§ 21. Divisions of Property. (a) From the divisions of persons we pass to those of property. The term property includes every valuable thing which can be made the subject of exclusive ownership; and the laws which regulate the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of it, form a large part of the laws of every society. I shall here barely enumerate the various kinds of property, and define the terms employed to designate them. 1. The most general division of property is into things in possession and things in expectation. The former are readily understood. The latter consists of legal rights, and their corresponding obligations. If I have a legal right to any specific thing of which you are in possession, or to receive from you something valuable but not specific, and you will not voluntarily fulfil the legal obligations resulting from my right, I may enforce performance by a series of legal proceedings to be explained hereafter, constituting a suit or action. The result, therefore, of an action, is to transfer into possession what was before in expectation; and the certainty of this result is what gives value to this class of things; hence they are denominated things in action; or, retaining the French term, choses in action. Of this description are all rights resulting from contracts, which will occupy a wide space in our future inquiries. It is sufficient here to say, that as commerce and credit increase, this kind of property increases proportionally; and it already forms an immense item in the account of individual and national wealth. 2. The next division of property is into things real and things personal. These terms, of themselves, afford no intimation of the things for which they stand; there being just as much of reality, and as little of personality, in the one as in the other. On this account the terms movable and immovable, which are used in the civil law, would be better. For personal property includes every valuable thing of an unfixed and movable nature, so that it can follow the person of the owner; and the terms employed to designate it are goods and chattels; or, in the abstract, personalty. While real property includes every valuable thing of a fixed and immovable nature, so that it cannot follow the person of the owner; and the terms employed to designate it, are lands, tenements, and hereditaments; or, in the abstract, realty. But although immobility is the distinguishing characteristic of realty, an indefinite duration of interest also enters into the idea; and therefore certain determinate interests in land, as leases for years, are called chattels real; because, although they have that immobility which is denoted by the term real, yet for want of an indefinite duration, they are treated as chattels. 3. Real property is divided into things tangible and things not tangible. The term land includes only what is tangible; that is, the soil itself, and every tangible thing permanently connected therewith, by nature or art, to an indefinite extent above and below the surface. Hence

(a) See the second book of Blackstone, for these divisions and definitions.

there are various articles of personalty, which become realty by being annexed thereto; and these are called fixtures. The term tenement is more comprehensive; since it includes, not only land, as above defined, but certain intangible rights or privileges connected with land, but not belonging to the same person; as a right of way, a right of fishing, and the like. The term hereditament was once more comprehensive still. By the ancient law, though personalty was not descendible from ancestor to heir, yet there were certain articles of personalty, not fixtures, such as family pictures, tombstones, and the like, which by custom descended along with the family mansion. These were called heirlooms, and were included in the term hereditaments, which comprehend everything inheritable. Probably the law of this country does not recognize heirlooms; and, if so, the term hereditament comprehends no more than tenement. However, the division of realty, now under consideration, is commonly expressed by corporeal hereditaments, and incorporeal hereditaments; the former including land only, as above defined; and the latter, all intangible rights annexed to land. These last are likewise denominated easements.

§ 22. Divisions of Time. (a) I shall conclude this lecture with

(a) See 2 Black. Com. 141; Herschell's Astronomy, chap. 13; 7 Com. Dig. tit. Temps. 15 Petersd. Abr. tit. Time; 4 Kent's Com. 95; Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East, 407; The King r. Cumberland, 4 Nev. & Man. 378; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 232; Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 104. Sunday is included in the computation of time, unless excluded by statutory provision or commercial usage. Paine . Mason, 7 Ohio State, 206. If a note or bill payable without grace falls due on Sunday, it is not payable till Monday. But if it is entitled to grace, and the last day of grace falls on Sunday, it is payable on Saturday. 1 Parsons' Contracts, 235; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426. A contract, as the execution of a bond or promissory note, made on Sunday in contravention of the provisions of the Sunday laws, is void whether so declared by the statute or not. Pattee v. Greely, 13 Metcalf, 284; Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Maine, 464; Hilton v. Houghton, 35 id. 143; Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133; Smith v. Bean, 15 id. 577; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; Adams v. Gay, 19 id. 358; Watts v. Van Ness, 1 Hill, 76; Smith v. Wilcox, 19 Barb. 581; Rainey v. Capps, 22 Ala. 288; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Penn. State, 102. The mere making of a contract, as for the sale of land, has been held not to be within the prohibition of the statute of Ohio forbidding common labor on Sunday. Bloom r. Richards, 2 Ohio State, 387 (overruling Seliers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio, 489). See Cincinnati. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. But contra in Indiana, where the same terms are used in the statute. Reynolds v. Stevenson, 4 Indiana, 619; Voglesong v. The State, 9 id. 112; Banks . Werts, 13 id. 203. See Ray v. Catlett, 12 B. Mon. 532; Slade v. Arnold, 14 id. 287; Murphy v. Simpson, id. 419. "Works of necessity and charity," or "works of necessity and mercy," are expressly excepted in the prohibitions of these statutes. The term necessity, as here used, is not a physical and absolute necessity, but denotes a moral fitness and propriety under the circumstances of the case. Such is the repair of a defect in the highway endangering the public safety. Flagg v. Inhabitants of Millbury, 4 Cush. 243. Or the lading of a vessel where there is danger of navigation being closed. McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio State, 566. See also Hooper v. Edwards, 18 Ala. 280; Logan v. Matthews, 6 Penn. State, 417; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 id. 102; Phillips v. Innes, 4 Clark & Fin. 234. It is a question on which the authorities conflict, whether a party has any remedy for torts to property committed by one to whom he has bailed it under a contract, in contravention of the Sunday laws. The point in issue is whether the owner's claim arises in such a case from a breach of the contract, or from an invasion of his right of property independently of it. In Massachusetts it has been held that he cannot recover for a conversion of his property so bailed. Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322. Contra in New Hampshire, Woodman v. Hubbard, 5 Foster, 67. See cases noted p. 441, note (a).

a few remarks on the legal divisions of time and place, beginning with those of time. About forty-five years before Christ, Julius Cæsar undertook to reform the method of computing time; and his substitute is called the Julian Calendar. In this calendar the twelve months, and the number of days in each, were arranged as at present; but the year commenced on the 25th of March, and contained 365 days and 6 hours. These extra hours make one day in four years; and accordingly a day was interpolated after the 28th of February, every fourth year, which is called bissextile or leap year. This calendar continued in use until 1582, when Pope Gregory undertook another reformation. The Julian year was found to be too long by eleven minutes and ten seconds, which amounts to a day in about 130 years. An error therefore of ten days had now occurred; accordingly in that year ten days were struck out from the month of October, and the day next after the 4th was reckoned the 15th. And to provide against the recurrence of a like error, it was ordained that in three centuries out of four, the last year should not be a leap year. Thus the years 1700, 1800, 1900, are not leap years; but 2000 is. There is still a small error, but it will not amount to a day in 3000 years. The computation of the Gregorian calendar is called new style, and the year begins on the 1st of January. In England and America, the new style was not adopted until 1752. The term month, in legal computation is somewhat ambiguous. The English rule seems to be that where a statute uses the term month, simply, it means a lunar month of 28 days; while the phrase, a twelvemonth, means a solar year, and not forty-eight weeks, and that the same holds true in centracts and other legal instruments, except where custom has created a different understanding, as in commercial paper. But in this country, the common understanding is, that month means calendar month, unless the contrary is expressed. (a) The legal day begins at midnight; and fractions of a day are never noticed, except in questions of priority, as in recording deeds, and the like. Hence it has been held that an infant becomes of age on the day before his twenty-first birthday, (b) but this is questionable. Where computation is to be made from an act done, the day of doing the act is included, except in case of a bill of exchange payable so many days after sight, when the day of sight or acceptance is excluded. But where a bill is payable so many days after date, the day of date is included. In a deed or lease, where the expression "from" or "after date," is used to pass an interest, the day of date is included; but where it is used as a terminus from which to compute time, it is excluded. In general, where notice of an act is required to be given a certain number of days before the act, the day of notice is included; and the day of the act excluded. (e)

(a) Jolly v. Young, 1 Esp. N. P. Cas. 186; Commonwealth r. Chambre, 4 Dall. 143; 4 Kent, Com. 95, note; Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wallace, 178. (b) 2 Kent, Com. 233.

(c) 2 Parsons on Contracts, 175-178. When an act is to be done within a given

§ 23. Divisions of Place. (a) I come, lastly, to the divisions of place. The division of the whole Union into States and territories, has been sufficiently explained. It remains, therefore, only to describe the subdivisions of a State. The first division is into counties, for the purpose of municipal regulation. Our State constitution empowers the legislature to lay off new, or alter old counties, with this limitation; that no new county can be laid off, which will be of less extent, or make that from which it is taken of less extent, than four hundred square miles. The object of this provision is not very manifest. It would seem better to have made population the criterion. As it is, the most populous city can never make a county by itself. Every part of the State, whether settled or not, belongs to some county. The municipal organization of counties will be described hereafter. Counties are again subdivided into townships. The power to lay off new, or alter old townships, is vested by our law in the county commissioners, with this limitation, that no township can be laid off, of less extent than twenty-two square miles, unless it includes a "town corporate." (b) By a town corporate is here meant a city or borough, specially incorporated by the legislature with peculiar powers and privileges ; whereas a township, by being properly laid off and named, becomes thereby incorporated, without a special charter. Its boundaries

are recorded in a book kept for that purpose, among the county archives. Cities and boroughs always belong to some township, and fall under its municipal regulations, except when their charters. otherwise provide. Townships, therefore, are the only divisions of counties which fall within the general municipal scheme.

number of days from the date, or from the day of the date, the day of the date is excluded. Fuller v. Russell, 6 Gray, 128; 4 Cruise, Dig. (Greenl. ed.), tit. 32, c. 5, § 17, note.

(a) See 1 Black. Com. 114. The new constitution requires cities and villages to be incorporated by a general law applicable to all. This was done by the act

of 1852.

(b) The validity of a law annexing one city to another, was in issue in the case of Warren v. Mayor and Aldermen of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84. The constitutionality of the Metropolitan Police Act of New York was affirmed in The People v. Draper, 15 New York (1 Smith), 532. As to the power of the legislature to extend the limits of a city or town, see Morford v. Unger, 8 Clarke (Iowa), 82; City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491. Under the constitution of 1851, forbidding special acts conferring corporate power the legislature cannot by special act extend the boundaries of a city. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio State, 18. An act supplementary to Act of May 3, 1852, was passed March 14, 1859, providing for the appointment of Police Commissioners in cities of a population exceeding eighty thousand inhabitants. This act, so far as it created boards of police commissioners, was repealed March 8, 1860. An act was passed April 5, 1866, providing for the appointment of such boards in cities of the first class having a population of less than 100,000 inhabitants at the last federal census, and a similar act March 29, 1863, extending to cities having more than 200,000 inhabitants.

5

PART II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (a)

LECTURE V.

RELATIONS OF THE STATES.

24. The Federal Government is not a League. From the views which have been presented in the preceding lectures, it is obvious that our fundamental law is to be sought for in our constitutions. Our country claims the transcendent merit of having made the first grand experiment of limiting delegated power by written constitutions, and, accordingly, constitutional law is a branch of study to which the American student should devote himself with patriotic ardor. Fortunately for him, the facilities for this study are now abundant. The text itself is found within a small compass; for, comprehensive as our constitutions are, they are as remarkable for their brevity: and the commentaries and precedents are numerous and ample. Not a word has been left unexplained; and where room has been found for difference of opinion, both sides of every question have been presented with all the force and clearness of which the subject is susceptible. With all these lights to guide the student, it must be his own fault if he do not make himself more thoroughly acquainted with constitutional law, than with any other branch of legal study. Under these circumstances, perhaps, I should do wisely to leave him to the guides I have named, and hasten to other branches where instruction is more wanted. But, on the whole, I have concluded to give an epitome of constitutional law, as necessarily introductory to our future inquiries. It is obvious that the most remarkable feature in our political organiza

(a) On the subject of constitutional law, see the American constitutions; Story's Commentaries; 1 Kent, Com. lec. 10-19; Madison Papers; Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution, in five volumes (the fifth volume being the Madison Papers), 1859. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia; Federalist; Adams's Defence; the treatises of Rawle and of Sergeant; the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, of which those delivered by Chief-Justice Marshall have been published in a separate volume; the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, with notes and Digest, by B. R. Curtis. See also, Curtis's History of the Constitution; Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations.