the three days that had already been devoted to the other subjects. It was decided that it should stand over to the next meeting of the Congress.

It has been sometimes suggested that the meetings of the Society are unpractical and lead to no definite result. Whether this is so or not, the British shipowner, who is by no means a visionary or unpractical person, is taking a very keen interest in them, and we are glad to see that this is so. If he cares more about his own interests than the unification of the law, that is only human nature; and his presence is a wholesome check upon airy eloquence and academic discursiveness into which these congresses have a tendency to degenerate. Lawyers and theorists, if left to themselves, might make uniformity of the law more remote than ever. An interesting episode in the recent Congress was the reception at the Elysée of the members of the Congress by the President of the French Republic.

R. G. MARSDEN.

VIII.-NOTES ON RECENT CASES (ENGLISH).

The House of Lords have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal in New Sharlston Collieries Co. v. Earl of Westmoreland (108 L.T. 538). It is well known that the rule of law in respect of mines is that where the property in the soil and in the minerals belongs to different persons, the mine owner must not work the mines so as to let down the surface, but this does not apply between a lessor and a lessee of mines. The rights of the parties under such a lease must depend on the terms of the con

tract, and it was so decided in 1872, in Eaden v. Jeffcock (7 Exch. 379). It is, therefore, proper to make express provision for protection to the soil and buildings thereon when so intended. In the newly decided case the surface and minerals belonged to different owners, and the decision shows that the owner of the surface of land does not by parting with the minerals under such land lose his common law right of support; and in the absence of express power or necessary implication in the conveyance, the grantee of the minerals has no right to work them so as to let down the surface.

A case interesting to those who live in flats came before the Chancery Division lately. The plaintiff was lessee of a flat at Grosvenor Mansions, and the defendant was the lessee of the basement and entresol below the plaintiff's premises. The defendant had altered his premises, placing a large cooking range in the place of a small grate, which opened into a flue not large enough for the purpose. The result was an excessive and alarming amount of heat. The matter came before the Court as Sanders-Clark v. The Grosvenor Mansions Co. Limited and D'Allesandri (35 L. J. 363),the action having been discontinued as against the Grosvenor Mansions Company. The judge (Buckley, J.) found that the defendant was using the premises for purposes for which the building was not constructed,the alterations made by the defendant were not reasonable, and the defendant had used the premises for a purpose for which they were not intended. The defendant was held liable in respect of the ground of complaint, viz.-the heat. Had he used the premises reasonably there was nothing which at law could be considered a nuisance. In Reinhardt v. Mentasi (58, L.J. Ch. 787) KEKEWICH, J., held that an action would lie to restrain a nuisance whenever it could be shown that the plaintiff suffered material

injury from the act complained of, and that it would not be a sufficient defence to prove that the nuisance arose from the reasonable use by the defendant of his own property. The point is not an easy one. There are expressions in some judgments which point to stronger protection being given where the rights of property are invaded than where they are not; but on the other hand there are many cases in which a private nuisance, not affecting rights of property except so far as to prevent a man from personally using his own with reasonable comfort, may be regarded as having been equally condemned. The principle applied in either class of case is that a man must not use his own so as to injure his neighbour, and in substance the only question discussed in any given case is whether that principle is applicable to the particular circumstances then occurring. Perhaps the most eminent decision on this intricate subject is that of Ball v. Ray (L.R. 8 Chanc. App. 467) on appeal to the Lords Justices from the then Master of the Rolls (Lord Romilly) where the occupier of a house in London had many years before converted the ground floor into a stable., In 1871 a new occupier altered the stalls so that the noise of the horses was an annoyance to the next door neighbour and prevented him from letting his house as lodgings. In that case the Court (Lord Selborne, Lord Justice Mellish and Lord Justice James) held that the fact of the horses having been previously kept in the stable, but so as not to be an annoyance, did not deprive the neighbour of his right to have the nuisance restrained. Annoyance caused by the unusual use of a house may be a nuisance when like annoyance from the ordinary use of it would not be. In making out a case of nuisance of this character there are always two things to be considered, the right of the plaintiff and the right of the defendant. If houses adjoining each other are so built that from the commencement it is

manifest that each adjoining inhabitant was intended to enjoy his own property for the purpose for which it is constructed, then so long as the house is so used there is nothing that can be regarded in law as a nuisance. But if either party turns his house or any portion of it to an unusual purpose, in such a manner as to produce a substantial injury to his neighbour, this is not according to principle or authority reasonable use of his property, and his neighbour shewing substantial injury is entitled to protection.

Shoolbred v. Roberts (109 L.T. 224) is interesting to those who play billiards for high stakes. R. and D. two professional billiard players arranged a match for £100 a side, each party depositing £100 with stakeholders, the whole to be paid to the winner. R. was bankrupt, and still undischarged. R. won the match. The trustee in bankruptcy then gave notice to the stakeholders that he claimed the £200, and the bankrupt gave them notice that he claimed the money himself. The stakeholders took out an inter-pleader summons and paid the money into Court, The issue was tried before Phillimore J., who held that the plaintiff was entitled to the £100 which the bankrupt had deposited, but he refused to make any order as to the other £100. On appeal and cross-appeal the Court of Appeal (Smith, Williams, and Romer L.JJ.) decided that the plaintiff was entitled to the whole sum of £200. This decision appears to be based on sound reasoning, and it gives a judicial interpretation to the words in section 44 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict. c. 52) "all such property... as may devolve on him before his discharge."

The Divisional Court (Grantham and Channell JJ.) decided an important point under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, in Christie (apps.) v. Cooper (resp.) (109 L.T. 204).

The King of Saxony is entered on the register of Trade Marks as proprietor of a certain trade mark in respect of china, porcelain, &c. The appellants exposed to public view at their auction rooms for sale certain goods, among others goods described as Dresden china in the catalogues, and they had affixed to them marks resembling the King's trade mark. On the morning of the sale the appellants received a telegram from the solicitors to the Royal Factory stating that they believed the above goods were not genuine. The appellants, on the lot being reached, stated the facts, and said that they sold the goods for what they were worth. On an information being laid against the appellants for having sold certain goods to which forged trade marks were applied, within the meaning of s. 2 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, the magistrate convicted the appellants, holding that they had not proved that, having taken all reasonable precautions, they had no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade mark, and that they had not "acted innocently" under subs. (c.) although they had not been guilty of any intention to mislead or to induce persons to purchase. It was submitted for the defence that the appellants were protected by the proviso in subs. (c.) if they had been innocent of any intention to induce a buyer to purchase something which he would not otherwise have purchased. The magistrate, however, held that the appellants would not rely on subs. (c.) as a defence unless they had been innocent of any knowledge or reasonable ground of suspicion at the time of sale that the trade mark was in fact forged. The Court reversed the decision of the magistrate, and held that he was wrong in the construction he had placed on the words in subs. 2 (c) viz. :"that otherwise he had acted innocently." The words "acting innocently" mean something outside the things stated in subs. (a) and (b) and include innocence of any