furely is a very unreasonable way of arguing; fince, at the fame rate, it might be proved, that there is no fuch thing as truth, or reafon in the world: for all men on all fides lay claim to it and yet the far greater part of mankind muft needs be deceived. The proper inference in this cafe is, not that, because most men, who would be thought masters of truth, are not, therefore there is no fuch thing as truth; but on the contrary, that truth is fomewhere to be found, elfe all men every where would not equally lay claim to it.

There are many empiricks in the world, who pretend to infallible methods of curing all patients. Because these are cheats and impoftors, does it follow, that there are no able and fkilful phyficians, no healing virtues in herbs and minerals? Or rather, may it not from hence be ftrongly concluded, that there muft certainly be an art of medicine, built upon true principles, and founded in the nature of things; becaufe fo many men every day advance groundless claims to it, and fo many others give in to their frauds and delufions? Were there no real and true remedies, there would be no foundation for fuch men to amufe the world with falfe ones; but they would, as foon as they appeared, be immediately exploded.

In like manner, if no true miracles had ever been done in proof of a divine revelation, it is impoffible to conceive, how fo many falfe religions fhould have been fupported by the pretence of them, or how the argument from miracles fhould at all times have had so strong an influence upon the minds of men. But

II. Secondly,

II. Secondly, As the common fenfe and opinion of mankind favours this fort of proof; fo will it appear to be in itself highly reasonable and neceffary, if we confider the general nature of it.

When any perfon pretends a divine commiffion to publish a new doctrine; in order to procure its reception, 'tis requifite he should be furnished with fome competent motives of credibility; he muft, by fome infallible fign or token, fhew, that he was really fent on that errand, and not expect to be believed on his own bare word and affirmation. Now this fign or token, what can it be, but his doing somewhat which it is on all hands confeffed, that no one, but God can do? that is in other terms, how can a man prove his miffion, but by a miracle? Will it be faid, that the doctrine he brings, may be fo pure and holy, and every way worthy of God, as to carry the ftamp and evidence of its own divine original; that the very nature of the meffage may clearly and fully evince, from whence the meffenger came? I fee not how this can well be. A doctrine may be very holy and good, and every way agreeable to the conceptions we have of God, and yet not be of divine revelation. The philofophers among the heathens uttered many fuch truths, as might have become them, had they been really infpired; and yet we believe not, for this reason, that they were infpired, but that they fpake merely from the dictates of their own reafon, and from the general confent of the wifest part of mankind: and fo may any other man al

fo,

fo, let the doctrine he teaches be never fo juft and holy, unless he produces fomewhat befide the doctrine itself, to prove that it was revealed to him. For though the badnefs of any doctrine, and its difagreeablenefs to the eternal rules of right reafon, be a certain fign that it did not come from God, yet the goodness of it can be no infallible proof that it did. Indeed when a good man publishes a good doctrine, and affirms that he had it from God, we may, for his own fake, and for his doctrine's fake, be difpofed to give credit to him; we may be inclined, perhaps, rather to be of opinion, that the thing is as he fays, than that is not; but we cannot be wrought up into a firm belief, an unfhaken affurance concerning it, merely by his affirmation. He may, at the bottom, not be fo good a man as he seems to be; and may therefore (it is poffible) intend to deceive me; or he may have been himself deceived, and mistaken a dream, or ftrong imagination, for a reality. Such things have fometimes happened, and fuch things may therefore happen again; and, while I have thefe doubts and poffibilities before my eyes, 'tis impoffible I fhould embrace his authority with the full and entire affent of my mind. But if to his own folemn affirmation he adds the performance of fome work, which, all things confidered, I have the utmost reafon to think he he could not perform, without immediate divine affistance; that indeed, and nothing lefs than that, is a proof, which I ought not, and am not able to withstand.

It will, perhaps, be further objected, that if the doctrine taught appears to be in itself good

and

and reasonable, 'tis no matter whether it is proved to be of immediately divine authority. For a good man will receive a doctrine evidently good and reasonable, whether any one be divinely in fpired to preach it, or not; and a doctrine evidently evil and abfurd, he will not receive, on the account of whatever pretended infpiration, And therefore, what need of miracles to make way for an opinion, which, if agreeable to reafon, will make its own way without their affiftance; and if contrary .o reason, can never be entertained by a reasonable creature, though it hould have ten thousand miracles to fupport it?

Now it must be confeffed, that this objection is fo far of force, as it relates to moral truths, and to whatever is difcoverable by the light of natural reason. There is indeed no neceffity for miracles to induce a belief of thefe; nor is it pretended that God ever employed them to this purpofe, to convince men either of his being, or providence, or of the eternal differences of good and evil because these truths were of themselves fufficiently obvious and plain, and needed not a divine teftimony to make them plainer. But the truths, which are neceffary in this manner to be atrefted, are thofe, which are of pofitive inftitution; thofe, which if God had not pleased to reveal them, human reafon could not have discovered; and thofe, which, even now they are revealed human reafon cannot account for, and perfectly comprehend. Such for example, are the doctrines of baptifm and the fupper of the Lord, of the refurrection of the fame body, of the diftinction of perfons in the unity of the di

APS

t

rine effence, and of the falvation of mankind by the blood and interceffion of Jefus. It is this kind of truth that God is properly faid to reveal, truths, of which, unlefs revealed, we should have always continued ignorant; and 'tis in ore, der only to prove thefe truths to have been really: revealed, that we affirm miracles to be neceffary. And though in the body of the revelation, itself,, known and unknown truths may be mixed, doc trines evident by the light of nature, with fuch, as we receive only by inspiration, yettis for theị fake of the latter of thefe, that miracles must be done, not at all on the account of the former. So that reafon being no competent judge of thofe, doctrines, to the confirmation of which miracles are specially adapted, cannot, fay, by examine ing into the nature of fuch, doctrines, determine, that a proof of them, by miracles, is needlefs.

Hitherto I have only confidered the generalnature of miracles, as they are acts of fupernatu❤ ral power, neceffarily attendant on revealed, doctrines, in order to promote their reception.

4

Thirdly, I proceed now, in the laft, place, to fhew, how well they are fuited to this purpose, by reafon of fome peculiar characters and propertics that belong to them, For, Fift, They are extremely fit to awaken men's attention.-Secondly, They are the fhortest and most expeditious....... way of proof-And, Thirdly, They are an ar gument of the most univerfal force and efficacy, reaching all capacities and understandings..

1. In order to the propagation of a new doc-, trine, the first thing requitite is, to create attenVOL. III.

R

tion,