congestion. As the expense would be very considerable, it is uncertain whether or not this will be done. The Battle-Cruiser "Lion."

It is reported that on her full-speed trials the new battle-cruiser Lion attained a maximum of 31 knots, thus beating the world record recently held by the German battle-cruiser Moltke. No official details of the Lion's trials have so far been published, and it is improbable that any will be, the tendency of the Admiralty of the present day being to endeavor, so far as possible, to suppress information having to do with trials. For that matter, the Lion has, throughout her construction, been surrounded with a certain amount of mystery, mostly of an entirely unnecessary nature.

The Naval War Staff.

A Naval War Staff has been added to the equipment of the British Navy. Its exact duties are somewhat vaguely defined, and it is not really quite clear whether the new

body will in substance be a series of additional assistants to the Lords of the Admiralty, or a more or less complete body acting on its own initiative and eventually tending to interfere more or less with the element in command afloat. Almost without exception, the press has hailed the new idea with great enthusiasm, and, curiously enough, attributed it to the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, although everything about the scheme suggests that it was outlined by Lord Fisher some four or five years ago.

In the navy itself, the scheme is by no means popular, as it has already been suggested that only those who are fortunate enough to get selected for staff duties will have any particular prospects; which is another way of saying that the future of the average officer will be even less rosy than it is at present.

The Navy League has given its adherence to the scheme, which, of course, has long been demanded by Lord Charles Beresford. The Imperial Maritime League,

on the other hand, which in the past has been so closely associated with what are known as "Beresford's ideas" and has strongly advocated the formation of a War Staff, expresses dissatisfaction with the scheme, and goes so far as to hint that there is a grave risk of the War Staff becoming a perfectly dummy body, whose name will be taken in vain by politicians anxious to find any excuse for reducing naval expenditure. This, of course, is an extreme view, but its existence is worth noting.

The increase of calibers in heavy ordinance first came into favor about thirty years ago, when England and Italy adopted the 100-ton gun. The English piece had a caliber of 415 mm.; the Italian, 430 mm.

The use of the progressive powders brought on a decrease in those calibers, because the new explosives gave superior results with guns of smaller calibers. It was this that brought about the general adoption of the 305 mm. caliber, which, for twenty years, remained the maximum caliber in all navies. Its superiority was not disputed, and it has been in general use in greater or less degree on board all battleships. Its reign, however, seems to be at an end. Since 1908, the naval powers have shown a disposition to abandon it and to require greater power of their heavier calibers.

The English, on the Orion and Lion, have guns of 343 mm., throwing a projectile of 566 K.

The United States has a gun of 356 mm., firing a projectile of 635 K. It is building a gun of 406 mm. for the fortifications of the Panama Canal, on the Pacific side.

In December, 1911, the Vickers yards placed on the stocks a Turkish battleship, which will carry guns of 343 mm. Italy is studying a gun of 400 mm., to fire a shell charged with 50 to 60 Kilos of explosive.

Germany, which at first armed its battleships with 280 mm. guns, abandoned that caliber in 1909 for the 305 mm. It is rumored that it actually has a gun of 380 mm.,

firing a projectile of 720 Kilos. But rumors from that country are not always to be accepted as reliable information. Germany, like Japan, considers secrecy one of the factors in determining victory. This explains why so little is known about the capacity of the German manufacture, especially the Krupp works, ignorance on that subject being apt to exercise a considerable influence outside. Knowledge of the time necessary for the building of a high powered gun is important, as it enters largely into the calculation of when the ship as a completed fighting machine may be counted upon. Up to 1906, the Krupps manufactured each year two armaments of four heavy guns. Since 1908, the German navy has been laying on the stocks annually three battleships and one armored cruiser, the former carrying twelve heavy guns, and the other at least eight, it is believed. Thus, the Krupps have taken steps to increase their manufacture.

In France, similar studies are being carried on, but more slowly. The Ordnance Department leans toward the 340 mm. caliber, but without losing sight of the fact that the increase of caliber diminishes the rapidity of fire, at least with the ordinary methods. Now, rapidity of fire is of primary importance.

The French battleships to be laid down in 1912, will receive 340 mm. guns, firing projectiles of 540 Kilos.

The Counseil Supérieur of the navy, consulted in 1911, showed a decided preference for the 340 mm. caliber and urged its early manufacture. The conclusive argument in favor of that caliber is that the 340 mm. gun works less close to its limit of resistance than the 305 mm. The increase in the weight of the shell and the explosive constituting the interior charge of the projectile will be compensated by lower pressures per square centimeter in the bore, and consequently strains the resistance of the 340 mm. less than that of the 305 mm.

The 305 mm. shell carries 17 K. of melinite and pierces a 30 cm. steel plate up to 7000 meters. The 340 mm. shell will carry 20 K. of melinite and will perforate the same thickness of steel up to 9000 meters. It is true that at that distance the probability of hitting the belt is rather small. French ordnance experts are rather of the opinion that, from a military standpoint, the 340 mm. gun is not preponderatingly superior to the 305 mm., the more so that, the 340 mm. being heavier than the 305 mm. and having heavier mounts and fittings, the number of the large guns must be reduced in order to maintain the same displacement. Thus the new Franch battleships are to carry ten 340 mm. instead of twelve 305 mm. guns.

In spite of that reduction in number, the efficiency will be considerably greater. It is reckoned that, with the ten

340 mm. guns firing on the same side, the kinetic energy of a broadside will be greater by one-third. By substituting the caliber 340 for that of 305, the kinetic energy of each gun is increased by 1/1.32. The difference is perceptible. Yet some people remain unconvinced. Some ordnance officers maintain that however much the range and the force of penetration is increased, the visibility of the object, which practically does not seem to exceed 8000 meters, on an average, will still have to be dealt with. This is another reason why the 340 mm. gun is not likely to prove so very superior to the 305 mm. Nevertheless, those who stand for the heavier caliber have carried their point.

The Turrets.

The gun being more than ever the arbiter of naval combats, everything relating to it demands the greatest study, as much on the part of the constructor as on that of the fighter. Therefore, the question of the turrets calls for close examination; and, for many years past, has been, in France, the object of most serious study. The old French turrets have been much criticized, and those just criticisms have brought about the adoption of more rational methods.

At first, turrets were primarily built to receive the guns, with scant regard for the personnel called upon to handle them, with the result that the overcrowded gun-pointers could not work with advantage or proper speed. Again, the computing methods were deficient. The displacement of the ship was the first thing fixed upon; after which, a quantity of apparatus and installations not provided for, were always introduced on board. In order to come within the fixed displacement originally determined, it was necessary to cut down other weights and, consequently, it was usually the turrets and their fittings that suffered. In this way, battleships like the Charlemagne and Gaulois were provided with only a single ammunition hoist for two guns. In reality, the hoist could serve but one gun, causing the other to be held in reserve while the first was in action. This was a poor way of utilizing the armament. In those times there prevailed in the Department a want of cohesion, which fortunately has since disappeared.

Three different corps co-operated in the material of the ordnance. The Bureau of Powders and Saltpeters, under the War Department, manufactured the explosive. The colonial artillery (War Department) manufactured the guns and mounts. The Genie Maritime (Naval Construction Corps) designed the turrets jointly with the ordnance bureau. If in that preparation of the material,

be

the naval constructor and the ordnance man had a predominant part, the representatives of those two corps, coming under two different heads, did not always harmonize. It was found necessary to establish tween the two joint operators a line of demarcation, or rather a plane, which was the platform of the turret, the ordnance corps working above, the construction corps below. But there was no authority to serve as umpire when any discussion arose.

The constructor, limited by the total cost of the displacement and in constant wrangle over the excess of weight, inclined toward a decrease in the size of the turrets in order to diminish the weight. The ordnance people, who were indifferent to displacements, demanded with a show of reason, turrets sufficiently spacious not only to lodge the guns, but to give elbow room to the gunners, in other words, the necessary space for handling, loading, pointing, and firing. Hence a secret contention between the construction and ordnance corps, in which the latter was not always the victor. Thus it is that the turrets of the battleships Patrie and Republique are too confining.

In order to overcome the difficulty, the Minister of Marine requested bids from the French turret constructors. He decided that henceforth the plans for the displacements of battleships should have as a point of departure the weights of the turrets, instead of the figure of displacement.

At first, a single gun of 305 mm. was placed in a turret; then two; and finally three. But whereas the singlegun turret was soon replaced by the twin-gun turret, the powers were slow in adopting the triple gun turret, which, nevertheless, has some advantages, among others, a decided decrease in weight. It is calculated that two triplegun turrets save 300 tons over three twin-gun turrets. The use of the triple-gun turret allows of a decrease of displacement for a determined number of guns, or an increase in the number of guns for a determined displace

ment.

On the other hand, it requires a much greater solidity. In each triple turret, the guns on either side stand farther apart from the axial line than in the twin-gun turret. The axis will thus have an extra strain to bear, demanding an increased solidity, especially in case of salvo firing by means of electric or mechanical device. The triple turret permits of a greater concentration of fire.

The above fact suggested to an Italian engineer, Lorenzo d'Adda, the idea of a revolving turret armed with six heavy guns, making a complete revolution of 360°. The six guns could be fired in three minutes. A single turret

of that kind would weigh thirty per cent less than three double turrets, and its use would necessitate but one ammunition hoist, or only one break in the armored deck for the supplying of the six guns.

We do not know what the future has in reserve for such a conception. Of course, it would have a great advantage from the point of view or concentration of fire, and would reach its greatest advantage in ships having internal combustion engines. But this method of triplegun turrets has one serious drawback as compared with the twin-gun turrets. One well-placed shell would suffice to put a turret out of commission,- that is, one-fourth of the power of a ship fitted with four triple-gun turrets, instead of one-sixth, as in the case of the armament consisting of six twin-gun turrets. This contingency, naturally, has been taken into account. But the case of the possibility of a shell disabling a turret presents as little probability as a projectile hitting squarely the belt of a ship.

The increase of the calibers of heavy ordnance, which is engaging the attention of all nations, does not call for great changes in navy yards. It can be said that the triple turret has come at an opportune moment to increase the power of the battleship without sensibly interfering with its displacement. Several powers have adopted the change since 1909,- Italy, Russia, the United States, and Austria.

Italy has placed triple turrets on her four Dreadnoughts either completed or under construction (the Dante Alighieri, Conte di Cavour, Leonardo da Vinci, and Giulio Cesare). The Dante will carry twelve guns in four turrets; the other three will have five turrets, of which three will be triple and two double, all on the axial line.

The four new Russian battleships - the Poltava, Sebastopol, Gangut and Petropavlovsk-will have twelve 305 mm. guns in four axial turrets.

The American Navy has adopted the triple turrets for the two battleships recently laid down.

Finally, the Austrian battleship Viribus Unitis is to carry twelve 305 mm. guns in four axial turrets.

In France, in the case of the later battleships, the "Section Technique" had designed a plan for twelve 305 mm. guns, of which six would be in two triple turrets,— thus saving in this a weight of 1,200 tons on the whole, reducing the present displacement of 23,500 tons to 22,300. But the idea has been abandoned, with the result that France, like some other countries, is still studying the question,- plodding in the rear, instead of marching in front.

D.

LETTER FROM ROME

Deputy Federico di Palma, one of the Italian members of Parliament, an expert in naval affairs and editor of the Rivista Nautica (Nautical Review), has just published an article in which, examining the new situation created for Italy by the occupation of the Provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenacia, he points to what he thinks should be the new naval program of the young kingdom :

The conquest of the Tripolitania has reinstated Italy in her ancient position of a great Mediterranean power. When the war is finished and a fruitful calm reigns over the vast Tripolitain region, Italy will soon begin to feel the great moral and political advantages of her new position; the economic benefits will come later, when Italian capital and work will be employed, organizing and preparing for the wise and practical colonization of that territory three times the size of Italy.

Deputy di Palma goes on to say that naturally a conquest of such importance, with the great advantages it is sure to bring, means new obligations and output for the State. About 1,250 miles of new coast have been added to the 3,750 of the home country; other mercantile ports are opened to the Italian flag and to Italian activity; ancther military naval base, Tobruck, has come to sensibly strengthen the strategic position of the young kingdom in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. He adds:

With the conquest of Tripolitania, we have established ourselves between the two greatest colonial nations of he world,England and France,-which constantly maintain two potent fleets in the Mediterranean, and which have joined the ports of their North African possessions to the national ones by means of steamship lines having the best and fastest ships.

Italy, therefore, above all, must prepare to augment her navy,the most efficacious instrument in maintaining her new position, to guarantee her standing as a great Mediterranean power. To-day our naval program is changing: fifteen years ago the efficacy of the naval efficiency of our naval forces was determined by the naval strength of France in the Mediterranean; later, relations with France being sensibly ameliorated and those with Austria much more strained, our naval program underwent a new and radical change, as the magnetic needle, which first pointed to the Tyrrhenian Sea, veered decisively toward the Adriatic,-the new program, although never clearly announced, having, as its integral basis, to construct, if possible, double the number of ships of Austria.

What should the present naval program be? Deputy di Palma answers that it should have, naturally,

A new camparison, as all naval programs have as object the comparison of their efficiency with that of a possible adversary. However, Italy to-day, although having to establish a minimum for her naval efficiency, has not the need to consider any nation as her possible adversary. Our first object should be to main