OPERATIONS OF THE TEN YEARS' WAR.

The Two Wars Compared-The Havana Volunteers-The Slaughter at the Villaneuva Theater-The Court Martial of the Students-A Holiday in Havana-The Close of the War-The Treaty of Zanjon.

The reader who has watched closely the struggle in Cuba for the past three years need not be told that Spain has had every advantage in men, money, arms and ammunition. The same state of affairs existed during the Ten Years' War. In fact, the inequality was even greater, for the Spanish army was then composed of experienced soldiers who were well fed, well clothed and paid regularly. In the present conflict many of them are boys who have been sent from home to make targets for insurgent bullets. They know comparatively nothing of military tactics, they have not been paid for months, and they lack food and clothing. The equipment of the insurgent forces in the former rebellion was even more limited than it has been in this one. While they did not experience serious difficulty in obtaining food, the implements of war in any quantities were beyond their reach. But the same spirit that gave courage to our American heroes in revolutionary times was in them, and for ten years they struggled bravely against overwhelming odds.

It is not possible to tell in detail of the monstrous cruelties practiced by the Spanish army during those years of carnage. Here is the testimony of one officer:

"We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright; on dying they shouted, 'Hurrah for Free Cuba, hurrah for independence.' A mulatto said, 'Hurrah for Cespedes. On the following day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen that we shot the first day we found three sons and their father. The father witnessed the execution of his sons without even changing color, and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled with women and children, the families of those we had shot, and they asked

us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among Spaniards."

Another wrote:

"Not a single Cuban will remain in this island, because we shoot all that we find in the fields, on the farms and in every hovel. We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal. If we find cows we kill them, if horses, ditto, if hogs, ditto, men, women or children, ditto. As to the houses, we burn them. So every one receives his due, the men in balls, the animals in bayonet thrusts. The island will remain a desert."

In the cities, outrages equally barbarous were committed.

The Havana Volunteers.

The Havana volunteers, made up of the Spanish-born residents, in whose favor the government of the island has always been arranged, took possession of Havana, and put it under mob rule. In May, 1870, they marched out in front of the Villaneuva theater and fired volleys into the crowds that were entering. They had reason to believe, some of them said, that the performance to be given there was to raise funds for the insurgent cause.

So powerful was this organization that shortly after this outrage they placed the Captain-General of the island under arrest, and finally shipped him to Spain, sending word to the home government that he was not severe enough in his rule to suit their views, and suggesting that in case there were no Peninsulars who had the necessary stamina to govern Cuba according to their ideas, they might feel it advisable to assume command themselves.

On another occasion the dead body of one of these volunteers was placed in a public tomb in Havana, and the repository was found to have been defaced by scurrilous writing on the glass of the door. For no known reason, except a blood-thirsty desire for vengeance on someone, no matter whether guilty or innocent, it was claimed that the outrage was committed by some of the students of the university, and on complaint of the volunteer corps, forty-three of these young men were arrested.

They were arraigned before the military tribunal, and so manifestly unjust was the accusation that an officer of the regular army of Spain volunteered to defend them. There was absolutely no proof against them, and they were acquitted. But the volunteers were deter

mined that their victims should not escape, and taking advantage of the fear in which they were held, even by the Havana officials, they forced the Governor-General to issue an order for a second courtmartial. At this examination they manipulated matters so that two thirds of the members of the trial board were connected with their organization, and a verdict of guilty was quickly rendered against all of the prisoners. Eight of them were sentenced to be shot, and the others to long terms of imprisonment at hard labor.

The day of the execution was a holiday in Havana. Bands of music paraded the streets, followed by the volunteers, 15,000 strong, while behind them, bound in chains, and under military guard, came the eight boys who had been condemned to die. Conscious of their innocence of any crime, they did not falter, but marched bravely to the place of execution, where they faced their murderers and fell, riddled by bullets from the rifles of the volunteers. The report of this affair sent a thrill of horror throughout the whole of the civilized world, and the perpetrators of the outrage were severely censured by the Spanish Cortes, but there was no attempt at punishment, nor were the ones who had been imprisoned released.

Meantime the war was being carried on in the provinces with vary. ing success, but dissensions finally arose between the civil and military authorities of the republic of Cuba, and as "a house divided against itself cannot stand," the effectiveness of the campaign was destroyed, and, in 1878, concessions were offered by the Spanish government, which were accepted by the revolutionists, and the struggle was abandoned.

What the outcome of the contest might have been, could it have been continued with the leaders united for its success, is an open question. As the years went by the rank and file of the Cuban army seemed to be more determined than ever to throw off the yoke, and the gov· ernment in Spain became less prompt in sending supplies of men and money to carry on the war. They eagerly seized the opportunity to bring it to a close, and the treaty of Zanjon, which was signed by General Martinez Campos, the Spanish Governor-General of the island, and General Maximo Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban army, promised many reforms, and gave amnesty to all who had taken part in the rebellion.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PEACE OF ZANJON AND ITS VIOLATED PLEDGES.

Spanish Hypocrisy and Deceit-Cubans Denied Representation-Increase of Taxation-The Royal Edicts-A Plausible Argument, Which Is Not Borne Out by Facts-Spain's Promises Always Broken.

If Spain had been sincere in the promises of reform she made her Cuban colony when the treaty of Zanjon was signed, it is probable that the present war would have never occurred. For while a few of the leaders—notably General Maceo-refused to become pacified, the great majority of the better classes were glad to accept a peaceful settlement on terms that gave them, in fact, if not in name, nearly every concession for which they had fought.

But it did not take them long to learn that they had been duped. Spain granted to Cuba the liberties of Puerto Rico, which had none. On this deceitful ground was laid the new situation, through which ran a current of falsehood and hypocrisy. Spain, whose mind did not change, hastened to change the name of things. The captain-general was called the governor-general. The royal decrees took the name of authorizations. The commercial monopoly of Spain was named coasting trade. The right of banishment was transformed into the law of vagrancy. The brutal attacks of defenseless citizens were called "componte." The law of constitutional guarantees became the law of public order. Taxation without the consent or knowledge of the Cuban people was changed into the law of estimates (budget) voted by the representatives of Spain.

The painful lesson of the Ten Years' War was entirely lost on Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy that would heal the recent wounds, allay public anxiety, and quench the thirst for justice felt by the people, who were desirous to enjoy their natural rights, the Peninsula, while lavish in promises of reform, persisted in carrying on, unchanged, its old and crafty system, namely: to exclude every native Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influen ce and intervention in public affairs; the ungovernable exploitation of the colonists' labor for the benefit of Spanish commerce and

Spanish bureaucracy, both civil and military. To carry out the latter purpose it was necessary to maintain the former at any cost.

Mr. Clarence King, a recognized authority on political subjects connected with Cuban affairs, says:

"The main concession for which the insurgents accepted peace was the promise of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, there promptly followed four royal edicts as follows: June 9, entitling Cuba to elect deputies to the Cortes, one for each 40,000 people; June 9, dividing the island into the present six provinces; June 21, instituting a system of provincial and municipal government, followed on August 16 by the necessary electoral regulations. But the system was immediately seen to be the shadow without the substance of self-government. The Provincial Assembly could nominate only three candidates for presiding officer. It was the inevitable governor-general who had the power to appoint, not necessarily one of the three nominees, but any member of the Assembly he chose. But all this provincial machinery is in reality an empty form, since expressly by law the governorgeneral was given the power to prorogue the assemblies at will. The deputies have never been able to accomplish anything in the Cortes. Moreover the crux of the whole financial oppression-tariff, taxes, and absolute control and expenditure of the revenue-remained with Spain."

The loyal Spaniard insists that every agreement entered into by his government was faithfully carried out; that the Cubans were given from time to time even greater liberties than the treaty promised them; and that in several matters of importance, immunities have been granted them that the people of the mother country did not share.

The Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain concludes a voluminous defense of the policy of his government in Cuba as follows:

There is thus no reason in Cuba to complain of the illiberality of the laws. If there has been any shortcoming in respect to morals, the nation is not to blame; none but the colonial provinces are to blame for this; if we proposed to seek comfort in comparisons, it would not be necessary to look for them in South America, in the countries that have emancipated themselves from the Spanish mother-country, because examples (some of them very recent) of acts of violence, anarchy and scandalous outbreaks could be found in the States of the Union itself.

In respect to another matter, a great deal of foolish talk is indulged in. From the statements of some people it would appear that Cuba