an equivalent in money; freedom of debate in the legislative bodies was secured; parties impeached, or indicted for crimes were to be allowed counsel as in civil cases; town officers and other officers before eligible by the people, were to continue so; and the legislature were forbidden to institute any new court, except such as should proceed according to the course of the common law.

Finally the legislature were authorized to pass naturalization laws; but persons of foreign birth were to take an oath of allegiance to this state, and to abjure all allegiance and subjection to all and every foreign potentate and state, in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil.

The freehold qualification required of voters for governor, lieutenantgovernor and senators, was found, as the population of the state increased, to operate injuriously. Large portions of the people, many of them persons of great intelligence and possessed of personal property, or of interests in lands less than freeholds, far exceeding the value of the freehold demanded by the constitution, were, so far as regarded the choice of these officers, practically disfranchised. The injustice and impolicy of this exclusion attracted more and more of the public attention, and in the year 1820, became a prominent topic of discussion. As relief could only be obtained by an amendment of the constitution, and as there was then no way of effecting such an amendment but by the call of a convention, the friends of reform made this measure their rallying point, and pressed it with such earnestness, that on the 13th of March, 1821, an act recommending a convention of the people of the state, was passed by the legislature.

This act authorized the taking of the sense of the electors on the. question whether a convention should be held; and in case of a decision in the affirmative, provided for the choosing and assembling of delegates. Such being the decision, a convention was accordingly chosen, and in August, 1821, it entered upon its duties.

The delegates to this body immediately resolved to take up the whole constitution, with the view not only of making the particular amendments so loudly called for by their constituents, but of giving the instrument a thorough revision. It soon became evident, that to carry out the views of the convention, it would be necessary to prepare an entirely new constitution. This was accordingly done; and the instrument, on being submitted to the people, was approved by a large majority of votes, and came into full effect on the first of January, 1823.

By this instrument, which was arranged in a lucid order, and expressed, for the most part, in a neat and perspicuous style, the general frame of the government was retained; but the changes in some of its most material arrangements were many and important.

The number of the senators was retained at 32, and the term of service was unaltered; but the number of the senate districts was doubled, the state being divided, for the election of senators, and also for judi

cial purposes, into eight districts. The house of assembly was fixed at 128. The numbers of these two branches, as thus settled, still remain.

The compensation of members of the legislature was permanently fixed; they were prohibited from receiving civil appointments from the governor and senate, or the legislature; officers of the federal government were prohibited from sitting in either house; and the legislature were empowered to remove, by a vote of two-thirds of the assembly, and a majority of the senate, the highest judicial officers. All these provisions have been retained in the constitution of 1846.

The term of service of the governor and lieutenant-governor was reduced to two years; the council of revision was abolished; and the qualified veto power, before possessed by that board, vested in the governor. These provisions remain in force.

The right of suffrage, (except as to persons of colour,) was placed on a new and enlarged basis. The freehold qualifications prescribed by the constitution of 1777 were abolished; but the payment of taxes, or some equivalent contribution to the public service, was still required. In 1826, this article was amended so as to require only citizenship, inhabitancy, and residence-thus introducing, in effect, universal suffrage, which yet exists.

Men of colour (except when citizens of three years' standing, owners of freeholds of the value of $250, and tax payers,) were prohibited from voting. This arrangement, though a provision for its alteration was separately submitted, by the convention of 1846, to the decision of the people, remains unaltered.*

At the time of framing the constitution of 1777, there were few or no free persons of colour, possessed of the qualifications required of voters, within the state; and the question, whether the right of suffrage should be confined to white persons, seems not to have arisen. By the act of February 22d, 1788, new facilities were provided for the manumission of slaves. Under its operation, the number of free persons of colour continued to increase from year to year; and as these persons, when possessed of the requisite qualifications, were entitled to vote, the number of eleetors of colour increased in almost equal proportion, though it remained small until after 1817. The act of March 29th, 1799, provided for the gradual abolition of slavery, by declaring that every child born after the 4th of July, 1799, of a slave, should be free-if a male, on attaining the age of 28 years, and if a female, on attaining the age of 25. By this law, a large number of persons of colour became free in 1817; and thus the number of coloured voters was largely increased. The act of March 31st, 1817, declared that after the 4th of July 1827, every coloured person born before July 4th, 1799, should be free-thus completing the abolition of slavery within this state. The convention of 1821-in view of the rapid increase of free coloured persons, by the operation of these laws, and by immigration from other states, and of the inexpediency of intrusting the right of suffrage to a class practically ineligible to even the humblest office, and doomed by positive enactment, as well as the stronger law of public opinion, to a degrading social inferiority-thought it necessary to insert in the constitution the prohibitory clause mentioned in the text; and the like reasons, it may be presumed, led to the rejection of the amendment submitted by the convention of 1846. As a consequence of their exclusion from the list of voters, the constitutions of 1821 and 1846 carefully provide, that persons of colour shall not be subject to direct taxation, unless seised and possessed of real estate sufficient to entitle them to vote.

It was provided that all elections by the citizens should be by ballot, except for such town officers as might, by law, be directed to be otherwise chosen. This provision is retained.

The appointing power was placed on an entirely new footing. The council of appointment was abolished. Militia officers, except a few of the highest grades, were made elective. The appointment of the higher judicial officers was assigned to the governor with the consent of the senate. Justices of the peace were to be appointed by the boards of supervisors and the county judges; a provision which was altered in 1826, when these officers were made elective.

The secretary of state, and other state officers, were to be appointed by the senate and assembly. Sheriffs, coroners, and clerks of counties were made elective; and they so continue.

The higher courts were empowered, as in the constitution of 1777, to appoint their own clerks. Local officers were, in some cases, made appointable by local authorities, and a discretionary power was given to the legislature, to fix the manner in which officers not specially provided for in the constitution should be elected or appointed. In the exercise of this power, the appointment of many administrative officers was afterwards devolved, by law, upon the governor and senatethus greatly enlarging the patronage of the former, and making more close the connexion of the latter with the appointing power.

All these provisions, except such as gave the appointing power to the people, or to local authorities, have been swept away by the constitution of 1846.

The constitution of 1821 retained the court of chancery, the supreme court, and the court for the correction of errors, as established in 1777; except that the judges of the supreme court were relieved from circuit duties.

The official tenure of the higher judicial officers, as fixed by the constitution of 1777, was retained; but they were made removeable by joint resolution of the senate and assembly, to be passed with the concurrence of two-thirds of the latter, and a majority of the former. The like power of removal is contained in the constitution of 1846.

For the trial of issues of fact, and of criminal cases, and for such equity jurisdiction as the legislature might assign to them, eight circuit judges were created. This arrangement was soon found to be inadequate, and as the state increased in population, the deficiency became more and more apparent, until, in 1845, it formed one of the chief necessities for calling a new convention.

The provisions of the constitution of 1777 for the security of personal rights were retained; but as they were not deemed sufficiently comprehensive, several new sections, mostly taken from the first amendments to the constitution of the United States, were added. These provisions, thus enlarged, are repeated in the constitution of 1846.

Provision was wisely made for further amendments without the

agency of a convention. Amendments might be proposed in either house. If agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each. house, and by two-thirds of each house of the legislature next elected, they were then to be submitted to the people; and if ratified by a majority of the electors, to become a part of the constitution. In the mode thus prescribed, several amendments, some of which have been alluded to, were adopted by successive legislatures, approved by the people, and thus added to the constitution.

The convention of 1846, had its origin in the failure of certain amendments on the subject of state debts and liabilities, proposed in 1844, to obtain, in the following year, the assent of two-thirds of each house, though they commanded that of a majority of each.

These amendments were directed to two objects: First, to confirm the pledges and guarantees of the memorable act of 1842, "to provide for paying the debts and preserving the credit of the state;" and secondly, to limit and control the debt-contracting power of the legislature. They had called out so general a discussion, and had been so favourably received by large portions of the people, and there was also so general a conviction that the judiciary establishments required a thorough re-organization, that the legislature of 1845, on the failure of the proposed amendments to receive the constitutional majority, passed an act recommending a convention to revise the constitution; and directing the question, whether such a convention should be held, to be submitted to the people at the annual election in November, 1845. In the event of an affirmative decision, an election for delegates was to be held in April, 1846, and the delegates then elected were to assemble in June, 1846, for the execution of their trust.

The people having decided for a convention, delegates were chosen and assembled. The result of their labours appeared, in due time, in the form of a new constitution, which, having been approved by a large majority of the people, is now, as to all matters within the circle of state sovereignty, the supreme law of the state, and of the three millions of souls dwelling within its bounds.

All the provisions of the constitution of 1821, with the amendments made to it, by which the right of suffrage, and other civil rights, were extended or more fully secured, are preserved in this instrument. It contains, in addition, many new provisions of the like nature, conceived in a still larger spirit of democratic liberty, and giving new efficacy and vigour to the popular will.

Thus the governor is no longer required to be either a native citizen or a freeholder; the general power of appointment before vested in him and the senate, is given directly to the people; and the legislature are authorized to confer on the board of supervisors, in the several counties, such further powers of local legislation and administration as they may prescribe. By these changes, and by other like provisions, the central power before existing at the seat of government is broken

up; the number of elective officers much increased; and the immediate agency of the people in the practical administration of the government, very greatly enlarged.

The principle of these changes receives its boldest illustration in the establishment of an entirely new judiciary, elective in all its parts, and for short terms of service.* Clerks of courts, and district attorneys, and all judicial officers of cities and villages, are also to be chosen in the same way. The secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, and attorney general, instead of being appointed by the senate and assembly for three years, are also to be chosen by the people, and to hold for but two years. A state engineer and surveyor, canal commissioners, and inspectors of state prisons, are also to be chosen, and for short terms, by the people.

All county officers, whose appointment is not otherwise provided for, are to be elected by the people, or to be appointed by the boards of supervisors, as the legislature may direct: and they may also direct all city, town, and village officers, whose appointment is not otherwise provided for, to be chosen by the electors of their respective municipalities.

Along with these proofs of undoubting confidence in the people, there is displayed, throughout the whole instrument, a jealousy of their representatives, which has led to the forbidding of some powers before possessed by the legislature, and to the limiting of others yet intrusted to that body. The principle of responsibility on the part of legislators and of other public agents, is also more fully developed by bringing

Art. 6. The court for the correction of errors, the court of chancery, the supreme and circuit courts, and, except in the city of New York, the county courts, as they existed under the constitution of 1821, are all abolished. In lieu of them, the constitution of 1846 creates, first-a court of appeals, to consist of eight judges, four to be elected by the electors of the state for eight years, and four to be selected from the class of justices of the supreme court having the shortest time to serve :-Secondly-a supreme court, having jurisdiction in law and equity, to consist of thirtytwo justices, to be chosen in eight separate districts, the electors of each district choosing four; the justices first chosen to be classified, so that one justice in each district shall go out of office every two years; but every justice afterwards chosen is to hold for eight years; general terms of the court to be held, in the several districts, by three or more of the justices; and special terms of the court, and circuit courts, to be held by any one or more of the justices, any one or more of whom may also preside in courts of oyer and terminer;-and, thirdly, a county court, of civil jurisdiction, in each county, (except in New York, where the court of general sessions, the court of common pleas, and the superior court, are left in existence subject to the direction of the legislature,) to be held by a single judge, chosen by the electors of the county for four years, which judge may be charged, by the legislature, with equity jurisdiction in special cases, and, in certain counties, with the duties of surrogate, and, with two justices of the peace, may hold courts of sessions of criminal jurisdiction. Art. 6. §§ 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 14; Art. 14. § 12. It is much to be regretted that the new method of appointing judicial officers should be associated at its commencement with a judicial system, in many respects, not well arranged. The elections of 1847 have fully sustained the confidence reposed by the convention of 1846 in the capacity of the people to select upright and able judges; but there seem to be defects in the system which no amount of ability or integrity in the judges can entirely overcome, and which will soon demand material and extensive changes.