Hume: The Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature--book I to the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Libro 1Macmillan, 1904 - 330 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
abstract according to Hume affirms appendix argument arises arithmetic and algebra belief Brede Burton causation cause and effect cause of perceptions certainty concerning conclusion Consequently contiguity custom David Hume Der Unterschied d derived distinct earlier ence Epicurus epistemological eral existence experience explain external faculties feeling force and vivacity geometry Gesch Hence human nature Hume's doctrine Ibid ical idea of cause idea of space imagination implies impressions and ideas impressions of reflection impressions of sense inference infinitely divisible Inquiry instinct intuitive intuitive knowledge Kant later Lehren H logical manner mathematics matters of fact means memory metaphysics metic mind necessary connection objects omission omitted particular perfectly exact personal identity Phil philosophical relations philosophy of human position principles priori probability psychological qualities question quiry reason regard relations of ideas resemblance sensation Skepsis skepticism statement substance thought tion Treatise of Human treatment Unterschied
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Página 240 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Página 267 - So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one.
Página 106 - ... that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent.
Página 243 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Página 210 - By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.
Página 228 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception...
Página 108 - But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist.
Página 121 - When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions, than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason ; and when I proceed still farther, to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimation I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.
Página 175 - We may well ask what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body; but it is in vain to ask whether there be body or not. That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.
Página 222 - Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different. from ideas and impressions.