tion or organisation were made during the next eleven years. Meanwhile the war of 1864 in Schleswig-Holstein and the AustroPrussian War of 1866 had brought three things prominently to notice :

(a) The necessity for modern Infantry being armed with breechloaders.

(b) The pressing need for Great Britain to be put in a position to place a far larger number of men in the field than had been in contemplation for many years, if she meant to remain one of the Great Powers.

(c) The fact that the marvellous successes of the Prussians were largely due to the superior training and education of their officers.

Fortunately for the Army, Mr. Cardwell, in December 1868, became Secretary of State for War. He had previously turned his attention to the question of Army Administration and Organisation -the most perplexing of all subjects on account of the peculiar nature of our Constitution, and the various conditions under which our soldiers have to serve. Mr. Cardwell's object was to arrange for a proper division of duties at the War Office, and to establish some system by which the Regular and Auxiliary Forces would become more effective for national defence.

How matters at the War Office could best be remedied had been considered and reported on by more than one Committee, 'yet,' as Sir Robert Biddulph puts it in his instructive book-Lord Cardwell at the War Office-the traditions still remained of a system of unnecessary check, double labour, and divided responsibility.'

Mr. Cardwell thought it necessary to convene another Committee; this was presided over by Lord Northbrook, who was then UnderSecretary of State for War. The Report was published in February 1870, and it pointed out, as the Reports of former Commissions had done, the great inconvenience of the War Office and the Horse Guards being under separate roofs.

The War Office Act of 1870, which was introduced in the House of Commons on the 15th of February of that year, was based on the recommendations of Lord Northbrook's Committee.

It divided the work at the War Office into three heads: Military (under the Officer Commanding-in-Chief); Supply (under a new official, styled Surveyor-General of the Ordnance); Finance (under the Financial Secretary).

These proposals became law during that Session, and at the same time the Army Enlistment Act was passed, by which the term of engagement was fixed at twelve years, six with the Colours and six with the Reserve.12

This reduction of Colour service was necessitated partly on

13 Subsequently altered to seven years with the Colours, or eight when necessary, and five or four years with the Reserve.

account of the difficulty of getting a sufficient number of recruits to enlist for the longer period, and partly in view of the formation of a larger Reserve, which, including the Militia Reserve, then amounted only to 23,000 men.1

13

The astonishing successes gained by Prussia' in her war with France emphasised the importance of the three lessons learned from the wars of 1864 and 1866, more particularly as regarded the proper training of officers. Mr. Cardwell recognised the urgent necessity for improvement in this respect, but he felt that his hands were tied so long as the purchase system existed.

The evil results of that system, which had been in force from the earliest period of a standing Army (except for a few years during the reign of William the Third), had been repeatedly brought to notice. So long ago as 1794, Major-General Craig, the Adjutant-General under the Duke of York, writing from Nimeguen, in the Low Countries, alluded to the danger of having officers who owed their commissions merely to the fact that they had enough money for their purchase. He said: 'Out of the fifteen regiments of Cavalry and twenty-six of Infantry which we have here, twenty-one are literally commanded by boys or idiots. . . . We do not know how to post a picquet or instruct a sentinel in his duty, and, as to moving, God forbid we should attempt it within three miles of the enemy.'

General Craig's fears were soon realised, for within seven days of writing his letter Nimeguen was captured by the French, and the English had to leave Holland.14

Lord Grey, in a memorandum written in 1846, strongly advocated improvement in the education of officers. He pointed out that, under the purchase system, officers could rise to the highest regimental rank without any assurance that they were acquainted with their duties; and he urged that no man should be allowed to receive a first commission without proving by examination that he had received the education of a gentleman, or be given promotion until he had proved himself in all respects qualified for the same.

Ten years later another Royal Commission, under the presidentship of the Duke of Somerset, was appointed to inquire into the sale and purchase of commissions.

The Commission condemned the system in the most unmeasured terms, describing it as 'vicious in principle, repugnant to the public sentiment of the present day, equally inconsistent with the honour of the military profession and the policy of the British Empire, and irreconcilable with justice.'

13 The Report of the Royal Commission on Recruiting, in 1857, laid stress on two points: (1) That there was no Reserve for expanding the Army to a war establishment. (2) That service in the Army was unpopular because two-thirds of a soldier's time was spent on foreign service.'

14 Lord Ca rdwell at the War Office.

But, notwithstanding this wholesale condemnation, the only practical recommendation the Commission made was that the rank of lieutenant-colonel should be no longer purchasable. They may have thought that the total abolition of purchase, at a cost of some eight millions, was too big a measure for Parliament to swallow all at once; whatever may have been the reason, no steps were taken to carry out even this one recommendation, and nothing further was done in the matter until 1870, when another Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the over-regulation payments.

This Commission reported that, although the practice of overpayment was strictly prohibited both by law and regulation, all attempts to prevent it being carried out had utterly failed.

Notwithstanding the difficulties before him, Mr. Cardwell, realising that no improvement could be effected in the training of officers until the whole system of purchase had been done away with, introduced in 1871 the Army Regulation Bill, the main objects of which were—the abolition of purchase, and the rendering of the Auxiliary Forces more efficient by withdrawing them from the control of the Lords-Lieutenant of counties and placing them under the Commander-in-Chief, except as regards their recommendations for first commissions.

The Bill was hotly opposed in Parliament. It was urged that the consequence of the abolition of purchase would be that officers would have to he taken from a different class of society; that promotion would be retarded; that the regimental system would be destroyed, while there would be no improvement in the professional efficiency of the officers.

After several long and somewhat acrimonious debates, the Bill, with slight modifications, passed through the House of Commons,15 only to be wrecked a few days later 16 in the House of Lords by the carrying of an amendment 17 moved by the Duke of Richmond, notwithstanding that the Duke of Cambridge gave it as his opinion that the offer of the House of Commons was a most liberal one, adding: 'I do not see that by making the proposed change we shall be doing anything calculated to lower the tone of the British Army.'

As the Bill could not be brought forward again that Session, and as Mr. Cardwell felt that it was impossible to permit the continuance of a system so pernicious to the best interests of the Army, he determined to obtain the Queen's consent to cancel all regulations

15 July 3, 1871.

16 July 13, 1871.

17 That this House is unwilling to assent to a second reading of this Bill until it has had laid before it, either by her Majesty's Government or through the medium of an inquiry and report of a Royal Commission, a complete and comprehensive scheme for the first appointment, promotion, and retirement of officers; for the amalgamation of the Regular and Auxiliary Land Forces, and for securing the other changes necessary to place the military system of the country on a sound and efficient basis.'

regarding the permission to purchase, and on the 20th of July, 1871, a Royal Warrant was issued absolutely abolishing purchase, either of first commissions or for promotion, from the 1st of November of that year.

It was hardly to be expected that a measure so drastic, affecting the interests of so many, and passed in such an unexpected manner, could become law without causing considerable dissatisfaction and excitement.18 How such an iniquitous system could have been tolerated for so long, or could have found any one to defend it towards the close of the nineteenth century, is difficult to understand.

None of the evil consequences prophesied by the supporters of the purchase system followed from its abolition, and every one with any knowledge of the Army must agree that Mr. Cardwell's action has been amply justified by results.

Mr. Cardwell's next move was the organisation of the Infantry on a double-battalion system. From the earliest days great difficulty has been experienced in keeping our armies in the field up to full strength. So recently as the Crimean War we were obliged to have recourse to foreign legions; and even in time of peace the difficulty was felt to be almost as great, in consequence of more than half the Army being stationed abroad under active-service conditions.

In deciding on extending to the whole of the Infantry the double-battalion system, which already existed in twenty-seven regiments," and to localise that arm as far as the peculiar conditions of our service would admit, Mr. Cardwell was guided, in a great measure, by certain memoranda 20 written by Lord Hardinge when, on

18 Sir Robert Biddulph, in his Lord Cardwell at the War Office, states: 'The issue of the Royal Warrant evoked a chorus of disapproval from all quarters. The Opposition were wroth because the Government had turned their defeat into a victory by what was deemed an unfair procedure. The House of Lords considered that they were flouted by the action of the Government. The Radical supporters of the Government disapproved of a measure having been carried by the sole exercise of the Royal power.'

19 The first twenty-five regiments of the Line, the 60th Rifles, and the Rifle Brigade.

20 In 1864 Lord Hardinge wrote as follows: During the Peninsular War each battalion on service had its second battalion of 1,000 men and 49 officers at home, by which double set of officers and men the war battalion was generally kept very effective. In fact, to fight 1,000 men in the field, we had 2,000 trained officers and men to rely upon, but we rarely exceeded 800 in the ranks.' In the same paper he wrote: The Guards, though low in numbers, are the most effective Infantry force we have, because they have second battalions and, therefore, a better reserve than the Line for keeping the battalions abroad effective in officers and men.' At the end of the Crimean War Lord Hardinge again recorded his opinion that the experience of the previous two years afforded a practical proof of the inefficiency and danger of relying on small regimental depots as a reserve for the field battalions when the country may be suddenly involved in war. What Infantry battalions most require, Lord Hardinge said, 'is to have the reserve of officers and men increased.'Lord Cardwell at the War Office.

the death of the Duke of Wellington, he became Commander-in-Chief; and also by a memorandum of the Duke of Cambridge on 'The Organisation of the various Land Forces in the Country' and a 'Mode of bringing about a closer Connection between the Regular Army and the Reserve Forces with Militia and Volunteers.'

A Committee, under the presidentship of Major-General P. MacDougall, was assembled to work out all details. The essential idea was that of territorial districts, each of which would consist of two Line battalions, two Militia Infantry battalions, and a certain quota of Volunteers, formed into an administrative brigade, the whole to rest on the brigade depot or centre.' 21

It was a most difficult problem, and, although it was admittedly solved with great care and judgment,' it took many years before the linked battalions looked upon themselves as belonging to one and the same regiment. Any want of regimental camaraderie, however, that may have existed was completely swept away by the late war. The battalions are now not only thoroughly welded together, but a strong and real attachment has sprung up between the regiments and the counties with which they are connected, an attachment which has been attended with the happiest results.

22

The Army is also indebted to Mr. Cardwell for establishing the system of competitive examination for entrance into the Army; examination for promotion up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel; the Intelligence Department, the Army Service Corps, the Royal Army Medical Corps, and annual manœuvres.

Since Mr. Cardwell's day, regimental institutes and mobilisation schemes have been established.

Up to 1886 no mobilisation scheme existed. A so-called scheme was drawn up in 1875, and an outline of it appeared in the Army List' for many years. It was merely an outline, but it served to open the eyes of the country to our deficiencies with regard to organisation, and it induced the Government to take certain steps towards remedying them.

Little or nothing, however, was done until 1886, when MajorGeneral Brackenbury,23 the head of the Intelligence Department, drew attention to the disorganised condition of our Army. General Brackenbury made it clear that not even one Army Corps could be placed in the field, either at home or abroad, with a sufficient supply of Commissariat and Transport, Medical and Veterinary arrangements, and Ordnance Stores; while for a second Army Corps there was a large deficiency of Artillery and Cavalry, and actually no Supply departments. The number of horses also was totally inadequate.

21 Lord Cardwell at the War Office.

22 This had been introduced for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers in 1855 by Lord Panmure.

23 Now General the Right Hon. Sir Henry Brackenbury, G.C.B.