sic ruling, used as precedent for all kinds of cases, has defeated justice time and time again, there cannot be the slightest doubt.

It is the custom of the writers of the rules of evidence to lay much stress upon a causal connection between facts as the touchstone of relevancy. This contention creates a semblance of logical soundness that is most deceptive, and blinds the truth. There could be no connection of cause and effect between the beer delivered to one customer and that delivered to another. Nevertheless, the ruling out of the testimony that other beer was good shuts out the brewer's only possible line of defense, for the beer itself not only no longer existed, but was wholly consumed by those interested in establishing a case against

him.

It would be easy to show the illogical character of the rules of evidence from thousands upon thousands of recent cases in American courts. This would be particularly evident in cases where expert testimony has been a

abuses of expert testimony, the rules of which differ from those of ordinary evidence are one of the standing disgraces of American legal practice.

Not only is the rule of relevancy, with its absurdly fictitious foundation, and supposedly logical foundation on causal connection, a source of perennial abuse, but the much more apparently reasonable rule as to the exclusion of hearsay and of opinion. Most supposedly direct observation is, in reality, only opinion, and opinion formed on other than "ocular" evidence, may be far more sound. And there may be cases where hearsay contains the gist of the whole matter.

The whole subject is in need of a thorough airing. It is a subject which the "legal mind" cannot be trusted to handle. The rules of evidence must become a law of evidence, and that law must be the enactment, not of lawyers and judges, but of the common sense and scientific training of the lay public.