and towns, which, coming into existence since the new constitution took effect, have been organized under said act of March 13, 1883; and even as to such cities and towns, the provisions of the general street improvement and street opening acts, passed since the passage of said municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, are controlling where inconsistent with the provisions of the said municipal incorporation act, but when not inconsistent the provisions of the latter act, the municipal incorporation act,-even in respect to street work may be applicable in those cities and towns which have incorporated thereunder. Thus in Capron v. Hitchcock, decided June 3, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep. 431, it was held that no valid assessment can be made for street work done under the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885,-if the contract therefore is void under section 628 of the municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, providing that no officer of a city of the fourth class, organized under said act, shall be interested in a contract to which the city is a party, and that any contract contrary to the provisions thereof shall be void: held, further, that the said municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883— section 628-forbidding any officer of a city of the fourth class to be interested in a contract with the city, is not impliedly repealed by section 5 of the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885— providing that under certain circumstances a street contract shall be awarded to the owners of a majority of the frontage on the street to be improved. In this case, the action was brought by plaintiff to enforce the lien of an assessment on the lot of defendant in the city of San Diego, for street work alleged to have been done by plaintiff under a contract awarded to him by the city council of San Diego, and executed on the part of the city by the superintendent of streets. At all the times mentioned in plaintiff's complaint the city of San Diego was a municipal corporation of the fourth class organized and existing under said general municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, and plaintiff, to whom said contract to do said street work was awarded as aforesaid, was a school trustee of said city of San Diego, duly elected, qualified and acting as such school trustee for the third ward of said city of San Diego, held, that, for the reasons given above,-i. e. because of the letting of the contract to plaintiff, was violative of said provision of section 628 of the municipal corporation act, under which the municipality was incorporated,―the contract was void, and plaintiff could not recover. Cities and towns incorporated under the general municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883, have for their charter the provisions of such act applicable to the particular class of cities or or towns to which such cities and towns belong. If any provisions of this general act, applicable to street improvements and not inconsistent with the provisions of the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885,be in force in cities and towns incorporated under said. municipal incorporation act, and if such provisions may be applied in street improvement proceedings,-provisions relative to the qualifications of the contractor, for example— then it is difficult to perceive why similar provisions in the charters of other cities and towns, freeholders charters for example, should not in like manner be applied to and govern in street improvement proceedings. The Vrooman act of March 18, 1885, may have entirely superseded all provisions in the general municipal incorporation act bearing directly upon the subject of street improvements, and may in like manner have superseded all charter provisions bearing directly upon the subject of street improvements, and yet other provisions of said general municipal incorporation act or of such charters, not directly relating to the subject of street improvements, but which, nevertheless, may be applicable in street improvement proceedings,provisions prescribing the qualifications of contractors, for example, as that no officer of the city shall be interested in any contract with the city-may perhaps be properly applied to and govern in all proceedings relating to street improvements. This conclusion seems warranted by the decision in Capron v. Hitchcock, supra. In other words, if Capron v. Hitchcock is authority for the proposition that any part of the general municipal incorporation act is controlling in street work proceedings, in cities incorporated under said act, then, by a parity of reasoning, it must likewise be authority for the proposition that similar provisions in the charters of cities, incorporated under special or freeholders charters, are in like manner applicable to street work proceedings. It is provided by section 6, article XI of the constitution that "cities or towns heretofore or hereafter organized, and all charters thereof framed or adopted by authority of this constitution, shall be subject to and controlled by general laws." Mr. Justice McKinstry, in his dissenting opinion in the case of Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 85, says: the 13th of March, 1883, (seven days after the approval of the act to provide for the improvement of streets, etc., within municipalities') an act was approved entitled 'An act to provide for the organization, incorporation and government of municipal corporations.' [That is to say, the first Vrooman act, approved March 6th, 1883, was approved seven days before the approval of the "municipal incorporation act," which was approved March 13th, 1883.] The last act [that is, the municipal incorporation act of March 13, 1883] is a general statute, providing for the incorporation, organization, classification and government of cities and towns, and was unquestionably intended to be a compliance with the mandate of the first clause of section 6, article XI of the constitution. It provides for the election of a superintendent of streets, and prescribes his duties, which are such as the title of his office would imply. Amongst the powers of the municipal council is enumerated the power of opening, altering, constructing, repairing, etc., streets, highways, etc., and in subsequent sections is supplied an entire scheme for 'street work. If both these statutes [that is, the municipal incorporation act, approved March 13, 1883, and the Vrooman act, approved March 6, 1883] were valid, the provisions of the act of March 13 were substituted for those of the act of March 6, 1883-at least so far as street work done in cities and towns organized under the act of March 13 is concerned. But the act of 1885 [i. e., the Vrooman act, approved March 18, 1885-statutes of 1884-5, page 147] was an amendment of the act of March 13, 1883, [the "municipal incorporation act"] or an entire revision and consequent repeal of those provisions of that act relating to 'work upon streets, alleys,' etc., within municipalities formed under the general law. * It was a substitution of one system of street work for another system. If operative at all, it made an end of the provisions of the general law of 1883 relating to street work." [That is to say, if operative at all, it made an end of those provisions of the "municipal incorporation act" which related to and regulated street work.] * * * * * However, these observations of the learned justice from whose opinion they are quoted, are not entirely compatible with the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in said case of Capron v. Hitchcock, cited supra, although it may be said of the decision in this latter case, that it was not held that any part of the general municipal incorporation act, relating directly to street work, was in force, but that a very salutary provision, limiting the powers of officers of the municipality to enter into contracts generally to which the city is a party, was not inconsistent with any provision of the general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March 18, 1885-and was in full force in cities incorporated under said municipal incorporation act, notwithstanding any of the provisions of said general street improvement act of March 18, 1885. See, also in this connection, the language of Mr. Commissioner Belcher, in Anderson v. De Urioste, 96 Cal. 405, when the learned commissioner said: "The act of March. 18, 1885, was a general street law, and was in force in the city and county of San Francisco from the date of its passage. [Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 74.] It therefore, as to all matters provided for, superseded the consolidation act and became the governing law of the city." While, however, it is quite probable, as stated by Mr. Commissioner Belcher, that this general street law of March 18, 1885, superseded all charter provisions providing for street work, in cities having "freeholders' charters," or charters granted by special enactment prior to the new constitution, the consolidation act of San Francisco, for example,—still, it is also quite probable that in these cities, as in municipalities incorporated under the general municipal corporation act, such charter provisions as do not directly relate to or provide for street work, but which, nevertheless, are, in the nature of things, capable of being applied to street work proceedings, will be so applied, when not inconsistent with any provision of the said general street improvement act, -such general charter provision, for example, as prescribe generally the qualifications of persons entering into contracts with the city. But, as to all provisions of these charters, relating directly to and making express provisions for street work, it is undoubtedly correct to conclude that all of these charter provisions have been superseded by the general street improvement act of March 18, 1885,the Vrooman act. The act known as the "Vrooman act of 1883" was approved March 6, 1883-seven days prior to the municipal incorporation act. This act, approved March 6, 1883, commonly known as the "Vrooman act of 1883," is entitled, "An act to provide for the improvement of streets, lanes, alleys, courts, places and sidewalks, and the construction of sewers within municipalities." [Statutes of 1883, page 32.] It takes its name from its putative author, Senator Vrooman of Alameda county, by whom the bill was introduced in the senate at the session of the legislature held in 1883. The same senator, at the session of the legislature held in 1885, likewise introduced the bill which subsequently became the general street improvement act of March 18, 1885, the general street improvement act now in force in the municipalities of the state, the provisions of which are to be found post, pages 1-216. These two acts may be designated respectively as the first and second Vrooman acts, or, as the "Vrooman act of 1883," and the "Vrooman act of 1885." The latter act, the "Vrooman act of 1885," expressly repealed the former act-the "Vrooman act of 1883." The act of March 6, 1883, known as the first Vrooman act, or Vrooman act of 1853, constituted a complete system of street work. At the date of the passage and approval of this act, the constitution [section 19, article XI] provided that "no public work or improvement of any description whatsoever shall be done or made, in any city, in, upon, or about the streets thereof, or otherwise, the cost and expense of which is made chargeable, or may be assessed upon, private property by special assessment, unless an estimate of such cost and expense shall be made, and an assessment in proportion to benefits, on the property to be affected or benefited, shall be levied, collected and paid into the city treasury before such work or improvement shall be commenced, or any contract for letting or doing the same authorized or performed." To meet the requirements of this provision of the constitution, the said act of March 6, 1883-the Vrooman act of 1883—provided that an assessment should be levied according to benefits, and that the city council should proceed to award the contract for the work and improvement, after receiving notice from the city treasurer that sufficient money has been received by the treasurer, on account of any such assessment, to pay the estimated costs and expenses of such work and improvement, for the payment of which such assessment was levied and collected. The act of April 1, 1872 [statutes 1871-2, p. 804] providing for work upon streets in the city and county of San Francisco, was very similar, in its general aspects, to the present general street improvement act-the Vrooman act of March. 18, 1885, post, pp. 1-216. Like the present general street improvement act, the said San Francisco street improvement act of April 1, 1872, adopted the "front foot" principle of assessment, and provided that the assessments should be levied after the execution of the contract, and after the work had been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the superintendent of streets. [Section 9 of act of April 1, 1872, stats. 1871–2, p. 813.] In McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 245, it was held that the provisions of section 19 of article XI of the constitution, as originally adopted, the provisions of which are quoted supra, providing that an estimate of the cost and |