Decree of Circuit Court modified and affirmed. Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting: I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court. owners in general terms. In this order it | 1908 as confines allowances to grain rewas stated expressly that the purpose of shipped within ten days, should be allowed the Commission was to prohibit and stop to stand. the payment of the elevator allowances everywhere. 14 Inters. Com. Rep. 510, 551. The Union Pacific made the allowances in question to elevators at its tremini; it had no motive to make them anywhere else. The competitors of the Union Pacific concerned in the Diffenbaugh Case were com- The Commission did not hold that elepelled by competition to make the same al-vation may not properly be furnished by a lowance at Missouri river points, but they railroad, or be allowed for to a shipper, also make it nowhere else. The Traffic but held that "such elevation must be Bureau, Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis, charged for at what it is reasonably complained to the Commission that the re- worth," and without discrimination. And sult was a discrimination against St. Louis I understand elevation to mean "the transof of a cent per 100 pounds. But the fer of the grain from the car of the inprinciple of the decision is that the allow-bound carrier, through an elevator, to the ance to elevators upon their own grain is to be stopped everywhere unless they are prevented from using the opportunity for treating their grain. Therefore this question of preference between cities does not need to be discussed. But, as remarked below, the Union Pacific could not be complained of on this ground (176 Fed. 424), and it would be impossible to deny the same right to competing roads, merely because, as the result of the conditions, one eity would gain and another lose. (Louis ville & N. R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 44 L. ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209). Although the order cutting down the allowance to Peavey & Company to the estimated cost may have been influenced by erroneous views touching the powers of the Commission and the elements proper for consideration (see Southern R. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. 214 U. S. 297, 53 L. ed. 1004, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678), we are of opinion that no sufficient reason appears for disturbing that. The Commission has decided what compensation is reasonable, and we infer that Peavey & Company I would be content under the circumstances to render the service for of a cent per hundred pounds rather than give it up. car of the outbound carrier," within a*giv.* The conclusion is not a misconstruction of the statute. Transportation simply is the business of the railroad company. Weighing, inspecting, cleaning, and mixing, that is, raising the quality of the grain to suit the demand of the market, is the business of the grain dealer or others, and the two businesses are not to be confounded, and it was not, I think, the purpose of the statute to confound them. The statute The jurisdiction in the Diffenbaugh Case makes the term "transportation" include was doubted, although the Commission did "all instrumentalities and facilities of shipnot press the point, as it wishes a final de- ment or carriage ;" and it is only when the cision. We are content to leave that matowner of property renders services "conter on the statement of the court below. nected with such transportation, or fur176 Fed. 416, 417. The plaintiffs are af-nishes any instrumentality used therein," fected by the order, and it is just that they should have a chance to be heard, although not parties before the Commission. The result is that the decree of the Cireuit Court must be affirmed in its main point, but that the Commission's order of 1907, diminishing the allowance to of a cent, and so much of the Peavey order of that he may be compensated by the railroad. What goes beyond that transcends the statute, and becomes, as the Commission held, a discrimination. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hughes concurs in this dissent. (222 U. S. 107.) GEORGE D. BRYAN, Collector of the Port | for that district upon a libel filed in that of Charleston, Petitioner, court against the vessel, her engines, etc.; that the marshal retained the custody of V. ROXANA S. KER, Executrix of W. W. Ker, the vessel, under that process, from November 15 until December 18, 1895, and that, Deceased. ADMIRALTY ( 47*) - ATTACHMENT-PRO- if any damage was sustained by the plaintiff CESS-VALIDITY-LIABILITY OF MARSHAL. by reason of the detention of the vessel, it A writ in the usual form of a monition did not result from any act of the defendand warrant of arrest in a suit in rem, is- ant. sued from the office of the clerk of a Fed eral district court, and bearing the seal of that court, will protect the marshal in seizing and detaining a vessel in conformity to the command of the writ, although the purported signature of the deputy clerk was affixed under an attempted but ineffectual delegation of authority, and although the case stated in the libel upon which the writ issued was not cognizable as a suit in rem in admiralty, but only as a personal action for damages. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Admiralty, Dec. Dig. § 47.*] the evidence, without any conflict, estabUpon the trial of the issue so presented, lished these facts: On November 15, 1895, the marshal, act-, ing upon the monition and warrant of ar rest soon to be mentioned,* seized the vessel at Charleston, and detained her in his custody until December 18, following, when she was surrendered to her master upon the execution of an agreement, with sureties, conformably to Rev. Stat. § 941, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 692, and the 11th admiralty rule. On November 16, while the vessel was so in the custody of the marshal, the defendDecided ant, as collector of the port, acting under directions from the Secretary of the Treasury, placed an inspector on board the vessel, and thereby assumed a qualified control over her; but the custody of the mar shal was not disturbed or questioned, or intended to be, the defendant's purpose being only to make sure that the vessel would be detained, according to the directions of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the event that the custody of the marshal should be terminated. On December 6, the Secretary of the Treasury abandoned the purpose to detain the vessel, and the defendant thereupon withdrew the inspector, the marshal still retaining his custody. N WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina, in favor of defendant in an action against the collector of the port of Charleston, to recover damages for the alleged unlawful detention of a vessel. Reversed and judgment of Circuit Court affirmed. See same case below, 90 C. C. A. 179, 163 Fed. 233. The facts are stated in the opinion. Assistant Attorney General Denison and Mr. Loring C. Christie for petitioner. Messrs. J. P. Kennedy Bryan and M. C. Butler for respondent. The monition and warrant of arrest under which the marshal acted was issued out of the district court upon the libel presently to be described, and what was done by him was in strict conformity to the command of the * Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the writ. When the writ was issued, the clerk opinion of the court: This was an action at law in the circuit court for the district of South Carolina, by a citizen of Pennsylvania against a citizen of South Carolina, as collector of the port of Charleston, to recover damages for the alleged unlawful detention, from November 16 to December 5, 1895, of the American steamship Laurada, of which the plaintiff was the owner. The answer admitted that the defendant, as such collector, acting under instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, caused the vessel "to be formally detained by placing an inspector on board;" but alleged that the marshal for the District of South Carolina had seized the vessel on November 15, 1895, under a monition and warrant of arrest issued out of the district court of the district court was fatally ill and absent from his office, and the deputy, his son, was attending him. A second son, who was not a deputy, was temporarily in charge of the clerk's office, with instructions, given by the deputy, to receive and file papers, and, if it became necessary, to sign and issue process. Acting upon these instructions, the brother signed and issued the writ in question, doing so in such manner that it purported to have been signed and issued by the deputy on behalf of the clerk. The libel upon which the writ issued purported in some respects to be one in rem, but it plainly disclosed that the libellants were not possessed of a maritime lien upon the vessel, her engines, etc., but only of ag right to damages. See Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How.*82, 90, 15 L. ed. 554, 556. There For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes was, however, no suggestion of this on the face of the writ, which was in the usual form of a monition and warrant of arrest in a suit in rem. It ran in the name of the President, was addressed to the marshal, commanded him to seize the vessel and to detain it until the further order of the court, bore teste of the judge of the district court, was sealed with the seal of the court, purported to be signed by the deputy on behalf of the clerk, and was transmitted from the clerk's office to the marshal's office in the usual way. At the conclusion of the evidence showing these facts, the court, at the request of the defendant, directed a verdict in his favor, and entered judgment accordingly. The judgment was subsequently reversed by the circuit court of appeals (90 C. C. A. 179, 163 Fed. 233), and the case is now here on certiorari. 212 U. S. 575, 53 L. ed. 657, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 684. As it is obvious that the verdict for the defendant was rightly directed, if the seizure and detention of the vessel by the marshal were justified by the writ under which he acted, we come at once to the reasons advanced for saying that his acts were not so justified. They are: (1) that the writ was not signed or issued by the clerk or his deputy, but by one who was without lawful authority; and (2) that the case stated in the libel, upon which the writ issued, was not cognizable as a suit in rem in admiralty, but only as a personal action for damages. Neither reason is sufficient. Both overlook considerations which operated with impelling force to justify the acts of the marshal. True, also, the case stated in the libel was not cognizable as a suit in rem in admiralty, and therefore afforded no basis for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. But as this did not appear on the face of the writ, and as the court was empowered to issue such process in a proper case, it still must be said that the writ, as it was received by the marshal, was apparently a valid one. In this situation the case falls clearly within the rule, often applied in this and other courts, which is well stated in Cooley on Torts, 3d ed., vol. 2, p. 883, as follows: "The process that shall protect an officer must, to use the customary legal expression, be fair on its face. By this is not meant that it shall appear to be perfectly regular, and in all respects in accord with proper practice, and after the most approved form; but what is intended is, that it shall ap parently be process lawfully issued, and such as the officer might lawfully serve. More precisely, that process may be said to be fair on its face which proceeds from a court, magistrate, or body having authority of law to issue process of that nature, and which is legal in form, and on its face contains nothing to notify or fairly apprise the officer that it is issued without authority. When such appears to be the process, the officer is protected in making service, and he is not concerned with any illegalities that may exist back of it." See Conner v. Long, 104 U. S. 228, 237, 26 L. ed. 723, 726; Matthews v. Densmore, 109 U. S. 216, 27 L. ed. 912, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126; Harding v. Woodcock, 137 U. S. 43, 34 L. ed. 580, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U. S. 293, 309, 35. L. ed. 1018, 1024, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 227; Marks*v. Shoup, 181 L. S. 562, 45 L. ed. 1002, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724; Erskine v. Hohnbach, 14 Wall. 613, 20 L. ed. 745; Haffin v. Mason, 15 Wall. 671, 21 L ed. 196; Bragg v. Thompson, 19 S. C. 572; Goodgion v. Gilreath, 32 S. C. 388, 11 S. E. 207; Clarke v. May, 2 Gray, 410, 61 Am. Dec. 470; People v. Rix, 6 Mich. 144; Henline v. Reese, 54 Ohio St. 599, 56 Am. St. Rep. 736, 44 N. E. 269; Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170, 21 Am. Dec. 181. True, the purported signature of the deputy was not his own, but was affixed by his brother under an attempted but ineffectual delegation of authority, and yet the writ, in the usual form, was issued from the office of the clerk, bearing the seal as evidence of its authenticity. In short, although thus irregularly issued, it came into the hands of the marshal as an apparently valid writ. Besides, this irregularity did not render the writ void, but voidable merely, for it could have been amended by substituting the true for the purported sig nature of the deputy. Rev. Stat. § 948, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 695; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Kirk, 111 U. S. 486, 28 L. ed. 481, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500; Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 38 L. ed. 812, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. WESLEY C. RICHARDSON et al., Appts., 874; Semmes v. United States, 91 U. S. 21, 23 L. ed. 193; Cotter v. Alabama G. S. R. Co. 10 C. C. A. 35, 22 U. S. App. 372, 61 Fed. 747; Long v. Farmers' State Bank, 9 LR.A. (N.S.) 585, 77 C. C. A. 538, 147 Fed. 360; Ambler v. Leach, 15 W. Va. 677. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and that of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Reversed. (222 U. S. 96.) V. JUDSON HARMON, Receiver of the Toledo BILITY-NONMARITIME TORTS. For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes of the owners in the vessel and her freight. for maritime torts not the result of his own fault, provided by U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 42834285, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 2943, 2944, was extended to nonmaritime torts by the provisions of the act of June 26, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 57, chap. 121, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2945), § 18, limiting the individual liability of a shipowner for "any or all debts and liabilities," except wages and liabilities incurred prior to such enactment, to his share in the vessel, and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same to the value of the vessel and freight pending. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Shipping, Dec. place of the boat and her freight. Moni Dig. 207. [No. 10.] Under this petition an appraisement was made of the value of the "Crete" on the termination of her voyage, and the value of each separate one-third interest of each owner in the vessel and her pending freight was appraised at $4,171.50, for which value bond was made to stand in the room and tion issued in usual form, requiring everyone claiming any loss or damage "by reason of the premises," to appear and make Argued April 25 and 26, 1911. Decided proof of their respective claims. A November 20, 1911. The appellees were also enjoined from proceeding with the action pending in the said common-law court, and they, together with all the world, were admonished to bring no other or further actions, and to file their claims against the "Crete," or. her owners, in the court below, that they PPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio to review a decree dismissing, for want of jurisdiction, proceedings to limit the liability of a shipowner for a nonmaritime tort. Reversed and remanded for fur-*might share in the distribution of the apther proceedings. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Harvey D. Goulder and Frank 8. Masten for appellants. praised value of the said vessel and her pending freight. The appellee, Judson Harmon, as receiver of the Toledo Terminal & Railway Com Messrs. George L. Canfield and Frank pany, owner of the bridge damaged by the H. Canfield for appellee. Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court: The steam barge "Crete," while proceeding up the Maumee river from Lake Erie, collided with the abutment of a railway drawbridge, resulting in great damage to both barge and bridge. For the damage sustained by the bridge an action was brought against two of the owners of the barge in a common-law court of the state at Toledo, Ohio. Thereupon the owners of the barge, three in number, filed their petition and libel in the district court of the United States at Cleveland, Ohio, where two of them resided and where the "Crete" was lying, for a limitation of liability under §§ 4283-4285, Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 2943, 2944), and § 18 of the act of June 26, 1884 [23 Stat. at L. 57, chap. 121, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2945]. This petition duly averred that the said collision was without fault upon the part of the "Crete;" but, if there was any, it was without the privity or knowledge of the owners, or either of them. It stated that the damages claimed in the pending action at law were $35,000, and that they apprehended other actions of like kind, and if liable as claimed, the aggregate would greatly exceed the value of the interests collision mentioned, appeared and excepted to the jurisdiction of the court. This exception was sustained and the injunction dissolved, the court holding that the cause of action asserted in the common-law court of Ohio by said receiver against the owners of the colliding barge was for a nonmaritime tort, not cognizable in a court of admiralty, and that the limited-liability act of Congress did not extend to any such right of action. Prior to the 18th section of the act of June 26, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. pp. 53, 57, chap. 121, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 2804, 2945), it had been the settled law that the district court, sitting as a court of admiralty, had no jurisdiction to try an action for damages against a shipowner, arising from a fire on land, communicated by the ship, or from a collision between the ship and a structure on land, such as a bridge or pier. The tort in both cases would have been a nonmaritime tort, and, as such, not within the cognizance of an admiralty court. The Plymouth (Hough v. Western Transp. Co.) 3 Wall. 20, 18 L. ed. 125; The Troy (Duluth & S. Bridge Co. v. The Troy) 208 U. S. 321, 52 L. ed. 512, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416. Inasmuch as the owner's liability was not limited by the statutes providing for a limited liability, the pendency of a petition to obtain the benefits of the limita For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes 102 of the country,-if competent at all, throws little or no light as to the meaning which was supposed to be attached to liabilities, as distinguished from claims arising out of contract. There does appear, however, a broad general purpose to put a shipowner in the status of one whose risk on account of obligations arising from the conduct of the master and crew is confined to his proportionate interest in the ship and her freight. No purpose to repeal or qualify any of the terms of the existing liability law is declared, nor is this section declared, tion did not operate to draw into such a proceeding action for a liability which could in no wise be affected by it. Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610, 30 L. ed. 274, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25. Such was the law, and so it still is unless changed by the 18th section of the act of June 26, 1884. That section is found in a chapter, the title of which is, “An Act to Remove Certain Burdens on the American Merchant Marine, and Encourage the American Foreign Carrying Trade, and for Other Purposes." The 18th section reads as follows: "That the individual liability of a ship-in words, to be an amendment of that law. owner shall be limited to the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same shall not exceed the value of such vessels and freight pending: Provided, That this provision shall not affect the liability of any owner, incurred previous to the passage of this act, nor prevent any claimant from joining all the owners in one action; nor shall the same apply to wages due to persons employed by said shipowners." But neither fact is of any marked importance. If the necessary effect be to repeal any part of the former law because of repugnance, that consequence must be declared. So, too, if it be in effect an amendment of the law as it stood, by extending that law to cases not before within it, that effect must be given to it, without any unnecessary disturbance of the qualifications or procedure under the former law. 801. The legislation is in pari materia with the act of 1851 [9 Stat. at L. 635, chap. 43, § 3], as carried into the Revised Statutes as §§ 4283 et seq. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2943), and must be read in connection with that law; and so read, should be given such an effect not incongruous with that law, so far as consistent with the terms of the later legislation. The former law embraced liabilities for maritime torts, but excluded both debts and liabilities for nonmaritime torts. The section under consideration includes debts, save wages of seamen and liabilities of an owner incurred prior to the passage of the law. The avowed purpose of the original act was to encourage American investments in ships. This was accomplished by confining the owner's individual liability, when not the result of his own fault, in the instances enumerated, to his share in the ship. The same public policy is declared to be the motive of the act of which this section is a part. True, a liability may arise out of a contract as well as from a tort. But a liability ex contractu is included ex vi termini, and the addition of the words "and liabilities"*would be tautol-➡ ogy unless meant to embrace liabilities not arising from "debts.” That the provision is not as definite as desirable may be conceded. The contention, upon the one hand, is that the limitation is extended only to obligations ex contractu; while, upon the other, that every kind of liability which might fall upon an owner on account of the ship, incurred without his knowledge or privity, is given the benefit of the provision. That it was intended to limit the owner's liability in respect of debts contracted on account of the ship is plain. But if that was the only purpose, why add the significant words, "and liabilities ?" The limited-liability act, as it stood, did not include the owner's individual liability for obligations ex contractu incurred without his knowledge or privity. Neither did it extend to his individual liability for nonmaritime torts by the master or crew. Was it the purpose of Congress to exclude this kind of an individual responsibility from the benefits of the limited-liability statute, while including every other class and kind of individual liability, except seamen's wages? Is no significance to be attached to the fact that the provision does not stop by adding to the former kind of claims against an owner "any and all debts," but terminates the clause by inserting, “and liabilities,”— -aployed in this last legislation, we can but perfectly unnecessary statement, if it was only meant to extend the limitation to obligations ex contractu? The meager debate which occurred upon this section of the act, an act which included many other matters concerning the shipping interests In view of the manifest policy of Congress to further encourage the shipowning industry, and the very broad terms em infer that the policy of the government was to confine the risk of an owner not personally at fault to his interest in the ship. To say that Congress meant no more by extending the limitation to any and all debts and liabilities than to in |