ings are only the expression of the universal feeling of humanity - that domestic affection fills a place in human character and human life that nothing else can take.

Sympathy, also, an Absolute Good. Sympathy, also, is one of the things that give absolute value to life. It is indeed true, as Wordsworth said, that

"Men live by admiration, hope, love;

And even as these are well and wisely fixed,

In dignity of being we ascend."

But the human brute that sympathizes with his fellow brutes is less of a brute than one who does not. What he needs for his transformation and uplifting is, not less sympathy, but a change in its direction. And we feel that the value of sympathy is not exhausted by the fact that it has a close relation to action. It is indeed a notorious fact that sympathy often leads to unwise action. The existence of the tramp profession, if the expression may be pardoned, would be impossible, if it were not for misdirected sympathy. But all know that if the mischief is to be remedied without inflicting any injury on society, it must be, not by decreasing sympathy, but by increasing intelligence. The man who is conscious of a strong impulse to help the undeserving, but who refrains from doing it because he knows he is thereby putting a premium on shiftlessness and degradation, is surely a better type of man than he who has no impulse to help them.

Loyalty an Ultimate Good. We cannot undertake to enumerate all the things of the mind that give value to life, but one more may be mentioned loyalty. Froude tells us that "between the lords [of the Middle Ages] and

their feudatories there were links of genuine loyalty which drew high and low together as they have not been drawn since the so-called chains have been broken. . . . No fact of history is more certain than that the peasants born on the great baronies looked up to these lords of theirs with real and reverent affection. .. Custom dies hard, and this feeling of feudal loyalty has lingered into our own times with very little to support it. Carlyle once told me of a lawsuit pending in Scotland affecting the succession of a great estate of which he had known something. The case depended on a family secret known only to one old servant, who refused to reveal it. A Kirk minister was sent to tell her that she must speak on peril of her soul. Peril of my soul!' she said. 'And would ye put the honor of an auld Scottish family in competition with the soul of a poor creature like me?"" I think the thrill of admiration that we experience when we hear such a story is the mind's spontaneous recognition of the fact that loyalty, however misguided, is one of the things that enrich life.

It is, then, things of the mind alone that have absolute worth, that make life worth living. And these things of the mind are (1) what Aristotle calls the theorizing activity, the apprehension of an isolated fact in wider and wider circles of relations, until to the poetic temperament the "meanest flower that blows suggests thoughts too deep for tears," and eyes and tones that would otherwise be dull and commonplace become weighted with the tragedy and comedy of life; (2) the appreciation of the beautiful; (3) devotion to duty; (4) friendship; (5) domestic affection; (6) sympathy and loyalty. And it is the realization of these things which education should set before itself as the ultimate aim.

Comparative Value of the Various Ultimate Goods of Life. To attempt to ascertain the comparative value of these various elements would be for the most part an idle and profitless discussion. The truth, even if it were attainable, and it probably is not, would be of questionable value for education. But there are two questions in this connection upon which the philosophy of education must decide: Is the development of the intellect, of the power to apprehend the relations between things, of more importance than the development of character? Is the dogma of art for art's sake true may true art prosecute its aim without regard to ethical considerations? Manifestly, if these two questions are answered in the affirmative the primary aim of the teacher must be the intellectual and aesthetic development of the pupil, making the formation of character a matter of secondary importance.

It is more than doubtful whether arguments can exert any influence on the decision which any individual may make as to which of these intellectual, æsthetic, or moral development - shall be the primary aim of his own life. A man who through education or heredity is willing to do violence to his sense of duty for the sake of intellectual or æsthetic culture is joined to his idols; there is nothing to be done but to let him alone. But if he admits that all these things have an intrinsic value, if he only differs with you as to which should have the preference in case of a conflict, then he can be forced to admit that all the rest of the world should be regulated by principles the value of which, in his own case, he refuses to acknowledge. For if intellectual and æsthetic culture, loyalty to duty, sympathy, friendship, and domestic affection are good things, then the more of them the better: every addition

to them is an increase of the spiritual wealth of the world. But the only one of these principles whose one aim is the increase of spiritual wealth is loyalty to duty. Make intellectual culture, or æsthetic culture, or friendship, or sympathy, or domestic affection the element of surpassing worth, and the enlargement of the goods of life, increasing the number of people who possess them, becomes a matter of secondary and incidental importance. You want your friends and the members of your family to have the things which seem good to you because of their personal relation to you; for the cultivation of your own intellectual and æsthetic nature requires the contact of your mind with other cultivated minds. But loyalty to duty makes you regard the goods of other people as of equal importance with your own, or, rather, modifying the fine saying of Aristotle, makes you see that the attainment of your own highest good depends upon your doing what you can to help others to attain theirs. Evidently, then, the man who refuses to admit that he is bound to sacrifice an iota of his intellectual or æsthetic life for the sake of other men is logically bound to concede that every one else should. He refuses to admit it in his own case because the realization of the goods of life by other men is as nothing to his consciousness when it comes into competition with the things which seem to him to be of supreme worth; he is bound to concede it in the case of the rest of the world because, when his own personality is not in question, the good of one abstract man, so to speak, must appear equal to that of another, and the greater the number of men who realize the condition that gives life intrinsic value the greater the wealth of the world.

The ultimate aim of education, then, should be to

promote the intellectual and æsthetic culture, enlarge the sympathies, strengthen and purify the friendships and domestic affections of those who are being educated, and to make devotion to duty the governing principle of their lives.

A Standard for Judging Institutions. This gives us a standard by which not merely schools but all institutions whatsoever may be judged. The one question the answer to which determines the right of an institution to be is: Does it help men think more clearly, feel more deeply, act more wisely? This is our only criterion for determining the value of civilization. If civilization is better than barbarism, the primary reason is not that it increases the amount of wealth per capita. It is that civilization has a greater tendency to make men clear-headed, appreciative of beauty, responsive to the calls of duty and affection.

The world has always been prone to forget the end in the means. It has no difficulty in realizing that in any kind of manufacture it is the product which is the essential thing. We would not permit an architect to distract our attention from an ill-planned house by insisting that his drawings were beautiful. But in the midst of the wonderful increase in the tools of civilization, we find it hard to bear in mind that the important thing is the product to which all these things must minister if they are to have any value, and that product is man. We are certainly making marvellous improvements in various arts; are we making corresponding improvements in the art of living?

Common opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, it is precisely this that the school must undertake to do if it is to discharge its obligations to society. Its task is to