Mrs. Lockwood will try to get around it, by showing that the law of husband and wife has been sadly demoralized since the day when the amiable Lord Coke published to the world that absurd solecism in legal physiology," Vir et uxor sunt quasi unica persona, quia cor unum et sanguis unus."

SUPREME COURT REPORTING.

When, in October last was commenced a series of reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, which seemed to answer the essential requirements of the profession, it was hoped that the subject of Supreme Court reporting was put at rest, until the legislature should make provision for placing the matter in the hands of the justices; but M. T. Hun, who claims to be the "official reporter," inspired by an ambition to "relieve the court and the profession," has opened the subject by commencing still another series. We have delayed noticing the matter, until the new off-spring had progressed far enough to enable us to form a judgment as to its character and pretensions.

The history of Supreme Court reporting in this State during the last four years is briefly told. Prior to 1869 it was carried on entirely as a private enterprise. There were, and had been for years, three series, Barbour's, Howard's and Abbott's, but neither series presented any thing like a systematic or complete collection of the decisions of the court or even the more important of them. Each reporter gave what he could get from judges and counsel, and very frequently all of them gave the same case. This duplication and triplication swelled the number of volumes, and became a serious burden to the profession.

In 1869 the legislature, with the intent of remedying the evil, passed an act providing for the appointment of a Supreme Court reporter; but instead of placing the appointing power where it properly belonged, in the hands of the judges, it was given to the governor, the secretary of state and the attorneygeneral.

This act provided that the reporter should issue not to exceed three volumes a year, at a price not to exceed $2.50 for a volume of not less than five hundred pages.

Under this act, Mr. Lansing was appointed in 1869, and commenced a fourth series. The result was that the act only aggravated the evil instead of remedying it. Instead of inaugurating a system which would bring to him all the decisions of the court, and so enable him to give such a collection as should satisfy the requirements of the bar, he adopted the method of his contemporaries and contented himself with reporting such cases as he chanced to get.

By the constitutional amendment of 1869, the legislature was directed to make provision for the appointment of a Supreme Court reporter by the justices

assigned to hold general terms. At a convention of the judges subsequently held, the governor was asked to call the attention of the legislature to this provision and to request the necessary legislation for carrying it into effect. This the governor did, and a bill was introduced to that end. Now it so happened that one of the publishers of Lansing's reports was at the time a member of the senate, and exerted his influence successfully in defeating action on the bill. Similar bills were introduced at the succeeding sessions, and similarly defeated.

In the spring of last year, the New York Bar Association appointed a committee to investigate the subject of reporting in this State. That committee reported in May, but while it denounced the then existing series of reports, it recommended no plan for relief nor gave promise of any.

In October, 1873, Mr. John D. Parsons, Jr., of this city, issued the first part of a series denominated the New York "Supreme Court Reports." The publisher announced that the series would be issued in monthly parts, and would contain a report of all cases decided at General Term, and in which opinions were delivered, and that to accomplish this end, he had consulted the judges, had secured their approval of his plan, and had made all necessary arrangements to secure copies of all opinions delivered. The series began with the cases decided in June, 1873, and the publisher has kept his promise to the letter for aught we have ever heard to the contrary.

It shortly appeared, however, that the committee of the Bar Association had a plan of its own, under which it desired to do the reporting. In December this plan was announced, but it was so obviously impracticable and cumbersome that it was received without favor. The "Supreme Court Reports" were received with favor, and so rapidly did they cut down the subscription lists of the other series, that in the early part of January the series of Mr. Barbour was discontinued and Mr. Lansing resigned. Mr. M. T. Hun was appointed to fill the vacancy created by Mr. Lansing's resignation, but neither the resignation of the one nor the appointment of the other was at the time known to any one save the little coterie in interest. They were, as it were, concurrent actsparts of the same plan, and brought about by the same diplomatist.

Mr. Hun first endeavored to induce the justices of the General Terms to pass an order requiring counsel to file extra cases and points for his use. He succeeded in the first department, but failed in the others. He then prepared and caused to be introduced into the legislature, a bill requiring counsel to file extra cases and points for his benefit, and directing the judges to send him copies of opinions. He was compelled, however, to abandon this project. About the first of February, two bills were introduced providing for the appointment of a reporter by the judges

one prepared by Mr. Hun, and the other

merit as a reporter. Unless he could improve upon existing series he was not justified in beginning another.

The second ground is more solid. If Mr. Hun can publish the same matter, and as well prepared, in a volume for the price of $2.50, that Mr. Parsons published for $5.00, then Mr. Hun's series ought, and undoubtedly will, succeed. This he cannot do without a positive loss to the publisher, unless his book should reach a circulation never yet attained in this State by a series of Supreme Court reports. The Court of Appeals reports can be sold at $2.50 with a profit to the publisher, because, 1st, the reporter's salary is paid by the State; 2d, there is no expense attending the getting of the opinions; 3d, the edition is very large, and 4th, the volumes are not so large-that is, do not contain nearly so much matter as the "New York Supreme Court Reports." The cost of procuring copies of opinions for a volume of the "Supreme Court Reports" and the editing thereof exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars; while the cost of composition, stereotyping, printing, paper and binding exceeds considerably double that sum. Supposing the edition to be 2,000 copies—a circulation which no series of reports of the Supreme Court has ever reached in this State, and the price to be $2.50, the publisher would lose on each volume at least a thousand dollars. Publishers are not such philanthropic and disinterested individuals that they are likely to continue such an affair long unless they have some ulterior object in view.

The fact that Messrs. Banks and Hun have begun a volume that they promise “to subscribers " for $2.50 is, of itself, nothing. The publishers concede, we are told, that they will lose money by it, but they are willing to lose now in the hope that they can crowd out the other series and have the field to themselves. In such an event either the size of the volume would be decreased or the price increased. This we state, of course, only as a probability. Indeed, we have occasion to know that the promise as to the price is not, in all cases, kept even now, as we were required to pay $2.50 for the first part, containing only a fraction of the volume.

CURRENT TOPICS.

The recent judicial changes in New Hampshire, which resulted in displacing Judges Doe, Sargent and Smith from their positions in the highest court of the State, were, to say the least, of doubtful expediency and propriety. If political reasons governed in making the change, as has been stated, the act is positively disgraceful to the dominant party in New Hampshire. We have always deprecated any attempt at making political qualifications a criterion in the selection of judicial functionaries. And it is especially deplorable in our view to make political considerations alone an excuse for the removal of

His

judges whose ability, learning and integrity are beyond question, and unsurpassed. Without disparagement, it may be said that Judge Doe is one of the most learned and indefatigable jurists who have adorned the bench of this country for many years. opinions exhibit the utmost research and elaboration, and his work showed him to be wedded to a purely judicial life. His removal is a loss not only to the judiciary of New Hampshire, but to American jurisprudence.

The subject of neutral rights at sea, which has become more than usually interesting at present in Europe, and which was brought home to us with exceeding vigor in the case of the Virginius, is a subject which is always likely to be troublesome. A writer in Berlin, Germany, thus sets forth some of the reasons for the peculiar difficulties attending the adjustment of neutral rights. He says: "War on land is confined, according to international laws, to the territorial dominions of the combatants. In a war at sea the waters surrounding the dominions of the combatants and the open sea itself are the scenes of action, and even the ships of the combatants are not prevented from entering neutral waters. Indeed, the greatest part of the ocean is placed at the disposal of the nations at war. It is evident that from these circumstances a series of peculiar relations of the combatants in a war at sea to the neutral powers have arisen, and likewise that many curious customs and usages under such circumstances are still in vogue." It is not unlikely that neutral rules will be the great bane of contention in any effort to codify international law.

Whatever may be said of the propriety of Senator Conkling acting as counsel in behalf of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad in the celebrated tax case, the language which he used in court in defending himself from the imputations of the nonprofessional press is, on general grounds, worthy of The Senator said: attention and commendation. "In England, a barrister offered a retainer who should refuse it or throw up the case for fear that obloquy might fall on him for doing his duty, would forfeit his prestige and standing as a member of the bar. If the retainer were against the crown, and he should falter, he would be held in meaner estimation than if he refused to appear against the humblest peasant in all the realm. The memorable language of Lord Brougham, on the trial of Queen Caroline, was only a passionate outpouring of this chivalric sentiment. In this country the morale of the profession in this respect has not yet reached the standard which has long been maintained in Westminster hall; but I would hold myself unworthy a place on the rolls if, being asked to argue a case involving a great sum of money, the reputations of many and the interests of many more, and involving also grave

questions of law, I should shrink from standing at the bar of the country and vindicating, as best I could, the constitution, the law and the right, even for an unpopular or hated client, because political opponents or slanderers might defame me for doing it. I give my gage that if the time shall ever come, politics or no politics, when I am afraid to brave such dangers afraid to hew to the line of professional integrity and fidelity, let the chips fly where they may, I will confess myself unworthy to stand before a court- unworthy membership of the bar-unworthy the association of men who place truth and honor above the passionate discords, the groveling resentments or the acclamations of the hour."

A brief report of the proceedings of the American Social Science Association, at its general meeting for 1874, has reached us. We look in vain for any important contributions to legal science, if we except the paper of Dr. Woolsey on "The Exemption from Capture of Private Property upon the Sea." One would infer that the department of jurisprudence is either not well filled by the association, or else the intimate relations and inter-dependence of jurisprudence and sociology are not sufficiently appreciated by the association. But in the committee for the department of jurisprudence we notice such names as J. B. Thayer, Emory Washburn and O. W. Holmes, Jr. men whose attainments and sympathies amply qualify them for tracing out the social relations of law, and for devising schemes of law reform. us hope that another year will witness greater activity in the jurisprudence-department of the association.

Let

The association for the reform and codification of international law, established last year in Brussels, will hold its second annual meeting at the Hôtel de Ville, Geneva, on September 7. It is expected that the conference will be attended by many eminent publicists of Europe and America. The Law Magazine and Review says: The English bar will likewise be represented. Sir Vernon Harcourt, Mr. Hinde Palmer, Mr. Osborne Morgan, Sergeant Simon, and others have been invited to attend. Mr. Thomas

Webster will read a paper on Property in Intellectual Labor; Mr. H. D. Jencken, the general secretary of the association, has agreed to bring forward in a treatise he has prepared, the very important question of 'The International Laws regulating Negotiable Securities,' including bonds and shares. Professor Amos and Professor Leone Levi will also, it is hoped, be present, and contribute their share to the valuable matters to be considered at the conference."

water, having embarked in a small iron boat at Elmira, N. Y. While passing through the Conewago Rapids, about fourteen miles below Harrisburg, he and his son were drowned. Col. Fisher was the first Commissioner of Patents under President Grant's administration, and was considered one of the ablest of our patent lawyers. He was the editor of "Fisher's Reports," consisting of several volumes of cases arising under letters patent for inventions, determined in the circuit courts of the United States.

NOTES OF CASES.

In N. Y. Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Flynn, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that in an action to recover possession of personal property in case a return cannot be had, the prevailing party is entitled to the value of the property at the time of the trial, and not at any intermediate time between the taking and the trial. This decision may be regarded as settling the vexed question in New York, which has been agitated ever since Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Caines' Cas. 200, as to what is the true measure of damages in case of a conversion. In Baker v. Drake, 8 A. L. J. 340, the N. Y. Court of Appeals decided that in an action to recover damages for a wrongful conversion of stocks, the measure of damages was not the highest market value which the stocks had reached between the time of the conversion and the trial. The court in that case gave a very elaborate examination of the authorities, and overruled all cases in New York State holding a contrary doctrine; but the decision was a negative one, and did not state what the measure of damages actually was. In N. Y. Guaranty and Indemnity Co. v. Flynn, supra, the measure of damages was positively decided. Whether the rule finally adopted by this court is the most reasonable or logical one, may be open to consideration. And it seems to us that a better rule would be the value which the owner of the property converted might have (probably) realized at any time between the conversion and the trial, had no conversion taken place. This, of course, would not necessarily be the highest value; for the owner might not avail himself of the highest price. But the value would be such as the owner might reasonably be expected to have realized, had the property remained in his possession at any time before trial. This would be for the jury to determine. this rule, but we think it not impracticable. There may be some difficulties in the application of

There are some recent cases in other States that hold the measure of damages to be the value at the time of conversion, with interest to the time of trial. See Sturges v. Keith, 11 Am. Rep. 28; 57 Ill. 451; Boylan v. Huguet, 8 Nev. 345. For an able and exhaustive discussion of this subject, see Sedgwick on Damages, 6th ed., 590, 609, note entitled "Rule of intermediate higher value."

In Sloan v. Holliday, 30 L. T. N.S. 757, the Court of Queen's Bench decided an interesting question in the law of easements. This was an action for trespass over plaintiff's yard at the back of defendant's house, and it appeared that for upwards of twenty years, during which defendant had occupied his house as a dwelling-house, he had possessed a right of way across the yard to his back-door for himself and his friends. During the last two years defendant had opened a small shop in one room of his house, and a few customers had crossed the yard for the purpose of going to the shop by the back door. Held, that this was not such an alteration in the dominant tenement, as constituted an excess of defendant's user of his right of way. The judges in their opinions desired to say that they confined themselves strictly to the circumstances; but Blackburn, J., made the remark, in the course of his opinion, that "when the user is limited to the right of persons going to the house the number of persons would not constitute an excess.”

In Barnaby v. Earle, 30 L. T. N. S. 760, the Court of Queen's Bench adjudicated an important point which is pertinent under the New York Code of Procedure. A bond for the payment to plaintiff of the sum for which he had obtained a verdict "if the determination of the action should be in favor of the plaintiff" was given by the defendant and others. A rule was afterward obtained to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff, which rule was afterward discharged. Thereupon, on November 15, 1870, defendant gave notice of appeal but bail was not put in as required by law; and no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal. On April 9, 1872, plaintiff having brought an action on the bond, the defendant pleaded that the former action was undetermined in favor of plaintiff. Held, that as there was, at the commencement of the present action, a judgment in favor of plaintiff and no stay of execution thereon, such a state of things amounted to a "determination" of the former action in favor of plaintiff within the meaning of the condition of the bond. Quain, J., who delivered the opinion, said: "Had the defendant, by putting in bail or otherwise, obtained a stay of execution on the judgment, we are disposed to think that then, though there would still have been a valid judgment in favor of the plaintiff, there would not have been such a determination of the action in his favor as is contemplated by the condition of the bond. But where, as in this case, the plaintiff has obtained a judgment in his favor, and is in a condition to enforce it by execution, the action, as far as he is concerned, may be properly said to be determined in his favor."

The Circuit Court in Chicago has given a decision in the famous ecclesiastical case of Bishop Whitehouse v. Rev. Mr. Cheney, holding that Mr. Cheney was never legally deposed from the ministry, and therefore dismissing the bill brought to restrain him from preaching in Christ Church, Chicago.

RATIONAL LAW-MAKING.

Among the recommendations contained in the recently published Report of the Select Committee on Public Departments is one to the effect that the Statutes of the Realm should in future be printed in a form which will admit of the volume comprising the year's legislation being sold at about five shillings. The committee thinks that the issue of Acts of Parliament in a cheap form is a matter of great public importance, since it would furnish to all classes an opportunity of informing themselves upon the laws which they are expected to obey. As the recommendation stands, the discrepancy between the end proposed and the means suggested for its attainment is very considerable. The publication of the statutes at the rate of five shillings a volume might be valuable as an indication of the disposition of the Government to make its subjects acquainted with the laws under which they live, but this is about all that can be said in its favor. Very few persons would care to pick out the provisions which specially affect them from the ponderous volume which contain the annual results of Parliamentary wisdom. The mere table of contents would throw most unlearned readers into hopeless confusion; and if any person more persevering than the search of, he would eventually be confounded by the rest succeeded in getting hold of the statute he was in

technical language and the frequent references to other acts not contained in the same volume. It may be questioned whether the authors of this recommendation are themselves in the habit of studying the laws which they assist in passing. At the same time the object which the committee has in view is one of real importance. In England, punishment is in too many cases the principal machinery for diffusing a knowledge of law. Certain acts are forbidden, and certain acts are enjoined, but a great part of the community only discovers what these acts severally are, by suffering, or seeing others suffer, for doing or not doing

them. The criminal class, indeed, learns to distinguish between the offenses which involve penal servitude and those which are let off with imprisonment; but there is a much larger class which lives in almost total ignorance of the laws which are supposed to govern its conduct, and by consequence furnishes many unintentional recruits to the criminal class.

There must be a considerable number of offenses which would never have been committed if the offender had clearly taken in beforehand that he was bringing himself within the grasp of the law. If even a few persons can be kept from breaking the law by being made more familiar with its provisions, it will clearly be a cheaper process than giving them

an experimental acquaintance with the penalties which they incur by their ignorance. Besides this, a better knowledge of what the law commands or forbids might sometimes save people from making blunders which, as regard results, may not be less disastrous than actual crimes. There

is a good deal of ignorant wrong-dealing - with trust property for example-which is not fraudulent, but yet produce as much misery as though it were fraudulent. If the principles of the laws affecting trustees were better known most of this might be avoided, and they would better know if the laws themselves could be had in a cheaper and more intelligible shape. Trustees would then contract a habit of looking at the law before dealing with the funds under their care, and the existence of greater facilities