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Louisville Land and Improvement Co.,97 Fed. 723; Holmes v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75. The rule in Marshall Corporations 222 is in direct contradiction to the above but does not seem to be supported by reason or authority.

FIRE INSURANCE POLICY-Stipulation AS TO INCUMBRANCES-EFFECT.— NEHER V. Western Assurance Co., 82 PAC. 166 (WASH.).—Held, that where one in possession of personal property encumbered by a chattel mortgage, makes an oral application for insurance thereon, without making any misrepresentations as to his interest and not knowing that the insurance company did not insure mortgage chattels, may recover on a policy for loss, even though it contains a condition that it shall be void if the chattels are encumbered by a mortgage. Root and Crow, JJ., dissenting.

Some courts have held that where there was a condition similar to the one above, the insured was precluded from recovering, notwithstanding the fact that the company made no inquiry concerning the interest of the insured; Waller v. Northern Assurance Co., 10 Fed. 232; and they base their decisions upon the principal that it is the duty of the insured to disclose all facts which might influence the company in assuming the risk. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. 25. But by the great weight of authority the courts say that since the insured seldom sees the policy until the contract is made and he has paid his premium, it is unfair to compel him to be bound by such conditions which are generally more or less technical and hard to understand; Dooly v. Hanover Ins. Co., 16 Wash. 155; also, unless the company makes inquiries, it insures at its peril; O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 131; so that, such conditions do not preclude the insured from recovering. VanKırk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 627.

INNS-WHAT CONSTITUTES A GUEST.-CRAPO v. ROCKWELL ET AL., 94 N. Y. SUPP. 1122.—Where one stays in a hotel for a period of seventeen months, installs a piano and other heavy furniture, and makes special arrangements with the proprietors, held, that she is not such a guest, in the eyes of the law, as to render the innkeeper liable as insurer for damages to her property. If any one goes to a hotel and rents a room by the month, he is not a guest in a legal sense. Horner v. Harvey, 3 N. M.. 197. An innkeeper is not liable as an insurer for the goods of one whose status is that of a boarder merely. Lusk v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468. If an inhabitant of a place makes a special contract with an innkeeper for board at his inn, he is a boarder and not a guest. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163. If a person goes upon a special contract, to board and to sojourn at an inn, he is not, in the sense of the law, a guest, but he is deemed a boarder. Story on Bailments, Sect. 447. Parsons on Contracts, vol. II, page 152, says: The special contract between the boarder and the master of the house maybe express or implied, and a length of residence, upon certain terms, might certainly be one circumstance, which, with others, might lead to the inference of such a contract.

INTERSTATE BUSINESS-TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.-WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co. v. HUGHES, 51 S, E. (VA.), 225.—Held, that one state may enforce a penalty for delay in the transmission of messages by telegraph between two points within its borders although part of the transmission is across another state and the delay actually occurs in the latter.

This decision following Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192 adds to the weight of authority. But see State v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co.,40 Minn. 267; and New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., a Inters. Com. Rep. 289. Where there are connecting carriers the rule is in doubt. Sternberger v. Railroad Co. 29 S. C. 510; Leavell v. West. Union Tel. Co., 116 N. C. 211. When the state attempts to “regulate” rates under such circumstances it acts without authority. Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 187 U. S. 617.

LIBEL-PRIVILEGE.—Prewitt v. WILSON, 105 N. W. 365 (Ia.).—Held, that a defamatory publication concerning a candidate for public office is privileged but only conditionally,

There is a direct conflict of authority on this point. Some courts hold that such publications are to be considered on the same basis as an ordinary writing. Post Pub. Co. v. Hallans, 59 Fed. 530; Root v. King, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 613. Others hold that they are conditionally privileged; that is, if made in good faith, even though false, the writer is not liable. State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465; Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. 162. It must not be reckless repetition of a rumor but must be on probable cause. Burke v. Mascarick, 81 Cal. 302; Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404. The reason is that each elector has the right to discuss and inform others as to his belief in the fitness or un fitness of the candidate. However, it must be published solely for the purpose of informing other electors or the writer will be liable. State v. Keenan, 82 N. W. 792 (Ia.). The ruling in the principal case is, therefore, in accordance with the general rule and prior decisions in Iowa. Bays v. Hunt, 60 Ia. 251.

MASTER AND SERVANT-OWNER'S DUTY TOWARD CONTRACTOR'S SERVANT.-STEVEns v. United Gas and ELECTRIC Co., 60 ALT. 848 (N. H.).— Where servant of an independent contractor, while engaged in erecting a power house for defendant is injured by defectively insulated wires maintained on the premises by the defendant, held, that the defendant is liable since he owed him the non-delegable duty of protection from concealed dangers. Young, J. dissenting.

The liability here is analogous to that of the owner of real estate who is held responsible for the injuries of those expressly or impliedly invited on his premises. Johnson v. Spear, 76 Mich. 139. The relation of master and servant does not subsist between proprietor and a servant of contractor; only that of landowner and invitee. Thompson, Negligence, §§ 680, 979; Huffcut, Agency, 278. Must warn them of all danger. Erickson v. Railroad, 41 Minn. 500, and is responsible if injured by instrumentalities he has furnished. Coughtay v. Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124. Although the owner's liability has not been recognized in some cases, where the contractor has full control over the servants and premises. Reier v. Detroit Steel & Spring Works, 109 Mich. 244. The owner's responsibility where contractor has such control would be the same as a landlord to his tenant's servant, Towne v. Thompson, 68 N. H. 317, except that owner must not contract for a nuisance. Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55.

MUNICIAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE-Maintenance of SEWERS. LOCKWOOD V. CITY Of Dover, 61 ATL. 32, (N. H.).-Held, that

where a city voluntarily exercises its authority to construct a sewer for the local advantage of the municipality, it is liable for negligence in the construction or maintenance of same. And, where the construction of such sewers is put in charge of board of commissioners, they act as agents of city and not public officers and the city is not relieved of its liability.

That an action at law will lie against a city for damages caused by negligence in carrying out a public improvement authorized by statute, seems to be well established. Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 149 Mass. 44; Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester. 3 N. Y. 463. Municipal cor. porations are responsible for due care in the execution of any work ordered by them, and if the work is one for the special benefit of its own people, it must not negligently be allowed to get out of repairs to the injury of individuals. Cooley on Torts, page 621. When the construction and maintenance of streets, sewers, etc., is put in exclusive control of a board of street and park commissioners it is interpreted to mean “exclusive" of other officers and not exclusive of city. Ehrgott v. The Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264. Members of such board are considered as agents of the city and the latter is there; fore liable for their negligence. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 531.

NUISANCES-CREATION BY GRANTOR-NOTICE TO ABATE.-GRAHAM V. CHICAGO I. & L. Ry. Co., 74 N. E. 641 (IND.).—Wherein an action for a nuisance on the alleged theory that defendant created the nuisance, it being specially found that the nuisance was created by defendant's grantor, held, plaintiff was not entitled to recover, in the absence of notice to defendant of such nuisance and a demand for abatement a reasonable time before suit is brought.

The notice Carleton v.

There must be a request to abate. Cooley on Torts, 728. may be written or oral or by acts clearly giving the party notice. Reddington, 21 N. H. 291–311. The grantee does not become responsible merely because he becomes the owner. London v. Mullins, 52 Iowa App. 410. Lufkin v. Zane, 157 Mass. 117. Although the principle "that it is clearly his (grantee's) duty to look into the right of his grantor before purchasing" was maintained in a well written opinion in Caldwell v Gale. 11 Mich. 774, in Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 539, it was held that neither express notice nor positive request to abate was necessary. The better opinion would seem that the liability for the nuisance is not incurred by the grantee on account of his ownership but through his participation in and continuance of the wrong and notice would therefore be necessary. Conhocton Stone R. v. B. N, Y. & E. R. R., 51 N. Y. 513.

PATENTS INVENTION-COMBINATION OF Old Elements.-Imperial BOTTLE CUP & MACHINE Co. v. CROWN CORK & SEAL Co. 139 Fed. 312.—Where a patent consists of a combination of old elements co-operating upon a new principle to produce the same results as a prior patent, held, that the use of the old elements may limit but cannot defeat the patent. Gaff, J., dissenting

To entitle improvement to protection as invention it should arise from the exercise of the inventive facilities involving something more than is obvious to persons skilled in that particular line. Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U. S. 112; Pack ing Co. v. Provision Co. 105 U. S. 566. A combination may result either from the exercise of inventive skill or from mechanical ingenuity and experiments, but it is an invention and the subject matter of a patent in the former case

only. Robinson, Patents, 228. By the weight of authority a combination of old elements is patentable when the several elements of which it is composed produce by their joint action either a new and useful result or an old result in a cheaper or otherwise more advantageous way. Niles Tool Co. v. Betts Machine Co. 27 Fed. 301; Stephenson v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 114 U. S. 149. It has been held that, in order that a combination of old elements be patentable, there must be some new results obtained. Hoffman v. Young, 18 O. G. 794; Stutz v. Armstrong, 28 O. G. 367. But the weight of authority is with the present case. Rob., Patents, § 155, N. 1.

TAXATION-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.-Delaware, LackawANNA & WESTERN R. R. Co. v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.-25 SUP. CT, 669.— Where the capital stock of a corporation is appraised for the purpose of taxation without deducting the value of property held by the corporation outside and beyond the jurisdiction of the state making the appraisement, held, that the collection of a tax under such an appraisement would amount to the taking of property without due process of law. The Chief Justice, dissenting.

A state cannot tax property situated without its territorial limits. Cooley, Taxation, 84; Darwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492. And it is almost universally held that the capital of a corporation is represented by the property in which it has been invested and that a tax upon the capital stock is in effect a tax upon such property. Gordon's Exr. v, Baltimore, 5 Gill 231; Rome R. R. Co. v. Rome, 14 Ga. 275; Cooley, Taxation, 396. Private corporations are held to be "persons" within the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to due process of law. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. R. 18 Fed. 385. This decision is distinguishable from Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 163 U. S. 194, holding that it was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment where a tax was laid upon the property of a corporation in the state, assessed on a basis of valuation derived by the rule of proportion to the whole capital stock.

WILLS-BEQUEST TO WIFE-DIVORCE-IN RE JONES' ESTATE, 60 ATL. 915 (Pa.).—Held-Bequest to my "wife. M. B. " is not revoked by implication because subsequently the wife procured an absolute divorce, the word "wife" being descriptive only. Mitchell, C., J. dissenting.

It is now well settled in this country that a bequest to a wife by name does not imply a continuing condition and is not revoked by divorce. So "to my wife A," Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492; Peck, Husband and Wife, 226; to "my intended wife E. J.,” Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio, St. 298; so for insurance policy payable to "my wife M. B," Brown v. Grand A. O. of U. W., 208 Pa. IoI; as to wife in devise to "T. B. and R. his wife," Bullock v. Lilley, N. J. Eq. 489; so to "my present wife "entire will not revoked. Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18. A will, however, is revoked where there has been an absolute divorce and the reciprocal property right have been arranged between the parties. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16; Schouler Wills, Section 426 A. The English courts, although formerly in according with American decisions, Bullmore v. Wynter,22 Ch. D. 619 and Boddington. v. Clairat, 25 Ch. D. 685, have recognized revocation of requests by divorce in Hitchins v. Morrieson, 40 Ch. D. 30, and criticized the holding in the cases above cited.

WILLS-CONSTRUCtion-Bequest to Creditor—Ademption—IN RE ARNTON, 94 N. Y UPP. 741.-Where the testator made a bequest to his credi

tors-the will reciting that it and others were made in an effort to repay those who had been kind to testator during his long illness-and the bequest was greater than the indebtedness. Held, that it did not amount to a satisfaction of the same.

Though the presumption, especially in Equity, is that a bequest equal to or greater than the debt, is intended as a satisfaction, slight circumstances will take the case out of the operation of the rule. Harris v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 10 R. I. 313; Cloud et ux. v. Clinkenbeard's Exrs. 47 Ky. 397; King v. Berry's Exrs., 2 N. J. Eq. 44. Pennsylvania and Illinois follow the English decisions-a legacy equal to or greater than the debt, and not contingent or uncertain, is presumed to be a satisfaction of the debt. Wesco's Appeal 55 P. St. 195, But the legacy must be paid before it can be set up as a discharge of the debt. Maloney et al. Admrs. v. Scanlon, 53 Ill. 122. The legacy is intended as a bounty and not as a payment, Strong v. William's Exrs., 12 Mass. 391. But in all questions of construction of wills "the intention of the testator has always been regarded as the pole star by which any construction of the testamentary instrument is to be guided." Bispham's Equity, p. 119.

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