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In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Vann contended that such a statute is a valid exercise of the police power in that it was passed to prevent fraud and is similar to acts passed in relation to chattel mortgages and conditional sales, and being uniform in its effect upon all persons to whom it applies is not invalid because it applies to a limited number. And in the first case decided on this subject, the court held that such an act was not in restraint of trade, as the act in question did not prevent the sale of stocks of goods in bulk, but merely restricts the application of the proceeds when the stocks are sold in that manner. McDaniels v. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549.

On the other hand, in Miller v. Crawford, 20 Ohio, St. 207, such a statute was declared unconstitutional because it place an unwarrantable restriction upon the rights of the individual to acquire and possess property, and because it discriminated in favor of a limited class of creditors. It is to be noticed, however, that this statute went further than the others in that it made the violation of its provisions a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment.

In considering a similar statute, which exempted from its operation, however, sales by executors, public officers, etc., the court in Squires & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18 remarked, "The object of this statute is like that of our numerous statutory provisions, which authorizes attachments on mesne process and require nothing unreasonable." But under such circumstances, the property in most cases ought not to be sold in bulk without first giving creditors an opportunity to consider what ought to be done with it. And the Connecticut court, in upholding such a statute, asserted that the legislature undoubtedly has power to adopt reasonable measures to prevent fraud in the sale of merchandise and such an act is clearly within that power. Walp v. Moor, 76 Conn. 515. And even admitting that such a law applies alone to merchants and not to other persons, such as farmers, traders, etc., it is a valid exercise of police power because it prevents fraudulent practices and secures to creditors a just participation in the distribution of the assets of such merchants. Neas v. Borches, 109 Tenn. 398. But Justice Wilkes, in his dissenting opinion in that case remarked that "to take from property its chief element of value, and to deny to the citizen the right to use and transfer it in any proper and legitimate manner, is as much depriving him of his property as if the property itself were taken."

In Block v. Swartz, 27 Utah 387, as in the Ohio case, where noncompliance with the statutory provisions was made a crime, such a statute was held unconstitutional, since it did not apply to sales of the same character by merchants not owing debts, but applied to, and renders criminal, similar sales by merchants who are debtors. But an act which made such sales prima facie and not conclusive evidence of fraud was adjudged valid, the constitutional question not even having been raised by the highest courts in Maryland and Wisconsin. Hart v. Roney, 93 Md. 432; Fisher v. Hermann, 118 Wis. 424.

Thus though within the past two years twenty states have passed such statutes, in the majority of which they were upheld, yet the law on the subject is by no means settled and until the Supreme Court of the United States passes upon it, the question whether such acts transcend the proper sphere of the police power will continue to form the subject of conflicting decisions.

We wish to call attention to an error in the November issue, where the article entitled, "International Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate," was attributed to James T. Barrett, instead of James F. Barnett, as it should have been.

RECENT CASES.

BASTARDY-EVIDENCE-BASTARD CHILD — ResemblanCE. — Shailer v. Bullock, 61 Atl. 65 (CONN.).—Held, that in a prosecution for bastardy, the alleged bastard child, ten months of age, was admissible in evidence to show a resemblance of features between it and defendant, alleged to have been its father.

Admissibility of child as evidence in such proceedings recognized in England without question. Douglas Case, 2 Harqt. Collect Jurid. 402. In United States weight of authority supports English ruling. Gilmantan v. Haw. 38 N. H. 108; Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378; State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89. Contra: Clark v. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454; Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wise 84. Main objection in such cases appears to be that child was too young to bear reliable resemblance. Some states admit child in evidence for such purpose only when it has attained some degree of maturity. Child two years and one month old admitted in State v, Smith, 54 Iowa, 104, but in same state child three months old not admitted. State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa 331. Rule is well established that a child is admissible as evidence to show face characteristics. Danford v. Guy, 23 Ark. 50; Bryan v. Walton, 20 Ga. 480; Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175. Where fact of resemblance has been regarded by the court as having probative value, the production of the child for the better apprehension of the resemblance has been treated as proper. Wigmore on Evidence, page 1349.

CARRIERS-EJECTION OP Passenger-PuNITIVE DAMAGES.-RICHARDSON V. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. R., 51 S. E. 261. (S.. C.). -Where a passenger buys & ticket to a station which the ticket agent tells him is on the main line, and, on changing cars is shown by a person in uniform a train for his destination, but after it starts is told by the conductor that it is a through train and will not stop, and is put off with only what force is necessary, on refusal to pay the additional fare to the next stopping point, and is again received on payment and carried to the station beyond-Held, he is entitled to damages. Woods. J. Dissenting. Where a failure to have a proper ticket is the fault of the ticket agent passenger is under no duty to pay additional fare and thus avoid trouble. Head v. Geo. Pac. Ry., 79 Ga, 358; Murdock v. B. & A. R. R., 137 Mass. 293; L. & N. R. R. v. Breckenridge, 99¡Ky. 1. That he is obliged to pay the additional fare. Penn R. R. Co. v. Lenhart, 120 Fed. 61 (Ill.); Sprenger v. Tacoma R. Co., 15 Wash. 660; Peabody v. O. R. & N. Co., 21 Or. 121. If passenger, under such circumstances, leaves the train he has the right to sue. but if he chooses to go on after ejection he cannot recover. Lake Shore & M. C. Ry. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277. Even if misinformed by ticket agent, if conductor correctly informs him before the train starts he would have no ground for action. I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Hassell, 62 Tex, 256. It is the duty of passengers to inquire of trainmen and of trainmen to warn passengers not to board or remain on the wrong train, Bæhm v. D. S. S. & Atl. Ry., 91 Wis. 592. In such a suit evidence must be admitted showing the passenger's good faith in riding according to the information given by the ticket agent.

Van Kirk v. Penn. Ry. Co., 76 Pa. St. 66. Conductor may rely on ticket and not be personally liable for ejection of passenger if only reasonable and necessary force is used. Ill. Cent. v. Jackson, 79 S. W. 1187 (Ky.). Passenger has the right to be carried according to the custom of the road, but cannot insist upon being carried otherwise. Beauchamp v. I. & G. Ry. Co., 56 Tex. 239.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARRIED WOMAN'S CONTRACT-LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS-GARRIGUE ET AL, v. Keller, 74 N. E. (IND.). 523.-Held, that a promissory note drawn and delivered in the state of a married woman's domicile and to be performed in another state is binding upon her as surety in the state where it is to be performed, although she would have been without capacity to make such a contract in that state.

211.

It is the established rule that a contract void by the Lex Loci Contractus is void in the state of its performance. Hager v, National German American Bank, 105 Ga. 116; Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538. But where as in this case capacity is given by the Lex Loci Contractus and denied by the Lex Solutioniis some cases hold the other way. United States v. Garling House, 4 Ben. 194; Phænix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Simons. 52 Mo. app. 385; Voigt v. Brown, 42 Hun 394; Polson v. Stewart,167 Mass. When the Lex Loci Contractus and the Lex Solutionis do not conflict the Lex Loci Contractus will prevail against the Lex Domicilii. First National Bank v. Mitchell, 92 Fed. 565; Bowles & v. Field, 78 Fed. 642. And even where the married woman does not leave the place of her domicile but contracts in another state through an agent or by mail the Lex Loci Contractus will prevail against the Lex domicilii. First National Bank v. Freeman, Supra; Bell v. Packard, 69 Me. 105; Millikin v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374. But see contra. Freeman's Appeal, 68 Conn. 533. Parties may stipulate in regard to certain matters as to what law shall govern. Depau v. Humphreys, 20 Martin R. 1., but see Van Schaike v. Edwards, 2 Johns. Cas. 355.

Constitutional Law-Chinese Exclusion-Claim of Citizenship.— United States v. Tu Toy,25 Sp. Ct. 644.—Held, that the decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor affirming the denial by immigration officers of the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter the United States is conclusive on the Federal courts under the act of August 18, 1894.

This case, analogous to two earlier decisions must be considered good law. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U, S. 649; Chın Bak Kan v. U. S., 185 U. S. 193. But see dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer and also United States v. Gee Mun Sang, 93 Fed. 365. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, does not decide the question. Where citizenship is not claimed the secretary's decision is final in all cases. See authorities cited and In re Lee Gee Ling, 85 Fed, 635. Congress may prescribe rules of evidence. United States v. Williams, 83 Fed. 997; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698. Congress is subject to constitutional provisions against unreasonable seizures. United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832. Decision where favorable to the right of entry is not conclusive on the Federal courts. In re Ki Sing, 30 C. C. A. 451; In re Li Foon, 80 Fed. 881.

CONSTITUTIONAL Law—Interstate Commerce.-State v. Delameter, 104 N. W. 537 (S. D.).—Held, that the interstate commerce clause of the Fed

eral Constitution is not contravened by sections of a state code making it an offense for a travelling salesman to take orders for intoxicating liquors without a license. Haney, J., dissenting.

A license tax for negotiating the sale in one state of goods in another is, in effect, a tax on goods sold and the state cannot levy a tax on goods without its jurisdiction. Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed, 470; Brown v. Hanston, 114 U. S. 622. But where the one negotiating the sales has the goods with him for delivering such goods may be taxed, if no discrimination is made against them as the property of residents of other states. Howe Mach. Co. v. Gage, 100 U, S. 676; Singer Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121. By virtue of its power to regulate interstate commerce Congress may authorize a person to import and sell intoxicating liquors in "the original package”; but here the power of Congress ceases and the power of the state begins. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 422; Re Beine,42 Fed. 546. In such a case only the importer may sell under the act. License Cases, 46 U. S. 504; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 69 Me. 524. By the "Wilson Act," 26 Stat. at L. 313, the sale of intoxicating liquors after entering the territorial limits of the state is left to state legislation.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE STATUTES-Construction.-CLARK V. Nash, 25 Sp. Cr. 676.—Held, that the construction put upon a state statute by the state court is binding upon the U. S. Supreme Court. Harlan and Brewer, JJ. dissenting.

On questions of a general commercial nature the courts of the United States will not follow the state decisions. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U. S. 343. But it is otherwise on a question of a purely local nature such as real estate law. Clark v. Graham, 19 U. S. 557. Or the construction of state statutes, especially when the statute has become a rule of property in that state. R. Co. v. Pa., 98 U. S. 359. Where, however, the rights of the parties have arisen before the state court has construed the statute the Supreme Court will follow its own views. Carrol Co. Smith, 111 U. S. 556. Or where such decisions have not been uniform. Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U. S. 680. Also, in determining whether a state statute is in violation of a provision of the Federal Constitution the Supreme Court will follow its own judgment even if opposed to prior decisions of the state court. R. Co. v. Palmer, 109 U. S. 244; Yich Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. The above case not coming under any of these exceptions was undoubtedly in accordance with prior decisions.

CORPORATIONS-ACCOMMODATION NOTES-ULTRA VIRES-ESTOPPEL.--PerKINS V. TIMES REALITY CO., 61 ATL. 167 (N. J.).—Held, a corporation can not be heard to plead that accommodation notes, given with the consent of the stockholders, were ultra vires.

Fifty years ago the courts would have summarily declared it to be illegal for a business corporation to become an accommodation indorser on commercial paper but to-day it will be bound on such paper in the hands of a bona fide holder without notice and before maturity. Marshall Corporations 287; Wright v. Pipe Co., 101 Pa, 204; National Park Bank v. German Mutual Warehousing & Security Co., 116 N. Y. 281. The old doctrine has been further modified, according to the weight of authority, and it seems that a corporation, will be estopped from pleading ultra vires to accommodation paper, irrespective of whether the holder is bona fide or not, provided all the stockholders have assented and no creditors object. Murphy v. Arkansas and

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