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standing of it than others, he ought not to add another book of the old-fashioned kind to the over-burdened literature now existing.

The writer, therefore, on comparative jurisprudence, who brings to his task proper qualifications and produces the needful kind of book will render a constantly increasing service to bar and bench, and more than regain the height formerly occupied by legal writers. If his deductions can never be as weighty with the court as were the responsa prudentium of the Roman lawyers with the prætors, yet he can always be one of the strong and welcome lights illuminating the judicial pathway. And the more complex our jurisprudence, the greater is the need of expert or special study of its different branches. Nor is there any reason for doubting the worth of the researches of any expert who truly achieves his task. Doubtless the writing of many of the state books has grown out of the inability or fear to produce those of the kind described. The cases may indeed become so numerous pertaining to a subject that no one can become master of them; but that time is not yet.

To produce a book of the highest utility on a branch of the common law, the writer can do something more than present narrowly the decisions. These are binding rules in the states where they were rendered; in other states they are simply reasons to the judicial mind. The law writer who is treating them comparatively regards them in a double aspect; for the citizen of the state wherein they were delivered they are formal declarations or rules of law, and in collecting, arranging and reproducing them the writer acts as a recorder; for the courts or citizens of other states they are not rules in any sense, but simply reasons; worthy, it may be, of conversion into rules whenever the proper occasion for doing so shall arise. Consequently a court in one state does not recognize any requirement to adopt the rules established in another state, except as evidence of the law in that state. In other regards its rules are reasons; often very weighty, fit for adoption by another jurisdiction. While the courts thus deal with the rules of other states, too often the law writer hesitates or neglects to regard them in the latter aspect, thereby impairing the usefulness of his work. He fails to sift and classify conflicting decisions, through fear perhaps that he does not understand them, and will put them into the wrong category. Of course, this criticism does not apply to all law writers; some of them clearly show a mastery of their subject, and do not fear to classify conflicting decisions and to deduce from these the better or more general rule.

As the common law rules established in every state are only reasons in other states for establishing similar rules, why should not statutes be thus regarded and considered also by the comparative law writer? Thus in most of the states both by common law and statute the holder of a check cannot sue the drawee bank unless it has promised to pay. In four states the opposite rule prevails. The latter rule has been recently superseded by statute in several states, and doubtless the former will ultimately become universal. In several of the newer states no rule has yet been adopted, but doubtless will be in the near future. In presenting to the court in one of these states the reasons for establishing the more general rule, why should not the statutes embodying it, showing the legislative, representative will, have quite as much or more weight than the decisions of courts representing the judicial will? Is it not as clearly within the province of the law writer to present the statutes establishing or superseding a common-law rule, as the legal decisions?

Again, a common-law rule is often superseded by a statute of which the writer takes no notice. The rule has been swept away; surely this fact is worth giving to one who is trying to find out what the rule is and how generally it exists. By thus stating the rule and ignoring its supersedure, the law writer is without excuse for leading his reader astray. It is just as easy to examine statutes as reports; only more time is required to complete the enterprise. And, after all, is not this the principal reason for producing so many imperfect books, the author's unwillingness or lack of patience to devote the time needful to write better ones?

Of late, another kind of book is appearing, in which completeness of citation is the author's goal. Such works are supposed to be especially valuable to the brief-maker as a quarry, to, which he can go and find ore. Many of the citations massed bear indirectly on the principle, yet by the method are rightfully included. Doubtless these works have a real use, but are still wanting in the comparative idea, the sifting of cases, putting them under their proper classifications and evolving from them the better rules. They may serve as authorities for the rules stated; they are still lacking in the higher critical elements.

Lastly, excellent as are many of our law schools, can they not break into new ground by dealing with a larger number of the unsettled questions than they now do? Doubtless some instructors would say: "It is our business to teach law students the leading or most general principles." But ought the work of instruction to stop with their presentation? Many of the conflicting rules are

of frequent application, and therefore it would seem that the student ought, if possible, to have some knowledge of them. The conflict has grown out of their constant application. Cannot the comparative method be applied to the examination and presentation of many of these questions, to the obvious profit of those who attend these institutions?

Albert S. Bolles.

PERSONAL NAMES.

The law of personal names, though not of high importance in itself, is an interesting example of common-law development. Unhampered, as it has been for the most part, by direct legislation, it has expanded gradually to meet the exigencies of changed conditions, illustrating most typically the progress of the common law. There are, however, at present, certain possibilities, which show that, in some places, this law is theoretically unsatisfactory.

In England, the use of surnames, though sporadically appearing at an earlier time, was not found to be universally necessary until the early part of the fourteenth century. At that time, owing to the paucity of Christian names (probably an estimate of two hundred would cover them all), it became customary to add a name to that of baptism. These names were picked and applied at random -a man's physical, mental or moral characteristics, his occupation or his place of residence, even his real or fancied resemblance to an animal, supplied a myriad surnames which still exist. These were at first merely temporary, not always lasting as long as the lives of the persons so named, and were not transferred to descendants."

Gradually the son came to take the surname of his father, and the wife (when she took one), that of the husband. Since the matter was made the subject of but unimportant legislation, the custom developed slowly, and might of course be interrupted by the caprice of any person wishing to abandon his surname. By the time of Elizabeth, however, owing partly partly to increased commerce and communication, which, to avoid confusion, necessitated surnames, and partly to the regulation of Thomas Cromwell, in the

1. E. g. Strong, Wiley, Goodman, Archer, Kent, Wolf, etc.

2. In Camden's Remains, (1637) is spoken of one William Belward, Knt., whose grandsons (in agnate line), were surnamed Egerton, Overtoun, Gough (red), Kenclark (learned clerk), Goodman, Richardson, etc.

3. A statute of the fourth year of Edward IV., provided that every Irishman within the English pale should take an English surname, and enacted that this name should be that of some town, color, art, occupation or office. Non-compliance was attended with forfeiture of goods. The Statute of Additions (1 Hen. V. c. 8) required in a writ or indictment the name, calling degree, or title, and the town or hamlet in which the defendant or accused lived. These references are found in Re Snook, 2 Hilt. 566.

reign of Henry VIII, that a parish record be uniformly kept of births, marriages, and deaths occurring in each parish, the use of such names became fixed. But the law had always regarded the Christian name, with the sanction of baptism behind it, as all-important. Says Coke: "And regularly it is requisite . . . that speciall heed bee taken to the name of baptism for that a man cannot have two names of baptism as he may have divers surnames."" This rule caused some difficulty, especially in the drawing of indictments and has of course, long since lapsed.

In course of time it became customary to give a child one or more middle names, but for the historical reasons above given, the law has always regarded such a name as unimportant, treating the omission of it, or of course, of its initial, as of no legal effect." There is a direct conflict as to whether the middle name or initial, when given, must be correct, the more logical rule being that it need not. This is of course not true of the initial of a first name. The designations Jr. and Sr. are also not essential."

A curious example of the quibbles into which the common law sometimes falls was developed by the use of single letters as names. It was many times held that while a vowel, being a complete sound in itself, was sufficient to constitute a name, a consonant, representing only part of a compound sound, could not so act.10 This absurd distinction was exploded in the case of Reg. v. Dale (15 Jur. 657), by Lord Campbell, and has never since been revived. It was, apparently, once seriously contended for in

4. Coke Litt. § 3 (a).

5. See also Button v. Wrightman, Poph. 56. "The law is not so precise in the case of surnames, but for the Christian name, this ought always to be perfect."

6. In Loyd's Case, Noy 135, a process against Evanum alias Ievanum Loyd was declared void because "no man can have two Christian names." See also East Skidmore v. Vandstevan, Cro. Eliz. 56.

7. Roosevelt v. Gardinier, 2 Cow. 463; Bletch v. Johnson, 40 Ill. 116. But this is not so in Massachusetts. Terry v. Sisson, 125 Mass. 563; Parker v. Parker, 146 Mass. 320. Obviously the use of more than one middle name might cause confusion in that state.

8. King v. Clark, 7 Mo. 269; R. R. v. Pierce, 72 N. E. 604. Holding that the middle initial need not be correctly given even in a criminal prosecution; English v. State, 30 Tex. App. 30; People v. Lockwood, 6 Cal. 205; Franklin v. Talmadge, 5 Johns. 84; Coe. v. Durham, 128 Fed. 870.

9. State v. Cafiero, 112 La. 453; Headley v. Shaw, 39 Ill. 354. contra, State v. Vittum, 9 N. H. 522.

10. Kinnersley v. Knott, 7 C. B. 980. Lomax v. Landells, 6 C. B. 577.

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