share belonging to the deceased partner, to be ascertained on final settlement of accounts down to the time of his death. And the duty of winding up affairs devolves upon the surviving partners; for the representatives of the deceased have no power to act in the matter, and can neither sue nor be sued on account of partnership concerns. (a) 2. The insanity of a partner, though it does not of itself work a dissolution, will authorize a court of chancery to decree a dissolution. 3. If a single woman be a partner, her subsequent marriage will work a dissolution, because by marriage she loses the legal capacity of acting. 4. When the object of a partnership becomes utterly impracticable, a court of chancery will decree a dissolution. 5. A war between the different nations to which partners belong, works a dissolution, on the principle before stated, that a war between two nations disqualifies the citizens of those nations from holding intercourse with each other. 6. It has also been held that the voluntary transfer by one partner of all his interest to a third person amounts to a dissolution; since no partner can introduce a stranger into the concern. But this is an unreasonable rule, because it puts it in the power of a partner to dissolve at any time, against the will of the rest. The just rule would be to hold the transfer void. 7. A very strong case of imbecility, fraud, or misconduct in one of the partners, will induce a court of chancery to decree a dissolution. 8. Where a bankrupt law exists, the bankruptcy either of the whole concern or of one of the partners will effect a dissolution. And the same would be the result under our insolvent law, where an assignment is made to the commissioner. 9. Where one of the partners is an infant, he may dissolve the firm on becoming of age, as he may disaffirm any other contract. The result of a dissolution is, that the authority of each partner to bind the firm ceases, unless it be continued, by special agreement, for winding up the concern, (b) but all the existing liabilities continue; and if those who have before dealt with the firm are not specially notified of the dissolution, a dishonest partner may still involve the firm in new liabilities to them; (c) for as to them, a mere addeath, and in that case may limit the liability of his estate to the funds embarked in it. Burwell v. Mandeville, 2 How. 560.

(a) Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616; Marlatt v. Scantland, 19 Ark. 443; Budow v. Mutual Savings Inst. 28 Mo. 181. A sole surviving partner has the entire legal title to all the partnership assets. He has a right, acting honestly and with reasonable discretion and diligence, to dispose of them as he pleases, to settle all debts against the firm, to make any compromise he may deem necessary, and to turn the assets into an available and distributable form. Barry v. Briggs, 22 Mich. 201; Adams v. Ward, 26 Ark. 135. As to his powers and duties where instructed by the will of the deceased to carry on the business, and what disbursements will be allowed him, see Tillotson v. Tillotson, 34 Conn. 335.

(b) This must be limited to binding the firm in new business. After dissolution, neither partner can renew the firm notes, or incur any new responsibilities, without the consent of the others. Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; Bacon v. Hutchings, 5 Bush, 525; Montague v. Reakirt, 6 Bush, 323. But he may do whatever is necessary to collect debts due the partnership, and to adjust, settle, and pay its debts. Admissions by him as to the balance of account between the firm and persons dealing with it, are admissible to charge his partners. Feigley v. Whittaker, 22 Ohio St. 606. But see Thompson v. Bowman, 6 Wall. 316.

(c) Wardwell v. Haight, 2 Barb. 549; Hutchins v. Bank of Tennessee, 8 Humph.

vertisement of dissolution is not sufficient, unless it can be shown that they knew it. But as to all others, an advertisement is sufficient. When the dissolution is decreed by a court of chancery, a receiver is usually appointed to settle up the business. In all cases of a voluntary dissolution, a partner may insist upon a sale of the joint stock, for the purpose of settlement, unless a division can be agreed upon. The principles of settlement have already been stated.

The view now taken of the law of partnerships, though a mere synopsis, enables us to form an opinion upon the comparative advantages of the two kinds of associations, corporations, and partnerships; and we can hardly hesitate in giving the preference to corporations. Their ability to do all acts in the corporate name without specifying the members; their independence of the death or transfer of interest among the members; and the liability of the members only to the extent of their respective interests, are three points in which corporations have decidedly the advantage of partnerships. Yet in the common transactions of life, and more particularly in the commercial world, partnerships are deemed to answer all the purposes of association; and are much more numerous than corporations. Nor can you have failed to remark, that the law of partnership, as above explained, is pre-eminently liberal and just in its principles. Probably no branch of the law deserves a higher encomium for these qualities.

LECTURE XIV.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. (a)

§ 101. Condition of Females compared with Males. Having treated of the two principal business relations, we come now to 418; Pitcher v. Barrows, 17 Pick. 361. Merrit v. Pollys, 16 B. Monr. 355; Clapp v. Rogers, 2 Kernan, 283; Brown v. Clark, 14 Penn. State, 469; Pope v. Risley, 23 Mo. 185. Little v. Clark, 36 Penn. State, 114; Williamson v. Fox, 38 Penn. State, 214; Chamberlain v. Dow, 10 Mich. 319. Whether the publication of such a notice in a paper, shown to be taken by the plaintiff, is evidence from which notice to them may be inferred by the jury, is a question upon which the authorities are at variance. Treadwell v. Wells, 4 Cal. 260; Page v. Brant, 18 Ill. 37; Reilly v. Smith, 16 La. An. 31. It is not. Zoller v. Janvrin, 47 N. H. 324. But a dormant partner is not liable, after retirement, to a creditor who never knew he was a partner. Grosvenor v. Lloyd, 1 Met. 19; Davis v. Allen, 3 Comst. 168.

(a) On the subject of Husband and Wife, see 2 Kent, Com. lec. 26, 27, 28; 1 Black. Com. ch. 25; 1 Swift, ch. 5; Roper on Husband and Wife; Clancy on Husband and Wife: Bingham on Coverture; Poynter on Marriage and Divorce; Reeves's Domestic Relations; Bishop on Marriage and Divorce; Page on Divorce; Mansfield on the Rights of Married Women. Bright on Husband and Wife; Cord on the Rights of Married Women; Schouler's Domestic Relations; Bishop's Law of Married Women. Since the text was written, we have had some legislation in favor of the wife. By the act of 1846, with a legislative construction in 1847, the wife's

what are called the domestic relations. These are four; namely, husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, and master and servant, each of which will form the subject of one lecture. To say that the law which regulates these relations is of the highest practical interest, would be to assert a mere truism. Every person, whether lawyer or not, ought to be familiar with this part of the law. We have a few statutory provisions on the subject, but, for the most part, the law of husband and wife is common law, and you will find that it savors of its origin in all its leading features. The whole theory is a slavish one, compared even with the civil law. I do not hesitate to say, by way of arousing your attention to the subject, that the law of husband and wife, as you gather it from the books, is a disgrace to any civilized nation. I do not mean to say that females are degraded in point of fact; I only say that the theory of the law degrades them almost to the level of slaves. With regard to political rights, females form a positive exception to the general doctrine of equality. They have no part or lot in the formation or administration of government. They cannot vote, nor hold office. We require them to contribute their share in the way of taxes, to the support of government, but allow them no voice in its direction. We hold them amenable to the laws when made, but allow them no share in making them. This language, applied to males, would be the exact definition of political slavery ; applied to females, custom does not teach us so to regard it. Perhaps it would be difficult to deduce from any abstract reasoning, the justice of making this their political condition. But we know that it always has been what it now is, and there is no prospect of changing it; and probably the most refined and enlightened of that sex would be the last to desire a change which would involve them in the turmoil of politics. As to legal rights, the case is different. So long as a woman remains single in tlris country, her legal rights and capacities are not inferior to those of a man. I say in this country, for in England, the laws of inheritance give males altogether the advantage. With some trifling exceptions, the son or

realty, whether hers before marriage, or acquired after by devise, gift, inheritance, or purchase with her means, whether the legal title be in her or held in trust for her, cannot be subjected to the payment of the husband's debts; but she may unite with him in a valid conveyance. And the same is true with respect to any chose in action, demand, legacy, or bequest of the wife, unless so reduced to possession as to become his property; and also with respect to all furniture and household goods not provided by him. They are all exempted from liability for his debts during the life of the wife, and the heirs of her body. On the construction of this act, see Jenney v. Gray, 5 Ohio State, 45. Also, by the act of 1847, with respect to life insurances, the husband may insure his life for the benefit of his wife or children, and such insurance shall be exempt from liability for his debts, where the annual premium does not exceed $150; and when it does exceed that sum, a proportional part shall be so exempted. If she dies before him, the benefit enures to her children. Also, by the wills act of 1852, it is questionable whether, if there be no children, the husband can, by will, place his personalty beyond the reach of his widow, any more than dower, if she elects not to take under the will. This question is removed by an amendment to this act, passed March 10, 1860, declaring that if the widow does not elect to take under the will, she shall receive her dower and such share of the personalty as she would have been entitled to, had her husband died intestate leaving children.

brother takes all, to the entire disinheritance of the daughter or sister. The glaring injustice of this rule of inheritance, which prefers males to females, is so palpable, that we can claim little credit for having totally abolished it. If either sex is to be preferred, it certainly ought to be females, because they are least able to make their way in poverty through the world. But our law stops at the point of perfect equality, and women inherit precisely as men. Also, in general, so far as relates to the acquisition, control, and transfer or transmission of property, single women stand on the same footing as men. They can make the same contracts and perform the same legal acts. In a word, the general rule is, that the legal competency of a single woman, or feme sole, as she is technically called, is the same as that of a man, and in some few particulars, perhaps, she may be considered as having the advantage. She attains her majority here at eighteen, (a) he at twenty-one. She can choose her guardian at twelve; he at fourteen. She can marry at fourteen; he at eighteen. In a word, the law considers her as arriving at maturity three or four years earlier than he does. Again, in relation to civil arrests, she has a peculiar privilege. In this State, no female can be arrested for debt; and in this exemption, she is named in company with the officers and soldiers of the revolution. This exemption does not, of course, embrace criminal matters. But when a woman marries, we call her condition coverture, and speak of her as a feme covert. The old writers call the

husband baron, and sometimes, in plain English, lord. In fact, the scene is now entirely changed. The merging of her name in that of her husband is emblematic of the fate of all her legal rights. The theory is, that marriage makes the husband and wife one person, and that person is the husband. He is the substantive and she the adjective. In a word, there is scarcely a legal act of any description which she is competent to perform. The common reason assigned for this legal disfranchisement of the wife is, that there may be an indissoluble union of interests between the parties. In other words, lest the wife might be sometimes tempted to assert rights in opposition to her husband, the law humanely divests her of rights. For the arguments by which this doctrine is vindicated, I must refer you to the books. It is my province to state what the law is, and not to justify it.

§ 102. Marriage. Marriage, whatever may be the popular idea of it, is regarded by the law as merely a civil contract. We have not even ecclesiastical courts to take cognizance of it. I shall treat the subject in the order of events.

1. Matters preceding Marriage. When parties have agreed to marry, or done any acts from which such agreement can be inferred, and one of them afterwards refuses, a court of chancery cannot, as in ordinary cases, compel a specific performance; but either party may sue the other at law, for a breach of promise; and very heavy

(a) See Stevenson v. Westfall, 18 Ill. 209.

damages are often recovered in such suits. (a) But if the parties intend to consummate their agreement, there are some preliminary arrangements frequently made, to obviate the helpless condition in which the law places the wife during marriage. These are chiefly two, jointures and settlements, (b) both made for the benefit of the wife. A jointure is the separate provision made by the husband for the wife's support. A settlement is the separate provision made by the parents or friends of the wife for her support. These may indeed be made after marriage, but they are usually made before. (c) The method is to place the portion set apart for the wife under the control of trustees, who manage it, independently of the husband, for the benefit of the wife, and perhaps for the issue of the marriage. And the propriety and importance of making such arrangements will be obvious, when we come to speak of the authority which the husband exercises over the whole property, when not thus placed beyond his reach. If it be called generosity in the husband, in anticipation of some possible reverse of fortune, to provide a sure support for his wife in the day of adversity, by placing some portion of his property for her separate use beyond the control of himself or his creditors, it must be considered a

(a) The defence of bad character or criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff, if not sustained, may be considered in aggravation of damages. Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254. Whether seduction of the plaintiff may be shown in aggravation of damages, is a question on which the authorities are not agreed. Paul v. Frazier, 3 Mass. 73; Conn v. Wilson, 2 Overton (Tenn.), 233; Perkins v. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493; Baldy v. Stratton, 11 Penn. State, 316; Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 324; King v. Kersey, 2 Carter (Ind.), 402; Goodall v. Thurman, 1 Head (Tenn.), 209. It may be so shown. Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395; Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339; Sauer v. Schulenberg, 33 Md. 288. It is a good defence that the plaintiff fraudulently concealed the fact that she had had a bastard child. Bell v. Eaton, 28 Ind. 468. An express promise to marry need not be proved, and the promise may be implied from indirect evidence. Wightman v. Coates, 15 Mass. 1; Perkins v. Hersey, supra; Hoitt v. Moulton, 1 Foster (N. H.), 586; Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 398. The acts and declarations of the woman are admissible in a suit brought by her to prove her acceptance of an offer of marriage. Wetmore v. Mell, Ohio State, 26; Moritz v. Methorn, 13 Penn. State, 331; Thurston v. Cavenor, 8 Clarke (Iowa), 155. (b) See Atherly on Marriage Settlements.

(c) Where a post-nuptial agreement is made between husband and wife, by which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, although void in law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of creditors interfere. Wood v. Warden, 20 Ohio, 518. Thomas v. Brown, 10 Ohio State, 247, An ante-nuptial contract entered into in another country, according to its laws, by which the husband, for a valuable consideration, agreed that all the property of the wife then owned by her, and all the property which they might mutually acquire during coverture, should be her property, is not contrary to the policy of the laws of Ohio, and will be enforced in its courts against the husband's creditors. Scherferling v. Huffman, 4 Ohio State, 241. An ante-nuptial agreement, securing to the wife her separate property, except so far as she is specially restrained thereby, gives her full power to dispose of the same; and a gift to her husband may be presumed where she passes money to her husband, who, with her consent, invests it in lands, and takes the title in his own name. Hardy v. Van Harlingen, 7 Ohio State, 208. It must be shown affirmatively that all the terms of an ante-nuptial contract favorable to the wife have been fully complied with, or an ante-nuptial contract will not be enforced against her. Phillips's Ex'rs v. Phillips, 14 Ohio State, 308. An oral ante-nuptial contract, supported by satisfactory parol testimony, and confirmed by the continued recognition of both parties, is binding on the parties, and all claiming as volunteers under them. Southerland e. Southerland, 5 Bush (Ky.), 591. As to post-nuptial agreements, see Huber v. Huber, 10 Ohio, 371. Miller's Ex'rs v. Miller, 16 Ohio State, 527.