face the situation as it is, not as we would wish it to be. If we see a young lion becoming daily more and more powerful and daily more inclined to snap and growl at us, we must see that the fence which protects us from his unwelcome attentions is made absolutely secure. The facts which we have to consider are that the German navy is already most formidable, out of all proportion to the requirements demanded for the protection of its commerce; that it is daily growing stronger; and that, if the present programme is adhered to, in eight years' time it will have a fighting force in the North Sea and Channel certainly equal, if not superior, to any fleet which, consistent with our other naval requirements, we could possibly bring against it. Such being the case, is it wise or prudent, in view of the expert opinions of distinguished sailors and soldiers, as quoted above, to place our eggs in one basket, to neglect entirely all our naval defences and measures to resist invasion, and to have an unquestioning faith in the dogmatic optimism of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Arnold-Forster? It has long been an axiom in all considerations of naval or military strategy that the offensive has an enormous advantage. The force that adopts it can deceive, baffle, and worry the defender by feints and similar devices, and can finally concentrate a superior force on his selected point of attack. It is also well known that a river is the worst possible guard and defence for any frontier. Behind its shelter forces may be concentrated at various points, and then the passage may be forced at the place selected before the defender has been able to divine where his adversary has selected his line of attack. We believe that it has scarcely ever happened in military history that a river has proved an insuperable or even a very formidable obstacle to an invading army. The Shaho and the other huge rivers of Manchuria have not prevented the advance of the Japanese, any more than the Rhine or the Danube hindered the invasions of Napoleon. To all intents and purposes the Channel and the North Sea take the place of rivers in the defence of the frontier of Great Britain. It is true they are broader, deeper, and more difficult to cross, and cannot be bridged, unless we adopt the views of the Duke of Wellington, who regarded every line of communication from one port to another as a bridge, by which troops and material could be conveyed to our shores. These seas, however, while presenting more difficulties than rivers as regards transit, have undoubted advantages-large ships can escort a flotilla, heavy guns can cover its landing, and, above all, the actual points of attack can be changed at the last moment, according as information, conveyed by wireless telegraphy, may indicate as desirable. It would be well worth the cost to sacrifice one or two flotillas, provided one were successful and could land a small, efficient army in what, according to the schemes as now foreshadowed, would be an entirely defenceless country. London might be occupied from one quarter, while the guns of our fleet were sinking the crews of many dinghies' in others. We cannot count on having warnings. Had Arabi imagined that the expeditionary force of 1882 intended to land at Ismailia, rest assured the Suez Canal would not have been left free for the passage of transports. Had the Russians imagined that Togo would deliver a torpedo attack on that fleet lying off Port Arthur at the commencement of the war, it is fair to conclude that the results would have been very different. Any such expedition to be successful must be secret, sudden, and unexpected, and we may be certain, were such an attack ever made on these shores, from whatever country it was delivered, these conditions would not be wanting. It would be well for those who imagine that we are certain to have ample warning of danger-that a declaration of war will be handed us in due form-to study a paper compiled for the Intelligence Department by Sir F. Maurice in the year 1883, and entitled, 'Hostilities without Declaration of War from 1700 to 1870.' From this historic abstract it would appear that during the period in question no fewer than 104 cases of this have occurred. Probably since that date there have been some additional instances. Certainly there was one in the action of the Japanese fleet at the commencement of the present war. It does certainly appear a strange anomaly that we, of all people, should throw any doubts on the possibility of the success of maritime expeditions and landings from ships, or that we should minimise the damage and loss that can be inflicted by such enterprises. If we take up the map and look at the extent of the British Empire, does it not occur to any of these optimistic prophets that every one of these vast possessions over the sea has been won by such hostile invasion, and by landings from ships? Moreover, when Mr. Arnold-Forster speaks of an invasion being impossible in such a force as to inflict a fatal blow or threaten our independence,' does he not realise the damage that would be done to our commercial prosperity, to our credit among nations, were London occupied or even threatened for a day by a comparatively small force, provided, as apparently he now would advise, there were no organised body of troops in the country capable of meeting and routing our adventurous invaders? If there is one point more than another on which all experienced witnesses are agreed in the enormous mass of evidence which has been given before the various Royal Commissions and Departmental or other Committees that have from time to time been assembled, it is this: that, with their present amount of training, neither our Militia nor Volunteers could be expected, without the support of Regulars, to meet with success the picked Continental troops which would inevitably be selected for any such invasion were it attempted. Nevertheless, Mr. Balfour is reported to have said in the House of Commons on the 3rd of April: While we do not believe that, in existing circumstances, a serious invasion of these islands is possible, one of these existing conditions is the Volunteer Force.' The writer is the last one who would wish to suggest any sinister designs on the part of the Germans, who have hitherto never been our enemies, and were our valued and warm allies in the great struggle with Napoleon. Mutual respect, however, is the best guarantee for lasting friendship; other rulers may arise who know not Joseph,' and it would, indeed, be the height of madness not to take all due precautions for our safety, as the friends of to-day may be the enemies of to-morrow. If anyone will take the trouble to study the peculiarities of the German coast-line as it now exists, he will scarcely fail to see that it is admirably adapted for the assembly and concealment of a hostile flotilla. The creeks and islands from Emden to Bremerhaven, to say nothing of the stretch from the mouths of the Elbe northwards to the German Schleswig frontier, behind the North Frisian islands, form a natural shield and rendezvous, the value of which can scarcely be overestimated, and the distance to the English coast is only from 250 to 300 miles, which at a moderate computation would require from thirty to thirty-five hours' steaming. 6 Perhaps it may not be out of place here to mention that the writer has had the advantage of discussing the military and naval problem, which is the subject of this article, as well as other abstract strategic questions, with some foreign military experts of great experience and admitted ability. Were he at liberty to mention their names, he thinks that even our present Secretary of State for War would acknowledge the competence' of these officers and their unrivalled opportunities of study. One of them, more especially, who has now passed away, was Moltke's favourite pupil, and had a European and welldeserved reputation for exceptional ability and genius. This special question, it may be added, was alluded to some years since, at a time when there was not a cloud in the political horizon of the relations between Great Britain and Germany, and discussed especially as regards our relations with France, and in a most friendly spirit. Suffice to say that every one of these authorities and students of strategy were on the side of Nelson and Collingwood, of Napoleon and Wellington, and that their views were diametrically opposed to those recently enunciated by the representatives of the Government in the House of Commons. Serious warnings were given by these Continental experts as regards the insufficiency of our land preparations. As they said, 'It is all very well to talk of your fleet; but are you certain that, under all possible circumstances and under all conceivable conditions, your fleet will be at the right spot at the critica moment?' In conclusion it would appear essential to make some reference to the Council of Defence and its present constitution, since the entire responsibility of this, as we consider it, very dangerous doctrine has been thrown on the shoulders of this heterogeneous body. In the first place, it would seem entirely anomalous that the Prime Minister should be president, and, as inevitably must occur, should exercise a controlling influence on its decisions. It would also seem strange that so many members of this tribunal, commanding a preponderance of votes, should be composed of those who, however able in their own departments, have not had the time, and do not profess to have turned their attention to questions of naval and military strategy, which are essentially in close connection with the defence of the Empire. If we might use a homely parallel, it is much the same as if there were to be a consultation of eminent surgeons regarding the condition of a sick child to decide whether a serious operation, say for appendicitis, was necessary or not, and as if the father or guardian of the child, the nurse as being responsible for its relations with other children, and the family lawyer as controlling the purse-strings, were called into the consultation and recorded their votes as to the action to be adopted. If we imagine also that each of these lay members laid some claim to surgical or medical knowledge from having occasionally perused the Lancet, we may imagine the result of this consultation might not be entirely satisfactory as regarded the treatment of the unfortunate patient. Thus it would appear to be with the present Council of Defence. Such a tribunal so constituted, and with such functions, does not exist in any foreign country, except, perhaps, China, of which, however, we have no clear evidence. We may, however, entertain no doubt that, had the Japanese dealt with the problems of their national defence in this fashion, the history of events in the Far East during the past year would have been somewhat different. Of course, before any recommendation of the Council of Defence were adopted or seriously considered, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have to give their assent and recommendation to the Cabinet; but this is an entirely different matter from taking part and having a preponderating voice in the deliberations. It now only remains to express a hope that the British public may be aroused to realise in time the true position of this country, otherwise it will be an illustration of the well-known Latin saying: 'Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.' FRANK S. RUSSELL, Major-General. VOL. LVII-No. 339 3 D THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE III. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING FOR LADS THE question of the defence of the Empire is becoming yearly one of greater and of still greater importance. Successive Secretaries of State for War have tried to solve the problem how to raise by voluntary enlistment, and without increased expenditure, an army numerically sufficient for the defence of the largest Empire with the most extensive land frontiers the world has ever known-and each in turn has failed. The problem still remains with us-unsolved-and we cannot avoid it, however much we may desire to do so. Our fleet, powerful and efficient as it is, cannot defend land frontiers. It cannot effect the impossible. The late Marquis of Salisbury, when, on one memorable occasion, a portion of the British nation, carried away by honest but thoughtless sentiment on behalf of persecuted Christians in Asia Minor, clamoured for immediate and energetic action to be taken in their defence, reminded his critics (who, by the way, were largely composed of the very men who on all occasions denounce any attempt to increase the army) that the British fleet could not cross the moun tains of Armenia. This awkward little fact that ships cannot sail on land-seems always to be escaping the attention of a certain portion of the public. These people expect the impossible. They require the interests-usually the commercial interests-of Britain to be defended in all portions of the globe, against the most powerful Governments which control the movements of millions of men-the entire armed and trained male populations of their respective nations. And, if ever they give the proportion of means to ends a thought, which is very doubtful, in cases where the navy cannot act, what is the instrument which they consider sufficient for this purpose? A voluntary army of some 200,000 men-the most costly in the world, supplemented in time of war by as many men as can be induced by mixed motives to volunteer for military service. The South African War has shown us the limit of our resources in this respect. We know now, if we did not know before, that patriotism, plus 58. a day, can with difficulty place in the field some 230,000 men on a distant shore. I do not in the least wish to disparage this number. We raised |