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tation on an elevated railroad, depositing it in a box provided therefor, and going on the platform, becomes a passenger, entitled to treatment as such.

It is generally held, that one who enters a railroad station and purchases a ticket intending to board a passenger train soon to arrive is a passenger; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hollaway, 80 Pac. 31 (Kan.); Central Ry. and B'king Co. v. Perry, 58 Ga. 461; and it is also held that the contractual relation between passenger and carrier begins as soon as the passenger comes within the sphere of peril incident to street cars, where a car has been signalled and has stopped to take on passengers. Holzenkamp v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 2 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 157; O'Mara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 202. But the mere purchase of a ticket does not make one a passenger. The ticket must be bought with the intention of taking passage on a train scheduled to depart within a reasonable time. Fremont, Elkhorn and Mo. Valley Ry. Co. v. Hagblad, 101 N. W. 1033 (Neb.); Vandegrift v. West Jersey and Seashore Ry. Co., 60 Atl. 184 (N. J.) In Lake Street Elevated Ry. Co. v. Burgess, 200 Ill. 628, it was held that a party upon the platform of an elevated railroad station, with the knowledge of the company that she intended to take a train, was a passenger when approaching to board a train.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION of Laws-TERRITORIAL INEQUALITY. —PEOPLE ex rel. Armstrong v. Warden of City Prison of New York, 76 N. E. 11 (N. Y.).-Held, that a statute regulating the keeping of employment agencies in cities of the first and second class is not, because it applies only to cities of the specified classes, in violation of Const. U. S., Amend. 14, guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws.

It has been found hard to define satisfactorily the police power of a state It is held in the case of Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation which is limited by the territory within which it is to operate, but merely that all subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike, and in the much-quoted case of Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, it is said that a statute operating equally on all elevator owners in places having 130,000 population or more, though not applying on owners in places of less than 130,000 population, does not deprive the owners of the equal protection of the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where part of a state is thickly settled and another part has but few inhabitants it may be desirable to have different systems of judicature for the two portions and the Fourteenth Amendment could never have been intended to prevent this. Missouriv. Lewis, 101 U. S. 23. Mr. Justice Field, concurring in Butchers' Union Company v. Crescent City Company, 111 U. S 746, says that the common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions and without any legislative restrictions.

CRIMINAL LAW—OBJECTIONS to Indictment—Waiver.-Klawanski et al. V. PEOPLE, 75 N. E. 1028 (ILL. SUP.).—Held, that advantage can be taken upon writ of error of an indictment which charges no criminal offense notwithstanding a plea of guilty to it. Wilkin, Boggs and Hand, JJ., dissent.

In the case of Fletcher et al. v. The State, 7 Eng. 169 (Ark.) it was held that by a plea of guilty the defendant only confesses himself guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and if the indictment charges no

offense against the law none is confessed. Fatal defects in indictments may be raised for the first time on appeal. Pattee v. State, 109 Ind. 545; Cancerni v. People, 18 N. Y. 128. But where the defect is merely formal and curable by amendment it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Kelly, 99 Mich. 82. So an objection that an indictment charging two persons with a misdemeanor in running a horse race in the street of a town is insufficient, because it does not allege that defendants ran together, is too late, if taken for the first time on appeal. King v. State, 3 Tex. App. 7. But failure to demur to an indictment for burglary which charges that the defendants entered, etc., with intent to commit a felony, without stating what particular felony, does not waive the objection. People v. Nelson, 58 Cal. 104. And (as in case at hand) where defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted without moving to quash, or in arrest, or reserving any exception, it was held in Henderson v. State, 60 Ind. 296, that the indictment might be questioned in the first instance in the Appellate Court on assignment of error, and several courts hold that the sufficiency of an indictment may be questioned for the first time in the Supreme Court on appeal. O'Brien v. State, 63 Ind. 242; Hays v. State, 77 Ind. 450; State v. Caldwell, 112 N. C. 854.

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CONFRONT WITNESSES-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIon.-Cremeans v. CommonweaLTH, 52 S. E. 362 (Va.).—Held, that it is not error to force the accused into trial in the absence of his witnesses, when it appears to the court that the motive is a mere pretext for delay. Caldwall, J., dissenting.

Hooker v. Rogers, 6 D'Eon, 1 Bl. Rep. 510. People v. Vermilyea,

The tendency has been to support this proposition. Cowen 577; King v. Pearce, 40 Mo. 223; The King v. The rule is the same in criminal cases as in civil cases. 7 Cowen 383; The King v. D'Eon, supra. The motion must show due diligence to procure the testimony, and that there is a reasonable probability that it can be obtained; Robinson v. Glass, 94 Ind. 211; and that it can be procured in a reasonable time. Brown v. Moran, 65 How. Pr. 349. The applicant must know the witnesses' whereabouts, Carberry and Case v. Warrell, 68 Miss. 573. The Massachusetts' courts seem to hold that the witness must be within the jurisdiction of the court. Com. v. Millard, 1 Mass. T. R. 6.

DEAD BODIES-MUTILATION-ACTION BY SURVIVING HUSBAND.-JACKSON V. SAVAGE ET AL., 96 N. Y. SUPP. 366.-Held, that a husband has a right of action for the dissection of the body of his deceased wife without his permission or without the permission of his wife given during her lifetime.

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The question as to whether a husband or wife has a right of action for the mutilation of the remains of the deceased has been much discussed. It resolves itself into a question of property in a dead body. There was at common law no such right of property. Lord Coke is reported as saying: "Cadaver nullius ni bonis." Blackstone says,: "Though the heir has a property in the monument and escutcheons of his ancestor, he has none in his dead body or ashes." 2 Bl. Com. 249. Wharton says: Corpus humanum non recepit estimationem." In support of this view, Griffith v. Chorlotte C. & A. R. Co., 23 S. C. 25, held that an administrator of a deceased person had no right of action for the mutilation of the body of his intestate, However, to-day the great weight of authority is to the effect that there is such property, quasi-property, or interest in the dead body of a human being as to sustain a civil action for its wilful mutilation. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, held that a widow has a right of action for the unlawful mutilation of the remains

of her dead husband. This ruling seems to be more in consonance with our enlightened and humane views.

DEED DELIVERY-RIGHT OF RECALL.-NOBLE v. Tiptin et al., 76 N. E. 151 (ILL.).—Held, that where a grantor encloses a deed in an envelope and gives it to a custodian to be delivered after grantor's death unless recalled by him, there is no delivery of the deed, and it never becomes operative, although delivered by the custodian after the grantor's death.

In general, a deed delivered by the grantor to a third person with directions to have it handed over to the grantee immediately after his death is valid; Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich. 238; even though given to wife of grantor, and grantor expressed dissatisfaction with terms of same two days before his death. Squires v. Summers, 85 Ind. 252. But, if grantor does not part with control by act, word, or both, the subsequent delivery after his death is not valid. It was held in Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296, that where a deed is delivered to one in trust for the grantee to take effect at the grantor's death unless he shall otherwise direct during his lifetime, and he dies without giving any further directions, the deed, at the death of the grantor, takes effect as his deed from the first delivery, it being said that a deed of this character was in the nature of a testamentary disposition of real estate and was revocable without any express reservation of that power. Belden v. Carter, 4 Am.. Dec. 185. But the weight of authority is overwhelmingly to the effect that the grantor must loose control over the deed.

Divorce-Counsel FEES-ALLOWANCE TO WIFE.-Dean v. Dean, 96 N. Y. SUPP. 472. Plaintiff's wife had left him and having obtained a divorce valid in Ohio but void in New York, she married in Ohio. Under oath she denies charges of adultery and asks for counsel fees. Held, that the above facts are no bar to her right to counsel fees.

It is a well established rule that the court will make allowance to the wife for the prosecution of a divorce suit, whether the bill be filed by or against her. Amos v. Amos, 4 N. J. Eq. 171; Ex parte King, 27 Ala. 387; unless there is an undenied charge of adultery against her. Bissell v. Bissell, 3 How. Prac. 242. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the wife must not be wholly in the wrong. Strong v. Strong, 1 Abb. Prac. N. S. (N. Y.) 358; Miller v. Miller, 43 How. Prac. 125. So the case in hand presents an apparent contradiction to the principle in the case of Munson v. Munson, 60 Hun. (N. Y.) 189, where it was laid down upon good authority that a marriage in a foreign state where a valid divorce had been obtained, was ground for divorce on charge of adultery if in original domicile the divorce was void. In Blake v. Blake, 80 Ill. 523, it is shown that the allowance is largely within the discretion of the court. But if the wife cannot easily defray expenses the allowance must be made. Douglas v. Douglas, 13 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 291. So too, the pecuniary condition was made a test in Miller v. Miller, 1 Wkly. N. Cas. 415.

EVIDENCE-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY-CONCLUSIONS.-HAWLEY V. BOND, 105 N. W. 464 (S. D.).—In an action to recover property levied on, alleged to belong to plaintiff and not to the judgment debtor, plaintiff was asked who was the owner at the time of the levy, over an objection that the question called for the witnesses' opinion, and not for a fact. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to testify that the property was hers.

Ownership of personal property, as a rule, can be proved as a fact; Pickler v. Reese, 171 N. Y. 577; Rasco v. Jefferson, 38 So. 246 (Ala.); Steiner v. Tranum, 98 Ala. 315; and, if there is a real dispute as to the net effect of these facts, these may be brought out in detail on cross-examination; Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1960; but there is authority for saying that when the question of transfer is the direct issue in the case, then the best evidence must be produced. Simpson v. Smith, 27 Kans. 565; Street v. Nelson, 67 Ala. 504. Still other authorities hold that the question of ownership is the opinion of a witness as to a mere conclusion of law and hence is inadmissable. Dunlap v. Hearn, 37 Miss. 471; Richmond v. Brewster, 2 N. Y. Supp. 400; Babe v. Baker, 44 Ill. App. 578.

LIBEL. NICHOLS V. DAILY REPORTER CO. 83 PAC. 573. (Utah).

Defendant printed and distributed cards on one side of which were the words "Vote for honest Jake Bosch for delegate," and on the other side "Explanatory-Mr. C. A. Nichols owes the Daily Reporter Co. a balance of $34.25 for printing done in 1894. Draw your own conclusions and vote for Mr. Nichols if you think he is unable to pay." Plaintiff was candidate for the office of delegate in a typographical union. Held, not libelous per se. Bartch, C. J. dissents. It would be otherwise if plaintiff were engaged in an occupation where credit was necessary.

LICENCES-MERCHANTS - PERSONS INCluded.-StatE EX REL. TOWN OF SIGOURNEY V. NELSON, 105 N. W. 327. (Iowa).-Code Sec. 700 gives to cities and towns power to define by ordinance who shall be considered transient merchants. Held, that this can be construed as a grant of power to declare one engaged simply in soliciting orders or making delivery of goods on behalf of another as a transient merchant, when, by universal acceptance of the business world he is not such.

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In the case of Seaton Mays v. The City of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 272, it was held that it is not part of the franchises of municipal corporations to change the meaning of English words; that where, under charter the council was prohibited from assessing charge on persons bringing provisions to the markets in wagons, etc., but allowing them to prevent huckstering and forestalling, an ordinance defining hucksters as 'any person, not a farmer or butcher, who shall sell, etc., any commodity not of his own produce and manufacture" and requiring such person to take out licence, is void. The city council has no power under the city charter, to enact by ordinance, that soliciting orders for future delivery of goods shall be deemed and taken to be peddling, within the meaning of the code, such soliciting not being "peddling" within the proper meaning of the word. City of Davenport v. Rice, 75 Ia. 74. The leading idea of a hawker or peddler is that of an itinerant or traveling trader, who carries goods about in order to sell them and who actually does sell them to purchasers, in contradistinction to a trader who has goods for sale, and sells them, in a fixed place of business. Com. v. Ober, 12 Cush. 495. A peddler fully embraces persons engaged in going through the city from house to house and selling milk to different persons. City of Chicago v. Bar. tee, 100 Ill. 61. Taking orders for goods to be manufactured is not peddlingTown of Spencer v. Whiting, 68 Iowa 678. An ordinance requiring transient merchants to pay a licence is discriminating in favor of resident merchant, and in conflict with Art. 1. Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the United States and void. The Town of Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa 38; The City of Marshalltown v. Blum, 58 Iowa 184.

MARRIAGE-COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE.-HEYMANN V. HEYMANN, 75 N. E. 1079 (ILL. SUP.).-Held, that it is sufficient to constitute a common law marriage if what is done and said evidences an intention by the parties to assume the marriage status, and the parties thereupon enter into the relation of husband and wife.

To make a valid contract of marriage it is essential that "the parties (1) were at the time of making it, willing to contract, (2) able to contract, and (3) mutually did contract in the proper forms and solemnities required by law." I Bl. Com. 439. By common law innumerable cases might be cited to show that no celebration is necessary. Dumarsesly v. Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh (Ky.) 368. Nor by civil law. Hallet v. Collins, 10 How. (U. S.) 174. But in England, Mass., Md., and N. C., it has been held that celebration is necessary. The Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. & F. 534; Com. v. Munson, 127 Mass. 459: Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361; State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 177; while the Supreme Court of the United States and most other states have held otherwise. Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76. Even where statutory provisions exist regulating the form and celebration of marriage, it is commonly held that a marriage valid at common law, even though not solemnized in conformity with the requirements of statutes, will be held valid, unless statute positively declares it void. Hargraves v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211; Courtright v. Courtright, (Com. Pl.) 11 Ohio Dec. 412. Where parties agree to take each other as husband and wife and do from then on live professedly in that relation, this constitutes a valid marriage. Newton v. Southworth, 7 N. Y. St. Rep. 130; Overseers v. Overseers, 2 Vt. 151. But some public recognition of it, such as living together as man and wife, is essential as evidence of its existence. State v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490. Sexual intercourse after agreement to marry is not of itself sufficient to consummate marriage. Sharon v. Sharon, 72 Cal. 633.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT NOT TAX.— ARNOLD ET AL. v. MAYOR, etc., of Knoxville. 90 S. W. 469. (TENN.).-Held, assessments for benefits of improvement are not within a constitutional provision as to uniform taxation, such assessment not being regarded a tax. Nail and McAlister, JJ., dissent on the ground that, although authority in other states holds with the majority in this decision, nevertheless it is stare decisis to hold, in Tennessee, that a special assessment is a tax within the constitutional provision.

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-COMBINATION OF PERSONAL AND GEO. GRAPHICAL NAMES.-W. R. LYNN SHOE Co. v. AUBURN-LYNN SHOE Co., 62 ATL. 499 (ME.).—-In the plaintiff's trademark geographical and personal names were both combined in an original device bearing the words, "Auburn-Lynn Shoes, Auburn, Maine." Held, that this arbitrary composite name of the plaintiff's product, with the location of the manufactory expressly added, undoubtedly constituted an impersonal trademark.

The unusual combination of geographical and personal names makes this case noteworthy and unique. As a general rule trade marks cannot consist of geographical names; Evans v. Von Laer, 32 Fed. 153; because their nature is such that they cannot point to the personal origin or ownership of the articles of trade to which they may be applied. Castner v. Coffman, 87 Fed. 457. But there is an exception where the adoption by the defendant is not so much to indicate the place of manufacture as to intrench upon the previous use and

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