ments offered by the plaintiff, prima facie evidence of the regularity and correctness of the assessment and of the prior proceedings and acts of the superintendent of streets and city council upon which it is based, and it was therefore not necessary to offer any evidence of these prior proceedings as the foundation for introducing these documents. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe rules of evidence for the trial of actions, and statutes which make a document prima facie evidence of the regularity of official proceedings in reference thereto, or which cast the burden of proof in an issue upon either party to the action, are within the constitutional power of the legislature. [Cooley Const. Lim., 450.] Neither does this provision of the statute contravene the provision of the constitution prohibiting the legislature from passing special or local laws 'regulating the practice of courts of justice.' It is not necessary that a law shall affect all the people of the state in order that it may be general, or that a statute concerning procedure shall be applicable to every action that may be brought in the courts of the state. A statute which affects all the individuals of a class is a general law, while one which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special. A statute regulating the rights of married women, or which affect all mining corporations, or confers rights upon municipal corporations of a certain class, or places restrictions upon all foreign corporations, is a general law. [City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238; In re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 316; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Penn. 348; Iowa R. R. Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112; Matter of N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 350.] The provision under consideration is neither a local nor a special law. It is applicable to all actions for the foreclosure of street assessment liens, and is in force in all parts of the state. That the legislature may prescribe different rules of procedure, as well of pleading as of evidence, for different actions, is illustrated by what it has done in defining the form of pleading upon judgments and in other special actions, in requiring the pleadings in forcible entry and detainer to be verified, in denying a divorce upon the mere default of the defendant, in making a tax deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the proceedings prior to its issuance, and in requiring a different form of proof for the execution of a will from that of any other written instrument as well as in numerous other instances."

And in City and County of San Francisco v. Kiernan, 33 Pac. 721, decided June 13, 1893, it was held that section. 18 of the Street Opening act of March 6, 1889, [statutes

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1889, p. 75] providing that "the complaint (in an action to condemn) may aver that it is necessary for the city to take or damage and condemn the said land, without setting forth the proceedings herein provided for," is constitutional.

2. Complaint, What Must Allege.

(a.) General Principles. A complaint to recover the amount of an assessment for street improvements should show by general or special averments a compliance by the council and city authorities with all the steps prescribed by law to confer jurisdiction on the council and to vest a right of action in the plaintiff. [Himmelman v. Danos, 35 Cal. 441; People v. Clark, 47 Cal. 456.] An action to recover the amount of a street assessment is, in reality, an action to recover a tax. As stated by Sanderson, J., in Hendrick v. Crowley, 31 Cal. 471, "The thing sued for is not the contract price or a part of it, but the tax specified in the assessment or warrant, for which he sues, not as contractor or as assignee of somebody else who was the contractor, but as assignee of the city, and he is compelled to make the same averments and the same proof which the city would have had to make had she undertaken to collect the tax." And in People v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal. 400, it is said: "Tax proceedings are in invitum, and, to be valid, must be stricti juris. If not valid they constitute no cause of action. It therefore becomes necessary that a complaint in an action for the collection of a tax should show upon its face facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case of valid tax, and that it is delinquent."

In Himmelman v. Danos, supra, 35 Cal. 441, the complaint contained an averment that on a certain day the board of supervisors of San Francisco awarded the contract, under which the street work in question was done, to plaintiff's assignor, but none of the precedent steps which the statute prescribed were generally or specifically alleged. In other words, the facts conferring jurisdiction upon the board were not stated. The complaint was silent as to the notice of intention, and as to all steps which, following the course of the statute, precede the awarding of the contract. The several steps, however, which follow the award were alleged either specifically or generally. It was held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and in this connection the court, pages 447-9, per Sanderson, J., said: "If, admitting all the facts stated to be true, the liability of the defendant does not follow as a legal conclusion, the complaint is bad. This is true of every complaint, regardless of the subject matter. The

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performance of all conditions which are precedent to the liability of the defendant, whether founded upon a contract or a statute, must be alleged in some form, either general or special. In the present case the liability of the defendant depends upon the performance of the several steps enumerated in the statute by the officers of the city government. The complaint must show by either special or general averments of the character permitted by our statute that the various provisions of the statute under which it is sought to charge the defendant were complied with, for, unless they have been complied with, the defendant is not liable. According to the node of procedure prescribed by the statute, the award of the contract is not the first step to be taken by the board of supervisors, yet the complaint is entirely silent as to all previous steps. In relation to them there is no allegation either special or general. If they were not taken the board had no power to award the contract, and hence no liability was cast by it or the subsequent steps, however regular they may have been, upon the defendant. In short, the liability of the defendant cannot be affirmed in view of the facts stated, and for that reason the complaint is defective. The alleged sufficiency of the complaint is grounded, however, by the respondent, upon a provision found in the thirteenth section of the statute in relation to street improvements [Statutes 1863, page 531,] which is to the effect that the assessment, warrant and diagram, with the affidavit of demand and non-payment, shall be prima facie evidence of defendant's indebtedness, and of the right of the plaintiff to recover. [Section 12 of the present act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885.] Upon that head it is sufficient to say that the provision in question does not establish a rule of pleading, but a rule of evidence only." In this same case it is said, page 448, that in actions upon contracts a general allegation of performance of conditions precedent is sufficient under our statute, but that a general allegation of the performance of conditions prescribed by a statute is not sufficient. It is likewise stated that the same rule prevails as to judgments and determinations of courts, tribunals, boards and officers of inferior or special jurisdiction, that, in favor of such, the law intends nothing, and hence, if the liability of the defendant depends upon them, the facts conferring jurisdiction must be specially alleged at common law. But our Code of Civil Procedure [section 456] changes the common law rule that, in counting upon the judgment of an inferior tribunal, it is necessary to state the facts conferring

jurisdiction, and expressly provides that "in pleading a judgment, or other determination of a court, officer, or board, it is not necessary to state the facts conferring jurisdiction, but such judgment or determination may be stated to have been duly given or made. If such allegation be controverted, the party pleading must establish on the trial the facts conferring jurisdiction." Accordingly it was held by the Supreme Court in Pacific Paving Co. v. Bolton, 97 Cal. 8, that an order of the council ordering certain work to be done is the judgment or determination of a court, officer or board, within the meaning of said section 456 of the C. C. P., and that, therefore, although it is necessary that the council should pass a resolution of intention, and that the superintendent of streets should post and publish the notice required by section 3 of the act before the council has jurisdiction to order the work to be done,— nevertheless, if the complaint alleges that on a certain day the city council, "deeming it necessary, duly gave and made its determination to order the work done," there is a sufficient averment of the action of the council, and the allegation that the order was duly given is under the special provision of said section 456 of the C. C. P., equivalent to the statement that everything necessary to be done to give the order validity had been done, or, rather it is equivalent to the specific allegation of each of the steps necessary to give this order validity.

In Bituminous Lime Rock Pvg. Co. v. Fulton, 33 Pac. Rep. 1117, it was held that in an action to enforce the lien of a street assessment an averment "that all the several acts required to be done by said city council, said superintendent of streets and this plaintiff, have been duly done, made and performed by it and them, in the manner, and at the times and in the form required by law," is sufficient on general demurrer.

Therefore, in an action upon a street assessment, the pleader must (1.) either follow the rule of the common law and allege specifically all the facts necessary to give the council jurisdiction to order the work to be done, allege specifically all the steps preceding the award of the contract, and likewise allege specifically all the steps following the award up to the final step necessary to vest a valid right of action in the contractor or his assigns, or (2.) he may avail himself of the provisions of section 456 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, as to all judgments or determinations of the council or of an officer, may allege generally that such judgment or determination was duly given or made, and this allegation, as to such judgment or deter

mination, will be equivalent to an allegation of the several facts and steps necessary to confer jurisdiction to give or make the judgment or determination. When the pleader adopts the course permitted by section 456 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he must allege generally the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction to give or make such judgment or determination by alleging generally such judgment or determination,-with the allegation that it was duly given or made, and must also specifically allege every other necessary prerequisite to the existence of a valid right of action which does not enter into or become a part of the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction to give or make a judgment or determination. That is to say, while the pleader need not allege specifically the passage of the resolution of intention, its publication, etc., and all the other steps necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the council to order the work to be done, but may allege these facts generally by the equivalent allegation that the order to do the work was duly given or made by the council, still, he must, for example, allege specifically that the superintendent of streets recorded the return in the margin of the record of the warrant and assessment, as this is one of the acts necessary to the existence of a valid right of action, and yet is not an act conferring jurisdiction upon the council or any officer to give or make any judgment or determination. [See notes to section 10 of the act for a statement of the necessary prerequisites to the existence of a valid right of action in the contractor.]

(b.) Some Special Rules Applicable to Complaints.

1. It is necessary to the validity of the proceedings that the council should order the notice of the award to be published; a publication without such order is void. [Donnelly v. Tillman, 47 Cal. 40.] Therefore it is necessary that the complaint should show that notice of the award of the contract was published by order of the council. [Himmelmann v. Townsend, 49 Cal. 150; Contra, Himmelmann v. Haskell, 46 Cal. 67; Dyer v. North, 44 Cal. 157.]

2. The complaint must allege that the defendants are owners or have an interest in the land sought to be charged. [San Francisco v. Doe, 48 Cal. 560.]

3. Two causes of action for enforcing liens for two street assessments, on the same lot, at different times and on different contracts, and for improving the same street, can not be joined in the same suit. In such case the claims of the plaintiff do not "arise out of contracts" within the meaning of section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contracts there spoken of are contracts to which the