tion of Statutes, § 294.] This is undoubtedly the correct rule of interpretation, but, by regarding section 52 as it now stands as being a part of the act of March 18, 1885, from and after the 9th day of March, 1893, the section speaks from out of the said act of March 18, 1885-as the same has been amended from time to time since-and according to the logical result of the application of the above rule of interpretation, the act spoken of in section 52, and whose. provisions are continued in force by this section, must be some act of which the act of March 18, 1885, is amendatory. But, as the act of March 18, 1885, is not amendatory of any act, the logical consequence of the application of said rule of interpretation does not express the legislative intent, and the act referred to, the provisions of which are, by section 52, made applicable to all matters contained therein, must be either the act of March 18, 1885, itself, as it reads without the added sections-sections 38 to 53, inclusive-or else it must be the act of March 31, 1891, by which these new sections were first added. The act of March 9, 1893, by which sections 38-53 were amended, purports to be amendatory of the said act of March 31, 1891. But it cannot be that the legislature intended by section 52 to declare that "all provisions of the act of March 31, 1891, which are not in conflict herewith, shall apply to all matters herein contained," because the act of March 31, 1891, purports to add to the act of March 18, 1885, sections 38-53, and the act of March 9, 1893, purports to amend these added sections, and does so in such a complete manner that the act of March 9, 1893, must be regarded as superseding and, by implication, repealing all of the act of March 31, 1891. It seems to the author, therefore, that when section 52 declares that "all other provisions contained in the act to which this is amendatory * ** shall apply to all matters herein contained," the legislature intended thereby to declare that "all other provisions contained in the act of March 18th, 1885-to which act this is amendatory-and which provisions are not in conflict with sections 38 to 53, inclusive, shall apply to all matters in sections 38 to 53 contained."

There is another ambiguity in this part of section 52. The section declares that all other provisions contained in the act to which this is amendatory, etc., shall apply to all matters "herein contained." What does the phrase, "herein. contained," refer to? Does it refer to the matters contained in this section, i. e., section 52; or to the matters contained in the act of March 18, 1885, as amended up to March 9, 1893; or does it refer to the matters contained in sections 38 to 53 only of the act of March 18, 1885-as these sections were

added to the said act of March 18, 1885, and subsequently amended?

* * * *

It would seem too narrow a construction to limit the phrase "all matters herein contained," to "all matters contained in this section-section 52." And, it is obviously too broad a construction to construe the phrase as meaning all matters contained in the act in which section 52 is imbedded as a part thereof, because this act, according to the cannon of interpretation, quoted supra, from Endilich on the Interpretation of Statutes, is the act of March 18, 1885, itself, and it was obviously not the intent of the legislature to declare that "all provisions contained in the act of March 18, 1885, shall apply to all matters contained in the act of March 18, 1885." It is most probable therefore that the legislature intended by this phrase to include all matters contained in that portion of the act of March 18, 1885, which was added by the act of March 31, 1891, which was amended by the act of March 9, 1893. So that the first sentence of section 52 should be construed as reading as follows: "All other provisions contained in the act of March 18, 1885, and which are not in conflict with the provisions of sections 38 to 53, inclusive, shall apply to all matters contained in said sections 38 to 53, inclusive." However, the section is so ambiguous and uncertain as to almost defy interpretation. It is apparent that the draughtsman who drew the act must have been deficient in imagination. He could not have had clearly presented to his mind the duality of the act which he was drafting,―he could not clearly have separated in his mental vision those portions of the act which, when the act took effect, became a part of the original act-the act of March 18, 1885,-and spoke out from that act as parts thereof,-from those portions of the act which did not thus become imbedded in the act of March 18, 1885,-the last section, for example,section 17 of the act of March 9, 1893, which declares that "This act (the act of March 9, 1893) shall take effect and be in force immediately after its passage."

SECTION 53. The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to permit the objects thereof. [Statutes 1893, page 96.]

[Section 53 was amended by the act of March 9, 1893, statutes 1893, p. 96.]

(UNIVERSA

OF

CALIFORNIA

Street Improvement Bond Act of 1893.

An Act to provide a system of Street Improvement Bonds to represent certain assessments for the cost of street work and improvement within municipalities, and also for the payment of such bonds.

[Approved February 27, 1893.]

The people of the state of California, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Wherever in this act the phrase "Street Work Act" is used, it means and shall be taken to mean the act entitled "An act to provide for work upon streets, lanes, alleys, courts, places and sidewalks, and for construction of sewers within municipalities," approved March eighteen, eighteen hundred and eighty-five, and all acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto; and wherever in this act the name of any municipal body or officer is used, or any word or phrase is used which is not herein expressly defined, it means and shall be taken to mean such municipal body or officer, or word or phrase as the same is expressly defined in said street work act, and in all acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto. [Statutes 1893, page 33.]

The object of the act is clearly declared by the first sentence of section 2, namely: "Whenever the city council of any municipality in this state shall find, upon estimates of the city engineer, that the cost of any proposed work or improvement authorized by said street work act, [the act of March 18, 1885] will be greater than one dollar per front foot along each line of the street so proposed to be improved, including the cost of intersection work assessable upon said frontage, it shall have the power, in its discretion, to determine that serial bonds shall be issued to represent the cost of said work or improvement in the manner and form hereinafter provided." Or, as more pithily stated in its title, the object of the act is "to provide a system of street improvement bonds."

The act is, in effect, supplementary to the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885. The latter act provides what work may be done upon streets, and provides the machinery for letting contracts for doing the work and for meeting the expenses of the same. The machinery for meeting these expenses, as provided for by the said act of March 18, 1885, contemplates cash payments after the assessment roll is made up, and riter the proper

proceedings prerequisite to the right to cash payments, such as "demand," etc., have been had. The above act of Feb'y 27, 1893, supplements this part of the machinery of the act of March 18, 1885, and provides different machinery for meeting the expenses of the improvements,―machinery that contemplates the issuance of serial bonds to pay for the cost of the work.

Throughout the act, the provisions of the street improvement act of March 18, 1885, and of all acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, are referred to, and, by reference made a part of the act. These acts are referred to under the general designation of the "Street Work Act," which phrase is, by section 1 of the act, defined to be the said act of March 18, 1885, and all acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and, by section 6 of the said act of Feb'y 27, 1893, it is provided that "all provisions of the 'Street Work Act,' not inconsistent with the provisions hereof, shall apply hereto." But whether said phrase "provisions hereof" means "provisions of this section-section six," or "provisions of this act" may be open to question.

In 1891, [statutes' 91, p. 116] by an act approved March 17, 1891, the legislature passed an act similar in its provisions to the above act of Feb'y 27, 1893; only, while the latter act, in a measure stands by itself, and only by reference, incorporates within itself the provisions of the general street improvement act of March 18, 1885, and the acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, the said act of March 17, 1891, on the other hand, tacked its provisions on to the act of March 18,1885, by adding thereto an additional part numbered Part IV, consisting of seven new sections numbered 38 to 44, inclusive. Statutes 1891, p. 116.] Section 8 of the act of Feb'y 27, 1893, [statutes '93, p. 38] expressly repeals said act of March 17, 1891, except as to proceedings theretofore commenced thereunder.

It will be noticed from a perusal of the bond act-the act of February 27, 1893—that it does not provide for the issuance of municipal bonds, backed by the resources of the whole city, authorized by popular vote, and payable out of general taxation. Such municipal bonds are provided for by the municipal indebtedness act, the act of March 19, 1889 [statutes 1889, p. 399], entitled "An act authorizing the incurring of indebtedness by cities, towns, and municipal corporations, incorporated under the laws of this state, for the construction of water works, sewers, and all necessary public improvements, or for any purpose whatever," etc., and the acts amendatory thereof. [See this municipal indebtedness act, infra.] The street improvement bond

February 27, 1893.

act-the act of Feb'y 27, 1893-on the other hand provides that each bond issued under it shall be a lien upon a particular lot or parcel of land, each bond being issued to represent the assessment against each particular lot or parcel of land, which is upon the list of unpaid assessments, mentioned in section 4 of the act. Each bond stands by itself; and if default be made in any payment, the bond becomes wholly due at the option of the holder, who can immediately collect without suit. The provisions of the act enabling the bond holder to collect without suit are most important. Under the general street improvement actthe Vrooman act of March 18, 1885,-the contractor or his assignee, after the issuance of a warrant, etc., and after demand, etc., brings suit against the lot owner as provided for in section 12 of that act, and in this suit the lot owner may set up in defense any facts which show that the assessment is void. [See supra p. 141 et seq.] But, when bonds are issued under this street bond act, the bond holder does not sue the property owner. He serves a written demand upon the city treasurer, who then proceeds to collect the amount due on the bond by sale of the lot in the same manner that unpaid state and county taxes are collected, as provided for in section 5 of the act. Furthermore, the bonds are, by section 4 of the act, made conclusive evidence of the regularity of all proceedings previous to the making of the certified list of unpaid assessments. [See notes under section 4 infra.] It is vitally important therefore, that the owner who desires to contest the validity of the proceedings, should give written notice to the city treasurer, as provided for by section 4, that he desires no bond to be issued for the assessment upon his lot or parcel of land. This notice will stop the issuance of such bond, and the contractor or his assignee will be compelled to bring suit as provided for by section 12 of the general street improvement act, and in this suit the property owner may set up in defense any facts showing the assessment to be invalid. See supra Sec. 12 of the act of March 18, 1885, p. 141 et seq.] But, if bonds are issued representing the assessment against his lot, and if the act be constitutional, he is practically remediless, except that after sale of his lot, he might have an action at law to recover possession. For as the bond holder does not have to initiate proceedings in court, but may collect without suit, the property owner does not enjoy the advantages of a defendant resisting the collection of an illegal assessment, but must himself take the initiative. His only possible remedy is an injunction to enjoin the sale of his lot. But even this rem