| a full right of occupancy of the lands in dis- iated Bands should execute a release to the pute and with all the incidents of such right, United States of all right, title, interest, and that each member of those tribes is now and claim of every nature whatsoever in and entitled to receive 160 acres in severalty, to any lands within the limits of the United and "also the proceeds of the balance of the States except those allotted to them. This land whenever such sales are made as au- view cannot be adopted, because the pleadthorized by the jurisdictional act." "If this ings do not inform the court of the existence were all," say the representatives of the gov- of any claims of that kind; indeed, the pleadernment, "that the Wichita and Affiliated ings could not properly embrace any claim Bands claimed, the United States would in- to lands, or to the proceeds of any lands, dorse the appeal of these Indians instead of except those within the Wichita Reservation. opposing it." The government itself sug- The court below could not make any decree gests and we recognize its right under all in reference to claims that have not been the circumstances of this case to ask-that referred to it by Congress. It is manifest the decree as to the Wichita and Affiliated that while article 6 of the agreement of 1891 Bands be reversed and set aside and the between the United States and the Wichita cause remanded with directions that, in ad- and*Affiliated Bands of Indians reserved the dition to the dismissal of the petition of the right of the latter to prefer against the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and order-United States any and every claim they being the allotment of 160 acres of land in the lieved they had the right to make, the only Wichita Reservation to each member of suit authorized by the jurisdictional act of those tribes, they have the benefit of the pro- 1895 was one that would determine the claim ceeds of the sale of such lands in the Wichita of the Choctaws and Chickasaws of an inteReservation as are not needed for the pur- rest in the particular lands here in dispute, poses indicated in the act of Congress. and the claim of the Wichita and Affiliated Bands to be compensated in money for their possessory right in such lands. No suit was authorized by that act that would embrace any and every claim that the Wichita and Affiliated Bands might elect to prefer against the United States. For the reasons given the decree must be reversed with directions to dismiss the petition of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and to make a decree in behalf of the Wichita and Affiliated Bands of Indians fixing the amount of compensation to be made to them on account of such lands in the Wichita Reservation as are not needed in order to meet the requirements of the act of Congress of March 2, 1895, chap. 188, and for such further proceedings as may be consistent with law and with this opinion. It is so ordered. (179 U. S. 335) To what compensation are the Wichita and Affiliated Bands entitled on occount of the lands not needed for the allotments required by the act of Congress? Upon this question this court does not feel bound to express any opinion. The agreement of 1891 between the United States and the Indians shows that the question of the amount of money, if any, to be paid to the Indians on account of the surplus lands was in dispute, and was left to the determination of Congress, whose action, it was agreed, should be final and binding on the Indians; and then by the act of Congress that question was referred to the court of claims, with a right of appeal to this court. But Congress did not indicate any rule for the guidance of the court of claims in fixing the amount due the Indians. It only declared that the compensation allowed in the present suit should not exceed $1.25 per each acre of land not required for the al-LOUIS J. GABLEMAN, Jr., by His Next lotments in severalty. This implied that in the judgment of Congress a less amount might suffice to meet the legal and equitable rights of the Indians and the ends of justice. For the purpose of fixing that compensation, should the surplus lands be valued as of the date the Indians were located on the Reservation, or of the date the agreement of 1891 was ratified by Congress, or of the date when this suit was brought, or of the date when the allotments are all made? Upon these points the act of Congress is silent. The decree in the present suit should declare that the Wichita and Affiliated Bands are entitled to compensation in money for such of the lands as are not needed to meet the requirements of the act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 894, 897, chap. 188, leaving the amount to be fixed upon such evidence as may be adduced by the parties, but not, in any event, exceeding the limit prescribed by Congress. The United States insists that it should be made a condition of any decree recognizing the right to compensation on account of the surplus lands, that the Wichita and Affil Friend, Louis J. Gableman, Sr., Plff. in v. PEORIA, DECATUR, & EVANSVILLE Action against receiver-removal into Fed- The bare fact that the appointment of a recelver was by a Federal court does not make all actions against him cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, which he can remove on that ground into a Federal court, where his appointment was made under the general equity powers of courts of chancery, and not under any provi sion of the Federal Constitution or laws, and his liability depends on general law, and his defense does not rest on any act of Congress. [No. 438.] 336 Submitted November 16, 1900. Decided De cember 10, 1900. N A CERTIFICATE from the United O States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit raising questions as to the right to remove an action against a receiver into a Federal court. Questions answered in the negative. See same case below, 101 Fed. Rep. 1. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: The general policy of the act of March 3, 1887, corrected by the act of August 13, 1883 (24 Stat. at L. chap. 373, 1552; 25 Stat. at L. chap. 866, p. 433), as is apparent on its face, and as has been repeatedly recognized by this court, was to contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 462, 38 L. ed. 511, 514, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, and cases cited. And it is well settled that a case cannot be removed from a state court into the circuit court of the United States on the sole ground that it is one arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim, and, if it does not so appear, the want cannot be supplied by any statement in the petition for removal Collins, 167 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 76, 17 Sup. Ct. or in the subsequent pleadings. Walker v. Rep. 738. It has also been determined that when the is more than one defendant, all the defendapplication rests on that ground, and there ants must join. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 178 U. S. 245, 44 L. ed. 1055, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: The certificate in this case was as follows: "This action was brought originally in the superior court for Vanderburg county, in the state of Indiana, on the 28th of August, 1897, by the plaintiff in error, a citizen of Indiana, against the defendants in error, to recover damages for personal injuries said to have been sustained by the plaintiff in error, in March, 1897, through the negligence of the defendants in error in the operation of a railway train, and the failure to properly operate the gates at a railway crossing. The defendant railway company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Indiana, and the defendant, George Colvin, is a eitizen of Indiana. The defendant, Edward O. Hopkins, was, at the time the injuries were received and the suit was commenced, receiver of the defendant railway company, of tort on the ground of separable controAnd in respect of the removal of actions by appointment of the United States circuit court for the southern district of Illinois, must appear on the face of the plaintiff's versy, that the existence of such controversy and was, at the time of the injuries, in the pleading, and that it does not so appear, if sole control and management of the railway the defendants are charged with direct or company, having an office in Vanderburg concurrent or concerted wrongful action. county, in the state of Indiana, the defendant Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. Colvin being in his employment as a locomotive engineer, and as his servant operating the engine at the time of the injury. The record does not show that the duties of the defendant, Colvin, extended to the operation or maintenance of the gates at the railway crossing. The record does not disclose the place of residence, or the citizenship of Hopkins, as an individual. 131, ante, 67, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67. In this case the pleadings are not before us, and the certificate states that the receiver removed the cause into the circuit court, on his sole petition, "upon the ground that it was a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States." A motion to remand was made and denied, 82 Fed. Rep. 791. This decision was afterwards reversed by the circuit court of appeals, but, as is admitted, a rehearing was granted, and this certificate was then made. 41 C. C. A. 160, 101 Fed. Rep. 1. "In due time after the commencement of the suit the defendant, Edward O. Hopkins, receiver, on his sole petition, removed the cause into the circuit court for the district of Indiana, upon the ground that it was a The receiver rested his contention that the case arising under the Constitution and laws case arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States. A motion to remand of the United States on the single ground of was entered by the plaintiff in error, and his appointment by the Federal court; and, overruled by the circuit court for the dis-upon this record, our opinion of the tenabiltrict of Indiana; and, at the trial subse-ity of that ground is requested. quently, a verdict was, by direction of the Section 3 of the acts of 1887 and 1888 court, returned for the defendants in error.reads: "The questions of law upon which this court desires the advice and instruction of the Supreme Court are: "(1.) Did the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana have, upon these facts, jurisdiction to try the cause? "(2.) Was the cause one properly removable into the circuit court of the United States?" Mr. W. A. Cullop for plaintiff in error. error. "That every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed; but such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed so far as the same shall be necessary to the lends of justice." This act abrogated the rule that a receiver 00 *339 could not be sued without leave of the court appointing him, and gave the citizen the unconditional right to bring his action in the local courts, and to have the justice and amount of his demand determined by the verdict of a jury. He ceased to be compelled to litigate at a distance, or in any other forum, or according to any other course of justice, than he would be entitled to if the property or business were not being administered by the Federal court. The inquiry we are pursuing does not fall within the ruling that a corporation created by Congress has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in respect to any litigation it may have, except as specifi cally restricted. Nor are the cases against United States? officers as such, or on bonds given under acts of Congress, or involving interference with* Federal process, or the due faith and credit to be accorded judgments, in point. The object of the section is manifest, and The question is whether the bare fact that it is equally plain that that object would be the appointment of this receiver was by a open to be defeated if the receiver could re- Federal court makes all actions against him move the case at his volition. The intention cases arising under the Constitution or laws to permit this to be done cannot reasonably of the United States, notwithstanding he be imputed to Congress, and, moreover, such was appointed under the general equity a right would be inconsistent with the gen-powers of courts of chancery, and not under eral policy of the act. As, however, the receiver, as the officer of the court, holds the property for the benefit of all who have an interest in it, and is not to be interfered with in its administration and disposal by the judgment or process of another court, the closing clause of the section, out of abundant caution, provides that when the receiver is sued, without leave, "such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which said receiver or manager was appointed, so far as the same shall be necessary to the ends of justice." any provision of that Constitution or of those laws; and that his liability depends on general law, and his defense does not rest on any act of Congress. We are of opinion that this question must be answered in the negative, and that this has been heretofore so determined as the circuit court of appeals properly held in this case. Bausman v. Dixon, 173 U. S. 113, 43 L. ed. 633, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316; Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 173 U. S. 573, 43 L. ed. 814, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500; McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, 32 L. ed. 771, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 29 L. ed. 261, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104. In Bausman v. Dixon we ruled that a judgment against a receiver appointed by a circuit court of the United States, rendered in due course in a state court, does not involve the denial of an authority exercised under the United States or of a right or im Of course it devolves on the court in possession of the property or funds out of which judgments against its receiver must be paid to adjust the equities between all parties, and to determine the time and manner of payment of judgment creditors necessarily applying for satisfaction from assets so held to the court that holds them. But, as we ob-munity specially set up or claimed under served in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U. S. 103, 38 L. ed. 89, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250, "the right to sue without resorting to the appointing court, which involves the right to obtain judgment, cannot be assumed to have been rendered practically valueless by this further provision in the same section of the statute which granted it." a statute of the United States. That was an action to recover for injuries sustained by reason of the receiver's negligence in operating a railroad company chartered by the state of Washington, though the receiver was the officer of the circuit court, and we said: "It is true that the receiver was an officer of the circuit court, but the validity of his In Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. authority as such was not drawn in question, Co. 178 U. S. 243, 44 L. ed. 1054, 20 Sup. Ct. and there was no suggestion in the pleadings, Rep. 867, we said, in the language of previor during the trial, or, so far as appears, in ous opinions, that when a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, upon the determination of which the result depends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution or laws. And it must appear on the record, by a statement in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to a right which depends on the construction of the Constitution or some law or treaty of the United States, before jurisdiction can be maintained. Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co. 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 276, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222; Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726. the state supreme court, that any right the receiver possessed as receiver was contested, although on the merits the employment of plaintiff was denied, and defendant contended that plaintiff had assumed the risk which resulted in the injury, and had also been guilty of contributory negligence. The mere order of the circuit court appointing a receiver did not create a Federal question under § 709 of the Revised Statutes, and the receiver did not set up any right derived from that order, which he asserted was abridged or taken away by the decision of the state court. The liability to Dixon depended on principles of general law*applicable to the facts, and not in any way on the terms of the order." And although that was the case of a writ of error to a state court, we applied the reasoning in Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., in which the right of appeal to this court from the circuit court of appeals ⚫342 recovered are payable from the property or funds in the course of administration, and the actions may be regarded as ancillary in the sense of subordination to such administration. We have just held in Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S., ante, 109, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 109, that where a receiver sued in the state court had removed the action to the circuit court which had appointed him, and the plaintiff had not moved to remand but had accepted the jurisdiction thus invoked, a judgment in that court in plaintiff's favor might be sustained, because the court would have had original jurisdiction, and it did not lie in the mouth of the receiver, under such cir cumstances, to deny the jurisdiction he had sought. was asserted on the ground that the case | courts, they may, nevertheless, also be arose under the Constitution and laws of the brought in the court by which the receiver United States, because Pope was a receiver was appointed, inasmuch as the judgments of a Federal court. We decided that the suit was ancillary to the original cases in which the receiver was appointed, and that the jurisdiction was dependent on the ground of jurisdiction in those cases, and we also held that the receiver's orders of appointment were not equivalent to laws of the United States in the meaning of the Constitution, and that the mere order of a Federal court, sitting in chancery, appointing a receiver, did not in itself form adequate ground of jurisdiction. We said: "The bill nowhere asserted a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States, but proceeded on common-law rights of action. We cannot accept the suggestion that the mere order of a Federal court, sitting in chancery, appointing a receiver on a creditor's bill, not only enables the receiver to invoke Federal juris- The judgments in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, diction, but to do this independently of the 145 U. S. 593, 36 L. ed. 829, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. ground of jurisdiction of the suit in which 905; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, the order was entered, and thereby 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. affect the finality of decrees in the 654; and Rouse v. Hornsby, 161 U. S. 588, circuit court of appeals in proceed- 40 L. ed. 817, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510, cited by ings taken by him. The validity of the order of the appointment of the receiver in this instance depended on the jurisdiction of the court that entered it, and that jurisdiction, as we have seen, depended exclusive ly upon the diverse citizenship of the parties to the suits in which the appointment was made. The order, as such, created no liability against defendants, nor did it tend in any degree to establish the receiver's right to a money decree, nor to any other remedy prayed for in the amended bill. The liability of defendants arose under general law, and was neither created nor arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States." The question there was as to whether or not the decision of the circuit court of appeals was made final by the sixth section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, and we held that it was, and dismissed the appeal. We could not, however, have arrived at that conclusion if the jurisdiction had rested on the ground that the case arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States, as such cases are not among the classes enumerated in that section, in which the decisions of that court are made final. We have repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of such proceedings is dependent upon that of the main case. Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 49, 39 L. ed. 342, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643, 40 L. ed. 566, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 161 U. S. 115, 40 L. ed. 638, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 537. In Rouse v. Letcher we pointed out that the intention could not be attributed to Congress of allowing judgments on every incidental controversy to be brought to this court for review, while denying such review to the principal decree; and any other conclusion would be manifestly inconsistent with the avowed object of the act of March 8, 1891. It should be added that while these actions against receivers may be brought in other counsel, are consistent with the result reached in Baggs's Case, as well as in this, although there are expressions in the opinions in those cases which are modified by what has since been said. The questions propounded are answered in the negative. (179 U. S. 472) LOUIS LOEB, Plff. in Err., v. TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP, Error to circuit court-jurisdiction of con 1. 2. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to review a decision of a circuit court under the act of Congress of March 3, 1891, § 5, on the ground that the Constitution or law of the state is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, is not limited to a case in which the constitutional question is raised by the plaintiff but extends to every case in which either party claims that the state law is in contravention of the Federal Constitutlon and that claim is either sustained or rejected, if the unsuccessful party seeks to have the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court. The opinion of a circuit court of the United States, regularly filed, and which has been an. nexed to and transmitted with the record to the Supreme Court of the United States, in accordance with rule 8, may be examined on the question of the jurisdiction to review the case by reason of a constitutional question, in order to ascertain whether either par ty claimed in the lower court that a state statute upon which the judgment necessarily depended, in whole or in part, was in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. 8. A municipal corporation is within the words | priate and enter upon and hold any real es"any corporation," in the Judiciary act of tate within the township necessary for such August 13, 1888, chap. 866 (25 Stat. at L 433, 434, § 1), under which the assignee of purpose; a chose in action made by a corporation and payable to bearer may invoke the jurisdiction of a Federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship without regard to the citizenship of the original holder. The unconstitutionality of the mode of assessment provided by § 3 of Ohio Act Gen. Assem. April 27, 1893 (if conceded), would not defeat the other portions of the act, which provide for the making of a street improvement and the issuance of bonds by the town to pay therefor. 5. The Federal courts, in determining contract rights as affected by a state Constitution, will enforce the contract in accordance with the Constitution of the state as interpreted at the time the contract was made by the highest court of the state, without regard to a contrary interpretation made by such court after the contract was made. [No. 42] That by the 2d section of the act the town. ship trustees were directed to "immediately make application to the probate court of the county as provided in § 2236 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, and thereafter, as far as practicable, the proceedings shall conform to and be had under the provisions of §§ 2236 to 2261, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of Ohio;" and, that "for the purpose of raising money necesThat by the 4th section it was provided the trustees of said township are hereby ausary to meet the expense of the improvement, thorized and directed to issue the bonds of the township, payable in instalments or at intervals not exceeding in all the period of*6* years, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, which bonds shall not be sold for less than their par value." 90 Ohio Local Laws, 251. Argued April 27, 1900. Decided December of the act. But as it was the duty of the cir 10, 1900. IN ERROR to of Ohio to review a decision for defendant ants in error. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: The petition did not set out the 3d section cuit court to take notice of its provisions, and as it must be referred to in order to dishere given in full: pose of the questions arising on this record, "The trustees shall receive reasonable compensation for their services, which shall not exceed the sum of $25 each, which, with all costs and expenses of constructing said imWar-provement, together with the interest on any bonds issued by the trustees for the same, shall be levied and assessed upon each front foot of the lots and lands abutting on each side of said Williams avenue between the termini mentioned in § 1 hereof, and shall be a lien from the date of the assessment upon the respective lots or parcels of lands assessed; said assessment shall be payable in five annual payments, and shall be paid to the township treasurer; and the option of paying his portion of such assessment in full within a period of twenty days from the date of the levy thereof shall be given to each of the property owners, but no notice to the property owners of such option shall be necessary. The township treasurer shall, on or before the 2d Monday of September, annually, certify all unpaid assessments to the county auditThe suit is upon bonds issued by the town-or, and the same shall be placed on the tax ship for the purpose of raising money to meet the cost of widening and extending a certain avenue within its limits. This action was brought in the court below by Loeb, a citizen of Indiana, against the trustees of Columbia township in Hamilton county, Ohio. The petition was demurred to upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the township. After argument the demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiff electing not to plead further, judgment was rendered for the defendant. The questions to be considered relate to the jurisdiction of this court, the validity under the Constitution of the United States of an act of the general assembly of Ohio in virtue of which the bonds in suit were issued, and the applicability in this case of certain decisions of the supreme court of the state rendered after such bonds were executed and delivered. The pleadings and orders of court make the following case: The petition alleged that on April 27th, 1893, the general assembly of Ohio passed an act by the 1st section of which the trustees of that township were authorized and required to widen and extend Williams avenue between certain points named, and to appro list, and shall be, with 10 per cent penalty to cover interest and cost of collection, collected by the county treasurer in the same manner as other taxes are collected, and when collected he shall pay the same to the township treasurer; and all moneys received by the township treasurer on such assessments shall be applied to the payment of the bonds issued under this act, and for no other purpose; and for the purpose of enforcing the collection of the assessments so certified to him the county treasurer shall have the same power and authority now allowed by law for the collection of state and county taxes." 90 Ohio Local Laws, 251. It further appears from the petition that the township trustees appropriated land for the avenue in the manner provided in the act; and that for the purpose of raising ther money necessary to meet the expense of the |