term for which it was originally granted. The Common Law limited a grant of letters patent to a reasonable period. The Statute of Monopolies, as we have seen, substituted the definite term of fourteen years, and the Patents Act, 1883*, adopted this period for the duration of a patent. Many cases, such as the apathetic attitude of the public towards the invention, powerful trade rivalry, continued litigation, and other circumstances incident to the particular invention, may prevent the patentee from deriving any substantial benefit from his patent within fourteen years. Of Watts' improvement in the steam engine, for example, it was said by Lord Broughamt: "It was so many years useless to him, not coming into immediate operation, that he had to obtain an extension of one-and-twenty years from the Legislature, but for which he would have been a loser, and probably ruined by the greatest benefit that was ever given to mankind next to the invention of printing." Notwithstanding, however, the expediency of prolonging the term in many cases, the only means formerly open to a patentee for obtaining a prolongation of his patent was by obtaining a private Act of Parliament.

This was remedied in 1835 by Statutet, which enabled. the Crown, where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in favour of the extension, to grant new letters patent for the same invention for a term not exceeding seven years after the expiration of the first term. Under the present law§ a petition for extension may be presented to the Queen in Council, and there is power, if the Judicial Committee report that the patentee has been inadequately remunerated by his patent, to extend the term of the patent for a further term not exceeding seven, or, in exceptional cases, fourteen years, or to grant a new

* s. 17 (1).

+ Woodcroft's Patent, 2 W.P.C. 32. 5 and 6 Will. IV., c. 83.

§ See Patents Act, 1883, s. 25.

patent. In considering their decision on such a petition, the Judicial Committee are to have regard to the nature and merits of the invention in relation to the public, to the profits made by the patentee as such, and to all the circumstances of the case. The exceptional merit of the invention and the inadequate remuneration of the patentee are the criteria of success in these applications, and as recently as July of this year there is an instance of a petition for the extension of a patent being refused by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the ground that the patent was not sufficiently meritorious to warrant a prolongation, and that the patentee's accounts of the profits of the patent did not show inadequacy of remuneration*.

Many interesting points arise upon the difficult question as to the infringement of patents, and the remedies available to the patentee and the public. The law is fully expounded in Messrs. Wallace and Williamson's new work, but the limits of space preclude anything more than a passing glance at it here.

The remedy of a patentee to secure compensation for the injury and to prevent its recurrence is by action for infringement of his patent right, and, in appropriate cases, orders may be obtained for an injunction, inspection, an account of profits, and delivery up or destruction of the infringing articles. There is also power, which is often most usefully exercised, to grant a certificate of validity of the patent to the patentee whose patent has been infringed‡.

Under the fourth section of the old Statute of Monopolies any person hindered, grieved, disturbed, or disquieted by pretence of any monopoly or letters patent was given a

* In re Kelly's Patent, 1900, 17 R.P.C. 476.

The Law of Letters Patent for Inventions, Chaps. xxi.-xxiv.

The most recent case in which a certificate of validity was granted to a successful plaintiff in an action for infringement was Acetylene Illuminating Co., Limited, and others v. Midland Acetylene (Parent) Syndicate, Limited, July, 1900, 17 R.P.C. 534.

remedy by action for treble damages and double costs. A recent unsuccessful attempt has been made to sue under this section*.

The remedy now open to the public, where a patenteeeven in good faith-threatens proceedings in respect of the alleged infringement of a patent, which cannot be legally supported, is by action against the patentee for threats. This remedy was introduced by section 32 of the Patents Act 1883. It is, however, noteworthy that no action will lie under the section-even where the threats are entirely without foundation-if the person making them commences and prosecutes an action for infringement with due diligence. "The sword of Damocles," to use the words of the late Lord Bowent "should either not be suspended at all, or should fall at once."

Upon the subject of the remedies of the public it should be added that the revocation of a patent may be obtained if the patent was granted to a person other than the first and true inventor, or was wanting in the attributes of novelty or utility. The proceedings for revocation of a grant of letters patent were formerly by writ of scire facias; the procedure is now by petition of the AttorneyGeneral or anyone authorised by him or of any person interested§.

Objections may easily be raised to certain phases of our patent laws, certain points may demand amendment, and improvements may be suggested by experience. But the agencies of the development of the system are still at work, and it has been well said of the Patent Laws by an acknowledged authority that they afford an inducement *Peck v. Hindes, 1898, 14 T.L.R. 164.

+ See the proviso to s. 32 of the Patents Act, 1883. In Skinner v. Perry, 1893, 10 R.P.C. at p. 8.

§ See Patents Act, 1883, s. 26.

Speech by Mr. Fletcher Moulton, Q.C., M.P., at the Article Club, December, 1898.

for the specialisation of work which alone can produce great results, and it must be remembered that the reward is automatically proportioned to the value of the achievement. G. H. B. KENRICK.

III. CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1898.*

TATISTICS are generally looked at askance by the

STATISTICS

average man, and judicial statistics, above all others, might reasonably, in the minds of most people, be accredited with that degree of dryness so pre-eminently associated with all matters appertaining to the law; but Master Macdonell invariably succeeds in putting the mass of figures contained in the innumerable tables, both annual and comparative, comprising the Judicial Statistics of England and Wales, supplemented by his introductory comments, in such a way that they cannot fail to afford to the most pronounced disbeliever in statistics, even on a cursory inspection, ample information and much food for reflection; so much so that we are inclined to regret that this valuable official publication is not more accessible to the general public, and particularly to that section of the community who are specially interested in the administration of justice. We will endeavour, however, to give our readers the cream of Master Macdonell's labours.

An inspection of the short statement setting forth the nature and amount of the civil business of all courts in England and Wales in 1898 (the figures of which would only be very slightly increased if there were added the proceedings of a civil nature in criminal courts) shows that there was an increase, both in the proceedings begun

* Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1898. Part II.-Civil Judicial Statistics. Edited by John Macdonell, C.B., LL.D., a Master of the Supreme Court. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1900.

and those heard, in almost all the courts, the exceptions being, as to proceedings begun, in the House of Lords, in Admiralty actions, in Lunacy matters, and in the Durham Chancery Court; and as to matters heard, Divorce and Admiralty proceedings, together with proceedings in the Railway and Canal Commission, Durham Chancery Court, the Mayor's Court and Borough Courts of Record.

Taking the number of actions begun in Scotland at 97,871, and the population at 4,249,946 inhabitants, the number of cases per 100,000 was 2,302.88, or about half as many as in England and Wales, but taking a country with a very different legal system (Italy, in 1896), it appears that the cases begun per 100,000 were 8,318, or about twice as many as the proportion in England and Wales.

The centralisation of cases in London, of which we hear so much from time to time, is not so exceptionally great as is popularly supposed, and this Master Macdonell shows by assuming the Sheriff's ordinary court, Sheriff's Debts Recovery Court, Sheriff's Small Debt Court, and Justice of Peace Small Debt Court to be substantially the equivalent local courts in Scotland to the county courts, the borough local courts, and other local courts in England and Wales, and comparing the respective figures. It is then found that 94,202 cases, out of a total of 97,871, or 96 25 per cent., were begun in local courts in Scotland, while in England and Wales the cases so begun were 1,198,707, or 93'35 per cent. of the whole.

Under the heading of Chief Appellate Courts we find that in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the business exceeded that of any other year for the last quarter of a century, and some of the cases were matters of great importance, such as Attorney-General for the Dominion, &c. v. Attorney-General for the Provinces as to Fisheries and Fishery Rights in Canada. There were more appeals entered, more appeals heard, and a larger amount