of a filial regard in the United States, that Canada and Nova Scotia were not claimed, in addition to the rest of our territories furrendered in America?-No; it arofe from their knowledge that this nation, however diftreffed, would not bear the impofition of fuch conditions. They faw they had a miniftry to deal with that was confcious of their own tottering fituation: though equally defirous of peace, they perceived it was the happy moment for their demands, and our conceffion; but at the fame time their policy would not let them go farther than they have now ventured.

With refpect to the navy, it was affirmed to be in a flourishing and vigorous state, and that we had the happiest profpects before us for the next campaign. The noble vifcount, who had lately retired from his high and refponfible office at the head of the admiralty becaufe, as he declared, he would not fubfcribe to the terms of the peace, had afferted in the other houfe, that the British fleet confiited of 109 line of battle fhips, and that the united force of the houfe of Bourbon did not exceed 125. With refpect to their condition, he declared, that, from the belt information he could procure, ours was greatly fuperior. During the courfe of last year, when our inferiority was infinitely more apparent, our navy had increafed (and principally by captures) feventeen in its number, whilft that of France alone had fuffered a diminution of thirteen hips of the line. It was likewife affirmed, that Admiral Pigot would, at the time of action, have

had 54 fail of the line in the West Indies; a force abundantly fufficient for every offenfive or defenfive purpofe, and which our enemies could not have met with any profpect of advantage. It was declared by the noble viscount alluded to above, that he most earnestly wished the fleet that was collected at Cadiz had failed, as he had not the fmalleft doubt that a decifive blow would have been given in the enfuing campaign, in the WeltIndies, to the marine of the House of Bourbon.

In the Eaft Indies, it had been allowed, on the other fide, that our force in point of number of guns was equal to that of the enemy; but in other refpects, it was now afferted to be much fuperior; and that the poffeffion of Trincomale gave us a decided advantage in all our naval operations in that quarter.

For the channel fervice there remained thirty-four fail of the line. This force, though allowed to be inferior to that of the enemy, yet was afferted to be fufficient for the fecurity of our trade, and adequate to all the purposes of homedefence.

An appeal had been made to the experience of the late campaign. On this point it was demanded, whether the navy had been inadequate to any fervice on which it was difpatched? and whether there had been any one offenfive or defenfive measure declined, in confequence of its being incompetent to the duty On the proof of either of thete propofitions, Mr. Fox offered to reft the fate of the queftion before the house.

With refpect to the army, it was faid, that the argument drawn from the depopulated ftate of the country did not deferve a ferious anfwer. It was afferted that tranfports might eafily have been procured for carrying the German troops to the West-Indies; and above all, it was contended, that the American war, the mill-ftone that hung about our necks, being at an end, the nation would have foon emerged from its dejection, and recovered its ufual high tone of thinking and acting.

It had been faid, that peace on any terms, by breaking the alliance confederated against us, and giving us time to breathe, was preferable to the continuance of the war under our prefent circumftances. In anfwer to that it was obferved, that improvident conceffions could never tend to the fecurity of peace; but by weakening the power that made them, rendered it more liable to future infults. It was further urged, that if any inability to profecute the war really exifted, it was not likely we should reap much benefit from the breathing time, which had been procured at so great and certain a lofs. It was not probable that the national debt would be fpeedily reduced; and it was a doubt whether we could build' fhips faster in time of peace than the courts of France and Spain. On the other hand, a variety of obvious circumftances, and more especially the brilliant fucceffes of the late campaign, ferved to prove, that the prefent was the moment for pufhing our fortune, if peace could not be obtained on equal and honourable terms. That fuch terms had not been obtained, was the next

point that was undertaken to be proved.

In every negotiation for peace, it is obvious that fome point must be fixed for the bafis of the treaty. Two principles are ufually reforted to for this purpose-either that of leaving each party in the actual ftate of their poffeffions at the time of the treaty, which is commonly called that of uti poffidetis; or that of reciprocal and general reftitution. The latter principle directs a negotiation, when the belligerent powers have equal defire and reason for concluding the war. It is then they find it their intereft to reinftate each other reciprocally in the poffeffions they have loft. The uti poffidetis is the principle of negotiation, when either of the belligerent powers has obtained a fuperiority in the war over the other. It is then the party worfted is obliged to fubmit to the lofs of its poffeffions; for, not hav ing the power of enforcing, it af fumes not the pretence of demanding reftitution.

Allowing we were in a fituation to treat on the principle of mutual reftitution, to which, from the actual state of our poffeffions, and our comparative ftrength, it was contended we had fair pretenfions, the articles of reftoration on our part could not have exceeded those contained in the present treaty, the fettlement on the river Gambia alone excepted, for which we had ceded and given up to France the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the right of fishery on an extenfive part of the coaft of Newfoundland, the island of Tobago, the river Senegal, with its dependencies and forts, and the abrogation of all former articles relative

to

to Dunkirk: To Spain, the island of Minorca, and the provinces of Eaft and West Florida

If it should be thought that the scale of fortune had turned in favour of our enemies, and that we were not entitled to infift on a general restitution, yet ftill, on the most unfavourable ground (that of uti poffidetis) we fhould have loft, to France, only the islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica, St. Chriftopher, Nevis, and Montferrat, the two latter of little importance, either in point of extent or quality; while, on the other hand, we should have retained the very valuable island of St. Lucia, in the Weft-Indies, all their continental fettlements in the Eaft, together with their forts and trade, as well as our own, on the coaft of Africa.

With thefe poffeffions, it was maintained, that we might have ftood on the ground of uti poffidetis, without any material, or probably any disadvantage. The island of St. Lucia, in how little eftimation foever it might have been held at the peace of Paris, was now found by experience, and univerfally acknowledged to be, of the utmost importance; and, together with the other fettlements mentioned, might be confidered as a fair and full equivalent for the Weft-India iflands restored to Great-Britain.

In the treaty with Spain, fuppofing it likewife to have been conducted on the principle of uti poffidetis, the province of Eaft Florida had been exchanged for the island of Providence and the Bahamas. With refpect to the merits of this exchange, it was faid, that the value of Eaft Florida, whether in point of fituation, or

of commercial produce, had been either little understood, or had been defignedly under-rated. It poffeffed one of the finest harbours in the world, called the Bay of Tampa, or Efpiritu Santo, fituated in a healthy climate, and where fhips were fafe from the annoyance of worms. Befides, the coast of that province was covered with small iflands, from whence privateers might run to fea, and attack our Jamaica trade, as it paffed the gulf of Florida. And this was the more to be feared in a future, than it would have been in any preceding war, from the lofs of Georgia, whofe harbours formerly ferved both to protect our trade and to fhelter it from tempefts. As a further proof of the rashness and improvidence of this exchange, an addrefs lately prefented by the provincial affembly of that country was read, in which, after setting forth their thriving fituation, and expreffing their abhorrence both of the rebellion in America, and of the Spanish government, they conclude "with profeffions of the "ftrongeft attachment to the Houfe "of Brunswick, under whofe pro"tection they remained, convinc"ed that their civil and religious rights would be fecure to the "lateft pofterity.”

But granting that thefe exchanges had been equitably and prudently made, there fill remained to be accounted for the important conceffions made to the court of France, of which no defence had been attempted, excepting that the houfe of Bourbon had a right to expect fome compenfation for the humiliating terms impofed upon her by the peace of 1762.

The first of these was an exclu

five right of fishery on a confider able part of the coaft of Newfoundland. It had been faid, that in return we had established an exclufive right on the remaining and more advantageous parts. In anfwer to this it was observed, that the propofal having evidently originated from France, it was abfurd to fuppofe that he had chofen for herself the worft ftations. The contrary was afferted to be the fact; and that the conceffion was of a new and important nature, the confequences of which it was not perhaps eafy at prefent to forefee.

The ceffion of St. Pierre and Miquelon followed, together with the right of fortifying them. Heretofore, as foon as ever hoftilities commenced between Great Britain and France, we were enabled, as had been the cafe in the preceding war, to feize upon her fisheries and her feamen, because they were unprotected. Hereafter this important advantage would no longer exift for by fortifying the two ceded islands, France would be as capable of carrying on the fishery in time of war, as in time of peace, and at the fame time would have it in her power to annoy and diftrefs us exceedingly. This article therefore materially affected the whole of the Newfoundland fishery, and rendered the ftipulations in that particular infinitely more important and more advantageous to France, than they had ever been by former treaties. It was farther obferved, that these islands, if once fortified, would command the entrance of the river St. Lawrence.

The value and importance of the island of Tobago, the ceffion

that followed next in order, was ftrongly infifted on; and, in anfwer to the arguments used on the other fide, the mifchievous confequences were itated, of leaving an article fo effential to our manufactures as cotton, in the hands of a rival power, to be taxed or prohibited at its pleasure.

The ceffion of Senegal and Goree, it was faid, was not less mifchievous ard improvident. If minifters had referred to the negotiation for the last peace, they would have feen that France explicitly ftates, that without one of thefe places the gum trade could not exit; and on this principle, admitted by us, they were then di vided. Now, that they are united, our trade is held at the pleafure of France. It had been urg

ed, that the trade was an object of trifling importance; but the want of it would destroy two great branches of our manufacture, that of printed linens, and that of filks and gauzes. If a war fhould break out, we might be deprived of it entirely, and in peace we should buy it at the French price.

The laft conceffion made to France, was the abrogation of all former articles relative to Dunkirk. It was allowed, that much difference of opinion exifted with refpect to the importance of this harbour but what it wanted in other re fpects was abundantly made up by the peculiar advantages of its fituation. The bason, when opened and repaired, would be capable of containing twenty or thirty fhips of a confiderable fize and burthen. Thefe, iffuing out at all feasons, would annoy our trade in its very centre, and counterbalance, in fome meafure, the advantages of

our

our local fituation for commerce. At the fame time, it would be of no ufe to the French, but in a war with England; fo that it was of all others the greatest temptation that could be thrown in their way for commencing fresh hoftilities.

To these great and extraordinary conceffions ought to be added the restoration of their fettlements, and other important advantages fecured to the French in the Eaft Indies. The addition of territory to Pondicherry and Karical, might be treated as a trifling matter; but it was not thought fo in the nego tiations for the treaty of Paris. Great art was employed, and preffing folicitations made, to carry that point; but the minifters then were well informed of the value M. du Pleix put upon that territory; and that he held it to be a Arm foundation for the re-establishment of the power of France, and for an effectual oppofition to the English influence on the coaft of Coromandel.

The grant of a free and undefined trade, fuch as the French East India Company enjoyed, without fpecifying at what period, might not only raise a conteft about duties, but, taken in its full extent, would make Chandenagore a place of arms. It was well known, that the French Eaft India Company, prior to our acquifitions in Bengal, was encouraged to carry arms into that country: but du ring the last peace their veffels had been vifited, and no arms had been permitted to be brought in. Would France now fubmit to fuch examinations? And if that restraint was intended to be given up, Chandenagore would foon be a most VOL. XXVI.

powerful poft in the centre of our government.

On the whole of the treaty with the court of France, it was contended, that at a time when we had the command of the East Indies, when we had excluded France from the coafts of India, of Africa, and. the banks of Newfoundland; when we were relieved from the preffure of the American war, and had nothing to apprehend in Europe, after having captured fo many fail of their line, and without the difgrace of having a fingle fhip of our line in the poffeffion of the enemy; we had reftored her to all her power, and given her a controul and check upon us in every quarter of the globe.

The American treaty, to which the principles already laid down were not strictly applicable, was referved for a feparate difcuffion. The neceffity or the policy of acknowledging the independence of the United States being admitted, it followed of course, that they were to be confidered merely in the fame view as any other power at war with Great Britain. The firft thing therefore to be looked at, in eftimating the terms of peace, was the known fituation of each at the time of the treaty.

At this time Great Britain poffeffed the strongest posts on the coaft of North America; all the back country and the river St. Lawrence; the fur trade and fisheries were entirely hers; a great party in the country were unealy at the continuance of the war, and dissatisfied with the new government; and many were zealously attached to our inte refts. Under thefe favourable circumftances, it was demanded, whe ther we were under the neceflity of [4]

accepting