reversing the decree of the District Court and dismissing plaintiff's bill
should be affirmed. Bryar v. Campbell, 649.

SALARY.

The act of February 16, 1897, c. 235, for the relief of Commander Quacken-
bush enacted "that the provisions of law regulating appointments in
the Navy by promotion in the line, and limiting the number of com-
manders to be appointed in the United States naval service, are hereby
suspended for the purpose of this act only, and only so far as they affect
John N. Quackenbush; and the President of the United States is hereby
authorized, in the exercise of his discretion and judgment, to nominate
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint said
John N. Quackenbush, late a commander in the Navy of the United
States, to the same grade and rank of commander in the United States
Navy as of the date of August first, eighteen hundred and eighty-three,
and to place him on the retired list of the Navy, as of the date of
June first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five: Provided, That he shall
receive no pay or emoluments except from the date of such reappoint-
ment." Held, (1) That its only apparent office was to forbid the al-
lowance of pay or emoluments from August 1, 1883, by limiting such
allowance to the date of the reappointment, which, in that view, must
be regarded as the date of appointment under the act; (2) that it was
remedial in its character, and should be construed as ratifying prior
payments which the Government in its counter-claim was seeking to
recover back. Quackenbush v. United States, 20.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. The personal property of a citizen of and resident in one State, invested
in bonds and mortgages in another State, is subject to taxation in the
latter State; and the amount of the tax is a claim against the property
of the person taxed which is a debt that may, in case of death of the
person taxed, be proved against his estate in the State where the mort-
gages and loans are contracted, subject to the statutes of limitations
of the State. Bristol v. Washington County, 133.

2. Cars of the Union Refrigerator Transit Company, a corporation of Ken-
tucky, engaged in furnishing to shippers refrigerator cars for the trans-
portation of perishable freight, and which were employed in the State
of Utah for that purpose, were subject to taxation by that State.
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 149.

TREASURY WARRANTS.

1. The treasury warrants in question in this case cannot be said upon the
evidence to have violated the Constitution of the United States, or of
the State of Texas. Houston & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. Texas, 66.
2. A warrant, drawn by the authorities of a State in payment of an appro-
priation made by the legislature, payable upon presentation if there be
funds in the treasury, and issued to an individual in payment of a debt
of the State to him, cannot be properly called a bill of credit, or a treas-
ury warrant intended to circulate as money. Ib.

3. A deliberate intention on the part of a legislative body to violate the
organic law of the State under which it exists, and to which the mem-
bers have sworn obedience, is not to be lightly indulged; and it cannot
properly be held that the receipt of the warrants issued in pursuance
of legislative authority in Texas, and in payment of an indebtedness
due the State from the individual paying them, is an illegal transaction,
and amounts in law to no payment whatever. Ib.

VIRGINIA AND TENNESSEE BOUNDARY.

A decree is entered, ordering the appointment of commissioners to ascer-
tain, re-trace, re-mark and reëstablish the boundary line between the
States of Virginia and Tennessee, as established by the decree of this
court in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, but without authority to
run or establish any other or new line. Tennessee v. Virginia, 501.

WATER RIGHTS.
See CONTRACT, 10.

WILL.

Thomas W. Means died in 1890, leaving a large estate, and a will made
some ten years before his death, containing, among other provisions,
the following: "Item 4. I give, devise and bequeath all the residue
and remainder of my estate, personal, real and mixed, wherever situ-
ated or located, of which I shall die possessed, to be equally divided
among my four children, John Means, William Means, Mary A. Adams,
VOL. CLXXVII—46

66

and Margaret A. Means, and my grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson
(son and sole heir of my deceased daughter Sarah J. Culbertson) who
shall be living at the time of my decease, and the issue of any child
now living, and of said grandson, who may then have deceased, such
issue taking the share to which such child or grandson would be enti-
tled if living. But said share given, devised and bequeathed to said
grandson or his issue is to be held in trust as hereinafter provided,
and to be subject to the provisions hereinafter contained as to said
grandson's share. Item 5. I have made advances to my said chil-
dren which are charged to them respectively on my books, and I may
make further advances to them respectively, or to some of them, and
to my said grandson, which may be charged on my books to their re-
spective accounts. I desire the equal provision, herein made for said
children, and the provision for said grandson, to be a provision for
them respectively, in addition to said advances made and that may
hereafter be made, and that in the division, distribution and settle-
ment of my said estate, said advances made and that may hereafter be
made, be treated not as advances, but as gifts not in any manner to be
accounted for by my said children and grandson, or any of them or
the issue of any of them." He was in the habit of advancing money
to his children, the amounts advanced to each individually being en-
tered against him in the father's books. At the date of the will the
several amounts so advanced were as follows: John, $79,214.36; Wil-
liam, $58,409.54; Mrs. Adams, $51,207.48; Margaret, $39,120.78; Mrs.
Culbertson, $29,609.82. Subsequently, in 1898, William becoming in-
volved, the amount advanced to him was largely increased in manner
as set forth in the statement of the case and opinion of the court.
After the death of the father a claim was made that the money thus
paid out for William was to be held to be a part of his share of his
father's estate. Held, (1) that in the absence of some absolute and
controlling rule to the contrary, the intentions of a testator, as deduced
from the language of the will, construed in the light of the circum-
stances surrounding him at the date of its execution, always control
as to the disposition of the estate; (2) that the testator believed that
after he had done in his lifetime what, in his judgment, his children
severally required, there would be an abundance of his estate left for
distribution, and intended that all dealings between himself and each
of his children should be wiped out, and that what was left after hav-
ing discharged to each his paternal obligation should be distributed
equally. Adams v. Cowen, 471.

After the probate of his father's will, William gave to the administrators
of the estate with the will annexed, an acknowledgment of the receipt
from them of $136,035.75 in his own notes to his father as part of his
distributive share of his father's estate. At the time when this was
done he was in straitened circumstances, was broken in spirit and was
wavering in his purposes. Held, that while a man in the full posses-
sion of his faculties, and under no duress may give away his property,
and equity will not recall the gift, yet it looks with careful scrutiny
upon all transactions between trustee and beneficiary, and if it appears

that the trustee has taken advantage of the situation of the benefici-
ary, and has obtained from him, even for only the benefit of other
beneficiaries, large property without consideration, it will refuse to
uphold the transaction thus accomplished; and that the conclusions
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case must be sustained, and its
decree affirmed. Ib.