Vol. VI

No. 4

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY

THE NAVY PUBLISHING COMPANY

In one of the principal contributions to this issue of THE NAVY, theses are put forward, the correctness of which is challenged, or perhaps even disproved in THE NAVY's own columns. The question may be raised as to the value and purpose of this course. It may seem that in doing this nothing is accomplished beyond setting up a straw man in order to destroy him. But the article is published with the discussion and criticism, because it was thought that from the discussion the truth will be developed perhaps more easily and in a way to compel attention more certainly than if the truth in regard to these matters had merely been stated without reference to the varying opinions surrounding them.

THE MAINE DISASTER

In its issue of July, 1911, THE NAVY called attention to the fact that, in spite of information which has long been available, the public seemed not yet to have realized that the Maine was blown up by an explosion originating from the outside.

Since THE NAVY published this comment, the task of raising the Maine has been completed, at an expenditure of nine hundred thousand dollars. A fully qualified expert board, viewing the wreck as exposed after raising, has presented its findings, which coincide with those of the board first ordered.

Of course, one of the principal objects of spending this large amount of money was to clear up, if possible, any remaining doubt as to the cause that led to the destruction of the Maine. To assist the board in its study of the causes of the wreck, a working model was built, which, in one position, showed the vessel as she floated intact in Havana Harbor; and in a second position, showed her as she lay on the bottom of the harbor. This model is stored in the Navy Department; and, while, to the lay mind, perhaps the most convincing evidence possible, it is not available for inspection by the public. Moreover, although it was a model of ingenuity, considering the circumstances under which it was built, it was nevertheless-and perhaps necessarily-somewhat crude in its workmanship. It would seem that, after all of the money and energy that has been expended in proving the cause of the destruction of the Maine, it would be worth while to spend a few more dollars in making the proof available; and it is suggested that the Navy Department, either out of available appropriations or from money specially appropriated for the purpose, have constructed not less than two similar models, made in a workmanlike manner, and that these be deposited in one or more of the great national museums, such as the Metropolitan Museum in New York, the British Museum, or the Government National Museum.

THE NEED OF A NAVAL POLICY Commander F. A. Traut, U.S.N., in his article in the March number of THE NAVY, "Wanted: An American Naval Policy," formulates and annunciates such a policy in the words: "A navy stronger than that of any other nation except England."

This is not a mere arbitrary formula. There are defi nite reasons for such a program, and many of these reasons Commander Traut has given. We are obliged to maintain the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine; we are bound to protect the Panama Canal; we are hardly less interested in maintaining our control over the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Rico; to say nothing of our obligations to Cuba. No one of these obligations can be met satisfactorily if our navy is weaker than the navy of the country that chances to dispute our policy.

It is impossible to foresee how soon the United States may be threatened in her obligations as to any of these various responsibilities; and when she is so threatened, neither diplomacy nor peace conferences will avail. A writer in another column of this issue, commenting on the acquisition by a German steamship company of a coaling station in the United States of Colombia, points out that this transaction does not violate the theory of the Monroe Doctrine in that technical manner that gives the opportunities for diplomatic representation in the premises. At any moment, however, this step may become practically as menacing as if actual sovereignty had been established by the German nation.

The details of the construction program that is necessary to produce a navy second only to that of England is a matter for the Navy Department to determine. But, in general terms, it is evident, on the most casual inspection of the building programs of foreign governments, that the two-battleship program-if, indeed, it may be called a program-is insufficient to meet the require

It is believed that the Navy Department will soon have formulated in detail-if, indeed, it has not already done so a ship-building program which will carry out this policy of an American navy second to none in the world except that of England.

There has recently been a gratifying lull in the public activity of the various peace societies, conferences, committees, and other more or less loosely organized mouthpieces of the amateur peacemaker. This could probably largely be traced to the conditions actually existing, which all must see and recognize and which, in themselves, are a full reply to the various vague cure-alls of these dilletanti. While war is being waged in Mexico. and in Tripoli, when territory and control are changing hands by dint of force in many quarters of the globe, from Agadir to Pekin, while diplomatic efforts are failing to limit armaments, and Germany and Japan are increasing their already extensive plans for naval expansion, Mr. Carnegie, preaching his doctrine of peace by grace and faith, would remind one rather too ludicrously of the boy on the burning deck, to make it worth while for him to waste his words (or his money) at this particular time.

AMALGAMATION

The divergence of opinion as to the desirability of the proposed amalgamation of the pay corps with the line, should induce those fathering the proposed measure to act with caution. In the first place, it should be stated that it is unlikely that Congress will in the near future authorize such an amalgamation as is proposed.

It matters little just how the amalgamation is proposed to be brought about in detail. The fact of the matter is that amalgamation is proposed, and that means that line

officers, practicing a highly specialized and exacting profession, shall be called upon to spend part of their time learning something not germane to their profession, making themselves poorer line officers and failing to make themselves efficient paymasters. Exactly the same thing will be true of the paymasters who go through the same process. They will lose efficiency as paymasters and will be more or less makeshifts as line officers.

The principal justification for the proposal seems to be the idea that in some way or other it is going to promote harmony. But here, it seems, may really be seen the straw man so gleefully alluded to by some of the critics. While no one with experience of the navy during the past thirty years, is ignorant of the fact that there has been friction between the line and the staff, which at times was most detrimental to the morale of the service, there are few among those who have been active in the fleet in the past fifteen or twenty years who have not seen that this friction is disappearing; and there are many, indeed, among the younger officers who already consider it practically a thing of the past. Even were there such friction, the causes should be sought deeper and the remedy more logically applied than by the method of giving the malcontents something that they want merely for personal reasons. That method is too closely akin to keeping a child good by giving it the cake it cries for.

The analogy sought between the proposed amalgamation and the so-called amalgamation of 1899 between the line and engineer corps does not exist in fact. It may be said that the amalgamation of 1899 was not what it is usually considered, an absorption of the engineer corps by the line. In many respects it was more nearly an absorption of the line by the engineer corps. Although one of the strongest motives back of that amalgamation was the idea of doing away with the then existing friction, there were substantial reasons of administration for the amalgamation, and it has accordingly resulted in great good to the service. The average captain of that day. knew little or nothing of engineering. Here and there, there was a conspicous exception. Indeed, any exception was so conspicuous that his name was almost a by-word in the service. The late Rear Admiral Converse was among

them. It became clearer and clearer that a line officer, to continue to do what were considered to be a line officer's duties, must be an engineer in some sense of the word, whether he was actually employed in operating the propelling machinery or not. The gun, turrets, anchor engines, steering engines, sight devices, electrical equipment,—the ship from bow to stern, was a mass of mechanical, electrical, and optical devices requiring the engineering mind to design, operate, and adjust them. If the line officers hoped to continue to efficiently discharge their duties, they must understand the manufacture and use of these devices. If they hoped to handle effectively in battle a ship driven by engines of vast power, they had to know the mechanics of their ship as in the old days they knew their sails.

But however desirable a wide field of information may be, a captain of a ship would hardly be a better captain because he happened to have intimate acquaintance with paymasters' duties, or duties of a medical officer, and he would be little, if any more competent, if he happened to be acquainted with the duties of the Construction Corps. Certainly no information of this sort would form an adequate offset to knowledge and expertness in his own branch of the profession.

The old amalgamation has already to a great extent accomplished this, and efficiency under that arrangement will increase as years go on. Moreover, it accomplished other good results. It broke down certain of the old Bourbon school of line-officer traditions that, being outworn, were out of date, and were hurtful to the service. It did smooth out certain line and staff jealousies and these were strong feelings in those days, for they dated back to a time when the engineer, coming from civil life, was given scant courtesy by the lineofficer school at the Naval Academy. Even after engineers were taken from Naval Academy graduates, this old feeling of rancor persisted, because it was traditional. But there is no friction to-day between the staff corps. and the line corresponding in any degree to this old quarrel between the line and engineers. Paymasters and doctors alike are learning to realize that they are practising a strictly military profession. The increasing efficiency of

the service has made the officers of these corps take pride in their professions, not merely as accounting officers and medical officers, but as naval officers practising a profession peculiar to the navy. Line officers have seen this striving for efficiency, and mutual respect between the corps is arising therefrom.

The idea of friction is still fostered to some extent by bureau controversies, and will be therefore more often heard of in Washington than in the fleet. Some of the older officers, who remember the bitterness of past days, may think that friction still exists. But it is going fast; and it will be wrong to cause an upheaval of the personnel and the naval establishment generally to meet a condition that exists only in the minds of a few.

CRITICISM OF MR. MAXIM'S ARTICLE

The article by the eminent engineer, Hudson Maxim, on "The Gun versus Armor-plate," which appears in this issue of THE NAVY, raises a point which deserves serious consideration. In connection with the article will be found criticism and discussion by Lieut. B. A. Long, and Lieut. W. L. Pryor, U.S.N. It will be seen, from the nature of that criticism, that these officers believe the conclusions reached are based, to some extent, on wrong premises. Again, there is some question, even supposing Mr. Maxim's premises to be correct, whether or not the conclusion that he reaches as a matter of theory would work out successfully in practice. Apparently a vessel relieved of armor weights and thereby realizing a speed, we will say, of thirty-two knots, and ability to carry guns, we will say, of twelve-mile range, could, by choosing her own range,-i. e. a range beyond the range of her adversary's guns,-ultimately defeat that adversary while herself going scatheless. Practically, it is doubtful if this result could be realized. In spite of the wonderfully increased accuracy of great gun fire at extreme ranges, the percentage of hits decreases very rapidly with increasing ranges. The decrease is not merely on account of the greater dispersion due at a greater range to any given error at the gun, but because of the decreased danger space corresponding to the less flat

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trajectory of the longer range. The result therefore would be that, even with the best of marksmanship at these extreme ranges, the percentage of hits would be small. Indeed, it might be so small that the life of the gun would be exhausted before the hit were made which would be fatal to an armored ship.

Mr. Maxim reaches his conclusions on the assumption that the range of our high-powered naval guns can be immediately substantially increased by merely increasing their size. Such, however, is not the case. The art of gun manufacture has produced to-day, in the 12-inch 50-caliber gun, a weapon the range of which cannot be materially exceeded by any gun of any other caliber that can be built to-day. This is not to say that the range of guns may not be materially increased in the future; but it will only be with improvements in material or in the principle of design, and such improvements would surely, to some extent, be of value in incresing the range of the 12-inch gun. Of course, the striking energy of the projectile of a 14-inch gun or of a 16-inch gun of equal, or even of less, range than the 12-inch gun, would be greater than the striking energy of the 12-inch prejectile. But Mr. Maxim does not seek mere increase of energy. In order to make his plan effective, he must have increased range and must be able to hit the target. It appears plain that, under present conditions, he could do neither