added a saving clause, in the form of a proviso, to the effect that the selection of any general and permanent provision from an act making appropriations or containing other provisions of a private, local or temporary character should not in any way affect such appropriation or such private, local or temporary provision. To this they added, by way of abundant caution, the further reservation that where no part of an act passed prior to said date is embraced in the revision, such act remains unaffected thereby.

The next three sections relate to the preservation of rights and remedies; the sixth forbids a resort to the title under which any particular section is placed, for the purpose of inferring legislative intent, and the last makes the revision subject to the operation of any act passed since the 1st day of December, 1873.

THE REVISION NOT RETROSPECTIVE.

Be

The impression seems to have obtained in some quarters that the revision is retrospective, taking effect from the 1st of December, 1873-an impression arising mainly, it may be supposed, from the expressed intention of congress to declare the law as it existed on that date. This idea is wholly erroneous for obvious reasons, not the least important being that such a construction would unsettle many transactions, both public and private, occurring after that date. sides, the words used, "hereby repealed," are immediate, not retrospective, in their operation, and hence the whole body of the statutes remained in force until the 22d of June, 1874, when the act of revision was approved, excepting in so far as they were affected by any act passed during the session. So far as the revision reproduces former statutes, unaffected by any act passed between the dates mentioned, the law remains the same; but so far as it makes any change, either in substance or form, it must be regarded as new legislation or as a legislative interpretation of prior statutes, which amounts to the same thing, taking effect in either case on and after the 22d of June and not before.

DIGEST OF RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. BILL OF EXCHANGE.

A drew a bill on B, which B accepted. C became the holder for value. Before due date it was agreed between A and C (A assuring C of B's concurrence) that the bill should be renewed; and C gave to A a cheque on C for the amount of the bill, to the intent that B should be placed in funds to meet the original bill, and should thereupon accept the renewed bill. A sent the new bill to B for acceptance, and also sent him the cheque, and B knew the purposes for which both were sent. B cashed the cheque and paid the first bill, but refused to accept the second. Held, that B had no right so to appropriate the cheque without accepting the bill. Held, also, that the agreement between A and C did not release B from his suretyship as acceptor of the first bill. Torrance v. Bank of British North America, L. R., 5 P. C. 246.

words "or order or assigns" in the bill of lading is not sufficient to give the indorsees constructive notice of some equitable arrangement between the person to whom the bill of lading was made out and the consignors. Henderson v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R., 5 P. C. 253.

CARRIER.

Railway company: failure of the consignee to take delivery: lien for charges.-The defendant sent a horse by the plaintiffs' railway directed to himself at S station. On the arrival of the horse at S station at night there was no one to meet it, and the plaintiffs, having no accommodation at the station, sent the horse to a livery stable. The defendant's servant soon after arrived and demanded the horse; he was referred to the livery stable keeper, who refused to deliver the horse except on payment of charges which were admitted to be reasonable. On the next day the defendant came and demanded the horse, and the station master offered to pay the charges and let the defendant take away the horse; but the defendant declined and went away without the horse, which remained at the livery stable. The plaintiffs afterward offered to deliver the horse to the defendant at S without payment of any charges, but the defendant refused to receive it unless delivered at his farm, and with payment of a sum of money for his expenses and loss of time. Some months after, the plaintiffs paid the livery stable keeper his charges, and sent the horse to the defendant, who received it. In an action brought to recover the amount of the charges, held, that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in putting the horse in the livery stable, and that the defendant, having refused to take the horse, was liable to the plaintiffs for all the livery charges which they had paid. Great Northern Railway Company v. Swaffield, L. R., 9 Ex. 132.

COLLISION.

Duty of steam vessel in dense fog.- A steam ferry boat started in a dense fog to cross a navigable river, those in charge of her having been informed that vessels were anchored in or near her track. The ferry boat, although navigated with all ordinary care, ran into and damaged a ship at anchor. Held, that the ferry boat was to blame. The Lancashire, L. R., 4 Ad. & Ec. 198.

COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND. The owner of some land sold a part of it and entered into an agreement with the purchaser, that an adjoining plot of land "should never be hereafter sold, but left for the common benefit of both parties and their successors." Held, that this was merely an agreement that the plot of land should be left open, in the state in which it then was, for the common advantage of both parties, and that such an agreement did not contravene any rule at law, but gave the person who might hold the vendee's land the right to enforce the obligation against the person who might hold the vendor's land. Thus the former might apply to a court of equity to order the removal of a structure that had been placed on the plot in violation of the agreement. McLean v. McKay, L. R., 5 P. C. 327.

nals of distress approached her to render assistance. In rendering salvage services to the barque damage was caused to that vessel by the negligent navigation of the screw steamer, the two vessels coming into collision on three occasions. To recover for the damages sustained in these collisions, the owners of the barque promoted a cause of damage against the steamer, and subsequently an action for the recovery of salvage remuneration was brought by the owners of the steamer against the barque. On the two causes coming on to be heard together, the court held, that the owners of the barque were entitled to recover in the damage cause, and that the owners of the steamer were entitled to recover in the salvage cause. The C. S. Butler, L. R., 4 Ad. & Ec. 178.

EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS.

It is a provision of the Hong Kong Ordinance, No. 2 of 1850, that, where it may appear to a magistrate or court that there is probable cause for believing that a Chinese, who has taken refuge at Hong Kong, has committed "any crime or offense against the laws of China," he may be imprisoned with a view to his being surrendered to the government of China:

Held, that the words "crime or offense" must be limited to those ordinary crimes and offenses which are punishable by the laws of all nations, and which are not peculiar to the laws of China, such as murder, robbery, theft, or arson, committed by a Chinese within Chinese territory, or in Chinese ships on the high seas; piracy, moreover, in certain circumstances would come within the ordinance, as for example if a Chinese went from the Chinese coast to plunder ships at sea, returning to China with his plunder.

Where a Chinese, who had taken refuge in Hong Kong, was accused of having previously murdered a French Captain of a French ship at sea, it was held that he could not be imprisoned and delivered up to the Chinese government under the ordinance; on two grounds-1. That it could not be assumed without evidence, that there was any law in China to punish a Chinese subject for a murder committed upon a foreigner within foreign territory; and, 2. That, even if it could be so assumed, still the offense having being committed within French territory, ought to be treated as an offense agaist French and not as an offense against Chinese law.

Where some of a large number of Chinese coolies, who were being taken from China to Peru in a French ship, killed the captain and several of the French crew, and then took the ship back to China, they were held to have been guilty of piracy jure gentium. But the piracy was held not to be an offense against the law of China within the meaning of the ordinance. If they committed an act against the municipal law of any nation, it was against that of France; and if they were punishable by the law of China, it was only because they had committed an act of piracy, which jure gentium is justiciable everywhere.

One of these coolies, who had taken refuge at Hong Kong, had been imprisoned with a view to being surrendered to the Chinese government on the ground of his having feloniously seized the ship at sea and murdered some of the crew, and had been brought up on a writ of habeas corpus, and discharged by the chief justice of Hong Kong. Thereupon he was again arrested upon a warrant for piracy jure gentium. On being brought up again on a writ of habeas corpus, he was again discharged by the chief justice, on the ground

that he had been committed a second time for the same offense, contrary to the 6th section of the Habeas Corpus Act. On appeal it was held, by the judicial committee, that the first order of discharge should be upheld, but that the second order of discharge should be reversed. Attorney-General for the colony of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, L. R., 5 P. C. 179.

INSURANCE (MARINE).

L., an agent of B., insured some goods belonging to B. that were being sent by ship from Montreal to St. John's, Newfoundland. The insurance company's agent issued to L. a "certificate of insurance," which stated that L. had insured the goods. It was the custom of the company to issue subsequently a policy stating that "X. Y., as well in his own name as in the name of every person to whom the same shall appertain," had insured the goods. On a loss occurring, it was held (reversing the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, Lower Canada), that the omission in the certificate of the words "as well as in his own name," etc., did not, either by the Canadian law or by the English law, preclude B. from suing the insurance company in his own name.

Where goods are insured for a voyage, the time of the loss occurring is not necessarily the time when the peril is encountered and the vessel driven ashore.

A ship, with some flour as part of her cargo, was seen in the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the 22d day of November, 1867, and nothing more was heard of her until May, 1868, when she was found ashore at Anticosti, all hands having been lost. On the 29th of November, 1867, a violent storm had commenced in the Gulf, and there was strong probability that the ship was capsized and driven ashore in that gale. Part of the flour insured was subsequently saved and sold by an agent of the insurance company. The action to recover on the policy was not brought until March, 1869. The policy containing a proviso that no action should be brought on it unless within a year after the loss was incurred, the insurance company contended that the assured was too late to bring an action:

Held, that the loss was not in its inception total, and only became so when it was found that it was impossible to carry the flour to its destination, and that it was necessary to sell it. Consequently the assured was not precluded by lapse of time from bringing his action. Browning v. Provincial Insurance Company of Canada, L. R., 5 P. C. 263.

PRINCIPAL.

The rule that an undisclosed principal may sue and be sued upon mercantile contracts made by an agent in his own name, subject to any defenses or equities which without notice may exist against the agent, is applicable to policies of marine insurance under the Canadian as well as under the English law. Browning v. Provincial Insurance Company of Canada, L. R., 5 C. P. 263.

SALVAGE.

Life salvage: persons belonging to ship in distress: the merchant shipping act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 458). A steam vessel incurred serious damage by a collision, and her master ordered her boats to be got out. Some of her crew, without leave from the master, got into one of the boats and rowed away. The boat's crew were afterward picked up at sea, and rescued from a position of danger, by a smack. In a salvage suit instituted on behalf of the owners and crew of the smack against the steamship; held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover in such suit salvage for the

SHERIFF.

Action for false return of nulla bona: no seizure: prior writs fraudulent.-In an action against the sheriff for a false return of nulla bona to plaintiff's writ of fi. fa. for £125, it appeared that the defendant had not levied at all. There were goods of the execution debtor of the value of £50, upon which he might have levied. There were two writs of fi. fa. against the execution debtor for more than £50, lodged with the sheriff prior to the plaintiff's writ; but these prior writs were proved to be fraudulent as against creditors; the sheriff had, however, no information as to this. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the £50; that it was the sheriff's duty to have levied, and the plaintiff might then have disputed the validity of the prior writs, and so obtained the proceeds of the levy. Dennis v. Whetham, L. R., 9 Q. B. 345.

SHIPS AND SHIPPING.

1. Plaintiff's ship with a general cargo sailed from London for Havre with some petroleum on board. Under the bill of lading the plaintiff was to deliver the petroleum at Havre, and it was to be taken out by the defendant within twenty-four hours after arriving at Havre, or ten guineas a day was to be paid for demurrage. On the ships arriving at Havre, the authorities of the port made the captain take her away in consequence of the petroleum being on board. Thereupon he went to neighboring ports, but was not allowed to stay there. Returning to Havre, he discharged his general cargo, and no bill of lading having been presented to him, and no application having been made to him for the delivery of the petroleum, he brought it back to London. On the shipowner claiming freight, back-freight, demurrage and expenses, it was held, that he was entitled to freight, back-freight, and expenses. Freight is earned by the carriage and arrival of the goods ready to be delivered to the merchant. And although the petroleum could not be landed at Havre, it was in the port a reasonable time, during which the owner might have received it; and the freight was accordingly earned.

In a case where no application for delivery is made, the captain may land and warehouse the cargo at the expense of the merchant; and where that is forbidden by the authorities of the port, he is not justified in destroying the cargo; but in the absence of advices he may take it to such a place as in his judgment is most convenient for the merchant, and may charge to the merchant all expenses properly incurred; consequently, here the ship owner was entitled to back-freight and expenses. The demurrage and the expenses incurred in the ineffectual attempt to land at the neighboring ports were not allowed, but were looked on as part of the expenses of the voyage. Simpson v. Blues, L. R., 7 C. P. 290, disapproved of. Cargo ex "Argos," L. R., 5 C. P. 134.

2. An apprehension of capture founded on circumstances calculated to affect the mind of a master of ordinary courage, judgment and experience, will justify delay in the prosecution of a voyage; and a ship is not answerable in a suit under section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, for damage to cargo caused by such delay. Anderson v. Owners of "Sam Roman," L. R., 5 C. P. 301.

3. A vessel in tow during a thick fog, knowing that it was dangerous to proceed, did not order the tug to stop, and the vessel in consequence ran aground.

owners of the tug for damages, that the vessel in tow contributed to the accident. Smith v. St. Lawrence Tow-boat Company, L. R., 5 C. P. 308.

4. A steamship seeing a sailing-vessel at a distance of two or three miles ought not, even if the lights of the sailing-vessel are not visible, to take a course which will carry her across the bows of the sailing-vessel.

In a case of collision, even if the light of one vessel was invisible, the vessel will not on that account be held to have contributed to the collision, where the other vessel has pursued a course which of itself would suffice to produce the collision.

A maneuver made too late to affect the collision does not make the ship liable as having contributed to the collision, even if the maneuver was erroneous.

Where a steamship is approaching a sailing-ship, and does not kow what course the other ship is pursuing, it is her duty (whether the lights of the other vessel are visible or not) to take no decisive movement until she can ascertain it.

The law does not appoint any particular place at which the lights should be fixed, but they ought to be placed so as to be properly visible.

Semble, the fact that the lights of one ship are invisible to the other does not make the former ship contributory when the course pursued by the latter is not in itself prudent and judicious. The "Bougainville " and The "James C. Stevenson." Beal v. Marchais, L. R., 5 C. P. 316.

5. A vessel in port was moored to a buoy, the use of which was sanctioned by the authorities, and, a storm being expected, she also had her anchor ready to drop. The mooring buoy broke and the vessel drifted. She attempted to cast anchor, but was prevented by inevitable accident. She came into collision wifh another vessel which was properly moored. Held, that the first vessel had not contributed by negligence to the collision.

Where the master of a ship takes all such precautions as a man of ordinary prudence and skill, exercising reasonable foresight, would use to avert danger, his owners are not held responsible because he may have omitted some possible precaution which the event suggests that he might have resorted to.

When the authorities of a port permit vessels to moor, take in and discharge cargo at a certain buoy, it must be assumed that they sanction the use of the buoy and treat it as a proper and sufficient mooring place. Doward v. Lindsay. The "William Lindsay," L. R.

5 C. P. 338.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

HABEAS CORPUS.

Where a prisoner shows he is held under a judgment of a Federal court, made without authority of law, the Supreme Court will, by writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, look into the record, so far as to ascertain whether the fact alleged be true, and if it is found to be so, will discharge the prisoner. Ex parte Lange, 163.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. The act of congress of July 2, 1864, which says that there shall be no exclusion of any witness in civil actions, because he is a party to or interested in the issue tried, does not give capacity to a wife to testify

*From advanced sheets of 18 Wall.

in favor of her husband. Lucas v. Brooks, 436; and see Willett v. Fister, 91.

IMPLIED REPEAL OF STATUTES.

A proviso to an existing act, held to have been repealed by an act which "amended" the former act "by striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof, the following;" this "following" being in part an iteration of the words of the section amended, and in part new enactments. Steamboat Company v. The Collector, 478.

INSURANCE.

1. The use of the phrase "lost or not lost," is not necessary to make a marine policy retrospective. It is sufficient if it appear by the description of the risk and the subject-matter of the contract that the policy was intended to cover a previous loss, if one, unknown, existed. Insurance Company v. Folsom, 237.

2. Where a policy, following the exact language of the application, insured on the 1st of March, 1869, a vessel then at sea, "at and from the 1st day of January, 1869, at noon, until the 1st day of January, 1870, at noon," nothing being said in either policy or application as to "lost or not lost," nor about who was the master of the vessel, nor as to what voyage she was on: held, on a suit on the policy-and the company not having shown that the name of the master or the precise destination were material facts that the application had no tendency to show that the assured when he made the application did not communicate to the defendants all the material facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and answer truly all questions put to him in regard to those several matters. Ib.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

1. On an information under the ninth section of the Internal Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, which enacts that any person who shall issue any instrument, etc., for the payment of money, without the same being duly stamped, "with intent to evade the provisions of this act, shall forfeit and pay," etc., an intent to evade is of the essence of the offense, and no judgment can be entered on a special verdict which, finding other things, does not find such intent. United States v. Buzzo, 125.

2. Under the ninth section of the act of July 13, 1866, laying on the owners of steamboats a tax of "2% per cent of the gross receipts from passengers," the owners of a night-boat which receives a certain sum for the mere passage of persons (that is to say, for their barely being on the boat during its transit), and also a certain sum for the use of berths and state-rooms (which berths and state-rooms it was not obligatory on the passengers to take, or pay for), is chargeable with 2% per centum on the latter sort of receipts as well as on the former. Steamboat Company v. The Collector, 478.

3. The proviso in the fourth section of the act of March 3, 1865, exempting a certain class of steamboats from a tax of 2% per cent, which was laid on all steamboats by the one hundred and third section of the act of June 30, 1864, fell by the enactment of the ninth section of the act of July 13, 1866. Ib.

4. Under the twentieth section of the Internal Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, as amended by the ninth section of the act of July 13, 1866, it is not necessary that an assessor, in making a reassessment for deficiencies, should make his reassessment coincide, month by month, in the terms which it covers, with the monthly returns of the manufacturer; that is to say,

it is not requisite that he should make a separate specification of deficiency for each defective return. Dandelet v. Smith, 642.

5. Nor, under the terms of the act of 1866, when the reassessment was made within fifteen months from the passage of the act, was it necessary that the reassessment should have reference only to returns made within fifteen months prior to the reassessment. Ib.

6. Nor, under the act of March 2, 1867 (conceding that since the act of 1866 brewers are taxable, in the first instance, by stamps per barrel, and not on monthly returns), would a reassessment for deficiency be void, even though it had been made out on the principle of an assessment for false returns, under the previous act of July 13, 1866. Ib.

INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE.

The word "from" excludes the day of date. Best v. Polk, 112.

JUDICIAL COMITY.

1. Where, in suits brought in a State court to settle an alleged copartnership between the plaintiffs and a deceased partner, the Supreme Court of the State decided that there had been no sufficient service on an infant defendant who had succeeded to an undivided interest in the property of the deceased partner, and consequently that the lower court had had no authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for such infant, and therefore reversed a decree directing a sale of the property of the deceased, such adjudication is the law of the case, and is binding upon the Circuit Court of the United States in an action brought by a grantee of the heirs of the deceased against a purchaser at a sale under such decree. Galpin v. Page, 350.

1. Where special powers conferred upon a court of general jurisdiction are brought into action in a special manner, not according to the course of the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its ordinary jurisdiction upon the performance of prescribed conditions, a presumption of jurisdiction will not attend the judgment of the court. The facts essential to the exercise of the special jurisdiction must appear in such cases upon the record. Galpin v. Page, 351.

I. Of the Supreme Court of the United States. (a) It Has jurisdiction

1. Where a prisoner shows that he is held under a judgment of a Federal court made without authority of law, by writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to look into the record so far as to ascertain that fact, and if it is found to be so to discharge the prisoner. Ex parte Lange, 163.

(b) It has NOT jurisdiction

2. As of a "final judgment," or as of a "final decree," of any judgment or of any decree which does not terminate the litigation between the parties. Hence it has not jurisdiction of a judgment or decree reversing the judgment or decree of an inferior court, and remanding the cause for such other and further pro

ceedings as to law and justice shall appertain. A writ of error and an appeal to such a judgment and such an appeal dismissed. St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 628; Moore v. Robbins, 588.

II. Of the Circuit Courts of the United States.

3. A case in which the plaintiff is a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and two of the defendants are citizens of other States, a third defendant being a citizen of the same State as the plaintiff, is not removable to the Circuit Court of the United States under the act of March 2d, 1867, upon the petition of the two foreign defendants. Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 553.

III. Of the District Courts of the United States.

4. When acting as a court of admiralty they can obtain jurisdiction to proceed in personam against an inhabitant of the United States not residing within the district (within which terms a corporation incorporated by a State not within the district is meant to be included), by attachment of the goods or property of such inhabitant found within the district. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Company, 272.

LACHES.

The general doctrines of courts of equity concerning lapse of time, laches, and stale claims, will protect the executors of a trustee sued after his death for matters growing out of his trust which occurred forty years before suit brought, which were known to the ancestor under whom the plaintiffs claim for over twenty years before his death, and where the suit is brought by those heirs fourteen years after his death, and two years after the death of the trustee, and where no person connected with the transaction complained of remains alive. Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 493.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

A person in possession of land who takes a lease from another who has bought and claims the land leased, is estopped from denying the title of such other person, or showing that such person was but trustee of the land for him. Lucas v. Brooks, 436.

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

1. A writing bearing even date with a paper having the form of and purporting to be the last will and testament of the party, and disposing clearly and absolutely of all his estate, which writing refers to the paper as the party's "will" and speaks of itself as "a letter" written for the information and government of the executors, so far only as they see fit to carry out the testator's present views and wishes,-has no testamentary obligation, even though it direct the persons to whom it is written to allow such and such persons to have specific benefits named in specific items of property. Lucas v. Brooks, 436.

2. Comments on the worthlessness of rules of decision and of decided cases on the construction of wills, when the question is on the point whether an estate in fee is devised or only a life estate with a vested remainder. Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 493.

LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS.

1. Those implied in support of the judgments of superior courts of general jurisdiction, only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts, concerning which the record is silent. Galpin v. Page, 351.

2. And they are limited to jurisdiction over persons within their territorial limits, and over proceedings which are in accordance with the course of the common law. Ib.

"MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES." 1. This expression as used in the act of March 3, 1849, "to provide for payment of horses or other property lost or destroyed" in, does not include the case of a contractor with the government transporting from port to port, remote from any seat of war. Stuart v. United States, 84.

2. The said act, giving compensation for "damage sustained by the capture or destruction by an enemy," a petition by a contractor for transportation of military supplies, to the Court of Claims for compensation, which represented that the party transporting was "attacked by a band of hostile Indians" was held not sufficiently full and specific, the government not being at the time at war with the Indians. Ib.

MOOT CASES.

No opinion will be given on cases devised to obtain an opinion from the Supreme Court upon a state of facts not really existing. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 129.

NATIONAL BANKS.

1. Organized under the National Banking Act of June 3, 1864, cannot, even by provisions framed with a direct view to that effect in its articles of association and by direct by-laws, acquire a lien on its own stock held by persons who are its debtors. Bullard v. Bank, 589.

2. A by-law giving to a bank a lien on stock of its debtors is not "a regulation of the business of the bank, or a regulation for the conduct of its affairs," within the meaning of the said act, and, therefore, not such a regulation as under the said act national banks have a right to make. Ib.

3. Under the thirtieth section of the said act, national banks may take the rate of interest allowed by the State to natural persons generally, and a higher rate, if State banks of issue are authorized by the laws of the State to take it. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 409.

NEMO BIS DEBET PUNIRI, ETC.

This maxim applied in the case of a court which, by one sentence, imposed fine and imprisonment (under a statute authorizing fine or imprisonment), and at the same term of the court modified the judgment by imposing imprisonment instead of the former sentence. The second judgment held void. Ex parte Lange, 163.

NEW YORK.

1. A violation of trust growing out of a mistaken construction of a will by the executors, unaccompanied by fraudulent intent, is within the ten years statute of limitation of the State of New York concerning actions for relief in cases of trust not cognizable by courts of law. Clarke v. Boorman's Executors, 493.

2. The court expresses itself as inclined to the opinion that such a case is not within the protection of the statute which allows bills for relief on the ground of fraud, to be filed within six years after the discovery of the fraud. Ib.

3. Where the party interested in his life-time had notice of the facts which constituted the ground of fraud alleged in the bill, and for eight years that he lived after the cause of action accrued to him, with notice of his rights and of the whole transaction, brought no suit nor set up any claim, his heirs are not entitled to the benefit of this exemption from the bar of the statute on the ground of recent discovery of the fraud. Ib.