discovered and which underlies the modern Mexican law on this subject. Students of legal history in Louisiana and certain of the southwestern states should welcome this addition of the author to the proper scope of his work. The author's introduction of fifteen pages is an ambitious effort. It notices the point of contact between certain American states and the civil law, discusses the codification of the Roman law by the Emperor Justinian, and gives some interesting data as to the possible influence of Assyrian, Persian and Egyptian law, on Roman water lay. Furthermore, it contains what is found in the works of the French civilian Domat and in the French Civil Code, relative to the same subject, a feature which would have come more logically in the supplemental posterior portion of the book. C. P. S. Cases on Domestic Relations and the Law of Persons. Second edition. By Edwin H. Woodruff, Professor of Law at Cornell University. Baker, Voorhees & Co., New York. Art canvas, pages XV, 624. The compilation of a satisfactory case-book upon the law of Domestic Relations is attended by peculiar and exceptional difficulties by reason of the changeable state of the law and the chaotic condition of the decisions by which the compiler is confronted. Professor Woodruff achieved an enviable degree of success by the first edition of his work and now, after an interval of eight years, we are favored with a new edition differing from the first chiefly in the recent decisions which are inserted to the extent of a hundred additional pages and numerous additional notes. These new cases add materially to the value of the entire work and the notes, while they are mostly brief, are very satisfactory. The author in his very brief preface calls special attention to the fact that a group of cases on conflict of jurisdiction in divorce cases has been added, but an examination of these cases indicates that, in this instance, Professor Woodruff has been less fortunate than usual in his selection of decisions. No mention whatever is made of that remarkable series of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1901, beginning with Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155. On the other hand, space is given to People v. Baker, 76 N. Y., 78, which is practically overruled by the Supreme Court in Atherton v. Atherton. No student should be allowed to complete his study of Domestic Relations without having had a brief opportunity to gain an accurate knowledge of the law as established in these cases by our court of last resort. Aside from this regrettable omission, Professor Woodruff's book commends itself to every student and will also prove of universal value to the practitioner. B. E. C. Wills on Circumstantial Evidence. Fifth Edition. By Sir Alfred Wills on Circumstantial Evidence is an exposition of the fascinating parts of the criminal law. Many of the cases digested and used for illustration remind one rather of the stories of Poe and Doyle than of a technical work-so much the more interesting because of their truth. Of course these cases are the pick of a century—the confession without guilt, or the case minutely perfect made out by the prosecution only to be controverted by an unimpeachable alibi are phenomena to be observed not more than once in the life of any man-but they make one forget the daily routine of pettiness, of sordidness, and of filth, which gains for the practice of criminal law so universal disfavor and which repels most of the greater lawyers. Without regard to its technical merits, but merely for the human interest of the cases, the book is well worth reading. The American notes, though containing fewer pages, are in much finer print than the text and since the digests of cases are more brief, they actually cover rather more ground. Some of the American cases are given in detail and are of great interest, especially those like that of the Chicago Anarchists, Molineaux and Prof. Webster. No table of cases, however, is cited which is rather detrimental, we think, to the general utility. The present writer sought in vain for the case of Martin Thorne and H. H. Holmes in the American notes, though possibly some mention is made of them, which he overlooked. But both for analogy and reference the book, and especially the American notes, ought, to those who have the opportunity and inclination to undertake the great cases of the criminal law, where usually the circumstantial is the only evidence obtainable, to be of great value. G. S. A. Jurisprudence, Law, and Ethics. By Edgar B. Kinkead, M. A., Professor of Law, Ohio State University. The Banks Law Publishing Co., New York, 1905. Buckram, pages, 357. This work consists of a collection of lectures prepared for the class room. It is an introduction of primary and fundamental principles. They are set out tersely, almost epigrammatically, leaving the reader plenty of opportunity for individual speculation. The author does not attempt to treat the subject of jurisprudence and ethics from any original standpoint, but is content in introducing us to what the great minds of continental Europe, England and America have thought, quoting freely from their works. The science of law, its fundamental basis and its relation to other sciences is displayed, and its objects set forth. In part II the professional relation of the lawyer to the bench, his fellow members of the bar and his client is discussed. Lawyers as well as students should find this part of the work useful and interesting. Too much cannot be said on professional ethics. Such works as this, together with more stringent requirements for admission to the bar in several states should help raise the moral standards of the American lawyer. M, S. W. Little, Brown & American Railroad Rates. By Walter C. Noyes. Co., Boston. 1905. Cloth, pages 277. This volume contains a clear, clean cut exposition of the present railroad problem,-federal regulation of rates. In the early chapters the author, treating the basal principles of rate making, classification, tariffs, discriminations, competition and combination, and movements of rates, sets forth the evils resulting from regulation of rates by railroad officials. The last two chapters consider the expediency of governmental regulation of rates and the inadequacy of existing federal legislation. The Interstate Commerce Commission Act in its provision for the regulation of rates is merely declaratory of the common law rule that all rates shall be reasonable. Congress has not given the commission power to complete the remedy by prescribing a reasonable rate to supersede one found to be unreasonable. Maximum Rate Case, 167 U. S. 512. Thus the power of the commission ceases at the vital point. The present problem, therefore, is to provide a constitutional and effectual plan for declaring authoritatively that a rate is unreasonable and also what rate should be substituted therefor. In effect, the remedies generally proposed provide that the existing law should be amended to give the present commission this latter additional power, e. g., the Esch-Townsend Bill, which has passed the House of Representatives and awaits the action of the Senate. The author strongly opposes these proposed remedies as unconstitutional in that they confer judicial and legislative powers upon the same body. He places much reliance on the following extract from the Maximum Rate Case, supra: "It is one thing to enquire whether the rates which have been collected are reasonable that is a judicial act-but an entirely different thing to prescribe rates which shall be charged in the future, that is a legislative act." In passing it is well to not that this question is still res integra, since the above statement is clearly dictum, the question before the court in that case being merely whether Congress had as a matter of fact given the existing commission power to prescribe future rates, not whether such a grant by Congress would be unconstitutional. The court said: The court said: "Our conclusion, then, is that Congress has not conferred upon the commission the legislative power of prescribing rates." (p. 512). To avoid this constitutional objection the author proposes the following plan: "First: A special court should be created in accordance with the constitutional provision concerning the federal judiciary. Complaints made by persons aggrieved or in their behalf by a public official or board, that specific railroad rates upon interstate traffic are unreasonable and unjust should be presented to this court. After speedy notice to the carrier the court should sum. marily inquire into the reasonableness of the rates complained of. If found reasonable, the complaint should be dismissed; if found unreasonable, the court should enjoin its further collection. This would end the function of the court. Second: In case a rate was found unreasonable all the papers in the case, together with the evidence, should be certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission, which should be empowered, upon an inspection of the papers, then to make a maximum rate to take the place of that found unreasonable by the court. The rate prescribed should remain in force a prescribed time, but should be subject to modification by the commission." (p. 255). This scheme is ingenious and its constitutionality is beyond question. Yet, however constitutional a scheme it may be it is of no avail if impracticable. The following reasons seem sufficient to show the difficulty of a practical application of the author's scheme and to establish the necessity of conferring upon one body authority to declare that a rate is unreasonable and also what rate should be substituted therefor. I. The second body might not have sufficient evidence before it to enable it to determine the reasonable rate. By the author's plan this body is to consider only the evidence before the first tribunal. The only question before this body being the reasonableness of the rate complained of, evidence bearing on this point only would be admissible. In case the rate complained of is palpably unreasonable it would be unnecessary for the first tribunal, in determining that the charge is unreasonable, to go through the process of determining the exactly reasonable rate. Says the author, "The courts might enjoin the collection of one dollar as an unreasonable charge. There would be no necessity for determining whether eighty or ninety cents would be unreasable." (p 254). Evidence of the latter fact would not be essential to the former conclusion. II. In case of a close question as to the unreasonableness of the charge it would undoubtedly be necessary for the first tribunal to adopt some standard of reasonableness for purposes of comparison. Of course a standard would have to be adopted by the second body in all cases. There is no certainty that both bodies would adopt the same standard. Some conception of the difficulty of fixing a proper standard and of the broad field for honest differences of opinion may be had from the following language of the Supreme Court in the Freight Association Cuse, 166 U S. 331: "What is the proper standard by which to judge the fact of reasonable rates? Must the rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to amount to a sum sufficient to afford a shareholder a fair and reasonable profit? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit? That depends sometimes upon the risk incurred, and as the rate itself differs in different localities, which is the one to which reference is to be made as the standard? Or is the reasonableness of the profit to be limited to a fair return upon the capital that would have been sufficient to build and equip the road, if honestly expended? Or, is still another standard to be created, and the reasonableness of the charges tried by the cost of a carriage of the article and a reasonable profit allowed on that? And in such case would contribution to a sinking fund to make repairs be assumed as a proper item? Or is the reasonableness of the charge to be tested by reference to the charges for the transportation of the same kind of property made by other roads similarly situated? It is quite apparent, therefore, that it is exceedingly difficult to formulate even the terms of the rule itself which should govern in the matter of determining what would be reasonable rates for transportation." In the opinion of the author "The only way is to base charges upon ability to pay. But in measuring ability and differences in ability there is no definite rule to go by. The method is so flexible and elastic that there is much room for honest differences of opinion as to the precise point where the rate should be fixed." (p. 236). In Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. 138 Fed. 753, the United States Circuit Court repudiates this rule of "charging what the tariff will bear." Even if a proper standard were agreed upon there_might arise a difference of opinion regarding its application. Thus a rate declared unreasonable by the first body might be found to be reasonable by the second body. Nor do we think the author's objection to combining these powers in one tribunal well taken. That legislative, executive and judical functions should not be exercised by one body is a maxim of political science. It may be well to note that Montesquieu, if not the parent, the foster parent of this precept, in saying, "There can be no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the executive and legislative powers," Spirit of Laws, Bk. XI C. 6, meant, as his own words indicate, especially when viewed in the light of the example before him, the English Constitution, considered by him "The Mirror of Political Liberty," that the same hands that possess the whole power of one department should not exercise the whole power of another department. Further on in this chapter he provides that the preferment of charges of impeachment and trial of the same should be in the hands of the legislature and that "the executive power should have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting. It is unnecessary to call attention to the numerous exceptions to the maxim made by the federal and state constitutions. Besides these exceptions there are many others based on the solid ground of public convenience and practical necessity. The courts exercise legislative power in prescribing rules of procedure, evidence, etc. Of necessity these great functions of government overlap each other and involve in their execution many incidental pow |