could fcarcely be torn, on any terms, from a depopulated country. That after the most careful inveftigation, it had appeared, that only three thousand men could have been fpared, with fafety to this country, for any offenfive duty. The foreign troops in garrifon at NewYork we had no power to embark on any other than American fervice; befides, if a new treaty had been entered into with the German princes, no tranfports could have been affembled for an early embarkation; and, even when embarked, where could they have directed their courfe, in the face of an enemy's fleet cruizing with undifputed fuperiority in every part

of the western world?

From this view of our total inability to engage in another campaign, with any profpect of bringing it to a more favourable conclufion than the laft, it was argued, that peace on any terms, by -breaking the powerful confederacy that was against us, and giving us time to recruit our waited ftrength, was preferable to a continuance of the war. But it was afferted, in the fecond place, that the peace did not stand in need of fuch a defence, and that the terms obtained were fair and honourable, and adequate to the juft expectations of the nation.

By the 3d and 4th articles of the treaty with the court of France, we had ceded the exclufive right of fathery on a certain part of the coaft of Newfoundland. But at the fame time we have alfo established an exclufive right to the most valuable banks. The concurrent fishery formerly exercifed was a fource of endless ftrife. The French were now confined to a certain

fpot: it was almost nothing, when compared to the extent we poffefs, and befides is fituated in the least productive part of the coaft. In proof of thefe facts, the opinions of Admiral Edwards, of Captain Levefon Gower, and of Lieutenant Lane, who took an accurate furvey of the whole, were confidently appealed to.

By the 5th article the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to the French. Thefe islands had formerly belonged to that crown, but were retained, in the pride of our fuperiority, at the treaty of Paris, in 1762: and furely there could be no juft ground of com, plaint now, if France, in her afcendancy, fhould require the reftitution of them. If it should be alledged, that these places might be fortified fo as to annoy us in a future war, and even endanger our fisheries, the anfwer was at hand; the most fkilful engineers had certified, that neither island would admit the conftruction of a fortrefs which would ftand the attack of the smalleft of our frigates.

In the Weft-Indies, by the 7th article, the island of St. Lucia was restored, and Tobago ceded to the French; but in return, by the 8th, his Moft Christian Majesty had reftored to Great Britain the iflands of Grenada and the Grenadines, of St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Chriftopher, Nevis, and Montferrat. It was afferted, that the island of Dominica, confidered as a place of obfervation and ftrength, was as valuable to this country, if not more fo, than St. Lucia. The importance of the latter island, it was faid, might fairly be estimated by the value fet upon it at the laft peace. It was then ours by con

queft;

queft; and if it had been thought ef fuch inestimable confequence, as was now pretended, why was it not then retained? The island of Tobago had alfo been extorted from France at the peace of Paris, and therefore might now be equitably re-demanded. Its importance to our cotton manufactory had been greatly exaggerated. If this manufacture had rifen to a flourishing ftate before we ever poffeffed that ifland, why might it not remaia fo now? The fact was, that cotton, whether in the hands of friend or foe, would always find its way to our door, in preference to that of those who cannot meet it with fuch a purse.

In Africa, by the 9th article, the King of Great Britain cedes the river of Senegal, with its dependencies and forts, and reftores the island of Goree. On the other fide, Fort James and the river Gambia is guaranteed to Great Britain, by the 10th; and by the 11th and 12th, the gum trade is put on the fame footing as in the year 1755. By thefe articles, it was faid, we fecure (as much as we ever had fecured) a share in the gum trade; and were freed from the neceffity of making that coaft a grave for our fellow-fubjects, thousands of whom were annually fent there to watch an article of trade which we in vain endeavoured to monopolize.

The four following articles relate to the East-Indies. By thefe, Pondicherry and Karical, with fuit able dependencies, the poffeffion of Mahé, and the Comptoir of Surat, are restored, and guaranteed to France, together with all the establishments which belonged to that kingdom at the commence

ment of the war, on the coaft of Orixa, and in Bengal, with liberty to furround Chandernagor with a ditch for draining the waters. Thefe conceffions were allowed to be very confiderable, and they were defended by the advocates for the peace on two very different and oppofite grounds. Some of them afferted, that the Company's affairs were in every refpect in fo deplorable a ftate, that the continuance of the war there must have brought on their irretrievable deftruction; whilft others, in order to remove any apprehenfion that might be entertained from the reestablishment of the French power in India, contended, that their affairs were in fo profperous a train, as would fpeedily put them out of the reach of injury from any rival whatever.

The abrogation of all the arti❤ cles relative to Dunkirk, which had been inferted in any former treaty of peace, formed the 17th article of the prefent. During all the administrations which have paffed away fince the demolition of that harbour was firft ftipulated, thofe articles had never been inforced. This negligence, it was faid, was a fufficient proof of the little account in which that matter was held; and the fact was, that all the art and coft that France could beftow on the bafon of Dunkirk, could not render it in any degree formidable to Great Britain. France wifhed for the fuppreffion of thofe articles, merely as a point of honour; and furely no fober man would continue the war to thwart a fancy fo little detrimental to us. At former periods England had dictated the terms of peace to fubmiffive na

tions; but the vifions of her power and pre-eminence were paffed away, and fhe was under the mortifying neceffity of employing a language that correfponds, with her true condition.

To the King of Spain, the poffeffion of Minorca and Weft Florida was guaranteed, and Eaft Florida ceded. With respect to the firstmentioned place, it was urged, that it was kept at an immense and ufelefs expence in peace, and was never tenable in war; and as to the Floridas, that the poffeflion of them was by no means fo im portant as might be imagined, and that we had gained an equal advantage by the restoration of Providence and the Bahama islands. The imports of both the Floridas did not exceed 70,000l. and the exports amount to about 120,000l. It certainly was not defirable to take fo much from the commerce of the nation; but it was a favourite object with Spain, and amidst the millions of our trade, it furely was not worth contending for, at the hazard of continuing the war.

The treaty with the United States of America, as far as regarded their independence, had in fome meafure been previously formed by parliament; the only points therefore that remained for difcuffion were the fixing of the boundaries, the fettlement of the fisheries, and the terms ftipulated for the loyalifts.

By the line of boundaries, all the back fettlements, and the whole country between the Allegany Mountains and the Miffiffippi were ceded to the United States. To have retained the large tract behind them, for the purpose of planting it with perfons of differ

ent political principles, would have been little better than laying the foundation of new war and new difturbances. The free navigation of the Miffiffippi was however referved.

To the northward, the line of divifion was carried through the centre of the lakes, and by that means a participation of the fur trade was fecured to both countries, with a fmall advantage in favour of Great Britain; as it was well known to all men converfant in the nature of that trade, that its belt refources lay to the northward. But fuppofing the entire fur trade was funk in the fea, what was the detriment to this country? Let this and every other part of the treaties be examined by the fair value of the district ceded, drawn from the amount of the exports and imports, by which alone we could judge of its importance. The exports of this country to Canada, then, were only 140,000l. and the imports no more than 50,000l. Was this an object for Great Britain to continue a war, of which the people of England had declared their abhorrence? Surely it was not: and much less would it appear so, when it was recollected that the prefervation of this annual impor tation of 50,000l. has coft the country for several years past, on an average, 800,000l. a year. few interested Canadian merchants might complain; for merchants would always love monopoly, without confidering that monopoly, by deftroying rivalry, which was the very effence of the well-being of trade, was in fact detrimental to it.

A

The ceffion of Penobscot had

been objected to, as depriving us

of

of a fupply of mafts, which that place is faid to furnish in wonderful abundance. But in oppofition to this affertion, it was proved, they faid, by the certificate of Captain Twifs, one of the ableft furveyors in the fervice, that there was not a tree there capable of being made

maft.

By the 3d article of the provifional treaty, the freedom of fishing on all the Banks of Newfoundland, and alfo on all the coafts of our dominions in America, was given to the subjects of the United States. And why ?-Because, in the first place, they could, from their locality, have exercised a fishery in that quarter, in the first season (for there are two) without our confent, and in fpite of all our efforts to repel them. The first feafon commences in February, and that is entirely at their discretion: for our people have never, and can never take their station there fo foon With regard to the other feafon, the principle on which the fur trade had been regulated was again reverted to; though we had not a monopoly, we poffeffed fuch fuperior advantages in the article of curing our fish for market, from the exclufive command of the contiguous fhores, that a rivalry would only whet our induftry, to make the most of thofe benefits which our fituation put within our power It might be asked, why we had not tipulated for a reciprocity of fish, ing in the American harbours and creeks? The answer was obviousbecause we had abundant employment in our own.

The last article objected to, was the terms procured for the loyalifts. On this point but one alternative offered itself; either to accept from

congrefs their recommendation to the provincial states in favour of thofe unhappy people, or to continue the war: and who was bold enough to ftep forward, and fay that we ought on that account to have broken off the treaty? But the fact was, that they could do no more than recommend. It was neceffary to be cautious in wording the treaty, left they should give offence to the new States. In all their measures, fince their first conftitution, for providing either money or men, they have used the word recommendation to the provincial affemblies; and it had always been paid refpect to. But to fuppose the worst, that after all, this estimable fet of men could not be received into the bofom of their own country; was England fo loft to gratitude and honour, as not to afford them an afylum? Without one drop of blood fpilt, with one fifth of the expence of one campaign, happiness and ease might be given to the loyalifts in as ample a manner as thofe bleffings were ever in their enjoyment.

Such were the arguments urged in favour of the articles of the feveral treaties of peace: an indirect defence of it was also attempted, by endeavouring to throw odium on the characters of thofe who, it was faid, pretended to disapprove of it, and were defirous, from interested motives, of inducing par liament to pass a cenfure upon it. A coincidence in opinion between a noble lord who had formerly been at the head of adminiftration, and the perfons who moved and fupported the amendment to the addrefs, was the ground of this accufation. So unnatural an alliance, between the lofty, affertors of regal

pre

prerogative, and the humble worhippers of the majesty of the people; the determined advocate of the influence of the crown, and the great purifiers of the conftitution; could not, it was faid, originate from any but the most bafe and fordid views. It was not the peace, which, it was afferted, was unimpeachable, but the offices of the minifters, that was the object of their purfait. On this occafion every art was ufed to inflame the minds of the public, and to incite their own friends to revolt against what was reprefented as a moft barefaced attempt to abufe their confidence: all the molt virulent expreffions of enmity and abufe, which during their long and violent contefts had fallen from either party in the heat of debate were induftrioufly brought forward; their junction was urged as a proof of a total dereliction of principle, and as an attrocious attempt to overbear the juft prerogative of the crown, and to feize on the administration of public affairs by force.

On thefe grounds was the defence of the peace undertaken: it now remains that we ftate thofe arguments which induced the majo rity of the houfe to adopt the amendments already recited, and on a following day to vote," that "the conceffions granted by the peace to the enemies of Great "Britain were greater than they were entitled to, either from "the actual fituation of their re"fpective poffeffions, or from their

comparative strength."

On the first head, viz. the inability of the country, from the fituation of public credit, and the state of its finances, to continue the war, it was faid, 'that speculative poli

ticians had in all times been fond of circumfcribing the bounds of public credit, and drawing a line, beyond which they imagined it could not be ftretched; but that repeated experience had fhewn that fuch ideas were for the most part imaginary and chimerical. But in whatever degree we may fuppofe the refources of this country to be exhaufted, we were well affured that thofe of the enemy were equally fo, and that their burthens were lets cheerfully fupported; witnefs the feveral spirited memorials from the States of Britanny, and other places, against the war; the loud murmurs of the whole Spanish nation; and the refufal of most of the provincial ftates in America to pay the laft tax ordered to be levied by congrefs. If the apprehenfion of bankruptcy made peace defirable, or even neceffary to Great Britain, it made it equally fo to the other belligerent powers; and where the reafons for defiring peace were equal, no argument could be adduced why the terms should not be equal and reciprocal. It was urged, befides, that this argument, if allowed, would prove too much. The ftate of our finances, from their public nature, being as well known to our enemies as to ourfelves, it might fairly be asked, how they came to grant us, knowing we were not able to profecute the war, even those terms that had been procured? Was it owing to the magnanimity of France that we are allowed to retain our poffeffions in the East and West Indies? Had the court of Spain at once forgot thofe objects, on account of which it had engaged in the war, the restoration of Gibraltar and Jamaica? Was it from the remains