Bouton agt. City of Brooklyn and Briant. The court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had not been brought within two years from the entry of the order for final judgment in the Supreme Court. There were some terms, by way of costs, imposed upon the respondent, on granting this motion, having relation to a former motion to dismiss the appeal on other grounds. BOUTON agt. THE CITY OF BROOKLYN AND BRIANT. A court of law only provides a redress for a wrong actually sustained. A court of equity grants a preventive within certain limits. The Supreme Court, in which the functions of both are joined, can not extend its power beyond what was possessed by the one or the other previous to the junction of the two. No court of law or equity can directly annul the proceedings of an inferior tribunal of a municipal corporation, unless they are regularly brought before it upon a certiorari or other appropriate process, addressed to the subordinate body. This court will not, by the exercise of its powers in equity, even for the purpose of removing an alleged cloud upon title, review the proceedings of subordinate tribunals of municipal corporations. Some rules laid down for the construction of statutes. The 30th section of title 4 of the act passed April 4, 1850 (which act constitutes the present charter of the city of Brooklyn), provides that the expenses of constructing wells and pumps, public cisterns, lamp-posts and lamps, flagging side walks, of fencing and filling in lots, and all other improvements of a like nature, not before specified, are to be assessed by the street commissioner of the city. Held, that the assessment for grading a public park (Washington) comes within this clause. Kings County Special Term, 1852. The complaint states that by an act of the legislature of the state of New York, passed the 23d day of April 1835, a public square was laid out in what is called the seventh ward of the city of Brooklyn; that subsequently, by an act of the said legislature, passed April 25, 1845, the location of the said Washington park was changed to what is now called the eleventh ward in said city; and in and Bouton agt. City of Brooklyn and Briant. by said acts, the property taken for the said park was declared to be a public park; and the said Washington park was subsequently opened as a public park, pursuant to several acts of the said legislature, passed the 24th day of March 1848. The city of Brooklyn was authorized to create a loan for the payment of the amount necessary to be paid for the land and other matters connected with the said park, and the faith, property and effects of the said city of Brooklyn were pledged, in and by said acts, for the payment of said loan; that defendants, the City of Brooklyn, as such corporation, took the title and possession of said park; that some years after the said corporation had been seized of the title and became in the possession of the said park, they undertook and did enter into contracts for the regulating and improving said park, and did, as the plaintiff from information and belief charges, enter into contracts for the regulating and improving of said park to the amount of upwards of $34,000; and thereafter, without any color, license, or authority by law, proceeded to take proceedings for the purpose of assessing the said amount as a local assessment upon the several lots, pieces or parcels of land benefited thereby, in proportion to the benefit which, in the opinion of the street commissioner of the city of Brooklyn, the same shall derive from, or in justice ought to be assessed for the same; and claims that the defendants, the City of Brooklyn, had no right whatever, under any law of this state, to impose the said assessment upon the plaintiff's property, and the property. of said other persons, for the said grading and improving of Washington park; that the said defendants have, without any warrant or authority assessed the plaintiff and the said other persons, and have made the same a local assessment; whereas, by the law of the land, the said park is declared to be a public park, and the expense of grading and improving the same, should be a charge upon the whole city, and not upon any local district in said city; and enumerates other objections to the legality of the assessment; which, with the other facts of the case, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. The defendant Briant, is the collector of taxes and assessments of said city, and had levied upon property of the persons assessed. Bouton agt. City of Brooklyn and Briant. The complaint prays for an injunction, restraining the proceedings both of the city and the collector. The defendants demur to the complaint; and specify and assign the following causes of demurrer: That the complaint does not state facts which constitute a case for the equitable relief specifically sought, or for any other relief whatever in equity, or for damages in a court of law. That the facts stated do not show the proceedings of the defendants to have been either void or irregular. That the facts stated do not show a cloud upon the plaintiff's title, or any other grievance or injury suffered or apprehended, which is the subject of legal or equitable cognizance. And that said complaint, in these and other particulars, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants jointly or severally. A. CRIST, for Plaintiff. J. M. VAN COTT, for Defendants. S. B. STRONG, Justice. The assessment of which the plaintiff complains, was made by the street commissioner of the city of Brooklyn for grading Washington park. The plaintiff alleges that the charter of that city did not authorize such assessment, and asks that this court shall declare it to be null and void, and not a lien or incumbrance upon the property assessed; that the defendant Briant, who is the collector of the taxes and assessments of the city, may be perpetually enjoined from proceeding under the warrant to him to collect the amount of the assailed assessment, and that the city of Brooklyn may be required to pay the damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of such unauthorized proceedings. The first, and as I view the case, the most material question involved in this controversy is, whether the assessment was warranted by the statute; that the legislature has the power to provide for making and enforcing local assessments for local improvements has been decided, and in my opinion correctly decided, by the Court of Appeals. Several acts have been passed relative to Washington park. They all speak of it as a public improvement, and as public Bouton agt. City of Brooklyn and Briant. property. The corporation, therefore, holds it as trustees for a designated purpose, and have not the absolute and unqualified title to it, to dispose of it as they may think proper for general objects. It therefore comes within the range of subjects deemed by the legislature proper for local taxation, and the assessment for the expenses of its improvement is not brought within the objection. of taxing the property of one for the benefit of another, which, if well founded, would be fatal to its validity. The act of April 27, 1847, relative to Washington park (§8), authorized the city of Brooklyn to make any improvement on the park or square in connection with it, which they might deem proper. The act of March 24th, 1848, relative to the same park, provided for the payment of the expenses caused by any proceedings then had under the act of 1847, but has no reference to any future improvements. When the act of April 4th, 1850, to revise and amend the several acts relating to the city of Brooklyn, and which constitutes its existing charter was passed, there was no statute providing specially and separately for paying for future improvements to Washington park. The provisions of that act extended to that park as they purported to relate to all such establishments in the city, and they conferred all the power possessed by the corporation or any of its officers to make improvements upon it, or to provide for their payment. The first section of title 4, of that act, authorizes the common council to cause streets and avenues to be opened and widened, and to be regulated and paved, and to cause public squares and parks to be opened, regulated, ornamented and protected, and streets and avenues to be kept in repair, and from time to time to be repaved, or regraded and repaired; to close up and discontinue roads, streets, lanes and avenues; to provide that lamps and lamp-posts be erected, and cisterns made for the purpose of furnishing water in case of fire; to cause sewers and drains, wells and pumps, to be constructed and repaired, and generally to make such other improvements in and about such streets, avenues and squares, as the public convenience may require; and it provides that the expenses of all such improvements, except for repairs, shall be assessed, and be a lien upon the property benefited thereby, in proportion to the amount of such benefit. The third VOL. VII 26 Bouton agt. City of Brooklyn and Briant. section of the same title provides that the expenses for opening or widening streets, roads, avenues, parks, or squares, shall be estimated and assessed by three commissioners, to be appointed by the County Court or Supreme Court. The 22d and 23d sections of the same title provide that the expenses of regulating, grading and paving, and of regrading and repaving streets, and of constructing sewers and drains, shall be apportioned and assessed by one or more commissioners, to be appointed in like manner. By the 30th section of the same title, the expenses of constructing wells and pumps, public cisterns, lamp-posts and lamps, flagging side walks, of fencing and filling in lots, and all other improvements of a like nature, not before specified, are to be assessed by the street commissioner of the city. The authority to make the assessment in question is claimed under this 30th section. It was admitted on the argument, by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the power to grade this park was conferred upon the corporation by the first section of the fourth title of the act which I have quoted. If so, that section also directs that the expenses of such improvement shall be assessed, and be a lien on the property benefited thereby, in proportion to the amount of the benefit conferred. This, then, confers upon the corporation the power, and imposes upon them the duty of making an assessment to pay for such expenses. The question very naturally suggests itself, whether the legislature would have conferred such power and imposed such duty, without at the same time. providing the requisite means for performing the power and discharging the duty. That is not to be presumed. The inference is altogether the other way. Judge Jewett remarks, in Stief vs Heart (1 Comst. R. 30), that when a power is given by the statute, every thing necessary to making it effectual or requisite to obtaining the end, is implied. Probably the remark is too general. Where ordinary common law incidents are necessary to render a power effectual, they may undoubtedly be inferred, although not mentioned in the statute; but when such incidents do not go far enough, and no statutory means are provided to carry the power into effect, it must fail. Where, however, there are provisions in the statute, probably designed to give effect to |