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more guards or other methods of security; and, therefore he ought, in reason and justice, to have a greater reward."

In the case before us four of the judges concurred in the rendition of the judgment against the company. Three of the judges dissented. The court held that the provisions of the passage ticket did not apply to luggage intended to be taken by the passenger to her stateroom for use during the voyage, but only to such as might be delivered to the defendant to remain in its possession until the termination of the voyage. As to baggage of a passenger delivered to its exclusive possession, the carrier assumes the full liability of a common carrier and is an insurer. Powell v. Myers, 26 Wend, 591. Where baggage remains partly in custody of the passenger the rule is different. It has been held that a company is not liable for the theft of an overcoat taken from a seat in a car, except in case of negligence. Carpenter v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 124 N. Y. 53. When property is stolen from the stateroom in which the passenger deposits his baggage for his use during the voyage the company is liable. Adams v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 150 N. Y. 163. The court further decided that the language of the ticket, which is to be construed against the carrier, supports the view that it was not intended to include baggage taken by the passenger into his cabin for use during the voyage. It provided that if the value of the passenger's effects exceeded $100, freight at a certain rate should be paid thereon. Certainly it could not have been expected that the personal effects of the passenger taken into his cabin or stateroom, the use of which changed from day to day, or, during the same day, should be paid for as freight.

A strong dissenting opinion was written. The contentions of the minority of the court were as follows: The contract was comprehensive enough to include all kinds of property, and had there been any intention to make any exceptions it would have so stated. It made no difference whether the custody was for the whole of the voyage or part. The moment the defendant became responsible for them at all, the liability, necessarily was measured by the value theretofore agreed upon, if not then otherwise declared. It is just to hold the shipper to his agreement, fairly made, as to the value, even where loss or injury has occurred through the negligence of the carrier. The effect of the agreement is to cheapen the freight and secure the carriage; and the effect of disregarding the agreement, after a loss, is to expose the carrier to a greater risk than the parties intended he should assume. Hart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331.

RECENT CASES.

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BANKS AND BANKING-CHecks — PaymeNT AFTER NOTICE NOT TO PAY. PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST Co. V. LACEY, 40 So. 346 (Ala.) — Held, that it is no defense to an action by a depositor against a bank that it paid his check; payment having been after notice from him not to pay it. The drawer of a bank check may, by notice to bank before its presentation for payment or acceptance, revoke the check. Tramell v. Farmers' Nat'l Bank, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 900. The check being considered merely an order on the bank for which the bank is not liable. Schneider v. Irving Bank, 30 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 190. But it is too late to revoke after bank has received the check, given credit to the holder, and charged up the check to the drawer, such acts being deemed payment. Albers v. Com. Bank, 85 Mo. 173. When a bank has paid a check after notice not to do so, it must refund the amount so paid. Pub. Grain & Stock Exch. v. Kune, 20 Ill. App. 137. But the bank is bound to pay to holder the amount of a check sent to it by him which it has in its possession when notified not to pay by the drawer. Freund v. Imp. & Trad. Nat'l Bank, 12 Hun. 537. Death of the drawer will act as a revocation of authority of bank to pay the amount of the check if death occurs prior to acceptance by the drawee. Nat'l Com. Bank, v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168; Simmons v. Cin. Sav. Soc., 5 Ohio Dec. 527. But where a good consideration was given for a check, death does not relieve the drawee from an obligation to pay upon presentment. Lewis v. Int. Bank, 13 Mo. App. 202.

CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS Care REQUIRED, SPOONER V. OLD COLONY ST. RY. Co., 76 N. E. 660 (Mass.) -Held, that on becoming a passenger on a Street Railway, it became defendant company's duty to provide for his benefit proper facilities for transportation, including proper servants, and to carry him safely over his route to his destinaton.

Carriers of passengers are liable only for negligence, McClenagan v. Brock, 5 Rich Law 17 (So. Co.), and are liable for even the slightest negligence, Baltimore & O. R. Co., v. Wightman, 26 Am. Rep. 384. A carrier of passengers is not liable for casualties against which it was unable to guard by the utmost prudence and care, Ken. Cent. R. Co., v. Thomas, 79 Ky. 160. Street railways are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence. Holly v. Atlanta Street R. R., 34 Am. Rep. 97. Carriers of passengers can not relieve themselves from the obligation to observe ordinary care by any contract whatsoever. Cooley on Torts p. 826. Prima facie, where a passenger, being carried on a train, is injured without fault of his own, there is a legal presumption of negligence, casting upon the carrier the onus of disproving it. Laing v. Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479. Must supply safe vehicle, Spear v. Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co., 5 Pa. co. ct. R. 393. The reasons for this line of decisions seems well summed up in the words of Cooley on Torts, p. 795: 'Shall not he who has entrusted his person and life to the control of the company, to be carried by them in vehicles of their own selection and

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management, rely upon the injury itself as entitling him to redress, and leave to the defense the task of exculpatory evidence?

CARRIERS-PASSENGER ELEvators — DeGREE OF CARE REQUIRED-EDWARDS V. MANUFACTURERS' BUILDING CO., 61 COL. 446 (R. I.). Held, that a landlord who maintains an elevator in his private building for the use of tenants and their employees and customers, is not a common carrier, nor bound to use the same degree of care as that imposed on a common carrier, but is bound to exercise only reasonable care for the safety of those who enter upon his premises and use the elevator.

In the above case the Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejects the rule adopted in the majority of the states and which imposes upon a landlord maintaining an elevator in his private building the same degree of care in running the same as that required of a common carrier of passengers, namely, the highest possible degree of care. The Court bases its opinion on the ground that a landlord does not occupy the same relation to the public as that occupied by a common carrier. The landlord is not the servant of the public. His duties are confined to tenants and their customers. The rule applied in the case of a common carrier is based on the relation of such carrier is based on the relation of such carrier to the public and not on the danger of the journey. Therefore, since the landlord does not stand in the same relation to the public the reason for the application of the rule fails. The Rhode Island Court follows the rule of New York laid down in Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 197.

CONTRACTS - CONSTRUCTION. ST. LOUIS DRESSED BEEF AND PROVISION Co. v. MARYLAND Casualty Co. 26 SP. CT. 400. This case came up before the Circuit Court of Appeals on Review and was referred by that court to the Supreme Court of the United States, Plaintiff was assured by defendant in a general accident policy against the claims of persons injured through the negligence of plaintiff's servants while engaged in its business. Paragraph 7 of the policy read:-" The assured shall not settle any claim, except at his own cost, nor incur any expense, nor interfere in any negotiation for settlement or in any legal proceeding, without the consent of the company previously given in writing . . . And paragraph 8:-" No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under this policy unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue." After the issuing of the policy one Mrs. H. was injured by a horse and vehicle driven by a servant of plaintiff. Damage suits were brought by the injured woman and also by her husband. Plaintiff notified defendant of the institution of the suits, but defendant, claiming that the driver was not a servant of the plaintiff, refused to defend and claimed the terms of the policy as a justification. As a matter of fact, the driver was a servant of plaintiff. Plaintiff at once employed counsel and investigated the injury done to the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. H., and, concluding that they had a very good case, settled out of court for a sum found to be reasonable under the circumstances. Suit is now brought against defendant to recover the amount paid and counsel fees. Defendant rests on the terms of the policy denying liability and especially sets up the clause in paragraph 7 as to the consent of the as

surer in writing, and that in paragraph 8 as to settlement "without a judgment after trial of the issue."

Held, that plaintiff may recover amount paid in settlement and also the attorney's fees which were found to be reasonable. The principle that one who has a claim against another is bound to use due care and not allow expense to pile up unnecessarily where it might be avoided by ordinary foresight does not seem to have been considered by the court in deciding the

case.

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CORPORATIONS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY STOCKHOLDERS - NATIONAL BANK-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. RANKIN V. BARTON, 26 SP. CT. 29. — Held, that a state statute of limitations does not begin to run against the right to enforce the individual liability of stockholders in a national bank, until the amount of such liability has been ascertained by the Comptroller of the Currency.

If the United States were compelled to pay the circulating notes of a national bank, on its contract of guarantee, it would have a paramount lien on the assets of the bank for reimbursement. Therefore, since the bank is an instrumentality of the United States, the duty of administering the assets of the bank is vested in an officer of the United States, namely, the Comptroller of the Currency. On his order only can the individual liability of a stockholder be enforced. It is, therefore, necessary for the Comptroller of the Currency to determine the amount of the liability of the stockholder before a right of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run.

V.

CRIMINAL LAW-ARSON EVIDENCE-PREVIOUS FIRES. - PEOPLE BROWN, 96 N. Y. SUPP. 957. Held, that in a prosecution for arson, alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, admissions made by defendant to an insurance adjuster that he had had fires in other buildings than the one in question were inadmissable. Spring, J., dissenting.

Upon the trial of a prisoner for setting fire to a building with intent to defraud the insurers, evidence showing that up to five years previously several buildings in which the prisoner was interested and which were insured, were burnt, is irrelevant. State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 261. In a charge of bribery evidence of previous attempts on the part of the defendant to commit bribery is not admissable, though it might show, in a moral sense, that he would be likely to commit the crime with which he is charged. People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427. The rule is that another act of fraud is admissable to prove fraud charged only where there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common purpose. Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42. But an assured having lost several other vessels evidence of such loss was admissable, as on a question of intent, any other transactions from which any inference respecting the quo animo may be drawn are admissable, though it has sometimes been thought that such other transactions should be cotemporaneous, or nearly so, but that is not essential. Howe v. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21. Where a defendant is charged with firing a house to defraud the insurers, it is admissable for the prosecution to prove that on prior occasions houses occupied by the defendant had been burned, though, as a general rule, evidence of distinct antecedent acts or transactions

is to be rejected as inadmissable against a person on trial for a particular offense. Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 656.

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CRIMINAL LAW-CONDUCT OF TRIAL - REMARKS OF JUDGE — O'SHEA V. PEOPLE, 75 N. E. 981 (ILL.). Held, in homicide, where the sole defense is insanity and the evidence is conflicting and the question close, the jury should be given no intimation by the trial judge as to the merits of the defense.

As a general rule, trial judges are inhibited by statute from discussing or commenting upon evidence. Rodrignez v. State, 5 S. W. 255; Wessels v. Beeman, 87 Mich. 481. Any remark tending to show the court's opinion has been held error, as a remark by trial judge "has it not already been shown that conspiracy existed to admit the evidence;" this being held to be a violation of a statute forbidding the judge making any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the case. Crook v. State, 11 S. W. 444; Kirk v, State, 32 S. W. 1045. It was held error for a court in the trial of a criminal case to make a remark to, or in the presence of, the jury, in reference to matter of fact, which might in any degree influence them in their verdict. State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54; State v. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. 1323. But it is said that the expression of the opinion of the judge, on the weight of testimony, is not matter of error in law. Gale v. Spooner, 11 Vt. 152. If the case is in the least doubtful upon the evidence it might be error for the judge to express an opinion upon the evidence, but sometimes it might be the duty of the judge to express his opinion upon the evidence. Johnston v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 54. It seems that in the South and West a restriction is put upon the court by statutes, while in the East and Federal Courts the matter is one within the discretion of the court to a great extent. DAMAGES PERSONAL INJURIES-PLEADINGS. HYNDS BROOKLYN HEIGHTS RY. Co., 97 N. Y. SUPP. 705. Held, that a complaint for personal injuries, alleging that plaintiff was struck in the abdomen and bruised, blackened, and injured there, and internally, authorizes evidence of eruptions that came out on the abdomen, though they were caused by the abdominal pains. Hirschberg, P. J., and Hooker, J., dissenting.

V.

General advertisements of personal injury are sufficient in the absence of exception, Graham v. J. H. Banland Co., 89 N. Y. SUPP. 595; Fuchs v. St. Louis Trans. Co., 111 Mo. App. 324, and under an averment of a particular injury, all natural effects of that injury may be shown. Comstock v. Georgetown Twp. 100 N. W. 788 (Mich.); Nichols v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 28 Utah 319. But where particular injuries are described there can be no recovery for others not described. Brown v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 94 N. Y. Supp. 190; Union Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Pac. 152 (Kans.). Such injuries as do not necessarily result from the defendant's wrongful act, but flow from it as a natural and proximate consequence must be specially alleged in order that the defendant may have notice thereof and be prepared to meet the same upon the trial. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 254; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574; Gumb v. Railway Co., 114 N. Y. 411. Where the complaint alleges the nature and permanent character of the injuries, the permanent loss and damage to plaintiff by reason of his impaired capacity, because of the injuries, for attending to business, may be given in evidence and considered by the jury in fixing the amount of damages without being specially pleaded. Wade v. Leroy, 61 U. S. 44; Tyson v. Booth, 100 Mass 266,

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