagging, rope and twine to bale the cotton unginned; and we do acknowledge to have received, in order to confirm this contract, the sum of $30. This cotton will be received and shipped by the house of De Silva & Co., New Orleans, and from this date is at the risk of Mr. Lobdell. This cotton is said to have weighed an average of five hundred pounds when baled. (Signed) W. C. GORDON, Agent for Messrs. Elgee and Chambers. Č. S. LOBDELL. At the time when the contract was made the baled cotton was stored under a covering of boards at some place not certainly designated. A portion, equal to about twenty bales unbaled, was in a gin-house on Buffalo Bayou, at a place known as "The Rocks," or 'Felter's Plantation," about ten miles from the Mississippi River. At this latter place Lobdell and the agent of Elgee met. Whether it was the same place where the bulk of the cotton was lying does not distinctly appear. Immediately after the contract Lobdell employed J. M. Morris, living near where the cotton was stored, "to watch and take care" of it, and paid him therefor, and Morris continued his care until the cotton was seized by the agent of the United States. But it does not appear that the possession was surrendered to Morris, or that there was any change of possession. At this time, the region where the parties were was greatly disturbed by the war, and the cotton was in danger of being burnt by the Confederate forces, and of being captured by the United States. Under these circumstances, what ought it to be concluded was intended by the contract between Gordon and Lobdell? Was it intended to pass the property in the cotton to the purchaser, or was it in legal effect only an agreement to sell?

It must be admitted there is often great difficulty in determining whether a contract is itself a sale of personal property so as to pass the ownership to the vendee, or whether it is a sale on condition, to take effect or be consummated only when the condition shall be performed, or whether it is a mere agreement to sell. It is,