obligations which it never had in contemplation. Even the Roman jurists, with their vague ideas of international law, recognised the impossibility of applying to the bone fidei conventions of nations the narrow rules of the civil law for the interpretation of contracts.

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There remain the jurists, and in effect the old jurists only, for the conceptions of modern writers on international law are too divergent to allow of anyone reconciling their views and moulding them into a harmonious whole. Some like Calvo, Despagnet, Bluntschli and Heffter content themselves with a few sweeping generalities. Others, like Phillimore, go into great detail and draw distinctions of arbitrary refinement; whilst Lieber indulges in metaphysical gymnastics that are more calculated to bewilder than to instruct the reader.

Of the older jurists, those who have treated most fully of the subject are Grotius, † Vattel, and Rutherforth. Vattel has closely followed in Grotius' footsteps, whilst Rutherforth, though he accepts most of their principles, treats the subject in a somewhat broader and more general way. It may be of use to set out briefly a summary of the rules of interpretation on which these writers are, on the whole, agreed, and which, at the same time, commend themselves to the judgment by reason of their fairness.

The first canon, and one which is almost a truism, is that words must be taken in their plain and literal meaning. "It is not permissible," says Vattel, "to interpret what has no need of interpretation." But this is qualified by the reservation that the resulting sense must not be absurd or utterly unreasonable. Up to a certain point, therefore, when the plain meaning of a stipulation lies on its surface, * Legal and Political Hermeneutics.

De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II., chap. xvi.

Vattel, Droit des Gens chap. xvii., sec. 262-322, and chap. xviii., sec. 305. Rutherforth has an interesting chapter on "The Interpretation of Treaties" in his Institutes of Natural Law.

there is an irrebuttable presumption, juris et de jure-to use Austin's nomenclature-that this is the sense intended. But beyond this point, where, though the terms used suggest a natural and obvious meaning, they can yet conceivably bear a narrower or a broader meaning, and, where it can be shown beyond reasonable doubt that to take the words in the first sense would be to defeat the avowed object of the treaty, it is permissible to construe them restrictively or extensively so as to fulfil the evident design of the compact. So far, it will be seen, we have no concern with the actual intention of the parties at the time of contracting. The words being plain, our criterion is simply this: How would a person, to whom the promise was made, reasonably understand them? Such a rule is essential in order that no place should be accorded to mental reservations. The jurists are rich in examples of chicanery and of evasions of the spirit by means of the letter. Grotius instances the quibble of Brasidas, who promised to depart from Boeotian territory and afterwards refused to leave it, denying that that could be Boeotian territory which he occupied with his army. "It is said," says Vattel, "that a man in England married three wives in order that he might not be subject to the penalty of the law, which forbids marrying two. This is, doubtless, a popular tale, invented with a view to ridicule the extreme circumspection of the English, who will not allow the smallest departure from the letter in the application of their law."

Many examples might be given, however, of attempts to explain away the clear provisions of a treaty by assigning motives which never existed. It is stipulated, let us say, that a fleet shall not be moved to a certain place. It may

not be moved thither, even without hostile intent, for the compact may have had in view not merely a certain damage, but the possible danger which the presence of the

fleet might cause. During the American war, the State of Virginia passed a law under which those who owed sums to British creditors could obtain a valid discharge by paying the amount into the Loan Office. The treaty at the end of the war provided that "creditors of either side should meet with no lawful impediments for the recovery of their debts." It was held that by virtue of this treaty a British subject was entitled to recover his debt in spite of the previous law, since no mention of it was made in the treaty, and a good reason could not be shewn why the words should not be understood in their natural and obvious meaning*.

On the other hand, it would be manifestly unreasonable for a State to demand help under the terms of an Alliance, where the nation to which it appeals needs at that moment all its forces for the defence of its own territories against an invading force. Again, it was provided by the treaty of Utrecht that the port of Dunkirk should be destroyed, the object of course being to prevent the French from commanding the mouth of the Thames with a port of naval equipment. Louis destroyed Dunkirk and then proceeded to build a larger port a couple of miles off, at Mardick. Naturally enough we remonstrated, and in the treaty of 1777 it was in consequence stipulated that no new port should be formed within two leagues of Dunkirk or Mardick.

There are, however, cases on the border line. Thus Hall speaking of the Anglo-Dutch treaties of guarantee 1678-1748 says that the causes of a war are so complicated that a defensive alliance would be rendered nugatory if it were left dependent on the party whose help is invoked to decide whether the war to which he is called is a just war or not. But Vattel is of the opposite opinion. Where the terms of a treaty are ambiguous, or where it *Ware v. Hightor, 3 Dallas (American) Reports 199.

is doubtful to what extent they were intended to apply, there are two means of arriving at a solution: either by artificial rules of construction or by evidence of the intention of the parties. Naturally the second of these two methods is the more satisfactory, if there are sufficient data to enable us to arrive at a tolerably certain conclusion, and in that event it will supersede the first. Amongst artificial rules may be classed the following: the meaning usually attached to words, in the special connection in which they are found, is to be observed. Where technical matters are dealt with, they must be construed according to their technical sense, account being taken of the state of scientific knowledge at the period when the treaty was concluded. Terms and provisions must be read by the light of the whole instrument; clauses, therefore, should (where possible) be so interpreted as to render each and every provision operative. When a word means one thing in one of the countries, and another in the other, the sense to be adopted is that which the word bears in the country bound by the particular stipulation*. It is always to be presumed that a party grants no more than he expressly states, the onus of proving anything beyond that resting with the promisee. All these are mere prima facie rules, presumptions juris, for arriving at a conclusion. as to which of the doubtful meanings to accept.

But, as we have said, all these modes of interpretation must give way to proof of the actual intention of the parties, though, in the case of ambiguities, we cannot demand that it shall be of so conclusive a nature as that which is required to rebut the very strong presumption raised by a plain and unambiguous term. The intention

*By the treaty of Berlin part of Old Servia was annexed to the Principality of Servia. No mention was made as to the nationality of the inhabitants of the ceded part. M. Péritch, Professor of Law at Belgrade, considers that it should be decided according to Servian Law. Vide: Revue Générale de Droit International Public, March-April, 1900.

of the parties may be derived from antecedent or contemporaneous acts and circumstances, and, perhaps, even from subsequent events, but only if they are of such a nature as to cast light upon what the previous state of mind of the parties was. The raison d'être of the treaty, i.e., the main intention of the parties in contracting at all, is often a good guide to their intention with regard to specific provisions. Here appears the usefulness of a preamble, which frequently enables later generations to judge of the motives which led up to the compact. But the fact must never be lost sight of, that such motives are seldom simple, but usually many and complex, and one side cannot be allowed arbitrarily to decide which of them was the dominant factor.

There is yet another source of conflict as to the meaning a treaty may bear. Circumstances may have changed since the time when the engagements were entered into, or events may take place of which the parties did not and could not have had cognizance. Here one test, and one alone, is applicable, namely, the consideration of what the parties would have arranged had they contracted with full knowledge of the new matter. This has been called an argument e ratione legis ampla. It is possible, too, that the new circumstances may be of such a nature that it is clear that if the parties had contemplated it, they would never have contracted at all, or have only concluded a resolutive bargain, conditional on the event not taking place.

There is a school of writers who insist that every treaty contains an implied clause that it shall operate only while things remain as they are, or in Latin (for those who import fictions of this kind love to cloak them in the words of learning) omnis conventio intelligitur rebus sic stantibus. If the old maxim panta rhei is true, we should be driven to the inevitable conclusion that a treaty ceases to be operative half-an-hour after it is made. Grotius, speaking of this doctrine, says it can only be admitted where it is