In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston, of the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the study of Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods in which the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralyzed,—when no discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted: and that when the mental activity of the world revived, and philosophical inquiry flourished and bore its fruits, logical studies fell into decay and contempt. And this I have introduced in the "Elements of Rhetoric," (Part II. Ch. III. § 2,) among other examples of a presumption not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted by a counterpresumption. When any study has been unduly or unwisely cultivated to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province, there is a presumption that a re-action1 will ensue, and an equally excessive contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed. And in the present instance, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logic during Ages of great intellectual darkness, might have been expected to produce, in a subsequent age of comparative light, an association in men's minds, of Logic, with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence to error; so that the legitimate uses, and just value of the science (supposing it to have any) would be likely to be scornfully overlooked. Our ancestors having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly threshing over and over the same straw and winnowing the same chaff, it might have been anticipated that their descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing and winnowing with contempt, and would attempt to grind corn, straw, and chaff all together.

The revival of a study which had for a long time been regarded as an obsolete absurdity, would probably have appeared to many persons, thirty years ago, as an undertaking far more difficult than the introduction of some new study ;- —as resembling rather the attempt to restore life to one of the antediluvian fossil-plants, than the rearing of a young seedling into

a tree.

It is a curious circumstance that the very person to whom the letter just alluded to was addressed should have lived to witness so great a change of public opinion brought about (in a great degree through his own instrumentality2) within the short interval-indeed within a small portion of the interval between the writing of that letter and its publi cation, that the whole ground of the presumption alluded to has been completely cut away. During that interval, the treatise which was with

▲ Sec "Charge," 1843.

2 See Dedication.

his aid composed, and by his permission inserted in the Encyclopædia, attracted so much attention as to occasion its separate publication, in a volume which has been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in the United States of America; where it is in use, I believe, in every one of their Colleges. Add to which, the frequent allusions (compared with what could have been met with twenty or thirty years ago) to the subject of Logic, by writers on various subjects. And moreover several other treatises on the subject, either original works or abridgments, have been making their appearance with continually increased frequency of late years. Some indeed of these have little or nothing in common with the present work except the title. But even that very circumstance is so far encouraging, as indicating that the name of this science instead of exciting, as formerly, an almost universal prejudice, is considered as likely to prove a recommendation. Certainly Lord Dudley, were he now living, would not speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic; though every branch of Science, Philosophy, and Literature, have flourished during the interval.

To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be done only in the course of an explanation of the system itself. One preliminary observation only (for the original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same friend to whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth while to offer in this place. If it were inquired what is to be regarded as the most appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as man, what would be the answer? The Statesman is engaged with political affairs; the Soldier with military; the Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and magnitudes; the Merchant, with commercial concerns, &c.; but in what are all and each of these employed?-employed, I mean, as men; for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals. Evidently, in Reasoning. They are all occupied in deducing, well or ill, Conclusions from Premises; each, concerning the subject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process going on daily, in each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the same, and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the better conducting of the process, then, it can hardly be denied that such a system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention,-not of the members of this or that profession merely, but-of every one who is desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general, and to learn to do that well, which every one will and must do, whether

well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education.

Even supposing that no practical improvement in argumentation resulted from the study of Logic, it would not by any means follow that it is unworthy of attention. The pursuit of knowledge on curious and interesting subjects, for its own sake, is usually reckoned no misemployment of time; and is considered as, incidentally, if not directly, useful to the individual, by the exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties. All who study Mathematics are not training themselves to become Surveyors or Mechanics; some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even expected in a man liberally educated, though without any view to his practising Surgery or Medicine. And the investigation of a process which is peculiarly and universally the occupation of Man, considered as Man, can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical pursuit than those just instanced.

It has usually been assumed, however, in the case of the present subject, that a theory which does not tend to the improvement of practice is utterly unworthy of regard; and then, it is contended that Logic has no such tendency, on the plea that men may and do reason correctly without it: an objection which would equally apply in the case of Grammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, &c., in all of which systems the practice must have existed previously to the theory.

But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other thing, are accustomed to cry up Common-Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reasoning. Now by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend, (when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules: such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us,-no line of procedure, as it were, distinctly chalked out,-we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. But that Common-Sense is only our second-best guide—that the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are always desirable when they can be had, is an assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of mankind in general; which is so much the more valuable, inasmuch as it may be accounted the testimony of adversaries. For the generality have a strong predilection in favour of Common-Sense, except in those points in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules; but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided CommonSense. A Sailor e.g. will, perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical

men, and prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense: but he would ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship by Common-Sense, without regard to the maxims of nautical art. A Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Systems of Political-Economy, of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such matters; but he would never approve of trusting to Common-Sense in the treatment of diseases. Neither, again, would the Architect recommend a reliance on Common-Sense alone, in building, nor the Musician, ir music, to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided by experience. And the induction might be extended to every department of practice. Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted Common-Sense only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments.

There is, however, abundant room for the employment of CommonSense in the application of the system. To bring arguments, out of the form in which they are expressed in conversation and in books, into the regular logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common-Sense, aided by practice; for such arguments are, by supposition, not as yet within the province of Science; else they would not be irregular, but would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise the learner in this operation, I have subjoined in the Appendix, some examples, both of insulated arguments, and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argumentative works. It should be added, however, that a large portion of what is usually introduced into Logical treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments, the different kinds of them, &c., I have referred to the head of Rhetoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements of that Art.

It was doubtless from a strong and deliberate conviction of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance with Logic, that the University of Oxford, 'when re-modelling their system, not only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamours of many of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by making it an indispensable part of the Examination for the first Degree. This last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a great degree, produced an effect opposite to what was designed. It has contributed to

See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, p. 28.

lower instead of exalting, the estimation of the study; and to withhold from it the earnest attention of many who might have applied to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any System can ensure great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in all students, or in a very large proportion of them: "we sow many seeds to obtain a few flowers:" but it might have been expected (and doubtless was expected) that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit worth mentioning from their logical pursuits; and that a considerable proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not eminent logicians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been called upon to judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very inadequately realized. The truth is, that a very small proportion, even of distinguished students, ever become proficients in Logic; and that by far the greater part pass through the University without knowing any thing at all of the subject. I do not mean that they have not learned by rote a string of technical terms; but that they understand absolutely nothing whatever of the principles of the science.

I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford will censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply that such is the truth; and that I think too well of, and know far too well, the University in which I have been employed in various academical occupations above a quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth. With all its defects, and no human institution is perfect, the University would stand, I am convinced, higher in public estimation than it does, were the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in all points respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty and partial success of the measures employed to promote logical studies is the consequence, I apprehend, of the universality of the requisition. That which must be done by every one, will, of course, often be done but indifferently; and when the belief is once fully established, which it certainly has long been, that any thing which is indispensable to a testimonial, has little or nothing to do with the attainment of honours, the lowest standard soon becomes the established one in the minds of the greater number; and provided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any such branch of study is regarded as a matter of indifference, as far as any views of academical distinction are concerned.

1 In the last-framed Examination-statute

that proficiency in Logic is to have weight

an express declaration has been inserted, in the assignment of honours.