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Opinion of the Court.

v. Rockwell, 128 N. Y. 334, as authorities for that proposition. We think the learned court took too narrow a view of the statute of 1885. This statute, though in some aspects a curative law, is primarily and essentially much more; it is a statute of limitation. It was distinctly held to be such in two decisions of this court, People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227; Same v. Same, 145 N. Y. 459, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90. A curative act in the ordinary sense of that term is a retrospective law, acting on past cases and existing rights. The power of the legislature to enact such laws is therefore confined within comparatively narrow limits, and they are usually passed to validate irregularities in legal proceedings, or to give effect to contracts between parties which might otherwise fall for failure to comply with technical legal requirements. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 454. A very full enumeration of the cases in which the legislature may properly exercise this power is to be found in Foster v. Foster, 129 Mass. 559. But there may be in legal proceedings defects which are not mere informalities or irregularities, but so vital in their character as to be beyond the help of retrospective legislation; such defects are called jurisdictional. This principle does not apply to a statute of limitations, for such a statute will bar any right, however high the source from which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is given a party to enforce his right. Terry v. Andrews, 95 U. S. 628; Turner v. New York, supra. Ensign v. Barse, supra, was strictly a case of a retrospective statute, for no period of time was given within which any party affected could assert his rights. The same is true of Cromwell v. McLain, 123 N. Y. 474. In Joslyn v. Rockwell, supra, as well as in the two cases of People v. Turner, all of which arose under the statute of 1885, there is to be found a discussion of defects which it was claimed were jurisdictional, and not cured by that act. Such discussion, however, is not to be construed as authority for the proposition that jurisdictional defects in legal proceedings which are beyond the scope of retrospective legislation will equally take a claim out of the bar of a statute of limitations. The existence of such defects was necessarily considered in the authorities cited, because the statute of 1885 in terms exempted from its operation cases where

Opinion of the Court.

the taxes had been paid, or where there was no legal right to assess the land on which they were laid. There is no exception, however, as to defects in notice of redemption or in their publication; on the contrary, it is expressly provided that the comptroller's deed, after the lapse of the requisite time, shall be conclusive evidence that 'all notices required by law to be given previous to the expiration of the two years allowed by law to redeem were regular and regularly given.""

These considerations dispose also of the other objections to the assessment and sale. If further comment be needed as to the insufficiency of the description, it may be brief. It is based on the possibility of there having been more or less land than 1215 acres covered by water. But whether there were depends upon a question of fact, and what the court found we are not informed by the record. Not insisting on that, however, the evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that the area covered was 1035 acres; the evidence of the defendant tended to show that the area was 1284 acres. Even if the court found the latter, the difference between it and the assessment did not make the description insufficient. A description of land for the purposes of taxation is sufficient if it affords the means of identification and does not positively mislead the owner. Cooley on Taxation, 407; Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 443.

The assessment was not of the land covered by water. That was an exception from a larger tract, and an error of a few acres in a part so completely defined by its character surely did not so impair the identity of the larger tract as to hide it from the search or knowledge of its owner, whether he was anxious or indifferent about his taxes.

The same comment can be made of the "1000 acres lying in the northwest corner of the northwest quarter" of the tract, whether we regard it as a parcel or an exception from another parcel. Jackson v. Vickory, 1 Wend. 407; Dolan v. Trelevan, 31 Wisconsin, 147; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Mississippi, 259; Doe ex dem. Hooper v. Clayton, 81 Alabama, 391.

The other assignments of error it is not necessary to specifically notice nor the defences of champerty and the alleged illegal organization of the plaintiff in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Statement of the Case.



No. 160. Submitted March 5, 1900.- Decided April 9, 1900.

There is no substantial difference between the Federal question in this case raised in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and that raised in it here. The act of Minnesota of March 2, 1881, c. 113, authorizing the consolidation of several railroad companies created a new corporation, upon which it conferred the franchises, exemptions and immunities of the constituent companies; but that did not include an exemption of stockholders in the old companies from the payment of corporate debts, or their liability to pay them.

In a State having a constitutional provision imposing liability on stockholders, if the legislature intended those of a new corporation created by it should be exempt, it would express the intention directly, and not commit it to disputable inference from provisions which apply by name to the corporation.

On the merits, this case presents the question of the liability of the individual plaintiffs in error upon a judgment which was recovered by one Revilo F. Parshall against the Minneapolis and St. Paul Railway Company, and assigned to the defendant in error.

A motion, however, is made to dismiss, on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction.

The Minnesota Western Railway was incorporated by the Territory of Minnesota, by an act of its legislature, approved March 3, 1853. The usual powers of a corporation were conferred, and the company was authorized to construct a railroad from and to certain points in the Territory.

Power was reserved to alter or amend the act. There was no provision fixing the liability of stockholders. The act was several times amended changing the route of the road in some particulars.

In 1858 the State of Minnesota was admitted into the Union, and its constitution contained the following provision: "Each

Statement of the Case.

stockholder in any corporation shall be liable to the amount of stock held or owned by him." Art. 10, sec. 3.

It was amended in 1872 so as to except the stockholders of corporations organized for carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business.

On February 4, 1870, the provision of the act of 1853, reserving the right to alter or amend the act was repealed.

After the passage of the act of 1870 the company changed its name to the Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company.

No steps were taken towards construction or acquiring any line of railroad until 1869. The actual construction was commenced during the fall of 1870, since which time the said company or the consolidated company, hereafter mentioned, has operated and maintained a line of railway in the State.

By an act approved March 2, 1881, in addition to other powers conferred, the Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company, and any other railway companies in the construction of whose lines it has aided, or whose lines were at the time held under lease by it, were authorized to consolidate. The act provided for the manner of consolidation, the name of the new corporation which might be "the name of either corporation party thereto or any other name "-the transfer of the properties of the old corporations, the retirement of their stock and the issue of new, and defined the purposes and powers of the new corporation. It is inserted in the margin.1

1 Chapter 113, Special Laws 1881, p. 651.

An act to amend an act entitled An act to amend an act entitled An act to incorporate the Minnesota Western Railroad Company, approved March third (3d,) one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, (1853,) and the acts amendatory thereof, approved February fourth, one thousand eight hundred and seventy (1870).

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota: SECTION 1. That the act entitled An act to amend an act entitled An act to incorporate the Minnesota Western Railroad Company, approved March third (3d), one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three (1853), and the acts amendatory thereof, approved February fourth (4th), one thousand eight hundred and seventy (1870), be amended by adding thereto the following sections, to wit:

SECTION EIGHT. The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company, formerly known as the Minnesota Western Railroad Company, in addition

Statement of the Case.

The consolidation was made as provided in the act by agreement between the Minneapolis Railway Company, the Minne

to the powers already conferred upon it by the laws of the Territory of Minnesota and of the State of Minnesota, is hereby authorized to make or acquire, from time to time, any extension of the lines of railway now owned and operated by it, or of those hereafter constructed and operated by it according to law, into the States of Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska and Wisconsin, and into the Territory of Dakota. or into one or more of the same. Provided, That authority shall exist or be given in or by the States or Territory into which its lines are so extended, to make or acquire and maintain such extensions.

SECTION NINE (9). The said Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company shall have power to acquire, from time to time, by lease or purchase, or exchange of stock or otherwise, any other railroad or railroads, whether within or without this State, whose lines connect with its own lines as they now exist or as they shall be extended, either directly or by means of intervening lines. Such acquisition shall be made upon such terms as shall be agreed upon by a contract in writing between the respective corporations. But the same shall not be consummated until first approved by two-thirds in amount of the stockholders of each such corporation, either given at a regular or called meeting of such stockholders, or by a consent expressed in writing. In either case a copy of such contract, together with the evidence of such consent of the stockholders, shall be filed in the office of the secretary of State.

SECTION TEN (10). It shall and may be lawful for the said Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company to merge and consolidate its capital, franchises and property with the capital stock, franchises and property of any other railroad company or companies organized under the laws of this State or under the laws of any other State or Territory of the United States, in the construction of whose lines the said Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company shall have aided, or whose lines of railway are or shall, at the time of such consolidation, be held under lease by the said Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company; Provided, That the lines of railway of the companies or corporations so consolidating shall form a continuous line of railway with each other, or by means of any intervening railway, bridge or ferry. But no such consolidation shall be made by the said company with any other railroad corporation, or the lessees, purchaser or manager of any railroad corporation owning or controlling a parallel or competing line.

Such consolidations shall be made under the conditions, provisions and restrictions and with the powers hereinafter mentioned and contained, that is to say:

First (1st). The directors of the company proposing to consolidate may enter into a joint agreement, under the corporate seal of each company, for the consolidation of said companies and railroads, which agreement shall prescribe the terms and conditions thereof, and the mode of carrying the

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