and habit of speech-in short, cultivate himself as a man of a wider world than before. In the old Navy days, foreign cruising, more varied shore employments, and less strenuous service requirements gave more time than we have now for broadening and refining influences; but this Post-Graduate Department will open many doors leading to such advantages, if the students will but enter them. Along with all this goes the responsibility which the student officers must feel, that they will be accepted as representatives of the service, and many will judge the whole corps of officers by their behavior.

To the service at large, the possibilities of benefit are too many to do more than touch upon. Better officers, better specialists; and in turn, after some years, better educators of our own. Steady and constant progress is assured; keeping pace with advance outside. The attitude of our civilian friends could not be more cordially inviting and encouraging. The best will always be at our disposal. It rests with us to avail ourselves of it, for advancement of the Navy's usefulness to the country.

The Navy Department order of October 31, 1912, establishing the Post-Graduate School, is as follows:

A Post Graduate Department is hereby established at the Naval Academy, separate from the academic departments and independent of the Academic Board. It shall be governed by an Executive Council for Post Graduate Courses, composed of the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, the Head of the Post Graduate Department, the heads of the Academic Departments of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction, Ordnance and Gunnery, Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Mechanics, and Physics and Chemistry, the Head of the Engineering Experiment Station, a Naval Constructor, and a Civil Engineer.

The Council will pass upon administrative questions and upon the merits of the student officers. and have advisory functions in matters of the curriculum. The Council will formulate its own rules for procedure, subject to the approval of the Bureau of Navigation, and shall submit to the Bureau of Navigation from time to time such recommendations affecting post graduate courses as may seem advisable.

The Head of the Post Graduate Department will be detailed by the Navy Department. He will direct and conduct the executive and administrative work connected with the post graduate courses, replacing the Head of the School of Marine Engineering. He will have the same general status as heads of academic departments, and occupy quarters in the Naval Academy of the same class as other heads of departments; but he will not be a member of the Academic Board nor have any duties in connection with midshipmen.

The curriculum for each post graduate course and any changes in curriculum will be established by the Navy Department, on recommendation of the Bureau of Navigation and the Bureau most directly concerned. The facilities and equipment of the Naval Academy and of the Engineering Experiment Station, and the services of such professors and instructors of the Naval Academy as may be necessary and available shall be at disposal for the purpose of the Post Graduate Department.

The curriculum for each post graduate course in a technical branch will begin with a four-months' term of study in

theoretical and applied mathematics and mechanics, physics, chemistry, laboratory and experimental work, mechanical drawing, principles of industrial management, and those special studies for each branch which are the ones that should be taken up first. The work will be laid out definitely in each study, and the student officers required to follow the schedule. Each study shall be under the general direction of the head of the appro priate academic department, and the student officers shall always have access to such head, or to some professor or instructor designated by him, for guidance and assistance. Examinations shall be held, at such intervals and of such nature as may be found most productive of good results, to test the application, industry, and progress of the student officers. At the close of the first term of four months a thorough examination will be held upon the ground covered, which, together with the work accomplished during the term, will determine the relative merit of the student officers. The purpose of the first term's closely regulated and directed work is to refresh and strengthen the theoretical knowledge previously acquired by the student officers, train them to method in investigation and experiment, and help them to regain the habit of study and reading - all this as necessary preparation for pursuing a chosen branch of specialized study.

The second four months will be spent at Annapolis, continuing such work of the first term as may be specified, or elsewhere at Governmental or private establishments, or both, in such occupation as required by the curriculum; but the same direction and guidance of each student officer's work, and the same touch with his progress will continue as in the first term, as far as different circumstances permit. At the close of the second term, the relative merit of the student officers will be determined the same as at the end of the first term.

After the close of the second term, the student officers whose progress has not been satisfactory will be dropped from the post graduate course upon recommendation of the Executive Council, and will be ordered to sea duty.

Following the first eight months' work, the student officers will pursue such course of study and investigation as the special curriculum may require or permit. The courses shall be definite and under such control as to enable the Head of the Post Graduate Department to keep fully informed of the employment and progress of each student officer. At the same time, these post graduate courses shall not be confined to the beaten track only, but, on the contrary, work along original or useful new lines is encouraged. The normal period for the post graduate course will be altogether two years; but in special cases recommended by the Executive Council an extension of time may be authorized; and the two-year limitation shall not apply to courses whose main part consists of a standard course pursued at outside educational institutions.

At the conclusion of the second year the student officers will be examined on their work accomplished, as shown by theses, reports, data on investigations and experimentation, and other appropriate tests. The coöperation of civilian professors and experts will be sought in establishing suitable standards by which to pass judgment in the various lines of post graduate work pursued, and the student officers will be given graded certificates accordingly. These certificates will be noted in the officers' records, and appropriately noted in the Navy Register against their names and they will be a guide in the assignment of the officers concerned to duty.

ADDRESS BY COLONEL R. M. THOMPSON

At Princeton University, November 12, 1912

(This was the first of a series of lectures to be given, under the auspices of the Navy League, before universities and commercial organizations throughout the country)

I have been sent here by the Navy League to address you because I love the navy; because my earlier years were spent in the navy; because my experience spans the change from ships propelled only by sails, to the present monsters of the deep driven by steam and maneuvered by electricity; and because I have studied the other navies of the world as well as our own, and so have some claim to speak to you as an expert.

The Navy League believes that we should have a Navy large enough and efficient enough to protect the shores of our country from any foreign attack, and strong enough to enable the country to keep its pledged word to maintain the Monroe doctrine and to guarantee the neutrality of the Panama Canal. We have not such a' navy to-day; but the Navy League believes that it is only necessary for the people at large to understand the facts and they will see to it that Congress provides such If I succeed in putting clearly before you the facts, I am sure you will be ready to help the League. If I fail in making my points clear to you, it will be my fault and not the fault of the facts.

a navy.

To begin, then: we have a navy. Our country has always had a navy, and some of the brightest pages of the nation's history are devoted to telling what that navy has done for the country. You are students and our history is well known to you, so why should I waste your time by recounting the glorious fights of our frigates during the wars of the Revolution and of 1812? Or why tell the tale of the brave deeds on the Barbary coast, when our young nation, not yet escaped from its growing pains, taught the robbers and pirates of Africa a lesson that the older nations of Europe had failed to teach them? Why tell of Farragut and Porter, when the scientific study of the War of Secession shows that the North owed its success to its navy quite as much as to its army?

In the last century, when there were many far-away corners and countries which knew nothing of the United States, our merchant ships would have received but scant justice were it not that our flag had been made known and respected by the men of war who, voyaging around

the world, sought out and made every nation respect the power that maintained such ships. In the long years of neglect following the Civil War, when the rest of the world was changing from sails to steam, our naval officers, maintaining the spirit of the navy, kept in touch with the world's progress, and when the day came when the navy was to be re-built, they supplied the pro fessional, and in many cases the technical, knowledge necessary for the construction of what were then modern men-of-war. The Spanish War found us with a navy small, but, for that day and time, efficient. Had it been somewhat larger, had its flag been shown a little more freely in other parts of the world, there would have been no Spanish War. But that war came, and ended with much added glory to our navy.

Then came the great period of naval development which has brought us to where we stand to-day. And to-day we stand where? A little time ago, as a naval power we were second only to England. To-day we are definitely in the third place, and in 1915 (only two years from now), we will be in the fifth place.

Let me make clear to you that the Navy League does not believe in war for war's sake. It believes in peace. It believes that the best thing for all healthy and sound nations is peace. It believes that the chief duty of the navy is the maintenance of peace for our land, and I, for one, have long wished that we could change the name of the Navy Department to the "Department for the Maintenance of Peace."

Many good people have believed that peace was possible without armament; that public meetings and resolutions, tracts and speeches (if there were only enough of them), could in some way keep the peace of the world. Long experience, however, has shown that the peace of a nation is best preserved by its being so ready for war that no other nation will dare attack it. Woodrow Wilson, in his "History of the United States," refers to the War of 1812 as an unnecessary war, and as a "war of arms brought on by a program of peace." Another great teacher has said: "Wouldst thou conjure up the clouds of war, induce our nation to disarm.”

cient to provide garrisons for our possessions across the sea, and a reserve of men in this country large enough to provide for the necessary reliefs on the various stations. Across either of the great seas that border our coasts lie nations infinitely stronger from a military point of view than we are. Assuming these seas unguarded and undefended by our navy, any one of those nations could land an army of two hundred and fifty thousand men on our shores almost before we knew that trouble was upon us. Two hundred and fifty thousand trained soldiers could march from New York to San Francisco, or from San Francisco to New York, and leave a desert where they found populous cities and fertile farms.

I know that this statement will be received by some with doubt, and by others with ridicule. That is "the valor of ignorance." In one short month, the disciplined and prepared armies of the little states of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Servia, and Greece have over-run and destroyed the old Turkish Empire, with a paper army twice as great as those of the allied States. The doubter will say that we are not Turks. But the Turk is known to be a fighting man; and is there anything to show that we are better fighters than the Turks? Another will say that the nations that attacked Turkey did so on provocations that we will never give; but the attacks of nations are not always dictated by justice, and one can never be certain as to why and when war will spring up. The point is this: War may come. If it does come, and finds us unprepared, our loss will be great, our suffering terrible. How can we insure against this loss? I reply: Follow England's example. That country for centuries has maintained a navy strong enough to control the sea, and no invader's foot has touched English soil. Civil war she has known; but from the terror and suffering of foreign war she has been free.. So as long as we control the sea, any war in which we are engaged will be fought in the territory of our enemy and not in the midst of our own homes. Without control of the sea, we are at the mercy of the strong military nations. Where, then, is the limit to our demand for a navy? We need a navy strong enough in material and efficient enough in personnel to hold the sea until from our people an army can be enlisted and trained. The time required to do this is well understood, and I think I am putting it at the minimum when I say two years. Therefore, our fleet must be strong enough to hold the seas for at least two years against any probable foe.

The great naval power of the world to-day- Great Britain is not a military nation. There is no fear of her armies invading or attacking us. Our standard, therefore, must be the navies of the great military powers, and our navy should surpass the greatest of these. We should maintain at sea, at all times, fleets

equal to those maintained by possible enemies, with a sufficient reserve of ships to replace those sure to be destroyed in the first of the great battles. The next step should be to see that these fleets are maintained in such condition of efficiency and discipline, with the officers and men so efficient, that our rivals shall obtain no advantage over us from this cause.

One class of the opponents of a great navy will say: "Insurance is all very well, but you may pay so high for insurance that, mathematically, it is the best policy to insure yourself and take the possible war loss rather than to make the many payments which, in the aggregate, will amount to much more than that loss." This is the mistaken view of persons ignorant of the vast cost of a modern war.

This brings us to the question: "What does the Navy cost?" The difficulty with many men is that they cannot distinguish between economic cost and book-keeping cost. It is an economic cost when you withdraw from production men who, if they were properly employed, would, by their labor, add to the store of things which are divided and consumed by the people. It is a bookkeeping cost when you take account of the money you must raise by taxes and pay out to purchase the things required for the navy. Part of the things purchased by this money may be given by the government to persons who would otherwise receive the same things from their parents. In other words, you are changing the channel through which the things pass, but you are not increasing the number of things that are being consumed, or decreasing the store of things which is to be divided among the people. The bookkeeping figures are that the navy costs $130,000,000 a year. This sounds like a very large sum; but when reduced to percentage, it isn't really large. It means $1.30 yearly for each one of us. It means about three-tenths of one per cent on the aggregate business of the nation, and less than one-half of the amount spent. annually for fire insurance premiums. It means about the sum spent annually for tires of automobiles. And it may be well to note here that the American people, in the few years since automobiles have come into fashion, have spent as much for automobiles as has been spent on the material of the navy since the Civil War, and the army of chauffeurs employed in driving automobiles is at least three times as great as the number of sailors and soldiers in the army and navy of the United States.

There is another way of checking this cost. The enlisted force of the navy to-day consists of 42,832 men. In the navy yards are employed 27,500 men. The time. of all of these persons is taken up in connection with the navy; but we must remember that in everyone's life there is period of preparation before the individual be

comes a producing unit. The navy is largely recruited from minors; and I estimate that at least ten thousand of these men are under the age when they can properly become producing units. There is, therefore, no economic cost or loss in connection with them, if their occupation and training tends to prepare them for citizenship. Anyone familiar with our modern navy knows that the young men who enter the service leave it better equipped for good citizenship and success in their future lives than if they had remained at home. Our ' modern battleships are really machine shops and many of the men learn trades, becoming good machinists and electrical and mechanical engineers. Above all, they learn the lesson of discipline, of love and respect for the flag and for the country which they serve. And they leave the service with "sound minds in sound bodies."

If I had a son to-day and was unable to send him to school and to college, I would rather send him on board a battleship, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two, than to any factory in the country. My point, therefore, is this: the total number of men employed in connection with the navy being practically 75,000, of whom 10,000 are in a period of preparation, which prepares them for future citizenship as well as they could be prepared elsewhere, the total number of men against whom economic cost can be charged is 65,000, and this is about onethird of one per cent of the effective men of the country.

Let us see if there is any offset to this cost. When Secretary Whitney, during the administration of Grover Cleveland, began the building of the new navy, the output of our steel works and our engineering and machine shops was of a very low grade. Many ignorant people have objected to building battleships on the ground that as fast as one ship was built another and better ship was put upon the stocks, so that in a few years battleships became, or tended to become, obsolete.

Well, what of it? If the navy, ever seeking for the best and never satisfied with something that was "as good as the best," kept constantly demanding higher qualities of steel, and paid the price to get it; if it always sought for more ingenious electrical devices to do the work by machines which could not be done by hand, and paid the price to get them; if, never satisfied with the engines of one ship, it demanded better ones for the next ship, and paid the price to get them,- what happened? Why, the skill and knowledge so acquired became the property of all. I do not hesitate to say that the skill and knowledge acquired in building the navy made possible the bicycle, the automobile, and now the aeroplane.

With the steel in use in 1870 bicycles could never have been produced to stand the strain of use; but nickel steel, introduced by the navy, furnished the ideal material and

made the bicycle possible. The engineers of 1870 could never have produced the engines of the automobile; but the improvements demanded by and created for the navy taught the designers, the artisans, and the capitalists what could be done, and the automobile followed. In the same path has come the aeroplane; and, in addition, the thousands of changes which make the difference in life between the '60s of the past century and now.

To-day our bridge builders are the first in the world. In spite of the higher labor costs in this country, we are building bridges in Africa, and in Asia, and in Canada. The first step taken toward the perfecting of the material which has sent our bridge-builders to the front was the employment of a naval officer by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway to inspect the steel that was being supplied for bridge members. That officer was the late Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, and his insistence upon quality revealed to the officials of the railways and to the rest of the world what could be done in the construction of bridges, and from that day to this the history of bridge building has been a history of great and rapid progress.

Of course I do not claim that every improvement and every change that has been made can be directly traced to naval influence; but I do claim that the great change was begun and pushed by the navy, and that the economic value of these changes to the country is. many times the total cost of all that the country has spent on the material of the navy since the Civil War.

Further, we are agreed that no money spent in this country is more wisely spent than that which is spent upon schools to train our children to be good citizens and good men. And anyone familiar with our modern navy knows that the graduates of our fleet make as good citizens and as good men as the graduates of any other school in the land.

I have presented to you one the great uses of the navy,―i.e. the protection of our shores from foreign war and the insurance to our great domestic trade which this gives. But there is another aspect of the use of the navy which must be considered. Are we to be, or not to be, a nation that keeps its word? Whether for weal or woe, the Monroe Doctrine has become one of our public obligations. We have said to the world: "No European nation shall descend upon the smaller nations of this hemisphere and take their lands and government away from them." Is the Monroe Doctrine an empty brag, or do we intend to uphold that American policy the avowed object of which, as declared by Woodrow Wilson, is to "keep the American continent free from the control of European monarchies"? If we do, we must provide the means to back our demands. We must be

strong enough to deserve and to receive the respect of the nations whose desire we may be thwarting.

By solemn treaty we have taken upon ourselves the duty of maintaining the neutrality of the Panama Canal. If two nations go to war, it is our duty to see that the weaker nation shall have the same rights in the Canal as the stronger nation. To perform that duty we must have strength and that strength must be on the sea. In 1862, we did not have the strength to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and it was practically disregarded. In 1865, our strength came back, and the Monroe Doctrine was promptly respected. History is valuable, for it teaches us what has happened in the past and At the prophesies what may happen in the future. present time, in addition to the general declarations of the Monroe Doctrine, we have practically assumed the guardianship of Cuba, of Nicaragua, of Santo Domingo, and of Panama. We have made ourselves responsible before the world for maintaining peace in these countries, and we can keep our promises only by the aid of a fleet.

I have said to you that my life spans the great changes that have taken place in the navy-the change from ships propelled by sails alone to the present mechanical wonders driven by steam or power engines and maneuvred by electricity; but I have not dwelt upon the wonderful change in their destructive power. Not going back to the wooden type of warship, but making comparison say, between the Oregon, as she was at the Battle of Santiago, and a modern superdreadnought like the Arkansas (and remember that the Arkansas with its twelve 12-inch guns will soon fall behind the New York, the Texas, and the Pennsylvania, with their batteries of 14-inch guns): the Oregon had four of the old type 13-inch guns, fitted with imperfect sights, with no method of rapidly and certainly ascertaining the distance of an object at which it was wished to fire. She was officered and manned by as fine seamen as ever trod the deck of a battleship. Her wonderful trip around the Horn, in her rush from the Pacific to the Atlantic, demonstrated the ability of her engineers, as did her final dramatic burst of speed when in pursuit of the Colon off Santiago. On that day, she was probably the most efficient man-of-war in the world; yet out of hundreds of shots fired from her guns on that day, at distances varying from 1,500 to 2,500 yards, only five shots out of each one hundred struck the enemy. To-day, the Arkansas has twelve long 12-inch guns, with sights so mechanically perfect, with a fire control so excellent, and mechanical and electrical apparatus so applied, that at from three to four times the Oregon's range, twelve to fifteen times as many shots would hit the target; and

each gun, in a given time, would fire three times as often. Three times as many guns firing three times as fast, hitting fifteen times as often, at distances three times as far away, mean at least four hundred times greater destructive power.

The Navy recognizes and claims a traditional friendship with Princeton. So we feel free to ask your aid and your influence in educating public opinion, in order that there shall no longer be a question of one battleship each year, or two or three battleships, or any number at all, but that we shall have such well digested and wellarranged legislation as will provide such a continuous program of naval construction as may be necessary to and that standkeep the navy up to a certain standard ard one which will insure to us the control of the sea and protection of our twenty-one thousand miles of coast; that will enable us to keep our pledge to the smaller nations of our hemisphere, and to protect the Canal that we have created.

To sum up: I claim that we are a maritime people, having an aptitude for the sea; that our situation is such that we are peculiarly dependent upon the control of the sea for our comfort, our safety, and our happiness; that we have a navy, and can have a greater one, without undue economic cost,- in fact, at an economic cost so small as not to be noticeable in the great expenditures of the country.

I hope I have convinced you that the navy as a school of patriotism, as a school for teaching young men the duties of citizenship, and, incidentally, for teaching them trades that will be useful to them in civil life, is worth to the country all that it costs the country economically. The other great services of the navy the country practically obtains for nothing,— namely, its insurance against the horrors of war, and its enabling us to maintain. American policies, including the Monroe Doctrine and the neutrality of the Panama Canal.

For two years the Navy Department has deemed it wise to bring together our fleet in the waters of the Hudson River at New York. The Department has believed that as an object lesson it was valuable to the people at large to see the mighty fleet maneuvered subject to the will of one man; to see the thousands of young men, servants of these great monsters of the deep, and to discover what manner of men they be. The young Americans who are enlisting in the service are of the type which turns the pessimist into an optimist. If, instead of 10,000 or 15,000 a year of men such as these going back into civil life, we were sending 250,000 back, we would need have no fear for the future of the Republic.